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panic, would not prices have fallen ? They would have fallen, but they would have fallen in detail and gradually, without producing, speaking comparatively, much injury. There was a stock of commodities sufficiently heavy for reducing them. The Bank spread the alarm, by drawing in its notes; the conviction was produced that prices must fall; and a vague idea took possession of the public mind, that the nation would be ruined by the loss of its gold. A very large part of the evil was produced solely by the run for gold. If cash payments had been suspended when the pressure for money began, there would have been comparatively but little run upon the Banks, scarcity of money, bankruptcy, and distress. The run upon the Banks was occasioned, in a large degree, not by doubts of their solvency, but by a desire to possess the gold. Those who joined in the run merely to obtain the gold, had no use for it. They were actuated by ignorant groundless alarm; they kept the gold in idleness for a few weeks, and then they parted with it. They thus jointly abstracted an enormous mass of capital from trade and manufactures, to the incalculable injury of the country, without deriving the least benefit from it.

If cash payments had been suspended, as we have said, prices would still have fallen sufficiently, but they would have fallen slowly. The mass of capital which was called in from the Banks merely to be hoarded, would have remained with them to support the holders of goods. The season for large imports was passing away, and that for large exports was approaching. In a very short time the exchanges would have taken a favourable turn, and an import of gold would have taken place, while the country would have escaped a very large part of the ruin and misery which befel it.

This expedient of the metallic people is the most exquisite and perfect one that human ingenuity could devise for re-plunging the country into ruin and suffering, as often as it may be able to emerge from them. A few months of public prosperity are pretty sure, particularly under the free-trade system, to produce in the latter part of the year an export of gold. The newspapers instantly raise the cla

mour-the Banks pull in their notes the capitalists call from the Banks their money-the run begins-and the country is speedily filled with bankruptcy and distress. All this takes place without any valid reason it takes place merely to keep that gold in the country which is not wanted for use, and which, if nothing were done, would soon return after being exported. It matters not how prosperous agriculture, trade, and manufactures, may be, their prosperity must be destroyed solely because useless gold is exported.

These are some of the doctrines which have placed the Country Banks in their present situation. The latter, by the suppression of their small notes, and the establishment of the Branch Banks, are to be deprived of all leading influences of the currency; and the currency is to be placed under the control of the Bank of England. The Bank religiously acts on the doctrine, that its issues ought to be regulated by the exchanges; and, of course, whenever the latter are unfavourable, it will contract the currency throughout the country at the same moment to bring down prices. A more mischievous and ruinous power it could not possess.

We will now glance at the general character of the Country Banks.

In a former Article, entitled Public Distress, we called the country bankers "a body of men second to none in integrity, respectability, and claims upon the gratitude of the country." We repeat it here. Speaking of them generally, they are men of great opulence. The partners of almost every Bank possess among them landed property of great value. In general, each Bank, looked at with reference to its engagements, is solid and wealthy. Exceptions there are; it is not in the nature of things, that 600 or 800 establishments, situated in different parts, doing business in different circumstances, and having different means of making profit, should be equally rich. Many Banks exist in places where a large capital cannot be employed, and large profits cannot be made; a Bank may commence with abundant property, and through losses, or the withdrawal of partners, become weak and insecure. But the exceptions are few, and they consist chiefly of Banks which possessed sufficient property

when first established. A new Bank cannot hope to obtain connexions sufficient to keep it in being, if it be not known to be reasonably wealthy. As to the trash which has been propagated, that Banks are established in the country by swindlers, men destitute of property, &c. &c. it is beneath contempt.

Putting aside runs, the legitimate business of a Country Bank is attended with little risk and expense. It has nothing to do with speculative buying and selling. If the Bank lend money, it lends on good information and security; and nothing but bad management can make it lose much by bad debts. Its profits are fixed and certain. If it act with moderate prudence, it is scarcely possible for its own bu siness to render it insolvent, or to diminish its property.

