Peking, where, from all reports, he read the riot act to a group of Americans who had permitted themselves and their Government to be placed in such a ridiculous position. Investigation disclosed that the British adviser to the President of China had drafted the treaty of alliance in anticipation of the hostilities which then seemed unavoidable, and when abroad on an official mission connected with the Washington Conference had exhibited the document to the Prime Minister of Canada and other high British officials in order to strengthen his own propaganda for the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Subsequently Japan was again accused of inaugurating an extensive programme of cruiser-construction, in addition to building a fleet of auxiliary vessels whose relative value had been proportionately increased by the restriction of battleship tonnage, thus violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the Washington Conference in a manner which very materially affects the efficacy of the agreement. Once again Japan was held up to world criticism for alleged disloyalty to a solemn treaty, and notwithstanding that the charges were very fully and satisfactorily answered by responsible Japanese naval authorities, the story served its purpose in the great game of propaganda directed by the world's masters of the profession. Such charges had the desired effect of fanning into a blaze the dying embers of American resentment against Japan, and a new war-campaign was opened with greater vigor. Aided by advocates for a greater American navy in pressing for larger appropriations to meet the changed situation, the campaign grew in intensity until President Coolidge proposed a new conference to check the growth of minor naval armaments warm support from the interested Powers that it had to be abandoned. After all, there was no great secrecy surrounding Japan's new naval programme. She had no difficulty in convincing her partners in the armament pact that her much criticized activities were well within the quota assigned her. There is another side to this picture a Japanese point of view, which by the application of the same logic places British and America in the position of violating the spirit of the Washington treaties, and fully justifies Japan in taking any measures to protect herself. Confiding in the honor of America and Great Britain, Japan cheerfully accepted the five-five-three programme handing over world naval supremacy to the Anglo-American fleets, and placing herself in a hopelessly inferior position in the event of the combination turning on her at some crisis arising out of the perennial racial controversy. The mere fact that Japan gracefully and unconditionally signed away her power for aggression is the strongest evidence that she will never carry the racial question to the point of inviting swift humiliation and defeat from the combined white Powers. Notwithstanding this pledge of peaceful intent, the armament treaties had not yet been ratified when to Japan's consternation a furious campaign was opened in the British press and Parliament for the immediate construction of a huge naval base at Singapore, followed by a similar agitation in the United States for an equally formidable naval stronghold at Pearl Harbor. After stripping the Japanese of their power of defense, they were to be hemmed in by the two great white naval Powers, their surplus population denied an outlet in the Pacific, and, by the operation of the Eight-Power treaty, deprived of their legitimate hope of expanding economically in China. Viewed from this angle, the Japanese saw themselves set apart as a race prohibited from participating on equal terms with other peoples in the struggle for existence, and viewed with justifiable alarm the closing of the net that would terminate their career as a great Power. There had been too much antiJapanese propaganda leading up to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Japanese did not forget its significance. Nor could they disregard the clear and unmistakable warning conveyed in the call for white unity against the Asiatic menace a cry so strong and determined from her white dominions that Great Britain reluctantly sacrificed her alliance with Japan in order to save her Empire from disruption. Imagine then the amazement of the Japanese when, in addition to all the other strategical arguments advanced to defend the immediate construction of the Singapore base, they read in the British press that, in the event of war between Japan and America, Singapore would become the operating base for the American fleet! Was this the reason America so willingly abandoned her plans for fortifying the Philippines? Was the plan proposed by Secretary Hughes on the opening of the Washington Conference arrived at after a secret understanding with Great Britain? When we enter the realms of fiction and invent plausible reasons for accusing another nation of bad faith, deceit, and sinister designs, Japan is equally entitled to indulge in flights of fancy and conjure up phantoms against her security that place America and Great Britain in a most unenviable light. The storm created by the naval scare, however, soon blew over. Japan and America settled down with a firm resolve to smooth out their differences and strengthen their commercial ties. The Asiatic Exclusion Act seemed to offer an opportunity to resurrect the war scare, which, in view of Japan's pledge embraced in the armament pact, failed of its purpose. Americans became more and more convinced of Japan's good faith, correct deportment, and desire to be friendly. A complete and harmonious understanding between Washington and Tokyo in regard to China superseded mutual distrust of each other's aims in that country. The American and Japanese financial groups faithfully reflected the attitude of their respective