C. P.] THOMPSON V. LAPWORTH. [C. P. therefore I think that this rule should be made | thereof, required him to pay the sum of 491. 28. 6d. absolute. KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. The machinery of the Act is not, perhaps, perfect, but the difficulties in the way of the plt. succeeding in this action are insuperable. The landlord has a right to distrain unless he is prevented by the Act, and all that the Act says is that when the tenant receives notice to pay to the vestry, he may deduct from his rent what he has actually paid. Here the tenant had paid nothing at the time of the distress, and if the Legislature had intended to have protected him in such a case, nothing would have been easier than to express their meaning to that effect. Rule absolute. Attorney for the plt., A. C. Scoles. Thursday, Jan. 16, 1868. THOMPSON V. LAPWORTH. The lessee of a house within the district defined by the Held, that the plt. was entitled to recover such amount Tidswell v. Whitworth, L. Rep., 2 C. P., 326; 15 This was an action to recover 35l. for rent, and 491. 58. 6d. for money paid to the deft.'s use, and by consent of the parties the following case was stated for the opinion of the court without pleadings. CASE. By lease under seal dated 4th June 1862 Springall Thompson, the plt. and Jacob Metcalfe demised to H. J. Lapworth, the deft., a messuage and premises, being 18 Carlton-villas, on the west side of the Edgeware-road, in the parish of Paddington, in the county of Middlesex. The said Jacob Metcalfe died on the 26th Aug. 1862. being the proportion of the estimated expenses of providing and laying such pavements payable in respect of the said house in the deft.'s occupation for which the owner thereof was liable. The deft. did not pay the said sum of 497. 2s. 6d., or any part thereof, and although requested to do so by the plt., refused to do so. The said amount not being paid, complaint was made by the said vestry to a magistrate of the police courts of the metropolis, and an order made by him pursuant to the said statutes for the payment by the plt., as owner of the said premises, of the said sum of 491. 2s. 6d. to the said vestry, and the further sum of 3s. for their costs, making together the sum of 491. 5s. 6d. to be levied in default of payment by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the plt. The plt. thereupon paid to the said vestry the sum of 491. 5s. 6d., in pursuance of the said order, and claims to have the said sum of 49. 5s. 6d. together with the sum of 31. 3s., being the fee paid by the plt. to his attorney for appearing on his behalf in answer to the said summons repaid to him by the deft. At the time of the commencement of this action the sum of 351. for one quarter's rent was due from the deft. to the plt. in respect of the said premises, but the same had before action been duly tendered to the plt. by the deft. The question for the opinion of the court was, whether, according to the true construction of the said lease as between the plt. and the deft., the deft. was bound to repay to the plt. the said abovementioned sums of 491. 5s. 6d. and 31. 3s., or either of them, or any part thereof. By the terms of the lease a rent of 1407. per annum was payable quarterly, "clear of all deductions in respect of land-tax, sewers-rate, and all other taxes, rates, and deductions whatsoever," and the deft. of the term pay and discharge all taxes, rates, duties, covenanted that he would "during the continuance and assessments whatsoever, which during the continuance of the demise should be taxed, assessed, or imposed on the tenant or landlord of the premises thereby demised in respect thereof, whether Parliamentary, parochial, or otherwise, except property and income-tax." By the Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 105, it is enacted That in case the owner of the houses forming the greater out or made, which is not paved to the satisfaction of the part of any new street laid out or made, or hereafter to be laid vestry or district board of the parish or district in which such street is situate, be desirous of having the same paved, as hereinafter mentioned, or if such vestry or board deem it necessary or expedient that the same should be so paved, then and in either of such cases, such vestry or board shall well and sufficiently pave the same, either throughout the whole breadth of the carriage-way and footpaths thereof, or any part of such breadth, and from time to time keep such pavement in good and sufficient repair; and the owners of the houses forming such street shall on demand pay to such vestry or board the amount of the estimated expenses of providing and laying such pavement. The Metropolis Local Management Act Amendment Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 77, extends the On or about the 24th Jan. 1867 the vestry of