with the greatest impartiality, and moft ftrict neutrality, she would referve for herself the honour of mediating in a future pacification; an honour which this princefs enjoyed at the treaty of Teschen, and was equally the object of her wishes at the termination of the British war.'

Such is the account of the steps which led to the establishment of the Armed Neutrality, as delivered by the author of the Secret History before us. It appears from the whole, that the scheme was entirely the work of count Panin; and that it was originally repugnant to the inclinations of his royal miftrefs, who wished to favour the interefts of Great Britain. That her imperial majefty concealed from fir James Harris the change which had taken place in her councils, and even amufed him with flattering hopes of the Ruffian alliance, ought perhaps to be afcribed, not to any real difaffection towards the British nation, but to the fhame of avowing a resolution so inconfiftent with her former declarations.

The ftate-papers, annexed to the narrative, elucidate the progrefs of the Armed Neutrality among the confederating powers, and afford a fatisfactory account of the policy which actuated the feveral courts. The history of this memorable enterprise presents the world with an additional inftance of the fudden revolutions in politics, which are often produced in the cabinets of princes by intrigue or personal influence.

Jura Anglorum. The Rights of Englishmen. By F. Plowden, Efq. Conveyancer, of the Middle Temple. 8vo. 75. Boards. Brooke. 1792.

MR

R. Plowden appears to be fufficiently fenfible of the arduous nature of the fubject which he attempts to elucidate in the investigation now before us. That he has been at no fmall pains in conducting the enquiry, is evident from the number of writers whofe fentiments he adduces, and the various historical occurrences whence he derives the gradual progrefs of the English constitution. His profeffed defign, in the present work, is to give a faithful account of that political fabric, and to imprefs the minds of his countrymen. with the genuine principles of the Rights of Man, at a time when misguided politicians have endeavoured to propagate the most erroneous notions on the subject.

Our author fets out with taking a general view of the state of nature. This he confiders as a mere theoretical and metaphyfical state, which had never any real existence. In regard to this opinion, we have no hesitation to join with him; but we think he misconceives, in the following fentence, the doctrine

which he supposes to be entertained by the modern advocates for the Rights of Man. To ftate, fays he, the opinions of thefe philofophers upon the Rights of Man, in this ftate of nature, is to demonftrate, that they confidered it as pre-existing and antecedent to the phyfical ftate of man's real exiftence.' That the opinions of thofe men, refpecting the state of nature, are deftitute of foundation, it would indeed not be difficult to demonftrate, and the fubject has been repeatedly difcuffed; but that the most extravagant among fuch writers, could ever entertain the idea imputed to them by Mr. Plowden, is too abfurd to be credited. Our author feems to have been drawn into this mistake, by a mifinterpretation of the fubfequent paragraph in Montefquieu's Spirit of Laws:

Prior to all thofe laws are thofe of nature, fo called, because they derive their force entirely from our frame and being. In order to have a perfect knowledge of thefe laws, we must confider man before the establishment of fociety: the laws received in fuch a ftate would be thofe of nature."

By the word, prior, in the above quotation, is not meant a period antecedent to man's real existence, but antecedent to the state of fociety. This appears clearly from the reafon af figned by Montefquieu for the appellation of the laws of nature; viz. because they derive their force entirely from our frame and being.' We are, however, inclined to think, that Mr. Plowden's true meaning is not that which the words he has made use of actually bear, but that he has employed the word phyfical in a vague and uncommon fenfe; which is more furprifing, as, in other parts of the work, he is particularly careful to define the precife meaning of fuch terms as are of effential importance in the argument.

Whether we suppose the state of nature to be real or imaginary, its characteristic quality is independence, on which is founded the original right of voluntary fubmiflion to government. Our author obferves, that, in this theoretical, or fuppofed tranfition of man from the ftate of nature to the ftate of fociety, fuch natural rights, as the individual actually retains independently of the fociety, of which he is a member, are faid to be retained by him, as a part of those rights, which he is supposed to have poffeffed in the ftate of nature.' Thefe rights are specified to be the free and uncontrouled power of directing his animal motions; the intercourfe of the foul with its Creator; and the unreftrained freedom of thought: for fo long as an individual occasions no harm, and offers no offence to his neighbour, by the exercise of any of these rights, the fociety cannot controul nor check him in the free exercife of them.

• But

But, fays our author, it is as fingular, as it is unaccountable, that fome of the illuminating philofophers of the prefent day should, even under the prefent conftitution, claim and infift upon the actual exercise of these natural Rights of Man, when it is notorious, even to demonftration, that the exercife of them would be effentially deftructive of all political and civil liberty, could they be really brought into action. For it is felf evident, that the perfect equalization of mankind, fuch as is attributable to this imaginary and merely fpeculative itate of natural freedom, would prevent every individual from acquiring an exclusive right or property in any portion of this terraqueous globe, or in any other particle of matter, beyond that of his own corporeal frame. Liberty prefuppofes the poffibility of acquiring and reaping the advantages of property, a right of receiving and giving aid and protection; and a power of bettering one's own condition, and providing for one's family: it presupposes virtue, in holding out its rewards; and the rewards of virtue neceffarily induce diftinction and preference of the virtuous over others, which are ef fentially contradictory to perfect equalization. The extent of this propofition, men are all born equally free, muft include each individual human being, or it fays nothing; but it admits of no other, than that original fenfe of equality inherent in the meaphyfical effence of man, which is not applicable to the physical existence of focial man, fince it is effentially incompatible with the existence of fociety, which denominates man focial.'

