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WASHINGTON'S WARNING1

BY MAXIMILIAN MILLER-JABUSCH

EUROPEANS Sometimes imagine that, because the United States refused to join the League of Nations, she threw over Wilson's Fourteen Points. Nevertheless the latter, which Germany made the condition of her armistice offer, are still an important political force not to be overlooked in any international negotiation. Last March, while the Geneva diplomats, indulging in the worst abuses of pre-war secret diplomacy, were patching up futile private compromises in hotel chambers, they utterly forgot that in one of these points Wilson declared that the very kind of diplomacy they were practising should be abolished. Washington, however, has just recalled this truth to their attention with painful bluntness.

Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador in London, recently returned to Washington to confer with President Coolidge. He submitted to the President a comprehensive report upon the condition of Europe, the substance of which he gave to the press. This method of taking the whole world into his confidence provoked some surprise. Of course, American diplomatic practices are often unconventional. Washington has a rough and ready manner that is sometimes called 'shirt-sleeves diplomacy.' But Mr. Houghton, whom we know and esteem in Berlin, is not of the shirt-sleeves type. He is a reserved gentleman, ordinarily super-correct in matters of diplomatic propriety. That makes his action on this occasion the 1 From the Berliner Tageblatt (Liberal daily), March 24

VOL. 329 — NO. 4270

more surprising, for he certainly did not take it unless he believed it necessary and unless he was assured that Mr. Coolidge approved it.

His report dwells chiefly upon the subject of Wilson's second point, calling for general disarmament which, by the way, received precious little attention at the last Geneva meeting. A preliminary conference to discuss that subject, to which both the United States and Germany have accepted invitations, was originally scheduled to meet in March, but has been adjourned until May. No one knows now whether it will ever be held. Ambassador Houghton stated positively that France, Italy, and Japan are opposed to separate negotiations over naval and land armaments. That means that they refuse to follow further along the path indicated by the Washington Conference of disappointing

memory.

Probably the American Government's experience at that Conference makes it distrust the coming Geneva meeting. The Washington sessions opened with a tremendous surprise: America's delegation brushed aside all theoretical discussion and immediately proposed a practical measure that was approved unanimously although reluctantly. But the League of Nations has no such idea in mind. It proposes to discuss theories as developed in an elaborate questionnaire that promises to supply many a hard nut to crack. As if to complicate matters as much as possible, a new idea has been ad

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Now it is perfectly obvious that if a disarmament conference starts out in this line it can go on talking until doomsday. Disarmament becomes impossible as soon as you complicate it with vague and incomputable factors upon which there can never be practical agreement. America's acceptance of the invitation to take part in such proceedings at all is an indication of her good-will, of her readiness to leave no stone unturned to accomplish her object.

Mr. Houghton's report has created an impression, however, that Europe's case is desperate. He therefore prescribes a remedy that looks disconcertingly like a 'kill or cure' prescription. The United States is to bring Europe to reason by financial pressure. Mr. Houghton thinks that in two or three years our continent's military burdens will have grown so heavy that our taxpayers will be unable to support them. In the same way that the Ruhr crisis compelled Europe to look facts in the face in regard to reparations, so an armaments crisis may prove necessary to bring her to her senses in respect to military expenditures. If America really resorts to this policy, it will certainly be a kill-or-cure operation.

Possibly the threat alone will be enough, for the countries against whom it is directed clearly perceive its meaning. Of course, their first impulse has been to become abusive and to ridicule the Houghton report. But America has made it plain that they are dependent upon her, and that they must respect her wishes whether they like it or not. France has not yet reached an agreement for paying her debts at Washington. The first great tumble of the franc was stopped by an American loan. Since then the franc has survived on the sufferance of America. Consequently France cannot refuse to heed Washington's injunctions, especially when they are as emphatic as this one. Moreover, Congress has not yet ratified the debt agreement with Italy.

Germany is not directly affected by America's warning, for our attitude at Geneva has made a good impression in that country. But we are likewise interested in seeing that America does not put that threat into effect. We know what these kill-or-cure prescriptions are; we took one ourselves at the time of the Ruhr invasion. We do not wish any other country to have a similar experience. But Europe must recover her health. If American credits are cut off, we may not be directly affected, but we shall be seriously affected indirectly. We want peace; our policies are definitely directed to that end. But other countries must want peace and must take the course that we have taken without kicking over the traces and gazing longingly back at glorious but unprofitable adventures. We cannot labor for a Locarno policy with one hand and for a big-armaments policy with the other; for this is a case where the right hand must know what the left hand does.

THE AMERICAN CLAIMS1

AN ENGLISH ANALYSIS OF OUR BLOCKADE BILL

It would be idle to deny that Senator Borah's resolution on the subject of American claims against Great Britain suggests possibilities of a most unpleasant kind. The knowledge that claims of a very controversial character, amounting to over a hundred million pounds sterling, might at any moment be presented at Whitehall would in itself be sufficiently disturbing. That, however, is not the worst. The nature and origin of these particular claims, and the circumstances in which their presentation is now demanded, combine to make it quite certain that they cannot be pressed without exasperating public opinion in this country to an extreme degree. The fact that Senator Borah's action has synchronized with the partial publication of a very critical and even censorious report on the political state of Europe by Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, adds to the risk of the question giving rise to an embittered controversy.