provisions of the above section to owners of land Paddington, pursuant to the Metropolis Manage-bounding or abutting on the street to be paved; ment Act 1855, and the Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862, and in execution of their powers under the said Acts and the other statutes in that case made and provided, gave notice to the defendant as and being the occupier of the said premises, that they had decided that Elgin-terrace, from No. 36 to Carlton-road, including the stables and premises at the rear of Carlton-villas, from No. 17 to No. 25 was not paved to their satisfaction, and having deemed it necessary and expedient that the said street should be paved throughout the whole breadth of the carriage-way and footpaths and sect. 96 gives power to the vestry or district board to require payment of the costs or expenses which the owner of any premises may be liable to pay under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, or this Act, either from the owner or the occupier of the premises; and the owner is to allow such occupier to deduct the sums of money so paid out of the rent; provided that no such occupier be called upon to pay any further sum than the amount of rent for the time being due from him; Provided, also, that nothing in this Act contained shall be taken to affect any contract made or to be made between any owner and occupier of any house, building, or other property, whereof it is or may be agreed that the occupier shall pay and discharge all rates, dues, and sums of money payable in respect of such house, building, or other property, or to affect any contract whatsoever between landlord and tenant. Lumley Smith for the plt.-By the words of the covenant the deft. bound himself to pay the sum in question, which certainly comes under the head of "a tax, rate, duty, or assessment, taxed, assessed, or imposed on the landlord of the premises in question in respect of the same: (Sweet v. Seager, 2 C. B., N. S. 119.) The present case is distinguishable from Tidswell v. Whitworth, L. Rep., 2 C. P. 326; 36 L. J. 303, C. P.; 15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 574, on the ground that in that case the payment had been made not for a rate, assessment, or imposition, which had become payable in respect of the demised premises, but for the breach of a duty imposed upon the owner of the house by a local Act of Parliament. In that case a duty was thrown upon the landlord by the Local Act to pave the street, and in case of his neglecting this duty, the town council might do it for him and charge him with the expense. It might well be said in that case that such a charge was not a "tax, rate, assessment, or imposition payable in respect of the demised premises." But this cannot be said in the present case. The words of sect. 105 of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, are precise. This section does not say that the owners of the adjacent houses are to pave the street, and in the event of their neglect the vestry is to step in and do it. But the vestry is to pave and then to require payment of the expense incurred in paving, from the owners of the land abutting on the road. [M. SMITH, J.According to the words of sect. 105, the owners of the houses abutting on the road might set the vestry in motion to pave the road; in the event of their doing so could they exact from their tenants payment of the cost of such paving?] That question does not arise here, as in the present case the plt. did not instigate the vestry, and sect. 96 of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, specially provides that nothing in the Act shall affect contracts between landlord and tenant. He cited also Payne v. Burridge, 12 M. & W. 727; Holker for the deft.-This payment was not a "tax, rate, duty, or assessment taxed, assessed, or imposed on the tenant or landlord of the premises in respect thereof." Even if it be so, yet it was not such a tax, &c., as was contemplated by the parties to the indenture. By sect. 81 of 18 & 19 Vict. the vestries have power to require the owner or occupier of any house to provide sufficient water-closets and ashpits, and the vestry has power if owners fail to make suitable arrangements in this respect to cause the work to be done, and to recover the expense so incurred by them from the owner. Could it be contended that the tenant in the present case would be liable to bear such a charge as this? If that were so he would have to make a permanent improvement to the premises at his own expense. The paving of the street is a permanent improvement to the houses abutting on it, and is not such a charge as the occupier could be called on to pay. The words "taxes, rates, and deductions whatsoever," follow close upon the words "land-tax and sewersrate," and must be regarded as ejusdem generis, that is to say, they must be looked upon as including the ordinary annual payments necessary to keep the premises and the approaches in good order and repair. The words cannot have reference to an extraordinary payment like the present. The case of Tidswell v. Whitworth is not distinguishable from the present. He cited Baker v. Greenhill, 3 Q. B. 148. [C. P. WILLES, J.