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abstract action admit affirm applied argument Aristotle assertion attri attributes believe biped called Causation cause cept common Comprehension conceive concept conclusion concrete consciousness consequently consider contradiction contrary Descartes determined distinction doctrine effect exclusively existence expression Extension fact faculties false feeling Formal Logic Forms of Thought free-will gism Hamilton human Ibid idea ilton imagination inconceivable individual object inference infinite infinitely divisible intellectual judge judgment knowledge language Law of Contradiction Law of Identity Laws of Thought Lectures Leibnitz Mansel mathematics matter means ment mental metaphysical mind mode moral nature Necessitarian necessity never Nominalist notion Noumena operation opinion phenomena philosopher possible Pre-established Harmony predicate premises present principle produced Prolegomena Logica proposition psychological punishment quantity reasoning Reid relation require sensation sense signified Sir W suppose syllogism theory thing thinker tion true truth universe volitions whole words
282. oldal - but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.
56. oldal - proper acceptations of abstraction. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case." It is evident, indeed, that the existence of Abstract Ideas — the conception of the class-qualities by themselves, and not as embodied in an
68. oldal - our dominion over what we have already overrun in thought ; to make every intellectual conquest the basis of operations for others still beyond. Or another illustration : You have all heard of the process of tunnelling, of tunnelling through a sand-bank. In this operation it
279. oldal - universe, except human volitions, is determined to take place by a cause. Now, the so-called Necessitarians demand the application of the same rule of judgment to our volitions. They maintain that there is the same evidence for it. They affirm,, as a truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral
274. oldal - commencement, but on the further and special ground, that the will is determined by motives. In rewriting the preceding passage for the Appendix to his " Discussions," he made the following addition to it : * "A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still
342. oldal - the passive impressions of my professor's lectures, without any active exercise of my own powers." For any trace the study had left in Sir W. Hamilton's mind, he might as well never have heard of it.* * The signs of Sir W. Hamilton's want of familiarity with the physical sciences meet us in every
56. oldal - one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated ; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper
42. oldal - every act of volition, I am fully conscious that it is in my power to form the resolution or to abstain ; and this constitutes the presentative consciousness of free will and of power." And the sole notion we have of causation in the outward universe, as anything more than invariable antecedence and consequence,
103. oldal - psychological judgment must not be confounded with the logical. The former is the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness : the latter is the judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each other. . . . The logical judgment necessarily contains two concepts, and hence