The learned and indefatigable Reinhardt was thus able to conduct one of the most valuable reviews in Germany, by writing his opinions on every work which came under his perusal. The late Lord Jeffrey commenced his literary career in precisely this manner. When a youthful student at the university, he not only wrote a review of every book which he read, but of every paper which he himself composed. His strictures were even more severe on his own writings than on the writings of others. He thus laid the foundation of his immense acquisitions, and attained to so great a power of intellectual analysis, that for many years he was acknowledged the most accomplished critic of his time.

REFERENCES.

Consciousness - Reid, Essay 1, chap. 1; Abercrombie, Part 2, sect. 2; Locke, book 2, chap. 6, sect. 2; chap. 9, sect. 1.

Is consciousness distinguished from perception? - Stewart, vol. i., chap. 2.

Cases of Abnormal Consciousness Abercrombie, Part 3, sect. 4; part 2. Attention and Reflection-Reid, Essay 1, chap. 5; Essay 4, chap. 4. Stewart, vol i., chap. 2. Abercrombie, Part 2, chap. 1.

Improvement of Attention and Reflection, Part 2, chap. 1.

Consciousness

Cousin, sect. 1, p. 12, 8vo: Hartford, 1834. Henry's translation, and note A, by Frof. H.

CHAPTER III.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, OR THE INTUITIONS OF THE INTELLECT.

SECTION I. - EXAMINATION OF THE OPINIONS OF LOCKE.

We have thus far considered those powers of the human mind by which it obtains a knowledge of the existence and qualities of the external world, and of the existence and energies of the thinking subject. This knowledge, as I have said, is all either of individual existences or of individual acts, or states of the subjective mind. It is, of course, all concrete, and the conceptions derived from it are of the same character. This knowledge is original, direct and immediate. It is the constitutional testimony of our faculties as soon as they are brought into relation to their appropriate objects. It always contemplates as an object something now existing, or something which at some time did exist. Let us, then, for a moment consider what would be the condition of a human being possessed of no other powers

He would be

than those of which we have thus far treated. cognizant of the existence and qualities of the objects which he perceived, and of the state of mind which these objects called into exercise; and, if endowed with memory, he could retain this knowledge in recollection. Here, however, his knowledge would terminate. Each fact would remain disconnected from every other, and each separate knowledge would terminate absolutely in itself. No relation between

THE

be

any two facts would be either discovered or sought for. The questions why, or wherefore, would neither be asked nor answered. The knowledge acquired would be perfectly barren, leading to nothing else, and destitute of all tendency and all power to multiply itself into other forms of cognition. The mind would be a perfect living daguerreotype, on which forms were indelibly impressed, remaining lifeless and unchangeable forever.

It was the opinion of Locke, that all our knowledge either consisted of these ideas of sense or consciousness, or was derived from them by comparison or combination. Thus, says he, "First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey to the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways in which those objects do affect them. Thus we come to those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, bitter, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which, when I say the senses convey to the mind, I mean they from external objects convey into the mind what produces these sensations. This source I call Sensation." Book 2, chap. 1, sec. 3.

from which experience

Secondly. "The other fountain furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. Such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all those different acts of our own minds, which, we being conscious of and observing in our ownselves, do from these receive into the understanding as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. I call this Reflection."

"The understanding seems to me not to have the least

glimmering of any ideas which it does not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all these different perceptions they produce in us, and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations." Again: "Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding, and let him tell me whether all the original ideas he has there are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of the mind considered as objects of his reflection, and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted, though, perhaps, with infinite variety, compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter."-Ibid. Sec. 5.

Again: "If we trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sensation and reflection, it will lead us further than perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself by repeating and joining together those ideas that it had from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them."- Book 2d, chap. 12, sec. 8.

From these extracts it appears evident that Locke believed all our original knowledge to proceed from perception, or, as he calls it, sensation, and consciousness. Whatever other knowledge we have, is produced secondarily by adding together, repeating, and joining together, the simple ideas derived from these original sources. I have before remarked that these ideas are of individuals and are concrete, If, therefore, the theory of Locke be correct, all our other

اد

knowledge is created by adding, repeating, and joining together these individual and concrete conceptions.

Now, if this be so,—if it be the law of our nature that the human intellect is incapable of attaining to any other knowledge than the ideas of sensation and reflection, that is, of perception and consciousness, in other words, than the knowledge of the qualities of matter and the operations of our own minds, then it follows that all our notions which cannot be reduced to one or the other of these classes, is a mere fiction of the imagination, unworthy of confidence, and is, in fact, no knowledge at all. But it is obvious that there are in our minds many ideas which belong to neither of these classes; such, for instance, are the ideas of relation, power, cause and effect, space, duration, infinity, right and wrong, and many others. Can these be produced by the uniting, joining, or adding together our conceptions of the qualities of matter, or of our own mental acts? Let any one try the experiment, and he will readily be convinced that they can be evolved by no process of this kind. It will follow then, if the theory of Locke be admitted, that these notions, which I have above specified, and all others like them, are mere fancies, the dreams of schoolmen or of fanatics, having no real foundation, and forming no substantial basis for science, or even valid objects for inquiry. Nothing, then, can be deemed worthy of the name of science or knowledge, except the primitive data either of perception or consciousness, or what is formed by adding, uniting, joining together, these primitive cognitions. Hence, the ideas of which I have spoken, such as those of space, duration, infinity, eternity, cause and effect, all moral ideas, -- nay, the idea of God himself,-are the figments of a dream, and all that remains to us is merely what we can perceive without and be conscious of within. This was the conclusion at which many men arrived at the close of the last century.