-I am of opinion that our judgment must be for the plt. The question in this case turns on the construction of the words of the lease. First of all, was the payment which the landlord has been compelled to make a "tax, rate, duty, or assessment, imposed, &c., in respect of the premises? This turns on the construction of the statute. Sect. 105 of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120 gives power to the vestry to pave streets and to impose on the owners of houses abutting on them the charge of such paving. The vestry may do this in the event of its being called on to do so by the owners of houses, or of its thinking it expedient to do so. Sect. 77 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 102 does not repeal the above section, but allows owners of land to be charged with contributions along with owners of houses. If the paving in this case had been done on the motion of the Owners of the houses in the street, and the plt. amongst the rest, it might well have been contended that the plt. was himself the party inviting the expense, and that the cost of the paving was neither "taxed, assessed, or imposed" on him. But this question does not arise in the present case. Sect. 96 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 102, provides the machinery for collecting the money payments due to the vestries or local boards. It authorises the vestry to come upon the occupiers of the houses in the first instance, under certain conditions. There is in this section a distinct proviso that nothing in either Act is to affect any agreement between landlord and tenant. The present charge appears then to be a money duty imposed on the landlord for the contended by the counsel for the deft. that even if premises demised in respect thereof. It was, however, this be so, the present payment was not such a rate, tax, duty, or assessment as was contemplated by the parties to the lease. These words in the covenant, he argued, mean no more than the words "all other taxes, rates, and deductions whatsoever." These last words occur in the reddendum, and it was contended that their meaning is fixed by the words, "all deductions in respect of land-tax and sewers-rate," which immediately preceded them. Now it is true that where particular language is used with reference to matter of a specific kind, and we find words immediately after which may refer to matters of the same genus, the latter words must be so referred. The question then arises, ought not the words "taxes, rates, and deductions whatsoever" to be understood to refer only to taxes, rates, and deductions ejusdem generis with the landtax and sewers-rate? That is to say, are we not to regard these words as referring only to duties, taxes, &c., which like the land-tax and sewer's-rate, regularly accrue at certain specified and recognised intervals, and as having no application to an extraordinary tax like the paving-rate in question. This is the substance of the deft.'s argument, but, however plausible it appeared at first sight, I am of opinion that it is negatived by the language of the agreement. This case falls within Payne v. Burbidge, in which the court decided that such a rate as this was to be placed on the same footing as a sewers-rate. The case of Baker v. Greenhill, cited by the deft., is quite distinguishable, as in that case there was a common-law obligation imposed on the landlord, and the Act did nothing more than provide a machinery for enforcing this obligation in the first instance on the tenant. The other cases cited were also adverse to the deft. The case of Tidswell v. Whitworth has received its answer in the course of the argument. This case, indeed, comes very near the rule there laid down; it is nevertheless distinguishable. That case turned on the construction of the Manchester Local Improvement Act (14 & 15 Vict. c. cxix). That Act threw on the owners of houses abutting on a street not properly paved the duty of paving such street, and provided that, in Ex] In the Matter of the PLUMPTON WALL TITHE RENTCHARGE, and HEYSHAM v. HESKETT. [Ex. the event of their neglecting this duty, the town council might step in, pave the street, and charge the landlord with the cost of such paving. It also provided a machinery by which the council might, in the first instance, come upon the tenant for payment. Under those circumstances, then, the landlord ought to have performed the duty thus imposed upon him. This duty was not to pay money, but to repair a road. The tenant had not