(Ex-parte Corporation of London, 18 Jan., 1868, L. R. 6 Equity, 418.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Lands Clauses' Act, 8. 92-Part of a house-Curtilage.-A public-house was bounded on one side by a street, and in front by a vacant piece of ground, not fenced off from the street, and separated from the house only by a narrow foot pave. ment, also without a fence, which was ordinarily used by the public as a thoroughfare, though sometimes closed. The piece of land had been treated as passing to the lessee by every demise of the publichouse since 1862; it was used by customers of the public-house, and it furnished the only means of approach for vehicles to the front door of the house: Held, that the piece of land came within the definition of a curtilage, and was part of the house within the meaning of the 92nd section of the Lands Clauses Act. () (Marson v. the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, 1 May, 1868, L. R. 6 Equity, 101.)

PÚBLIC COMPANY-Railway company: Negligence of a servant-Contributory negligence. The plaintiff, a passenger by the defendants' railway, was in the act of getting into a third-class carriage at a station, the train not being in motion. Having a parcel in his right hand, he placed his left on the back of the open door to aid him in mounting the step. Before he had completely entered the carriage, the guard without any previous warning forcibly closed the door, and crushed the plaintiff's hand between the door and the door-post. In an action for the injury thus sustained: Held, by Byles and Keating, JJ., that the jury were justified in finding in favour of the plaintiff, that the guard was guilty of negligence; and that there was no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Held, by Montague Smith, J., that by putting his hand in the position he did, knowing that the door was about to be closed, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, which contributed to the injury, and therefore was not entitled to recover. (Fordham v. the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, 8 May, 1868, L. R. 3 C. P. 368.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Railway company-Rent-charge-Power of distress-Receiver-Leave to distrain-Lands Clauses Act, 1845, s. 11. By s. 10 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, "It shall be lawful for any person seised in fee of, or entitled to dispose of absolutely for his own benefit, any lands authorised to be purchased for the purposes of the special Act to sell and convey such lands, or any part thereof, unto the promoters of the undertaking, in consideration of an annual rent-charge payable by the promoters of the undertaking." By sect. 11, "The yearly rents reserved by any such conveyance shall be charged on the tolls or rates, if any, payable under the special Act, and shall be otherwise secured in such manner as shall be agreed between the parties, and shall be paid by the promoters of the undertaking

as such rents become payable; and if at any time any such rents be not paid within thirty days after they so become payable, and after demand thereof in writing, the person to whom any such rents shall be payable may either recover the same from the promoters of the undertaking, with costs of suit, by action of debt in any of the superior courts, or it shall be lawful for him to levy the same by distress of the goods and chattels of the promoters of the undertaking. Where land had been conveyed to a railway company in consideration of a rent-charge, and the deed gave the person entitled to the rentcharge a power to distrain on the land for arrears of the rent-charge, the Court gave the owner of the rent-charge leave to distrain on the land, notwithstanding the appointment of a receiver of the tolls, profits, and income of the undertaking of the company in a suit instituted by the owner of a similar rent-charge on behalf of himself and all the other owners of similar rent-charges who should come in and contribute to the expenses of the suit. (Eyton v. Denbigh, Ruthin, and Corwen Railway Company, 27 April, 1868, L. R. 6 Equity, 14.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Rectification of register-Companies' Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 35.-A shareholder in a company, whose articles of association contained a clause prohibiting the directors from carrying on the business of the company or making calls until all the shares were taken up, except after a resolution to continue the company, successfully resisted an action for calls, on the ground that the whole of the shares were not taken up, and that no such resolution had been passed. He then applied under s. 35 of the Companies' Act, 1862, to have his name removed from the register: Held, that the power of the Court to remove a shareholder's name from the register only existed in the two cases of his name having been improperly entered, and of his having ceased to be a member, and that neither circumstance occurred here. The application was therefore refused. (Ex parte Ward re North Staf ford Steel, Iron, and Coal Company (Burslem), Limited, 30 April, 1868, L. R. 3 Ex. 180.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Shareholder in-Liability of bankrupt shareholder to pay subsequent calls-Companies' Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89) s. 75-Bankruptcy Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 134) s. 154. A shareholder in a company under the Companies' Act, 1862, who has become bankrupt and received his discharge, but retains his shares, is not discharged from liability to pay subsequent calls, whether made while the company is in operation or when it is being wound up for the covenant of the shareholder on becoming a member, under s. 16, to pay the calls on his shares is not a contract to pay sums of money yearly or otherwise" within s. 154 of the Bankruptcy Act, 161, so as to make the present value of their liability proveable under that section and s. 75 of the Companies'