Governments, and on the foundation of this new confidence American capital began to flow into Japan. The earthquake disaster brought to the surface the real American sentiment toward Japan and cemented the bonds which even Japanese indignation over the Exclusion Act was powerless to break. Several Japanese loans were successfully floated on the New York market, and the coöperation of American capital in important Japanese industrial enterprises completed the great work of the Washington Conference. All reasonable causes for war between the two nations nations have been eliminated. A pretext for hostilities can exist only in the pages of fiction. Nevertheless, European opinion is practically unanimous in that Japan and America must fight. Nothing can shake that belief, and every incident that can be twisted to support this view is employed to fortify this conviction. The wish is undoubtedly the father to the thought. If America and Japan were to come to grips in the Pacific the European war-debt controversy would come to an abrupt termination. The gold that rolled into the coffers of Japan and America during the great conflict would then roll back to its original strong-boxes in Europe. The debt would be evened up. Japan would be so seriously crippled financially and industrially as to eliminate her for another quarter-century as a competitor in the markets of Asia. American shipping in the Pacific the Pacific would disappear and the trade and development of China would be handed over to Europe. The real losers in such a conflict would be the two combatants. The fruits of victory would go to the onlookers. It is not difficult to understand the selfish European point of view or the stimulus behind this propaganda. The favorite cause of war between Japan and America, as conjured up by British and European writers, inwriters, invariably involves Japan's violation of the open door in China. For example, Mr. Hector C. Bywater, a British naval critic, in his new technical novel, The Great Pacific War, 1931-1933, creates an imaginary incident to bring matters to a head in the great conflict which he imagines occurring at that date. He says: 'In October the Peking Government granted to an American syndicate, headed by Mr. Waldo Sayers, the well-known New York financier, a concession to work the Green Mountain iron and coal fields of Kiangsi, an upper province of the Yangtze Valley, where exceptionally rich deposits had been found by American prospectors. Japan forthwith addressed a note of protest to Peking, pointing out that, since the district referred to was one in which Japanese had hitherto been recognized as paramount, the validity of this concession to the nationals of another Power could not be admitted by her. The Chinese Government, in reply, pointed out that Kiangsi province was not mentioned as a Japanese enclave in any existing convention or treaty between the two countries, so that the Chinese Government was fully justified in granting such a concession to the American syndicate. The Japanese rejoinder to this note was brusque, and even threatening, but Peking stood firm. There the matter rested for the moment, while Mr. Sayers continued his preparations for developing the concession, though the Japanese press boasted in violent language that neither he nor any other foreigner would be permitted to raise a ton of coal or iron from the Kiangsi mines.' This sounds like a good case against Japan. Mr. Bywater intentionally selects a possibility that would most certainly draw forth a vigorous protest from Japan and then carefully conceals the other side of the story which justifies her action. No question of the Open Door is involved in such an imaginary controversy, but there is a very clear case of equity. Briefly stated, the Japanese have advanced to date over forty-five million yen to the Hanyehping Corporation, and hold a first lien on its valuable coal and iron mines in the Kiangsi region and on its steel mills at Hanyang. The original loan of twenty-five million yen was made in 1913, since when the Japanese have been compelled to pour out further millions in order to keep the company afloat and save their investment. At no time since the original loan was defaulted have they been able to foreclose their mortgage or even assume technical direction over the properties that would place them on a paying basis. Supported by an antiJapanese foreign opinion, the Chinese have steadily rejected all propositions that would hand over control to the Japanese, who are forced to watch their huge investment depreciate without hope of intervening to save it. As with the Hanyehping properties in Kiangsi, so with the Kiangsi Pro vincial Railway, which owes the Japanese over fifteen million dollars and cannot meet even the interest, let alone repay the principal. The Japanese cannot foreclose their mortgage or take over the management and operation of the line. Over sixty million yen of Japanese capital is therefore secured by properties situated for the most part in the Kiangsi region, the only return being the insufficient cargoes of iron ore, which under the terms of the original Hanyehping loan agreement are shipped from Tayeh to Japan. Past experience tells us that the Chinese would jump at the chance to involve Japan with America over the Open Door principle in exactly the manner predicted by Mr. Bywater in his book, and in view of her investments in Kiangsi it is a foregone conclusion that Japan would vigorously protest a concession to American or any other capitalists to work the iron. and coal fields of the Kiangsi region unless her own rights to equal opportunity were immediately recognized. Japan would not object to a dozen American syndicates working the mines of Kiangsi, but she would undoubtedly insist upon the liquidation of her outstanding loans on similar properties in the province, or