bound himself by covenants, of similar purport with those in the case before us, to perform such a duty as this. The landlord could not then, in such a case, throw on the shoulders of the tenant a charge which would never have been made but for a dereliction of duty on the part of the landlord himself. But the same reasoning cannot for a moment be held to apply to an imposition or charge imposed under the 105th section of the Metropolis Local Management Act of 1855. Although, then, I am not in the least ashamed of my judgment in Tidswell v. Whitworth, I am of opinion that in the present case the deft. has bound himself by the words in the covenant, and that our judgment must be for the plt. KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. At first sight the case seemed very similar to Tidswell v. Whitworth, but it is clearly distinguishable from it. I think this is a payment which comes within the very words of the covenant, and is a duty imposed on the landlord in respect of the premises. It was contended by Mr. Holker that this was permanent improvement, and that the deft. could not have intended to undertake such a burden when the lease is determinable at the end of five years, but the force of that argument is much weakened by the fact that it was only determinable at that time at the option of the tenant. M. SMITH, J. concurred. a BOVILL, C. J. stated that he did not hear the whole of the argument, but was of opinion that the payment came clearly within the words of the Covenant, and that the case was distinguishable from Tidswell v. Whitworth. Judgment for the plt. Attorneys for the plt., Powell, Thompson, and Groom. Attorneys for the deft., King, and McMillan. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Reported by H. LEIGH and E. LUMLEY, Esqrs., Barristersat-Law. Saturday, Jan. 11, 1868. In the Matter of the PLUMPTON WALL TITHE Tithe Commutation Act-Tithe rentcharge-Remedy for Manisty, Q. C. had obtained a rule on behalf of the owners of a certain piece of land, numbered 276 in the tithe apportionment of the township of Plumpton Wall, in the parish of Lazonby, in the county of Cumberland, calling upon the Rev. John Heysham to show cause why a writ issued by him on the 28th June last, under the 82nd section of the Tithe Commutation Act (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71), Sect. 81. And be it enacted that in case the said rentcharge Sect. 82. And be it enacted that in case the said rentcharge shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of forty days next after any half-yearly day of payment, and there shall be no thereof, it shall be lawful for any judge of His Majesty's Courts sufficient distress on the premises liable to the payment of Record at Westminster, upon affidavit of the facts, to order a writ to be issued directed to the sheriff of the county in which the lands chargeable with the rentcharge are situated. requiring the said sheriff to summon a jury to assess the arrears of rentcharge remaining unpaid, and to return the inquisition thereupon taken to some one of His Majesty's courts of law at Westminster, on a day therein to be named, either in term time or vacation; a copy of which writ and notice of the time and place of executing the same shall be given to the owner of the land or left at his last known place of abode or with his known agent, ten days previous to the execution thereof, and the sheriff is hereby required to execute such writ according to the exigency thereof, and the costs of such inquisition shall be taxed by the proper officer of the court, and thereupon the owner of the rentcharge may sue commanding him to cause the owner of the rentcharge to have out a writ of habere facias possessionem directed to the sheriff possession of the lands chargeable therewith, until the arrears of the rentcharge found to be due and the said costs and also the costs of such writ and of executing the same and of cultivating and keeping possession of the lands shall be fully satisfied, provided always that not more than two years' arrears over and above the time of such possession shall be at any time recoverable. It appeared from the affidavits that the Rev. John Heysham is the vicar of the parish of Lazonby, in the county of Cumberland, and the defts. were the joint occupiers of a parcel of land called the Plumpton Head Holme, part of which is situate in the parish of Penrith, and a small undivided portion of which is situate in the township of Plumpton Wall, in the parish of Lazonby, and numbered 276 on the tithe apportionment of the said township. The vicar of Lazonby, who is the owner of the tithe rentcharge in the township of Plumpton, claimed to be entitled to 10s. 2d. for two years' arrears of rentcharge due on the 1st Jan. 1867, in respect of the said piece of land so numbered 276. On the 30th May he served notices of