The admiffion of these principles into the ftate of civil fociety would prevent the very poffibility of thofe focial virtues, out of which arifes the moral and political harmony of the univerfe. To view this with an impartial eye, we must make ample allowances for the exigencies, and even the foibles of human nature. We are fo conftituted by an all-wife Creator, that, although we act generally upon certain fundamental principles, that are effentially. invariable, yet the prevalence of early prejudices, the force of example and habit, the impulfe of paffion, and the allurementof pleasure, create a great diversity in the customs, manners, and actions of men. In fome focieties, the philanthropy of peace is never. broken into; others are in an uninterrupted ftate of warfare; fome focieties float in a fea of pleafurable delights, whilst others glory in the rudeft practices, of which their nature is capable; one fociety countenances only the embellishment of the mind, whil another encourages only the improvement of the body; fome focieties form themselves principally upon religious inftitu tions, whilst others fhew not even the most remote knowledge of a deity. It is then to be expected that our practical ideas of the civilized state of fociety will be generally drawn from the practical knowledge

knowledge, we have of different focieties. Under this influence," an Englishman will conceive no liberty, where there is no law, no property, no religion. The preservation of these conftitutes the fum total of those rights and liberties, for which he will even facrifice his life. Upon what ground then, fhall an Englishman, even in theory, admit principles into civil government, which would justify the peafant in feizing the lands of his lord, the fervant in demanding the property of his mafter, the labourer that of his employer, the robber in purloining his neighbour's purfe, the adulterer in defiling the wife of another, the outlawed in reviling, contemning, and violating the laws of the community.'

Mr. Plowden endeavours to fhew, that the altercations refpecting government have arifen from the words natural and nature being misunderstood or mifapplied; and he obferves, that if any other terms had been used to exprefs the natural rights of man, or the ftate of nature, the whole animofity of the difputants would have fubfided, under the conviction that neither differed in opinion fubftantially from the other. I have read over, fays he, moft of the late publications upon the fubject; and I do not find one of any note or confequence, that does not in fact and fubftance admit this ftate of nature, to which they annex or attribute thefe indefeafible rights of man, to be a mere imaginary ftate of fpeculation.' The fame, it must be acknowledged, to the difgrace of human reafon, has been the fate of the greatest number of fpeculative controverfies which have employed the attention of mankind.

Our author next proceeds to confider the ftate of fociety, after the inftitution of which the rights of individuals in the ftate of nature were transferred to the community. He re cites the opinions of different writers refpecting the origin of government; and infers from the whole, that the real bafis of political power, which exifts in each ftate, is the original compact, to delegate the rights, which were individually in the different members, in the ftate of nature, to thofe, whofe duty it should become, to rule, protect, and preferve the community. It would, he obferves, be nugatory to question the' reality of this original compact, becaufe the particular time and place, when and where it was exccuted, cannot be named, nor the written document in which it is expreffed, be produced for the fatisfaction and benefit of all future generations. But without proving the actual ratification of fuch a contract, it is fufficient for all the purpofes of political reafoning, to admit, in the room of it, a tacit confent of the members of a community, to establish amongft them any particular form of government. In treating of this fubject, our author makes the following just remark on the abfurd doctrine, that no parC. R. N. AR. (V.) Auguft, 1792. Hh

liament,

liament, or any other body of men, have a right to enact laws that fhall be binding upon pofterity; a doctrine equally false and deftructive of all political government,

Who does not fee, at the very first view of such doctrines, that, in order to give them effect, a new legiflation must be provided for the birth of each individual, if the former legiflation ceafes by the deaths of the legislating individuals, who framed it? For if we confider the real phyfical state of mankind, we shall, find that the fame hour, which terminates the existence of one, gives birth to another individual; there confequently cannot be one given inftant of time, in which government can be faid to ceafe by the demife of one, and revive by the birth of another.'

From the principles which Mr. Plowden endeavours to eftablish, he maintains that the British conftitution is founded upon the Rights of Man; and, in fupport of this affertion, he takes an extenfive view of the constitution and government of Great Britain; beginning the historical detail with the civil establishment of religion, concerning which he examines the opinions of different modern fectaries. The fubject which next engages his attention, is the legislative power; treating afterwards of the Revolution, with regard both to its principles and effects. In this part of the work we meet with feveral obfervations on Dr. Price's fermons at the Old Jewry; amongst which we fhall present our readers with the following, as relating to an object of controversy:

There is one more paffage in this much canvaffed fermon, which has given the higheft offence to Mr. Burke. "All things in this fulminating bull are not of fo innoxious a tendency. His doctrines affect our conftitution in the most vital parts. He tells the revolution fociety in this political fermon, that his majesty is almoft the only lawful king in the world, because the only one, who owes his crown to the choice of his people. This doctrine, (he fays), affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconftitutional pofition." I think it clear, that Dr. Price, by the words, owes his crown to the choice of his people, did not mean, that he owed his high office to any form of popular election, as Mr. Burke infinuates, which would have been notoriously false; but that our fovereign owes his crown and station to the free affent of the people, which is the efficient cause of every free conftitution; and this I take to be true, found, and genuine revolution doctrine; and as fuch was it exprefsly delivered by Mr. Locke, immediately after the revolution had taken effect.'

In the fucceeding chapters, our author treats of the fupreme executive power; the fupreme head of the church of

England;