1844. บ. The LEATHER SELLERS Company. On the other hand, the officer and another witness stated, that he arrested J. T. in Bagnigge Wells Road, The ATTORNEY- when J. T. stated, that he had a cause at Westminster, GENERAL and was then on his way to attend it, but he did not name the Court in which such cause was to be heard, nor did he shew any papers confirmatory of this statement; that he on the contrary, and in the same breath, stated, that he had an appointment at Judges' chambers, and after that another appointment in Lincoln's Inn Fields. That when he, the officer, arrested J. T. in the Bagnigge Wells Road, he was walking towards Coppice Row, Clerkenwell, which is not the direction in which the Deponents, if they resided in Wharton Street, Pentonville, would have proceeded to Westminster, as the nearest and most direct way to such last-mentioned place. Mr. C. P. Cooper now moved that J. T. might be discharged out of custody, on the ground that he was privileged from arrest, while proceeding to attend to his professional duties in this Court. Mr. John Baily, contrà, contended that the party was not entitled to his discharge; that he had deviated from the direct road to the Court, and was, in fact, proceeding to other places before coming to Westminster. The MASTER of the ROLLS. The only question is, whether Mr. J. T. is entitled to his protection from arrest. No doubt a solicitor, who is proceeding to Court to attend to his professional business there pending, is privileged from arrest; and the question always is, whether, at the time of the arrest, he was bonâ fide pro ceeding ceeding in a direct line to or from the Court. The GENERAL he states positively, that he was proceeding direct from his residence towards Westminster Hall, for the express ATTORNEYpurpose of attending the hearing of two petitions in the paper, and he is corroborated in this by another person, who states other collateral circumstances. I think this would clearly be sufficient to entitle him to his privilege; but a doubt is thrown on the matter, by his not having given a distinct account to the officer of where he was proceeding: it is, however, very possible that he might have been flurried at the time, and that he might have intended to go to the several places, first to the Court, and afterwards to the others; - this would not be quite inconsistent with what he stated. With regard to his proceeding in a direct line, the officer says that he would not have proceeded in this direction, as the nearest and most direct way to Westminster; but he might be better acquainted with the way, and might have known a nearer road; and he has not stated that this was not the way by which persons ordinarily go from Wharton Street to Westminster. I think that, on the affidavits before me, this party is entitled to his discharge. (a) (a) See Ex parte Ledwich, 8 Ves. 598.; Gascoygne's Case, 14 Ves. 183.; Castle's Case, 16 Ves. 412.; Ex parte Byne, 1 Ves. & บ. The LEATHER SELLERS Company. 1844. Feb. 8. A motion to THE MARQUIS OF HERTFORD v. SUISSE. dismiss being THE bill in this cause was filed on the 12th of July made, the Vice-Chancellor ordered it to stand over till the Lord Chancellor had decided on appeal a motion relating to the subject. After the Lord Chancellor's decision, the Plaintiff, suppressing what had taken place before the ViceChancellor, obtained, at the Rolls, an order of course to amend. It was held irregular, and dis charged with costs. 1842, against Suisse and other Defendants. The answer of Suisse was filed on the 17th of November 1842. On the 8th of May 1843, Suisse moved, before the Vice-Chancellor of England, to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution, but an appeal motion being then pending before the Lord Chancellor, which related to the matters of the cause, the Vice-Chancellor of England ordered the application to dismiss to stand over, until the Lord Chancellor had given judgment on the motion. On the 18th of November 1843, the Lord Chancellor gave judgment (a), and on the 25th of January 1844, the Plaintiff, upon petition of course, obtained at the Rolls an order to amend his bill. The Plaintiff, in his petition, made no mention of the pendency of the motion to dismiss, or of what had taken place before the ViceChancellor of England on that motion. Mr. Roupell and Mr. De Gex now moved to discharge the order to amend. They argued, that it was irregular, first, on the merits (which it is unnecessary to state, as the judgment was founded on the irregularity); secondly, because it had been obtained while the motion to dismiss was pending, and by a suppression of those material circumstances which had occurred before the Vice-Chancellor. Mr. (a) 1 Phillips, 207. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Schomberg, contrà, argued that the order was regular on the merits, that there was no suppression of any facts which were material; and that an order to amend was regular, if obtained before judgment given on the motion to dismiss. The MASTER of the ROLLS was of opinion that the order was irregular, having been irregularly obtained, as of course, upon a suppression of material facts. (a) He said that he could not determine the merits, as the cause was attached to the other branch of the Court. He discharged the order with costs. (b) (a) See 6th Order of 9th May 1859, Ordines Can. 137. (b) See Robinson v. Milner, 5 Beav. 49.; Hooper v. Paver, 1844. The Marquis of HERTFORD V. SUISSE. A BOWMAN v. BELL. TESTATOR devised his estate to trustees, who contracted to sell the property. This suit being afterwards instituted, the heir disputed the will. An issue devisavit vel non was directed, the accounts of the personal estate were ordered to be taken, and further directions were reserved. The jury found in favour of the will. The trustees, before the case had been brought on upon the equity reserved, presented a petition for a reference to the par *1845. Feb. 10. On an issue devisavit vel non, the jury found in favour of the will, but before the cause had been heard on the equity reserved, the devisees in for a refer trust applied ence, to inquire whether a contract entered into by them was beneficial. Mr. Kindersley, Mr. Purvis, and Mr. Shee, for different Held, that the application 1845. BOWMAN v. BELL. The MASTER of the ROLLS thought the application premature, and that this petition could not be heard till the case had been disposed of on the equity reserved. He said that the issue having been directed merely to inform the conscience of the Court, the validity of the will had not yet been finally established so as to enable the Court at present to act upon it. 1844. Feb. 24. This Court has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law in cases of fraud, but there strues as frau- of law would not notice. Upon an injunction to restrain an action at law, on the ground both of legal and equitable fraud, the court, admitting its THIS CLARKE v. MANNING. HIS was a motion for an injunction to restrain proceedings at law, and was founded on the merits confessed by the Defendant's answer. It appeared that in 1842 Roe and Blachford carried on business in the Isle of Wight as bankers, and that they had in their hands monies, to a considerable amount, belonging jointly to the Defendant Manning and others, who were their customers. A joint stock bank being about to be formed, it was agreed that the business of Roe and Blachford should cease, that the banking company should be carried on upon the same premises, and that Roe and Blachford should become two of the managing directors of the banking company. The company accordingly commenced business on the 12th of May 1842. Manning, some time afterwards, jurisdiction to determine the opened an account with the new banking company, and legal fraud, permitted the Blachford, action to proceed, in order to determine the question of legal fraud, and restrained execution only, with liberty to apply. The jury having found that there was no legal fraud, this Court afterwards entered into the consideration of the question of equitable fraud, and finding none to exist, permitted execution to be taken out. |