Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics

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University of Michigan Press, 2000 - 556 oldal
A much-needed exploration of the New Institutional Economics, or NIE, including a critical assessment of its central theoretical contributions since the field's early beginnings in the 1960s, is this book's objective. It traces the development of major ideas about the genesis and significance of institutions as these ideas have been presented in the NIE. Given the fundamental understanding underlying work in this new area of research--that transactions involve the use of real resources and have costs--the book views the NIE as an amalgam of transaction-cost economics, property-rights analysis, and contract theory.
Efforts are made to explain how the various theoretical strands discussed in the NIE literature fit into the general fabric of modern institutionalism, and how the new concepts put forward can be applied to institutional analysis. Since the new institutionalist approach contrasts sharply with that of the traditional neoclassical model, special attention is given to elucidating the points of difference between the two. And, along these lines, a final chapter deals with the troubling question of whether neoinstitutionalist theory can be advanced by efforts to extend or generalize neoclassical theory.
The book will be essential reading for economists attracted to the NIE approach. In addition, scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance.
Eirik G. Furubotn is currently serving as Research Associate, University of Texas at Arlington; he recently retired as James L. West Professor of Economics, Texas A&M University. Rudolf Richter is Professor of Economics, Center for the Study of the New Institutional Economics, University of Saarlandes.

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Tartalomjegyzék

Introductory Observations
1
11 Some Basic Assumptions and Terms
2
12 The Strange World of Costless Transactions
8
13 The Ideal Type of the Classical Liberal State
11
14 The Ideal Type of Market Socialism
12
15 Constructed or Spontaneous Orders?
14
16 The Work of the Invisible Hand Can Be Accelerated
15
17 Rational Incompleteness
17
57 SelfEnforcing Agreements
239
58 Looking Back
246
59 Bibliographic Notes on Formal Contract Theory
250
510 Suggested Readings for Chapter 5
262
The New Institutional Economics Applied to Markets Firms and the State General Remarks
265
61 The Elementary Rules of a Private Ownership Economy
266
The Firm the Market and the State
269
63 A Brief Guide to the Literature on Order and Organization
278

18 Enforcement
19
19 The Political Process
21
110 Agency
22
111 Institutional Stability
23
112 Once More with Feeling
25
113 The New Institutional Economics and Modern Institutionalism
29
114 Some Notes on the History of the Old Institutional Economics
33
115 Suggested Readings for Chapter 1
37
Transaction Costs
39
21 The Concept of Transaction
41
Illustrations and Attempts at Definition
42
23 Guesstimating the Size of Transaction Costs
49
The Activity Transaction
54
25 Some Notes on the Development of the TransactionCost Literature
62
26 Suggested Readings for Chapter 2
67
Absolute Property Rights Ownership of Physical Objects
69
Some Basic Concepts
71
Illustrations and Attempts at Definition
76
The Private Property Issue
85
34 Common Pool Resources
98
35 The Emergence of Property Rights
104
Some Notes on the Literature
114
37 Suggested Readings for Chapter 3
119
Relative Property Rights Contractual Obligations
121
41 Basic Principles of Contractual Obligations
123
42 Diverse Types of Contractual Obligations
127
43 Some Elements of Contract Theory from the Economists Viewpoint
140
44 Three Types of Contract Theory
147
45 Resume
169
Some Notes on the Literature
172
47 Suggested Readings for Chapter 4
176
Contract Theory
179
51 Overview of the Types of Contract Theory to Be Discussed
181
The Expense Preference Model
183
Moral Hazard
186
Adverse Selection
202
55 Implicit Contracts
227
56 The Incomplete Contract Model
232
64 Suggested Readings to Chapter 6
281
The New Institutional Economics of the Market
283
71 The Market as Organization
284
72 On Price Rigidity
285
73 Market Organization as a Result of Market Cooperation
287
74 Some Views of Neoinstitutionalists on Market Organization
291
Conclusion and Outlook
312
76 A Brief Guide to the Literature on Market Organization
314
77 Suggested Readings for Chapter 7
319
The New Institutional Economics of the Firm
321
82 The Incentive to Integrate
328
83 The Limits of Integration
336
84 Ownership and Control
342
85 Institutional Models in the Tradition of the Neoclassical Theory of the Firm
354
86 The Traditional Soviet Firm
366
87 The Socialist LaborManaged Firm
375
88 Codetermination
389
Forerunners and First Steps
404
Summary and Main Literature beyond Coase
405
811 Suggested Readings for Chapter 8
410
The New Institutional Economics of the State
413
91 A Simple Neoclassical Theory of the State
414
92 The Role of Political Institutions
417
93 Political Markets
420
94 International Relations
423
95 A Brief Guide to the Literature on the Economics of the State and International Relations
430
96 Suggested Readings for Chapter 9
434
Future Development of the New Institutional Economics
435
101 Institutionalism as Extended Neoclassical Theory
439
102 The Initial Approach Reconsidered
441
103 The Basis of a New Paradigm
464
The Opportunities for Progress
477
Glossary
483
References
497
Author Index
539
Subject Index
547
Copyright

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Rudolf Richter is Professor Emeritus of Economics and Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany.

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