We have known various Country Banks fail, but we never knew one that failed through losses caused by its legitimate banking business. The partners in one were perhaps merchants, as well as bankers; and their mercantile transactions ruined them, while their Bank was highly prosperous. The monied partner of another was perhaps extensively engaged in trade, and his trade rendered him insolvent, while the Bank gave him a handsome revenue. The partners of a third, perhaps, lost their property by some wild speculation in corn or some other article, while their Bank flourished. We believe it will be generally found, that if a Bank fail from any other cause than unwarrantable run, it fails from trafficking and speculation in matters having no connexion with its legitimate banking business.

What suggestion does this furnish towards increasing the stability of the Banks? This every banker ought to be strictly bound from entering into trade and manufactures, and from engaging in trading speculations; he ought to be strictly confined to his business as a banker. When its failure brings such heavy evils on the community, a Bank ought to be prohibited to the utmost from plunging into perils which do not in any way flow from its own business. Much has been said in favour of increasing the number of partners in the Banks, as a means of increasing their wealth and solidity. We are ourselves friendly to

joint-stock Banks, less from their greater wealth, than because their nature protects them, in a great mea sure, from being injured by speculation. But we are not sure that any increase of partners in the Country Banks would yield material benefit.

An increase of partners would bring to a Bank no increase of regular business worth mentioning. Many Banks are so situated, that no increase of capital could gain them new accounts, or enable them to put out more notes. The additional capital gained from its new partners by a Bank, would, perhaps, lead it into speculation, and cause it to be inore insecure.

Such trafficking and speculation as we have named, and unwarrantable run, form almost the only causes which ruin Banks. If they could be protected from these, they would rarely fail. We have already spoken of a remedy for the first cause, and we will now speak of one for the second. We do not mean, by unwarrantable run, a run which occasionally takes place on a single Bank, from wellfounded doubts of its stability; we mean an almost general run, like that of 1825, arising from groundless fears, and erroneous opinions.

Without a moment's notice, a demand is made upon a Bank for the payment of its notes, balances, and deposits, in gold. It is scarcely in the nature of things, that the most opulent one should be prepared to meet such a demand, particularly as three or four days are necessary for enabling many of the Banks to communicate with London. The Bank has lent the deposits, value of the notes, &c. and cannot immediately recall the amount; it has land, but this is not available; it has bills, &c. which it sends to London to buy gold with, but there is a run on most of the Banks for gold, the London Banks are pressed, the Bank of England cannot provide gold with sufficient rapidity, and the bills are refused on the excuse that confidence is destroyed. The Bank has funded property which has just fallen very greatly in consequence of the run, but which it is compelled to sell at a very heavy loss. The run causes it a loss, from first to last, of some thousands. Perhaps it becomes bankrupt with property sufficient to pay 30s. or 40s. in the pound: then a handsome fortune is wasted in law

and other expenses, bad management of assignees, forced sales of land, &c. in bad times, &c. &c. until the creditors, after waiting a year or two, cannot obtain 20s. in the pound.

Putting out of sight general runs, like that of 1825, Bank failures are of rare occurrence. The failure of one Bank, or of a couple of Banks, in a year, is not felt by the community at large. Even the solitary failures, which take place between general runs, are often caused by these runs ; the Bank gets so much weakened by the general run, that it cannot reCover itself; and after struggling for a year or two, it sinks.

No one can need convincing, that the Banks ought to be protected to the utmost from these runs, for the sake of the community. Bank-notes ought to be convertible into gold on demand, so long as the gold is wanted for use, and the community at large is not injured. Here the line should be drawn. The moment the probability appears, that a general run will take place on the Banks for gold, not for use, but to lock it up in idleness for a few weeks, from groundless fears, cash payments should be suspended. The suspension need not continue longer than a month or two: not a soul would be injured by it, and it would yield incalculable benefit to the community. Bank-notes would still be generally convertible into gold on demand; the suspension would only create an occasional exception to the general rule. During its continuance, Country bank-notes ought to be payable on demand in notes of the Bank of England.

This would protect the Banks from general run, merely for the sake of gold.

