character already exist in the neighbourhood does not justify the establishment of fresh ones, so as to increase the total (A.-G. v. Leeds, 1870, L. R. 5 Ch. 583). Nor does the fact that the nuisance is produced for the benefit of the public, or of a large section of it (unless in the exercise of statutory powers, vide supra) (R. v. Ward, 1836, 4 Ad. & E. 384; A.-G. v. Birmingham, 1858, 4 Kay & J. 528; 70 E. R. 220).

If a nuisance is substantial, the mere fact that it is only temporary is no answer to an action for damages (Bamford v. Turley, supra); though it may be a ground on which the Courts may refuse to grant an injunction to prevent its continuance (Swaine v. G. N. Rly. Co., 1864, 4 De G., J. & S. 211; 46 E. R. 899; Harrison v. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co., [1891] 2 Ch. 409).

Prescription.-A right to commit a private nuisance may be acquired by prescription as an easement (Murgatroyd v. Robinson, 1857, 7 El. & Bl. 391; Lord Leconfield v. Lord Lonsdale, 1870, L. R. 5 C. P. 657; Sturges v. Bridgman, 1879, 11 Ch. D. 852). But if the nuisance injuriously affects the public, no prescription will make it lawful (Dewell v. Sanders, 1618, Cro. 490; 79 E. R. 419; R. v. Cross, 1812, 3 Camp. 224; 13 R. R. 794), as that is an offence at common law. Nor can the Crown by grant entitle any person to commit a public nuisance, e.g. to obstruct an existing right of way. The grant must be subject to the rights of the public, if any (4.-G. v. Burridge, 1822, 10 Price, 350; 24 R. R. 705).

Legal Proceedings.—In case of a public nuisance, the remedy must be sought by proceedings instituted on behalf of the public, i.e. by indictment or by an information in the name of and sanctioned by the Attorney-General. Any person may put the criminal law in motion against an alleged offender, and may therefore apply for an indictment against those whom he charges with causing a nuisance. In case of most nuisances the proceedings are under the common law, and not regulated by statute. The informer may in such cases prefer his bill direct to the Grand Jury, at assizes or Quarter Sessions, without any preliminary proceedings before justices, and without any leave from the presiding judge. He is, however, liable personally for all costs, if he proceeds in this way. If the Grand Jury find a true bill, notice is given to the defendant, and the case is tried at a subsequent assize. Some common-law misdemeanors, such as nuisances to highways, etc., are triable at Quarter Sessions. If there is a conviction, the Court may impose such fine as it deems suitable, and may also as part of its judgment order the nuisance to be abated (Hawk. P. C., c. 75, s. 14). Sentence is frequently suspended in order to give the defendant an opportunity of abating the nuisance. Where this has been done, either before or after verdict, and no real inconvenience has been caused to the public, a nominal fine, with or without costs, is considered to meet the justice of the case. But where the nuisance has been continued and has caused serious injury, a heavy penalty might be imposed.

An individual who, or whose property, is injured in consequence of a private nuisance has his remedy by action, in which he may claim an injunction to prevent the continuance or recurrence of the nuisance, and may also claim damages for any loss he has himself sustained. If, however, he puts the law in force on behalf of the public, the proceedings must be in their name, i.e. by indictment or information. An aggrieved individual may of course act as relator.

Though the nuisance is of a public nature, an individual who, as a direct consequence of a public nuisance, suffers special damage more

than the rest of the public, may nevertheless bring his own action in respect of that special damage (reson v. Moore, 1998, Rayım. (Li) 486; Benjamin v. Story, 1873, L. R. 9 C. P. 400; Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., 1873, 1 App. Cas. 662, But if he merely suffers inconvenience in common with other members of the public, he has no private right of action. If he takes any proceedings, he must take them on behalf of the public. Thus no action lies for non-repair of a highroad (Corley v. Normarket Board, (1895) A. C. 345), though it does for placing a dangerous obstruction in or near a highway, whereby any individual sustains an injury (R. v. Watts, 1597, I Salk. 357; Wate v. Hindley Board, 1875, L. R. 10 Q. B. 219). The action may be brought in the County Court if large damages are not claimed. That Court can grant an injunction against a nuisance (Martin v. Bannister, 1879, 4 Q. B. D. 491).

An information by the Attorney-General is a civil proceeding, commenced by writ and tried in the ordinary way. It may be instituted by him of his own motion; but more usually is initiated by some person aggrieved, who as relator asks for the sanction of the Attorney-General (see O. S. C. 16, r. 20). If the Attorney-General is simply proceeding on behalf of the public, the result of a successful information is an injunction to restrain the continuance of the nuisance (A.-G. v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co., 1882, 21 Ch. D. 752); but a claim for damages by the relator may be joined with the claim for an injunction, and an action commenced by an individual on his own behalf may by amendment be turned into an action and information in which the two claims are joined (Caldwell v. Pagham Harbour Co., 1876, 2 Ch. D. 221).

