will, instead of leading him to comply, only served to excite his resentment against the tempter himself. And just so the devil's tempting Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit, must have excited his love, rather than his hatred, to God, had he remained perfectly holy. It is impossible to conceive, therefore, that Adam's pure heart was corrupted, or drawn into sin, by the mere force of external temptation.

Nor will it relieve any difficulty on this subject, to say that Adam and Eve were deceived, when they partook of the forbidden fruit. For, their deception must have been either voluntary or involuntary. If it were voluntary, then their sin was the cause of their deception, and not their deception the cause of their sin. But if their deception were involuntary, then it entirely excused them. For their eating of the forbidden fruit, while their hearts were perfectly holy, and they really supposed they ought to do it, would have been a duty, instead of a crime.

As these and all other methods to account for the fall of Adam, by the instrumentality of second causes, are insufficient to remove the difficulty; it seems necessary to have recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose, that God wrought in Adam both to will and to do, in his first transgression. As Adam acted freely, while he was acted upon, before he fell; so he acted freely, while he was acted upon, at the moment of his fall. His first sin was a free, voluntary exercise produced by a divine operation, in the view of motives. Satan placed certain motives before his mind, which, by a divine energy, took hold of his heart and led him into sin. In this view, Adam's first sin is as easy to account for, as David's in numbering the people; as Pharaoh's in refusing to let the people go; as Ahab's in going up to Ramoth-Gilead; or as any other man's sin since the fall. This, perhaps, is a full solution of

the first sin in this world, and, of consequence, of the first sin in the universe.

INFERENCE 6.-If God can work in moral agents both to will and to do of his good pleasure; then we may easily account for the moral depravity of Infants. Next to the first sin of Adam, the first sin in his posterity is supposed to be the most difficult to account for.

Some suppose, that the human soul, as well as the human body, proceeds directly from the parents who naturally and necessarily convey their own moral image to their children. And upon this principle, they suppose, that after our first parents became corrupt, they conveyed a corrupt nature to their children, and they again to theirs; and so a corrupt nature has, ever since the fall, been transmitted from parents to children, and will continue to be transmitted in the same manner to the latest posterity. This solution, however, by no means, gives satisfaction. We are not certain, that the soul of the child does proceed directly from the parents. Scripture and reason rather lead us to suppose, that the soul is a divine production, and proceeds immediately from the Father of spirits. But even allowing, that the soul does proceed, according to a divine constitution, from the parents; yet this will not account for its moral pollution. For, moral depravity consists in the free, voluntary exercises of a moral agent; and of consequence cannot be transmitted, by one person to another. Adam's moral impurity or defilement was his own voluntary wickedness, which could not, by any divine constitution or appoint ment, become the moral impurity or defilement of his natural offspring, either in whole or in part. Besides, if parents naturally convey their moral likeness to their children, then Adam, after he became holy, must

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have conveyed holiness to his children, and they likewise to theirs; and so there must have been a constant succession of holy families down to this day; which we find is contrary to universal observation and expe

rience.

Others suppose, that the depravity of the soul originates from the mortality of the body. Though they allow, that the soul comes pure and clean from the hands of God; yet they imagine a corrupt mortal body must soon defile it. They say, while the minds of children are weak and ignorant, their bodily appetites and passions gain the ascendency, and lead them into sinful courses and evil habits. But this supposition is clogged with insurmountable difficulties. How can a corrupt body corrupt a pure mind? At most, the body can afford only temptations to sin; but temptations of themselves have no power to corrupt a pare heart. Christ was once an infant. He grew like other infants, in body and mind; but yet his mind was never corrupted by his body. Though he was subject to hunger, thirst, pain, weariness, and mortality; yet these bodily appetites and infirmities never led him into intemperance, impatience, or any other moral evil. His soul was holy, harmless, undefiled, while united to an earthly, feeble, mortal body. Hence it appears to be contrary to fact, that the depravity of the soul should arise from the mortality of the body; or that the mortal bodies of infants should morally defile their pure and immortal spirits.

But though we cannot suppose, that infants derive their moral corruption from Adam, nor from their own mortal bodies; yet we can easily conceive of their becoming depraved, in consequence of the first apostacy. God constituted such a connexion between Adam and his posterity, that if he sinned, they should

all become sinners. Accordingly, in consequence of Adam's first transgression, God now brings his pos terity into the world, in a state of moral depravity. But how? the answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants, he forms them with moral powers, and makes them men in miniature. And being men in miniature, he works in them, as he does in other men, both to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts, in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists. Moral depravity can take place no where but in moral agents; and moral agents can never act but only as they are acted upon by a divine operation. It is just as easy, therefore, to account for moral depravity in infancy, as in any other period of life.

INFERENCE 7.-If God can work in saints both to will and to do of his good pleasure; then he can convert sinners, consistently with their activity and moral freedom. God operates precisely in the same manner, in producing the first exercise of grace, as in producing the second, or any other. All that he does, in converting, or regenerating a sinner, is to work in him to will and to do that which is holy, instead of that which is sinful. The sinner is not passive, but active in this change. He acts as freely, while God turns him from sin to holiness, as ever he did in his life. He feels no violence done to his will, nor the least constraint thrown upon his moral freedom. God has often converted some of the most hardened and obstinate sinners. He subdued the hearts of his rebelTious people, in Babylon. He converted, in one day, three thousand of those, who had been concerned in crucifying the Lord of glory. He met Paul on his way to Damascus, and instantaneously turned that blasphemer and persecutor into a meek and humble fol

lower of Christ. And he can now convert as many and as great sinners as he pleases, in perfect consistency with the free and voluntary exercise of all their natural powers. God has no occasion of sending sinners to another world, in order to soften and change their hearts; for he is always able to work in them both to will and to do that which is pleasing in his sight, without destroying, or even obstructing their moral freedom.

INFERENCE 8. If God always works in men both to will and to do; then they are as able to work out their own salvation, as to perform the common actions of life. The only reason, why sinners suppose they are less able to work out their own salvation, than to do the common actions of life, is because they imagine they need more divine assistance, in working out their own salvation, than in doing any thing else. If they are urged to repent, they say they cannot repent, of themselves; for repentance is the fruit of the Spirit. If they are urged to believe in Christ, they say they cannot believe, of themselves; for faith is the gift of God. And if they are urged to make themselves a new heart, they say they cannot do this, of themselves; for it is the work of God to give them a new heart. These expressions plainly intimate, that they suppose they always act, of themselves, except in the concerns of religion; and of consequence, that they are less able to perform religious duties, than the common actions of life. But there is no just ground for this conclusion. They never do act, of themselves. They live, and move, and have their being in God, who constantly works in them both to will and to do, in every instance of their conduct. They are as able, therefore, to do right, as to do wrong; to do their duty, as to neglect their duty; to love God, as to hate God; to