distress on the occupiers of the Holme, and issued a distress warrant to a bailiff. The bailiff entered the land, but did not ultimately distrain on the ground that there was not sufficient distress to satisfy the rentcharge in arrear and the expenses of distress. The vicar then commenced the proceedings under the 82nd section of the Tithe Commutation Act, which it was now sought on behalf of the landowners to set aside. It appeared from the bailiff's affidavit that at the time when he entered there was a crop of grass growing on the land which was not fit for cutting, but which, by the middle of July, would have arrived at maturity; that the value of this crop when matured, deducting the expenses of cutting and converting the same into hay, would have been 37.; that the expenses of distress, namely, the cost of eight notices of distress to the occupiers, which was claimed as an addition to the distress under the Tithe Commutation Acts, 17.; costs of levy, 3s.; appraisement, 2s.; advertisement for sale, 10s.; sale and commission, 3s., if added to the Ex.] In the Matter of THE PLUMPTON Wall Tithe RENTCHARGE, and HEYSHAM V. HESKETT. [Ex. arrears, would come to 21. 15s. 11., and that that sum, added to the expense of keeping a man in possession from the 12th June till the crop should come to maturity, which happened in the last week of July, at the rate of 2s. 6d. a day, would greatly exceed the value of the crop. Jones, Q. C. and Crompton Hutton now showed cause. They contended that there was no sufficient distress to satisfy the arrears of tithe rentcharge and the reasonable expenses of the distress; and secondly, that the tithe-owner was not bound under the Act to distrain the growing crop of grass before taking proceedings under the 82nd section of the Tithe Commutation Act. They cited 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 9; 57 Geo. 3, c. 98, s. 1; Piggot v. Birtles, 1 M. & W. 441; Owen v. Lee, 3 B. & Ald. 470. MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. It is incumbent on the tithe-owner to make out that there was no sufficient distress upon the land: it seems to me that his own affidavits show that there was. It is clear that these affidavits have been framed on the supposition that the charges specified in the schedule to 57 Geo. 3, c. 92, were applicable to this case; but the common law rule applies independently of the statutes that the expenses must be reasonable in each case, and it appears to me that the expenses here claimed were altogether unreasonable. CHANNELL, B.-I also think that the rule should be made absolute. I should feel it unnecessary to add anything to what has been said by my Lord, but that I felt some doubt in the course of the argument whether the 81st and 82nd sections of the Tithe Commutation Act would authorise the tithe Manisty, Q. C. and H. T. Atkinson in support of owner to distrain upon growing crops; but this the rule, were not called upon. KELLY, C. B.-I am of opinion that this rule should be made absolute. The question is, whether under the circumstances disclosed by the affidavits, there was a sufficient distress upon the premises. It appears that there was a growing crop of grass, and that it would probably have become capable of being cut and converted into hay in the space of two months or less. The question is, whether it can be said that this crop was not a sufficient distress to satisfy the rentcharge of 10s. 2d., | which was due according to the affidavits of the owner of the rentcharge. There was not sufficient distress if the value of the hay when sold would not cover the aggregate sum of the arrears, the expenses of cutting, and realising the value of the crop and the reasonable expenses of the distress. For this purpose let us take the affidavit of the principal deponent on behalf of the owner of the tithe rentcharge. By that it is stated that the value of the hay, after deducting expenses of cutting, would be 31., and the question is whether the amount of the expenses added to the arrears exceeds that sum. Now there are several items of expense given, 11. being in respect of notices served on eight tenants interested in the land. It must not be assumed that we sanction such a charge, nor, indeed, some of the other items; but assuming, for the sake of argument, that these charges would be justifiable, the aggregate of them and the arrears would be 21. 