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actual analysis Aristotle branch of philosophy called categorical proposition Chapter character conceptual order constructive branch contradiction contraries copula determinations differentia direct consciousness distinction distinguished doctrine double aspect elements existence experience fact feelings Hegel Hume imagination individual induction inseparable instance intuition J. S. Mill Kant Kant's kind knowledge Leibniz Lewes logical Maimon matter means metaphysic metempirical method mind mode of consciousness namely nature ness nexus not-A noumena noumenon object-matter objective aspects observation Ontology Parmenides perceived percept and concept pheno phenomena philo portion positive possible predicate present primary consciousness principle principle of contradiction problems propositions psychology pure question racter reasoning reflective consciousness reflective perception relation Scholasticism sciousness second intentions sensation sense separate sequence sophy space spontaneous redintegration subjective and objective supposed syllogism theory Thing-in-itself things Things-in-themselves Thomists thought tion tive true truth unknowable verification volition whole words
53. oldal - THE baby new to earth and sky, What time his tender palm is prest Against the circle of the breast, Has never thought that " this is I :" But as he grows he gathers much, And learns the use of "I," and "me," And finds "I am not what I see, And other than the things I touch.
64. oldal - While, under its objective aspect, Psychology is to be classed as one of the concrete sciences which successively decrease in scope as they increase in speciality; under its subjective aspect, Psychology is a totally unique science, independent of, and antithetically opposed to, all other sciences whatever.
415. oldal - I think no statement could have been made more opposite to the undoubted facts of the case, that mathematical analysis is constantly invoking the aid of new principles, new ideas, and new methods, not capable of being defined by...
23. oldal - It is a dull and obtuse mind, that must divide in order to distinguish ; but it is a still worse, that distinguishes in order to divide.
70. oldal - Each feeling, as we here define it, is any portion of consciousness •which occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a perceivable individuality...
71. oldal - Obviously if it is indistinguishable from an adjacent portion of consciousness, it forms one with that portion — is not an individual feeling, but part of one. And obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable area, or an appreciable duration, it cannot be known as a feeling.
354. oldal - In .every induction we proceed from truths which we knew, to truths which we did not know; from facts certified by observation, to facts which we have not observed, and even to facts not capable of being now observed; future facts, for example; but which we do not hesitate to believe on the sole evidence of the induction itself.
191. oldal - ... a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has become clear that while the nature of this Power cannot be known — while we lack the faculty of framing even the dimmest conception of it, yet its universal presence is the absolute fact without which there can be no relative facts.