1844.-Maden v. Veevers. the several last mentioned documents, papers, and writings, or any or either of them, and she declined so to do." A motion was made for the production of these documents. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Rogers, for the plaintiffs. Mr. Turner and Mr. Bacon, contra. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS reserved judgment. July 31.-THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS:-In this case, production is sought for the documents stated in the second part of the schedule to the defendant's answer; she says, that they relate exclusively to the dispute between her and the plaintiffs respecting the title to the estate in question, and that they were all prepared and made since the dispute arose, in contemplation of the litigation of that dispute, and her defence against [*491] the plaintiff's claim. If these documents *were cases laid before counsel, and statements made by or for her legal advisers, or communications made between her and her solicitor, merely in the relation of solicitor and client, she would be entitled to protection; but that is not said, and the answer does not bring her within the rule.[1] With regard to the other documents, which show the manner in which she has dealt with her own share of the property, I am of opinion, that the plaintiffs, as tenants in common, have an interest in them, if it be only for the purpose of ascertaining who are tenants in common with them.[2] [1] Hughes v. Biddulph, 4 Russ. 190; Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 Myl. & K. 88; S. C., Coop. Sel. Cas. 19; Nias v. The Northern and Eastern Railway Company, 3 Myl. & Cr. 356; S. C., 2 Keen, 76; Storey v. Lord George Lennox, 1 Keen, 341; Greenlaw v. King, 1 Beav. 137, 145; Bunbury v. Bunbury, 2 Beav. 173; Flight v Robinson, 8 Beav. 22; Kerr v. Gillespie, post, 572; Herring v. Clobery, 1 Phillips, 91; Smith v. Duke of Beaufort, id. 209, 219, et seq.; Steele v. Stewart, id. 471; Holmes v. Baddely, 1 Phillips, 476; S. C., 6 Beav. 521; The Mayor, &c. of Dartmouth v. Holdsworth, 10 Sim. 475; Clagett v. Phillips, 2 Yo. & Coll. C. C. 82; Lord Walsingham v. Goodricke, 3 Hare, 122. [2] As to the right of a plaintiff to the production of documents affecting his title, 1844.-Maden v. Veevers. I am therefore of opinion that the documents mentioned in the schedule must be produced. IN RE WATTS. 1844: March 23. Special direction given on an order for taxation, that if the solicitor should be unable to establish any of the charges by reason of the death of his clerk, or the absence of the books and papers delivered to the client, the taxing master should report specially thereon. THIS was a petition for the taxation of five bills of costs. One of the objections was, that the solicitor would be unable to establish some of his charges, in consequence of the death of his clerk, and of the books and papers having been delivered to the petitioner and to other persons jointly liable who had become bankrupt. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Bagshawe, for the petition. Mr. Turner and Mr. Elmsley, contra. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS having ordered the taxation, directed, that if the taxing master should find, that with respect to any of the items in any of the five bills of costs, Mr. Watts should be unable to establish any of *his charges, by reason of the death of Oliver Orlando Scott in the affidavit of Mr. Watts named, or the absence of the books and papers stated in the said affidavit to have been delivered to the petitioner [*492] or supporting his claim, see Bolton v. The Corporation of Liverpool, 1 Myl. & K. 88; S. C. Coop. Sel. Cas. 19; Burrell v. Nicholson, 1 Myl. & K. 680; Adams v. Fisher, 3 Myl. & Cr. 526; The Attorney General v. Strutt, 3 Beav. 396; Herey v. Ferrers, 4 Beav. 97; Balls v. Margrave, id. 119; Gill v. Eyton, ante, 155; Bannatyne v. Lander, 10 Sim. 230; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Phillips, 501; S. C. 13 Sim. 632; Combe v. The Mayor &c. of London, 1 Yo. & Coll. C. C. 631; Smith v. Duke of Beaufort, 1 Hare, 507; Llewellyn v. Badely, id. 527; Neesom v. Clarkson, 2 Hare, 166; Greenwood v. Rothwell, ante 291, 295, n. 1. 1844. In re Watts. or the said other bankrupts, the said taxing master should report specially thereon to the court. Where the only gift to a class consisted of a direction to divide and pay, upon the death of the tenant for life: Held, upon the context, that those only took who survived such tenant for life. A testator made a direct gift of his real and personal estate to his wife for life, and after her death he directed his executors to sell and "divide and equally pay" the produce amongst a class of children; and in case of the death of any of the children in the lifetime of the wife, leaving issue, he directed his executors to "pay" unto the issue, his parent's share. Held, that those children and issue were alone entitled who survived the tenant for life. THIS bill was filed by the three plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other persons interested in the freehold and copyhold estate of a testator, except the defendants. The testator, by