Held, that the first vessel had not
contributed by negligence to the colli-
sion.
Where the master of a ship takes all
such precautions as a man of ordinary
prudence and skill, exercising reason-
able foresight, would use to avert dan-
ger, his owners are not held responsible
because he may have omitted some
possible precaution which the event
suggests that he might have resorted to.
9. When the authorities of a port permit
vessels to moor, take in and discharge
cargo at a certain buoy, it must be as-
sumed that they sanction the use of
the buoy and treat it as a proper and
sufficient mooring place. Doward v.
Lindsay.
10. A large steamship, bound for a for-
eign port and fully equipped for her
voyage, left dock in the port of Liver-
pool about 11 p.m. She had a pilot on
board, and those in charge of her in-
tended to take her out to sea at once.
But after she got into the river it was
determined that she should anchor there
for the night, and cross the bar in the
morning. The pilot remained on board,
and by his direction the vessel was
brought up by her port anchor and sixty
fathoms of chain. The ebb tide began
to make soon after the vessel was brought
up, and the pilot remained on deck un-
til she was three-parts swung to the
ebb. He then went into a house on the
deck under the bridge, and left orders
that he was to be called if he was
wanted. Whilst he was in the deck-
house the vessel parted her cable; the
pilot came on deck almost immediately
afterwards, and under his directions
efforts were made to bring the vessel
up by her starboard anchor, but it did
not hold, and although her fires were
banked and steam was up, the vessel
was allowed to drift down the river un-
til she came into collision with a ship at
anchor :
Held, that the pilot was to blame for
the collision, and that the vessel was
"proceeding to sea" within the mean-
ing of the Mersey Docks Consolidation
Act, 1858, so as to render the employ-
ment of the pilot compulsory by law.
The City of Cambridge.
11. A screw steamship had just come out
of the Regent's Canal Dock in the river
Thames, about 2 a.m. on a December
morning, when she came into collision
with a dumb barge which was drifting
up the river with the flood tide, and
without having any light exhibited:
Held, that the steamship might, under
the circumstances, have kept out of the
way of the barge, and that she ought
to have done so, and that she was alone
to blame for the collision. The Owen
Wallis.
652
12. A steam ferry-boat started in a dense
fog to cross a navigable river, those in
charge of her having been informed that
vessels were anchored in or near her
track. The ferry-boat, although navi-
gated with all ordinary care, ran into
and damaged a ship at anchor :
Held, that the ferry-boat was to
blame. The Lancashire.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
See CORPORATION, 909.
COMMISSION.
See EXHIBITS, 441.
1. The plaintiffs sent to the defendant
an invoice for barley, which stated that
the barley was bought by the defen-
dant of the plaintiffs through G. as
broker, and also a delivery order, which
made the barley deliverable to the
order of the consignor or consignee.
The defendant had not in fact ordered
any barley of the plaintiffs. G. called
on the defendant, who showed him the
documents, and told him it was a mis-
take. G. said that it was so, and asked
the defendant to indorse the order to
him, for the purpose, as he said of sav-
ing the expense of obtaining a fresh de-
livery order. The defendant indorsed
the order to G., who possessed himself
of the barley and disposed of it, and
then absconded.
On the trial of an action of trover
for the barley, the jury found that the
defendant had no intention of appro-
priating the barley to his own use, but
indorsed the order for the purpose of
correcting what he believed to be an
error, and returning the barley to the
plaintiffs:
Held, that the defendant having in-
dorsed the order without any occasion
to do so, and without authority, was
liable. Hiort v. Bott,
See TROVER, 505.
TRUST AND TRUSTEES, 848.
1. The directors of a company entered
into an agreement with A. to sell him
the business and assets of the
company,
upon the terms that the directors should
forthwith call an extraordinary meet-
ing and endeavor to get the sanction
of the shareholders to the carrying out
the sale, and that on such sanction be-
ing obtained he should pay the directors
£250 in cash, and if he should succeed
in establishing a new company for the
same purpose, should, within three
months from the allotment of shares,
pay a further sum of £1,250 in cash,
and £2,000 in fully paid-up shares of the
new company. The company, at an ex-
traordinary general meeting, passed a
resolution for affixing the seal of the
company to the agreement, which was
done, and A. paid the £250:
A married woman having a power of
appointment over certain funds, exe-
cuted the same by will in favor of her
husband. The funds were handed over
to the husband in the lifetime of his
wife, and by him transferred to the
trustees of a settlement made in antici-
pation of the marriage of his adopted
daughter.