on being given the right to foreclose or take over their operation. Mr. Bywater's selection of an imaginary casus belli is therefore not a happy one. America is not going to war with Japan or any other nation over a Chinese concession. The door to equal opportunity in China has stood open for twenty-seven years, and every American who has passed through its portals to explore the other side has been gold-bricked. The Open Door has been a standing invitation for unsophisticated Americans to enter and drop their wad. Not one American has carried through a Chinese concession, for the simple reason that in every case the contract concealed a joker that made it necessary for the United States to go to war with some other Power enjoying prior rights in the premises. Outside of our participation in the Hukwang Loan, not one cent of American capital is invested in China's railways or major industrial enterprises. Our stake in the country is purely an academic one, and our continued interest in the preservation of the Open Door principle arises from a hope that some day in the distant future the Chinese market and investment field may contribute to our economic welfare. Although it is highly probable that America would view with grave concern any attempt to deprive her trade of equal opportunity in China, she would not be stirred over the loss of a concession. It can be demonstrated by actual figures that American interest in China is not so much a question of trade as it is one of philanthropy. China is America's pet charity, our favorite field for the expenditure of surplus millions in missionary and educational work. For every dollar in profits derived from exports to China, Americans spend two dollars in uplift work among the Chinese people, giving employment to an army of men and women who outnumber those engaged in the pursuit of commerce. American policy toward China is moulded by its citizens who have the greatest stake in the country, and our diplomatic envoy is selected for a special fitness to represent the educational and missionary element. It is only necessary to recall President Wilson's rejoinder to Mr. Morganthau when the latter expressed the desire to be appointed Minister to Peking, instead of to Constantinople, to appreciate that our philanthropic interests in China are of far greater importance than our trade. When war alarmists base their argu ments on some probable infraction of the Open Door as a reason why America must fight Japan, they overlook the essential truth that a change must come over our trade relations with China that makes them a stake worth fighting for. It is inconceivable that America should go to war over a principle which, on analysis, resolves itself into a right to continue in business as a charitable institution. It is also well to bear in mind, when discussing the possibilities of a war with Japan arising out of some infraction of the Open Door principle, that American trade with China does not conflict in any essential or basic commodity with Japanese products. Exact figures are perhaps difficult to obtain, but it is not far from the truth to state that a large percentage of America's trade with China is carried on by Japanese firms whose activities as agents of American manufacturers have materially contributed toward expanding the Chinese markets for our products. There are at present absolutely no points of contact between Japan and America in the Chinese market that might lead to serious misunderstanding, and as the years pass a much stronger spirit of coöperation may be expected to characterize these relations. Those who have the most to lose from the keen competition of Japan in the Chinese market are not Americans. Japan controls about sixty per cent of China's textile industry, and the products of her domestic looms make her a very formidable rival to Manchester for the China piece-goods trade. Japanese steamers engaged in China's coastwise and riverine services have taken much profitable traffic from the older-established British shipping interests. Japanese investments in China in the aggregate are probably greater than those of Great Britain. The day is rapidly drawing nearer when Japan's trade and investments will give her the preponderating influence in the country a fact that will automatically strengthen her diplomatic position in any future international conference convened to discuss Chinese affairs. The time will arrive when the other interested Powers must concede the leadership to the nation with the greatest stake in the country. In every way the nation that has the most to gain from the peaceful development of China under the Open Door principle is Japan. Now that American and British Asiatic exclusion laws force her increasing population to seek an outlet on the mainland of Asia, or else to remain at home and solve its problem through industry, Japan imperatively needs a near-by field for the investment of capital that will ensure a steady stream of raw materials for her mills and factories. It is folly to assume that a nation with so much to gain would deliberately throw away its chances of success by any act that might invite the lasting hatred of the Chinese people and destroy its international standing by flagrantly breaking a solemn treaty. As long as Japan adheres to her present policy toward China, and works in complete harmony with America for the maintenance of the Open Door principle, the peace of the Pacific is in no danger of being broken. When, in addition, we have the most positive assurance that Japan will never carry the racial issue to the point of hostilities, a certainty evidenced in her cheerful acceptance of an inferior naval status, it is reprehensible in the extreme to continue a propaganda based on the assumption that Japan will provoke a crisis by some act of international bad faith. VOL. 329-NO. 4873 |