15s. 11d. falling short by the sum of about 4s. of the whole amount of 31. Then with regard to the estimated charge for retaining possession, I think that no such charge can be justifiable. Some small sum for putting up a board with a notice that the crop was in the custody of the law, or if there had been a gate for putting a lock upon it, or for taking some measure of that kind, might, perhaps, be justifiable. It is unnecessary to enter into a disquisition upon the modes by which constructive possession of growing crops might be taken; but it is contrary to common sense that in the case of a small piece of land in Cumberland, with some grass upon it, it should be reasonable that a man should be kept in possession on the land at an expense of 2s. 6d. a-day for a space of two months. A few shillings is the utmost amount of the expense which could be justifiable for this purpose. Then there is the further point that the tithe-owner was not entitled to distrain the crop under the Commutation Act. I am clearly of opinion that growing crops are distrainable under the Act. The Legislature, when giving effect to the rights of the tithe-owner, cannot have intended to deprive him of the right to distrain upon the very thing out of which the tithe was previously claimable. doubt should not, I think, prevail. The words used in the Act are very large; they authorise the titheowner, when the rentcharge is in arrear for twenty-one days, to distrain and to demean himself as a landlord may for his rent. Now, giving the ordinary construction to this language, it would clearly authorise the tithe-owner to distrain growing crops; the only doubt remaining in my mind is, whether the Act did not intend that at the end of forty days the tithe-owner should either receive payment, or be in a position to have recourse to the land itself, and bring his action. But the policy of the Legislature, I believe, was not to encourage actions, but to place the tithe-owner in the position of the owner of a rentcharge, and to make his primary remedy that by distress. He is not to have the option of bringing an action, he must first have recourse to his primary remedy, and must satisfy the court, or a judge, that there is no sufficient distress before he can have recourse to other remedies. I therefore think that the tithe-owner must show that this growing crop would not have satisfied the arrears. His affidavits, it seems to me, show that it was sufficient, for though it is attempted to show that the expenses of distress would exceed the value of the crop, I think the estimated expenses are unreasonable, and therefore I am not satisfied that there was no sufficient distress. PIGOTT, B.-I am of the same opinion. The case depends on the questions whether growing crops are distrainable, and what the amount of the expenses of distress would be. On the former question I agree with the opinion expressed by the rest of the court, and with the respect to the question whether the distress was sufficient with reference to the expenses, I think upon the tithe-owner's own affidavit it does not appear that the distress was insufficient. Apart from several debateable items, it seems to me the estimated expenses for keeping possession are quite unreasonable. What the nature of the possession must be depends upon the nature of the subject-matter. In a case like this it is almost absurd to contend that 2s. 6d. a day for a man to keep possession should be allowed. Rule absolute. Attorneys for plt., Gray, Johnston, and Mounsey. Attorneys for defts., Jones and Morris. Ex.] DADDLE v. HICKTON-REG. v. JAMES DOWEY. Monday, Jan. 27, 1868. DADDLE v. HICKTON. This was an appeal from a decision of the judge of the County Court of Derbyshire. The action was trover for a gun. It appeared that the resp. was found upon Sunday, the 26th of May, with a gun, poaching upon lands forming part of a manor, by the app., a gamekeeper duly appointed for the manor. The app. took away the gun from the resp.. who thereupon brought his action in the County Court in respect thereof. The app. relied as a justification upon the 13th section of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32. The 3rd section of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, provides: That if any person whatsoever shall kill or take any game, or use any dog, gun, net, or other engine or instrument for the purpose of killing or taking any game on a Sunday or Christmas-day, such person shall, on conviction thereof before two justices of the peace, forfeit and pay for every such offence such sum of money not exceeding five pounds, as to the said justices shall seem meet, together with the costs of conviction. The 5th section enacts, That nothing in this Act contained shall in anywise affect or alter (except as hereinafter mentioned) any Act or Acts now in force, by which any persons using any dog, gun, net, or other engine for the purpose of taking or killing any game whatever, . are required to obtain and have annual game certificates. The 13th section enacts, That it shall be lawful for any lord of a manor, lordship, or royalty, or reputed manor, lordship, or royalty, or any steward of the Crown of any manor, lordship, or royalty appertaining to His Majesty, by writing under his hand and seal, or in case of a body corporate, then under seal