Act, 1862, which makes it lawful in the case of the bankruptcy of any contributory to prove against his estate the estimated value of his liability to future calls, only applies where the bankruptcy of the contributory is contemporaneous with the winding up of the company. (Martin's Patent Anchor Co. (Limited) v. Morton; The same v. Hewett, 4 Feb., 1868, L. R. 3 Q. B. 306.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Winding-up- Contributory-InfantTransferee of shares.-In June, 1865, S. having bought in the market shares belonging to C., gave the name of A. as the transferee, and C. accordingly transferred them to A., who was registered as owner. A. was a clerk of S., and was an infant. In November, 1865, C. received a letter from the solicitors to the company, informing him that A. was an infant, and applying to him for payment of a call. C. having found upon inquiry that his share certificates had been cancelled, and new certificates issued to A., took no further notice of the matter, and no further step was taken on either side till January, 1867, when the application for the call was renewed, after a resolution for winding-up the company had been passed: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that C. must be on the list of contributories. (Re China Steamship and Labuan Coal Company, Capper's Case, 12 March, 1868, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 458.)

mem

PUBLIC COMPANY-Winding-up-Contributory-Past bers. In the winding-up of a joint-stock company a past member who ceased to be a member within a year before the commencement of the winding-up cannot be placed on the list of contributories until it is proved first that there was at the date of the winding-up order some existing debt or liability of the company contracted before he ceased to be a member; and secondly, in the case of a limited company, that the shares formerly held by him have not been fully paid up. (Re Contract Corporation, Weston's Case, 25 April, 1868, L. R. 6 Equity, 17.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Winding-up-Contributory-Transfer of shares-Laches by company and transferor-Companies' Act, 1862, 8. 35. Although there may have been unnecessary delay on the part of a company in registering a transfer of shares, no order for the rectification of the register can be made under the 35th section of the Companies' Act, 1862, on the application of a transferor who is also in default after the company has been ordered to be wound up. A shareholder in a company resisted an action for calls on the ground of alleged misrepresentations contained in the prospectus, and also brought an action against the promoters and directors to recover moneys previously paid in respect of the shares. Both actions were, with the sanction of the company, compromised, one term of the compromise being that the shares should be transferred to one of the directors. A transfer was accordingly executed by the shareholder