With regard to general run, caused by panic and the destruction of confidence, the Bank of England would have no difficulty in providing the Country Banks with notes, if relieved for the time from the obligation of paying in gold. The Government ought to stand forward promptly, and throw its shield over the Banks; it ought to lend liberally to every Bank, which could offer fair security in land, stock, bills, &c. By this the Banks would be protected from loss; they would be able, without making any material sacrifice, to provide Bank of England notes in

abundance to meet the demands upon them. It would be far better for the Treasury to lose a few thousands, than for the community to lose what it lost from the run in 1825. But if the Treasury should lose a few thousands by the Banks, it would gain far more by the revenue. We must not be mistaken; we are calling for the interference of Government in cases of general run only; and we are only calling for it, in order that it may avert an immense mass of national calamity and distress. By supporting the Banks, Government would render the most efficient support to trade and manufactures.

To the scheme of compelling the Banks to give security to Government for the amount of the notes they issue, we are strongly opposed. It gives to one part of a Bank's creditors a most unjust advantage over the other part. The evils which flow from the failure of a Bank consist in but a small degree of the loss they occasion to the holders of its notes. The poorer part of the working classes seldom have a bank-note in their possession longer than a few hours; and if the small notes be suppressed, they will scarcely ever hold a bank-note. The currency of a town or district generally consists of the notes of several Banks, so that, if one fail, its notes form only part of the money which traders happen to hold. The loss sustained by the holding of notes is shared amidst a great number of individuals, and only a few suffer from it severely. The great losers are those who keep accounts with a Bank, and have in it balances and deposits; through the losses sustained by these, the working classes lose, by being deprived of employment. The scheme we have mentioned, by paying the least sufferers in full, would pay scarcely anything to the greatest. Suppose a Bank should fail, and owe in notes £40,000, and in other ways £80,000, and should have assets to pay 10s. in the pound, the note holders would get 20s. in the pound, and the other creditors only 5s. The man holding a five pound note, which he could lose without injury, would be paid in full; but the owner of a balance or deposit of £500, or £5000, whom the loss would ruin, would only receive one-fourth of his money.

The suppression of small notes will

be worthless in protecting the Banks from run; this was abundantly proved in 1825, by the failure of the London Banks. It will deprive the Banks of a considerable part of their profits, and, in consequence, take away the inducement for rich men to become partners in them; it will thus diminish their solidity. As a measure for preventing high prices and speculation, it is destitute of efficacy. It will deprive the smaller merchants, manufacturers, and tradesmen, of a large part of their means of doing business; it will do grievous injury to trade and manufactures; but, in its general operation, it will favour speculation and high prices. A manufacturer, by means of additional capital, may do twice the business in one year which he did in a previous one, without raising his prices in the least; and the country, as a whole, may, by additional capital, double its business, and even reduce its prices. Nothing ever contributed more powerfully to bring down the monopoly-prices of capitalists, than bank-notes. The suppression is a most uncalled for and pernicious measure.

Of the Bank of England, as what it has been, we have nothing to say but praise; but we protest against its Branches. We wish it to flourish, as it has flourished, the head, friend, and supporter of the Country Banks; but not their rival, enemy, and destroyer. As to what is said of the formation of some rival National Bank, we hope the country will never see any such establishment. It would be a fearful thing for the community, were many millions of the paper currency issued by an unwieldy Bank, having its funds, stability, and management beyond the inspection and control of Government. Such competition and rivalry amidst Banks can never yield anything but injury to both them and the empire.

We cannot conclude, without offering our thanks to the Country Banker who has favoured us with his friendly

On

and sensible communications. the point of security he will see he had mistaken us. We are aware of the difficulties in which his brethren were involved when they were sacrificed; but we still think they ought, even without hope, to have vindicated their character, and asserted their rights. John Bull is mightily eccentric, and he is, moreover, vastly unmanageable when the fit is on him; but, nevertheless, he loves from his heart truth, and right, and justice. We did not mean that the competition between the Branch Banks and the Country ones was one of equality. We said it was a competition like that to which the silk manufacturers and ship-owners had been exposed, viz. one that gave advantages to the one side, ruinous to the other. We thought the country bankers acted most indiscreetly in alluding, as a body, to what they called "liberal and enlightened principles of trade." They knew that these principles were matter of controversy, and that the application of them was on the point of being carried from its trifling beginnings, to the vital question of agriculture. It was not for them to travel out of their case, or to give offence to the only men likely to befriend them in Parliament.