Proceedings by Local Authorities.-The Public Health Act, 1875, gives local sanitary authorities large powers of dealing summarily with nuisances in or near their district (infra). Sec. 107 provides that if in their opinion summary proceedings would afford an inadequate remedy, they may cause any proceedings to be taken against any person in any superior Court of law or equity to enforce the abatement or prohibition of any nuisance under the Act. The meaning of this provision is that a local authority may take such proceedings as are known to the law for the purpose. They cannot therefore sue in their own name, unless the nuisance affects them as a corporation, e.g. by injuring their property; but must proceed by indictment or sue in the name and with the sanction of the Attorney-General (Tottenham Urban District Council v. Williamson, [1896] 2 Q. B. 353). They may, like any individual, act as relators in an action brought by the Attorney-General; and, if aggrieved themselves, may join a claim in their corporate capacity for damages, just as an aggrieved individual might (4.-G. v. Logan, [1891] 2 Q. B. 100).

Sec. 334-a saving clause-declares that nothing in the Act shall be construed to extend to mines, or to certain processes, such as smelting ores, etc., so as to obstruct or interfere with their working. The meaning of this section, which is copied from earlier Acts, was for a long time doubtful; but it seems now clear that it only exempts mine owners, etc., from the special liabilities created and penalties imposed by that Act. It does not relieve them from liability for a public nuisance (4.-G. v. Logan, [1891] 2 Q. B. 100), nor even from proceedings under the Act, if the nuisance could be prevented without obstructing the efficient working of the mine (Patterson v. Chamber Colliery Co., 1892, 8 T. L. R.

Summary Remedy.-Proceedings by indictment or information or by action are often too expensive and dilatory to afford an adequate means of dealing with a nuisance which may be serious, but still does not affect anyone sufficiently to induce him to embark in possibly prolonged litigation. In some cases Parliament has provided a remedy by means of summary procedure before magistrates. Unless, however, a case can be brought within the provisions of some Act authorising such a course, the party aggrieved can only protect himself by the means recognised and provided by the common law.

Many local Acts, some passed long ago and others in comparatively recent times, have given special powers for dealing with specific nuisances within the districts to which those Acts applied. The powers so given, of course, vary in the terms and in the subject-matters with which they deal. The tendency of modern legislation has discouraged the granting of special powers by local Acts, and has rather taken the direction of enabling local authorities to adopt clauses which are of general application, or to legislate for their own requirements by means of by-laws. Nuisances affecting particular localities can now be, and often are, dealt with summarily in this way. Thus obstructions to highways may be summarily dealt with under the Highway Acts, e.g. 5 & 6 Will. Iv. c. 50, Act of 1835, ss. 26, 56, 72, 77, 78, etc.

Further powers are given to local authorities in towns for regulating physical obstructions in or near streets, by secs. 66-83 of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34; and for dealing with obstructions to traffic, by secs. 21-29 of the Towns Police Clauses Act of the same year, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89. These sections are now in force in all urban districts by virtue of secs. 160 and 171 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (see also the Metropolis Management Acts, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, and 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102). Vehicles likely from their size or weight to damage roads or interfere with other traffic may only be used subject to conditions for minimising the nuisance they would otherwise occasion (see the Highways and Locomotives Acts, 1861, 1865, 1878, 1896, and 1903).

So also there are now statutory requirements that mines and quarries near highways must be properly fenced so as to prevent persons or straying animals from falling into them and being injured. And local authorities have summary powers of enforcing the observance of these provisions (35 & 36 Vict. c. 77, s. 13; 50 & 51 Vict. c. 19, s. 3, and c. 58, s. 37). Barbed wire fencing adjoining a highway may be similarly dealt with, if a nuisance (56 & 57 Vict. c. 32, s. 3).

The most important enactments authorising summary proceedings are contained in the Public Health Acts and the statutes incorporated with them, and deal with the suppression of nuisances which interfere with the health or convenience of the public generally. The Public Health Act, 1875, following the earlier Nuisances Removal Acts, gives in sec. 91 a list of various matters which shall be deemed to be nuisances which may be dealt with summarily under the provisions of that Act. This list has now been considerably increased in districts where the Public Health Act, 1907, has been adopted (53 Edw. VII. s. 35). They may be divided into-(a) things which are a nuisance in ordinary parlance, or are injurious to health; and (b) fireplaces or chimneys causing excessive quantities of smoke. For the purpose of detecting the existence of such nuisances, every local authority shall from time to time cause inspection of their districts to be made (s. 92); and, if satisfied

of the existence of a roleanse, shall serve on the person by whose act, default, or sufferance the pulleanse arises or continues, or on the owner or occupier of the premises where it arises, a notice requiring its abatement (s. 94). If the notice is not complied with, proceedings may be taken before a Court of summary jurisdiction, who may order the nuisance to be abated and the execution of any works necessary for that purpose (8.96). The local authority are the proper body to determine what works are necessary: and the Court should order them, if satisfied that they are proper R. v. Wheatley, 1885, 16 Q. B. D. 34; Clerkenwell Vestry v. Feary, 1820. 24 Q. B. D. 703). Besides the local authority, any person aggrieved by a nuisance, or any inhabitant of or owner of property in the district, may institute these summary proceedings (s. 105).