and the transferee, and deposited with the attorney who acted for the company and the directors in the actions, but no further steps were taken in the matter, and two years after the company was ordered to be wound up: Held, that the shareholder whose name was on the register was a contributory. Fox's Case (Law Rep. 5 Eq. 118), distinguished. (Re Anglo-Danubian Steam Navigation and Colliery Company, 4 May, 1868, L. R. 6 Equity, 30.) Lord Romilly, in his judgment, said:" The distinction between Fox's Case (Law Rep. 5 Eq. 118) and this is, that in that case the Court determined that Fox ought never to have been registered as a shareholder. He was prepared to file a bill saying that he had been misled, and was entitled to have his name taken off. If the company had refused to take his name off there would have been a decree against them, just as there was in the Venezuela Railway Case (Law Rep. 2 H. L. 99), but instead of having recourse to litigation the company gave way, and took the name off the register without a bill being filed, exactly the same as if there had been a decree. There was no compromise. Mr. Fox had a case to show that he ought never to have been a shareholder at all, and the Court came to the conclusion, upon reading the evidence, that the company were not bound to go to the expense of defending a suit in which they were sure to be beaten. The fault alleged here is that the company did not remove a name from the list of shareholders; that is a different case from one where the company did remove a name which they ought never to have put on, and where the fault was in putting the name on the list of shareholders, which was in the nature of a fraudulent act. That is quite different from a shareholder transferring his share and not taking care to get the transfer registered for upwards of two years before the winding-up order was made. The very object and purpose for which the Act was framed, as shown by the clauses of the Act, is to enable you to provide against this particular emergency, and to enable the transferor to take care that the company shall make a proper entry in the register of the transfer of the shares. In cases where there has been no fault at all on the part of the transferor, and the fault is merely that of the company, the Court directs the transfer to be made, or the register to be amended, thus doing what ought to have been done. Where there has been no fault on either side the register remains as it was-where the fault is on both sides the register also remains as it was."

PUBLIC COMPANY-Winding-up-Dividend claim of lessor in respect of future rent.-After a lessor of premises to a company, now in liquidation, had obtained leave to enter a claim for the amount at which the future rent was estimated, in the terms of the order in the case of re Haylor Granite Co. (Law Rep. 1 Ch. 77, 81) a dividend was paid by the liquidators: Held, that the lessor was not entitled to have a sum, equal to the dividend upon the amount

at which the future rent was estimated, impounded, to secure payment of the future rent, and summons for that purpose dismissed. (Re London and Colonial Co., Horsey's claim, 14, 18 March, 1868, L. R. 5 Equity, 567.)

REVIVOR Bankruptcy of plaintiff after decree - Revivor by defendant. Where a sole plaintiff becomes bankrupt after decree, and his assignees decline to revive the suit, the defend int may obtain the common order to revive. (Thomas v. Buxton, 17 April, 1868, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 407.)

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SHIPPING · Marine Insurance --·Policy on profits Illegal policy-"Without benefit of salvage"-19 Geo. 2, c. 37, s. 1.-The 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, s. 1, after reciting that "the making of assurances, interest or no interest, and without further proof of interest than the policy, hath been productive of many pernicious practices, whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, have either been fraudulently lost and destroyed, or taken by the enemy in time of war... and by introducing a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering, under the pretence of assuring the risk on shipping and fair trade, the institution and laudable design of making assurances hath been perverted," &c., enacts that no assurance or assurances shall be made by any person or persons, bodies corporate or politic, on any ship or ships belonging to his Majesty or any of his subjects, or on any goods, merchandises, or effects laden or to be laden on board of any such ship or ships, interest or no interest, or without further proof of interest than the policy, or by way of gaming or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the assurer; and that every such assurance shall be null and void to all intents and purposes. In the following case it was decided that a policy on profits is within 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, s. 1, and if made "without benefit of salvage,' although "free from average," it is avoided by the statute. Smith v. Reynolds (1 H. & N. 221; 25 L. J. Ex. 337) followed (De Mattos v. North, 5 May, 1868, L. R. 3 Ex. 185.)

SHIPPING-Marine insurance-Valued time policy-Estimated value-Mistake.-The value of the ship insured, stated in a valued time-policy, is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive between the parties, however largely in excess of the true value. A ship was insured by a valued time-policy, and its value stated in the policy was £8,000. At the time the policy was made-but unknown to the parties the ship had been injured in a storm, so that the expense of the repairs would have exceeded its value when repaired. During the continuance of the risk the ship was totally lost. In an action against the underwriters: Held, that the policy attached, notwithstanding the previous injury to the ship, and that there being no fraud, the value of the ship, as stated in the policy, was conclusive between the parties. (Barker v. Janson, 15 Jan., 1868, L. R. 3 C. P.