What we said was not, however, intended, or calculated to deprive the country bankers of friends; and, we are pretty sure, they will not suffer from what we have written. They will, we even think, profit from it, if anything we have said cause them, in their future proceedings, to confine themselves strictly to their own question. To men like our respectable and able correspondent, our admonition does not apply. He is a man of the right stamp; and we heartily wish that all his brethren, and not them alone, but all our fellow-subjects, were of his opinions. The empire would then soon regain its wealth, prosperity, and happiness.

THE SHEPHERD'S CALENDAR. CLASS IX.

Fairies, Brownies, and Witches.

BY THE ETTRICK SHEPHERD.

IN this class of my pastoral legends, I must take a date, in some instances, a century earlier than the generality of those of the other classes, and describe a state of manners more primitive and visionary than any I have witnessed, simple and romantic as these have been; and I must likewise relate scenes so far out of the way of usual events, that the sophisticated gloss and polish thrown over the modern philosophic mind, may feel tainted by such antiquated breathings of superstition. Nevertheless, be it mine to cherish the visions that have been, as well as the hope of visions yet in reserve, far in the ocean of eternity, beyond the stars and the sun. For, after all, what is the soul of man without these? What but a cold phlegmatic influence, so inclosed within the walls of modern scepticism, as scarcely to be envied by the spirits of the beasts that perish?

However, as all my legends hitherto have been founded on facts, or are of themselves traditionary tales that seem originally to have been founded on facts, I should never have thought of putting the antiquated and visionary tales of my friends, the Fairies and Brownies, among them, had it not been for the late advice of a highly valued friend, who held it as indispensable, that these most popular of all traditions by the shepherd's ingle-side, should have a place in his Calendar. At all events, I pledge myself to relate nothing that has not been handed down to me by tradition. How these traditions have originated, I leave to the professors of moral philosophy, in their definitions of pneumatology, to determine.

The following incidents are related as having occurred at a shepherd's house, not a hundred miles from St Mary's Loch; but, as the descendants of one of the families still reside in the vicinity, I deem it requisite to use names which cannot be recognised, save by those who have heard the story.

John Allanson, the farmer's son of Inverlawn, was a handsome, roving, and incautious young man, enthusiastic, amorous, and fond of adventure, and one who could hardly be said to fear the face of either man, woman, or spirit. Among other love adventures, he fell a-courting Mary Burnet, of Kirkstyle, a most lovely and innocent maiden, and one who had been bred up in rural simplicity. She loved him, but yet she was afraid of him; and though she had no objection to meeting with him among others as oft as convenient, yet she carefully avoided meeting him alone, though often and earnestly urged to it. One day, the sinful young man, finding an opportunity, at Our Lady's Chapel, after mass, urged his suit for a private meeting so ardently, and with so many vows of love and sacred esteem, that poor Mary was won; at least so far won, as to promise, that perhaps she would come and meet him.

The trysting place was a little green sequestered spot, on the very verge of the lake, well known to many an angler, and to none better than the writer of this old tale; and the set time when the King's Elwand (now foolishly termed the Belt of Orion) set his first golden knob above the hill. Allanson came too early; for his heart yearned to clasp his beloved Mary all alone; and he watched the evening autumnal sky with such eagerness and devotion, that he thought every little star that arose in the southeast the top knob of the King's Elwand; but no second one following in the regular time, he began to think the Gowden Elwand was lost for that night, or withheld by some spiteful angel, out of envy at the abundance of his promised enjoyment. The Elwand did at last arise in good earnest, and then the youth, with a heart palpitating with agitation, had nothing for it but to watch the heathery brow by which bonny Mary Burnet was to descend. No Mary Burnet made her appear

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