The husband survived his
wife, but did not prove her will, and
died possessed of property of only
nominal value. Subsequently his repre-
sentative propounded the will of the
married woman and was opposed by
her next of kin. A copy of it was pro-
nounced for, and the costs of the next
of kin ordered to be paid out of the de-
ceased's estate:
Held, that there was no property out
of which such costs could be paid. Ad
amson v. Hammond.
620
See ADMIRALTY, 663.
CRIMINAL LAW, 601.
DIVORCE, 613.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS, 787.
MARSHALLING ASSETS, 881.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 35.
1. The owner of some land sold a part of
it and entered into an agreement with
the purchaser that an adjoining plot of
land "should never be hereafter sold,
but left for the common benefit of both
parties and their successors:"
Held, that this was merely an agree-
ment that the plot of land should be 4.
left open, in the state in which it then
was, for the common advantage of both
parties, and that such an agreement did
not contravene any rule of law, but gave
the person who might hold the vendee's
land, the right to enforce the obligation
against the person who might hold the
vendor's land. Thus the former might
apply to a court of equity to order the
removal of a structure that had been
placed on the plot in violation of the
agreement.
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8. In 1844 the defendant was party to a
twenty-one years' lease of coal mine,
which gave certain powers over the sur-
face incidental to the working of those
mines and an adjoining colliery. The
coals so demised were substantially
worked out before September, 1845.
In October, 1845, the defendant sold
and conveyed the land to J., who knew
of the workings, and the defendant cov-
enanted with him for title, for quiet en-
joyment, and against incumbrances.
In July, 1846, J. sold and conveyed to
the plaintiff, who was ignorant of the 7.
workings. In 1865, in consequence of
the mining operations above described,
the land subsided, and houses built on
it by J. and the plaintiff were damaged.
In 1848, subsequently to the plain-
tiff becoming owner of the land, and
within twenty years before action, the
lessees, or persons acting under their
authority, entered the mines and took
some fire-clay (which was not included
in the demise) and a few loose pieces of
coal.
In an action brought on the above
covenants, the declaration in which
alleged that whilst the plaintiff was seised
the lessees entered upon the land, and
worked, got, and carried away the coal,
whereby the plaintiff lost the coal, and
the land subsided:
Held (by the court), that as to the
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoy-
ment by the removal of coal which
caused the subsidence, there was a fatal
variance between the declaration and
the evidence, which under the circum-
stances the court declined to amend.
By Bramwell and Cleasby, BB.: First,
that the fact of the coals having been
worked out was no breach of the cov-
enant for title, J. never having bought
those coals; that the subsistence of the
lease in respect of the coal left un-
wrought and the powers (not exercised)
incident to the working of other col-
lieries, did not constitute a breach; that
the breach (if any) was complete in the
time of J., and (by Bramwell, B.) that
the action was barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
Secondly, that neither the acts of tres-
pass in taking the fire-clay, in 1848, nor
the subsidence caused in 1865 by the
workings in 1845, were breaches of the
covenant for quiet enjoyment, on the
ground that the first was a mere tres-
pass, and that as to the second, the sub-
sidence gave no new cause of action; the
principle of Bonomi v. Backhouse (9 H.
L. C., 503) not applying to a case where
the subsidence is caused by a wrongful
taking of the plaintiff's minerals.
By Kelly, C.B. First, that the sub-
sistence of the lease was a continuing
breach of the covenant for title, in re-
spect of which the plaintiff was enti-
tled to nominal damages.
Secondly, that the removal of the small
pieces of coal, in 1848, was a breach of
the covenant for quiet enjoyment, in re-
spect of which the plaintiff was also en-
titled to nominal damages.
8. Thirdly, that, the removal of the coal
by the lessees being lawful, the subsi-
dence in 1865 gave a new cause of action
to the plaintiff. Spoor v. Green. 540
Bankrupt. On the 21st of December,
1872, the prisoner executed an assign-
ment of the property upon his farm to
trustees for the benefit of certain of his
creditors. The assignment was not
registered as a bill of sale, and the
prisoner continued in occupation of the
farm, and in possession of the property
assigned, under an agreement with the
trustees by which he was to hold pos
session as their bailiff. On the 14th,
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