In these circumstances it is of the first importance that all, on both sides of the Atlantic, who realize the supreme importance of friendly Anglo-American relations should form a clear idea of the questions at issue. What, in the first place, is the present position, and what are the chances that the American Government will take official action in support of the claims?

For several years past American exporters, shippers, and marine-insur

1 From The Nation and the Athenæum (London Liberal literary and political weekly), March 27

ance firms have been filing with the State Department claims against Great Britain and France for damages arising out of the Allied blockade of Germany between August 1914 and April 1917

- that is, during the period of American neutrality. For a long time the United States authorities did nothing; but, as the claimants are very numerous and very wealthy, they have combined to put political pressure on the Administration. The Senate has passed a resolution that the Secretary of State be invited to explain what action he proposes to take with regard to the claims; the resolution has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Borah is chairman, and the Committee has reported favorably upon it.

The next step to be taken is not quite clear. Either the chairman of the Committee summons the Secretary of State to answer questions, or else the resolution is placed upon the Senate's agenda for further discussion, and the necessary action with regard to the Secretary of State is taken by the Committee, after a debate and division. It is reported, however, that Senator Borah, for the moment at any rate, does not intend to press the matter. Further, it must always be remembered that, even if the Foreign Relations Committee or the Senate presses for a decision, the Secretary of State is under no constitutional obligation to comply; he is perfectly entitled to refuse, on grounds of general policy, to proceed further in the affair.

The latest reports give reason to hope that counsels of wisdom and moderation will prevail; but the fact remains that the agitation in favor of the claims is backed by a large number of very wealthy men with great electoral influence, and that the present temper of a large section of American public opinion with regard to European affairs ensures a favorable hearing for those who wish to press the claims. Even if the question should stand over for the moment, it may be revived, and it is essential that the British public should realize that the claims are seriously put forward, and that, if the American Government should decide to support them diplomatically, it would have a strong backing in the United States.

The claimants' case stands thus: The blockade of Germany was carried on by a series of Orders in Council, contraband proclamations, and methods. of naval and financial pressure which the United States Government, during its neutrality, challenged, and declared to be illegal. Each of these measures caused loss to American exporters, and the State Department cannot refuse to press their claims so the claimants argue without admitting that its own protests were merely formal and made without justification or conviction. It is true that, after the United States entered the war, the weapon of economic pressure was used more drastically than ever; but it was exercised, so far as concerned the United States, not by naval patrols, the interception of neutral goods, and prize-court condemnations, but by general export embargoes on all American goods with a neutral destination, which were only removed when neutrals adjacent to Germany gave satisfactory guaranties against reëxport. It is claimed, and from a lecture delivered by Admiral Tupper before the Royal United Service Insti

tution it appears to be a fact, that the United States Government carefully avoided sending so much as a picket boat to strengthen the naval forces employed on blockade duty.

It is important to grasp the last point, for the incredulity with which the first reports of the American claims were received on this side was based largely on American participation in the economic offensive during the later stages of the war. It is an essential part of the claimants' case that the right of a sovereign State to impose such restrictions as it pleases on the exports of its own products is absolutely consistent with the protests made by the United States Government against British interference with neutral goods and ships.

If the claims are really presented, they will, of course, have to be discussed in terms of international law, and it is not impertinent to remark that precedents, extremely valuable to the Allies, will be found in the records of American Prize Court decisions during the Civil War. We propose, however, to leave the legal aspect of the claims, for the moment, on one side; for we believe that an embittered legal wrangle would have a very bad effect on Anglo-American relations, and we hope that, on general grounds of honor and policy, the American people, as a whole, will express themselves so strongly against the claims as to enable the Administration to resist any pressure brought to bear by the claimants and their supporters. So long as there is still room for American opinion as a whole to make itself felt, it would be bad strategy for Britain to spend time and energy on legal arguments appealing, of necessity, only to a few specialists.

There are, it seems to us, two questions which every American citizen should be invited to answer, with

out regard to political or juridical niceties:

First, can it be doubted that the American nation profited, and profited enormously, by those very measures against which the State Department protested? The legend of a Germany that gorged itself with neutral supplies while the British Foreign Office slumbered was long ago exploded. The American armies took the field against an enemy whose powers of resistance, military and economic, had already been sapped and debilitated by a long period of isolation. Whatever judgment be passed on the methods employed, can the United States Government, with any sense of equity, seek to recover vast sums from Great Britain in respect of measures which, as matters turned out, saved many millions of American treasure and many thousands of American lives?

Secondly, can the United States Government decently press claims press claims upon Great Britain of which no mention was made in the debt settlement? It is true that the admitted liability in respect of war loans and the contested

claims in respect of seizures and condemnations were not, even in their origin, on the same footing; but it is equally true that at the time of the debt settlement the British people had no idea that such claims as these could be made, and looked on the debt settlement as a final liquidation of all outstanding financial questions between the two countries. The American public, press, and Government must be perfectly well aware that the debt settlement would never have been effected on its actual terms if the British Government had had the slightest inkling that a new and most burdensome set of claims might be presented a few years later.

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