of such body corporate, to appoint one or more person or persons as a gamekeeper or gamekeepers to preserve or kill the game within the limits of such manor, lordship, or royalty, or reputed manor, lordship, or royalty for the use of such lord or steward thereof, and to authorise such gamekeeper or gamekeepers within the said limits to seize and take for the use of such lord or steward all such dogs, nets, and other engines and instruments for the killing or taking of game as shall be used within the said limits by any person not authorised to kill game for want of a game certificate. The judge of the County Court was of opinion that the 13th section gave no power to seize guns, and therefore decided in favour of the plt., against which decision the deft. now appealed. Hannay, for the app.-The decision of the County Court judge was wrong. A gun is an engine or instrument for killing or taking game within the 13th section of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32. It is true that guns are expressly mentioned in some of the preceding sections and not in this; but that does not prove that it was not intended to be included in this section. It is difficult to see what meaning can be given to the word "instrument" if a gun is not meant. [KELLY, C. B.-It is really impossible to contend that the 13th section can give the right contended for when the word "gun," which is used in various previous sections, is left out.] The COURT gave judgment for the resp. Judgment for resp. [C. CAS. R. CROWN CASES RESERVED. Reported by J. THOMPSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Saturday, Jan. 18, 1868. (Before COCKBURN, C. J., KEATING, and SHEE, JJ., PIGOTT, B., and M. SMITH, J.) False REG. v. JAMES DOWEY. pretences-Obtaining value for notes of a bunk that has stopped payment-Bankruptcy. The deft. knowing that some old country bank notes had been taken by his uncle forty years before, and that the bank had stopped payment, gave them to a man to pass telling him to say, if asked about them, that he had taken them from a man he did not know. The man passed the notes, and deft. obtained value for them. It appeared that the bankers were made bankrupt : Held, that the deft. was guilty of obtaining money by false pretences: Held, also, that the bankruptcy proceedings need not be proved. Case reserved for the opinion of this Court. The deft. was indicted at the Epiphany Quarter Sessions of the peace of the North Riding of Yorkshire, for obtaining money and goods by false pretences, with intent to defrand. The first count of the indictment stated that the deft. falsely pretended to one John Beal that a piece of paper was a bank note then current and good, and available for the sum of 51, and of the full value of 57. by which false pretence the deft. then unlawfully obtained from the said John Beal the sum of 51. with intent to defraud, whereas, in fact, the said piece of paper was not a bank note then current or good, or of the full value of 51. as the deft, then well knew. The second count stated that that the deft. falsely pretended to the said John Beal that there was then in existence a banking co-partnership of persons carrying on business as bankers under the name of the Stockton and Cleveland Bank, and that a piece of paper purporting to be a bank note of the Stockton and Cleveland Bank for the payment of 5., was then of value, by which false pretence the deft. then unlawfully obtained from the said John Beal 57. with intent to defraud, whereas then carrying on business as bankers under the in fact there was not any banking co-partnership was the said piece of paper of any value whatever, name of the Stockton and Cleveland Bank, nor as the deft. well knew. The fifth count stated that the deft. falsely pretended to one Walter Grimshaw that a piece of paper was a bank note then current and good, and available for 5., and then of the value of 51, by which false pretence the deft. then unlawfully obtained from the said Walter Grimshaw a boy's coat and a pair of leather leggings and 41. 7s. with intent to defraud, whereas in fact the said piece of paper was not a bank note then current or good, or of the value of 5l., as the deft then well knew. The sixth count stated that the deft. falsely pretended to the said Walter Grimshaw that there was then in existence a banking co-partnership carrying on business as bankers under the name of the Stockton and Cleveland Bank, and that a piece of paper purporting to be a bank note of the Stockton and Cleveland Bank for the payment of 51. was then of value, by which false pretence the deft. then unlawfully obtained from the said Walter Grimshaw a boy's coat and a pair of leather leggings and 44. 7s. in money, with intent to defraud, whereas in fact there was not any banking co-partership then carrying on business as bankers under the name of |