his will dated in 1801, gave and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to his wife for her life; and immediately after her decease, he directed his executors to sell his freeholds, &c., and his household furniture, &c., and to call in moneys, and invest a sufficient sum in consols to answer the three annuities, which annuities, in case of the deaths of the annuitants, were to fall into the residue of his personal estate, and be divided as after mentioned. The testator proceeded as follows:-" And with respect [*493] to the residue of the produce of the sale of my said *freehold, copyhold, or leasehold estates, household furniture, books, plate, linen, and china, and other household stuff, hereinbefore directed to be sold, and money due upon bonds or otherwise, and other the rest, residue, and remainder of my real and personal estate, I direct my executors to divide and equally pay the same, to and amongst all and every the children born in lawful wedlock of my brothers and sisters, and to and amongst 1844.-Beck v. Burn. all and every the children born in lawful wedlock of my said dear wife's brothers and sisters, share and share alike. And my further will and meaning is, that in case of the death of any or either of the above-mentioned children in the lifetime of my said dear wife, leaving issue, then and in that case, I hereby direct my said executors, to pay unto the issue of such child or children his, her, or their parents' share equally between them, share and share alike. And my further will and meaning is, that as the several annuitants die, I hereby direct that their said annuities, as they respectively fall into the residue of my personal estate, and the stock wherein they are invested, shall go and be equally divided amongst all and every the children above mentioned, and the issue of such deceased child or children, share and share alike." The testator died in 1818, at which time all the brothers and sisters both of himself and wife were dead. His widow died in 1837. William Wilson, a nephew of the testator, died in his lifetime. Samuel Verry, a nephew of the testator's wife, died in her lifetime without leaving any issue, and Robert Stone, a nephew of the widow, also died in the widow's lifetime. *Mr. Spence and Mr. Wood, for the plaintiffs. [*494] The life estate is given to the wife directly, and there is no gift to the trustees until her death. There is no gift whatever to the class, except in the direction to divide and pay, and, therefore, there was no vesting until the period at which the sale, division, and payment were to take place; consequently those only who survived the tenant for life attained vested interests, and became entitled to participate in the fund. Mr. Turner and Mr. Maxwell, contra, contended, that there was a gift to a class, which vested immediately on the death of the testator, and that the payment alone was postponed for the convenience of the estate. That, therefore, the representatives of those who survived the testator, but died in the lifetime of the widow, were entitled to share in the fund. The following cases were cited: Billingsley v. Wills,(a) Vi(a) 3 Atk. 219. 1844.-Beck v. Burn. ner v. Francis,(a) Batsford v. Kebbell, (b) Walker v. Main,(c) Leeming v. Sherratt, (d) Gray v. Garman,(e) Hallifax v. Wilson.(g) Mr. Stinton, Mr. Elderton, Mr. Shebbeare, Mr. Cory, Mr. Ellis, and Mr. Miller, for other parties. Mr. Spence, in reply. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS reserved judgment. [*495] *March 23.-THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS :-The testator in this will has described a class of children, amongst whom the residuary estate is to be divided, after the death of his wife, to whom he has given his real and personal estate for life. He has made no direct gift to the children, nor to any trustee for them; but he has directed the whole to be sold and "divided and equally paid" amongst the children, &c. I am of opinion, upon the construction of this will, that the direction to "divide and pay" applies to such persons only as might answer the description at the time of distribution; and that the class to take, consists of such children as should be living at the death of the wife, and the issue of any who should die in the lifetime of the wife, leaving issue, such issue being living at the period of distribution. The effect therefore is, that the children who died in the lifetime of the tenant for life, and their issue who died in the lifetime of the tenant for life, are excluded. I do not say that in all cases where there is only a direction to "pay," it excludes all those who may not be living at the time of distribution. That must always depend on the context of the will.[1] DECREE. Declare, that the residuary estate "was divisible amongst such only of the children of the testator's brothers and sisters, and of his widow's brothers and sisters, (a) 2 B. C. C. 658, and 2 Cox, 190. (b) 3 Ves. 363, 364. (c) 1 Jac. & W. 1. (d) 2 Hare, 14. (g) 16 Ves. 171. [1] As to the proposition that the interest in a gift does not become vested, where the gift itself arises merely from the direction to pay-and as bearing upon the |