Among the nuisances which may be thus dealt with are many of those caused by smoke; but the conditions to which they are subject are peculiar, and they are dealt with in a separate article SMOKE.

The powers so given can only be used for dealing with such nuisances as are specified in sec. 91 cr have been added by subsequent legislation. Justices, for instance, cannot summarily order the cessation of a nuisance caused by the use of sewage works constructed under proper sanction, but parties agrieved are in such a case left to their ordinary remedy, by indictment, information, or action (R. v. Parlby, 1889, 22 Q. B. D. 5201

Inspector of Nuisances-Every sanitary authority, urban or rural, is required to appoint an inspector or inspectors of nuisances. The same person may also act as their surveyor. His duties are defined by a general order of the Local Government Board, published in the London Gazette, March 24, 1891. They include inspecting shops in which unsound food may be exposed for sale, taking samples of articles suspected of being adulterated, giving notice of cases of infectious disease, calling attention to the existence of all nuisances injurious to health, and superintending the execution of any remedial works that may be directed. The medical officer of health has also all the powers of an inspector of nuisances.

By-Laws.-Local authorities may further make by-laws under sec. 44 for preventing nuisances arising from rubbish, etc., and from keeping animals so as to be injurious to health; for diminishing the noxious effects of offensive trades (s. 113); for the management of slaughterhouses (s. 169); with reference to drainage and sanitary arrangements of buildings (s. 157); for preventing the spread of infectious disease (ss. 90 and 121); for promoting the habitable condition of tents, vans, etc., used for human habitation (48 & 49 Vict. c. 72, s. 9); for the decent conduct of public conveniences (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59, s. 20); for regulating shows which may be dangerous (ibid., s. 38); and for other matters. Such by-laws are intended to supplement, not to supersede or vary, the law. But if made in conformity with the statute which authorises them may often be useful.

By-laws may also be made under other statutes, such as the Highway Acts.

Under sec. 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, re-enacting sec. 90 of the original Act of 1835, now repealed, the council of a municipal borough are empowered to make by-laws, amongst other matters, for the prevention and suppression of nuisances not already punishable in a summary manner by virtue of any Act in

force throughout the borough. The powers so given were among those conferred on County Councils by the Local Government Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 16. Where, therefore, in any borough or county it is thought that acts causing a nuisance should be dealt with summarily, power to do so can be obtained without the necessity of applying to Parliament for special sanction.

[Authorities. Clerk and Lindsell on the Law of Torts, 2nd ed., 1896; Garrett on the Law of Nuisances, 2nd ed., 1897.]

Nulla bona.-This is one of the ordinary forms of return available to a sheriff. It is made either where there is no property of a debtor within the sheriff's bailiwick, or where the proceeds of the sale have not been sufficient to cover the expenses of the execution, or to pay rent which may be exactable by the debtor's landlord, or to meet the amounts of prior writs (see Dennis v. Whetham, 1874, L. R. 9 Q. B. 345; Heenan v. Evans, 1841, 3 Man. & G. 398; 60 R. R. 539; Wintle v. Freeman, 1840, 11 Ad. & E. 539; 52 R. R. 438). Such a return implies that there are no goods applicable to the plaintiff's writ (Shattock v. Carder, 1851, 21 L. J. Ex. 200), and in form, therefore, ought to negative the existence of any property of the debtor within the bailiwick (Cleaver v. Fisher, 1842, 2 Dowl. N. S. 292). So a return was held bad which stated that the debtor's premises were so barricaded that it was impossible to ascertain whether there was property therein (Munk v. Cass, 1841, 9 Dowl. P. C. 332); as also was one which gave the bankruptcy of the debtor as an excuse for not making the levy (Wright v. Lainson, 1837, 2 Mee. & W. 739). If, therefore, the sheriff has notice of some obstacle, he must not on that account remit his seizure; and if in consequence of such notice he returns nulla bona, he will be liable for a false return (Warmoll v. Young, 1826, 5 Barn. & Cress. 660; cp. Christopherson v. Burton, 1848, 3 Ex. Rep. 160; 77 R. R. 572; Cleghorn v. Des Anges, 1818, 3 Moore, 83). But a sheriff will not be liable for not seizing goods of the presence of which within his bailiwick he has no notice, if he uses due diligence (Yourrell v. Proby, 1868, 2 Ir. C. L. 460); and so long as he makes the only return possible at the time, he will be protected though something subsequently happens to falsify it (Smallcombe v. Olivier, 1844, 13 Mee. & W. 77). Where he has rendered himself liable, the measure of damages will be the value of the goods he might have seized (Dennis v. Whetham, supra).

Where there have been goods of the debtor within the jurisdiction, but the proceeds have gone to pay rent due at the time of the seizure, that need not be stated in the return (Reynolds v. Barford, 1844, 7 Man. & G. 449; 66 R. R. 727); and he may return nulla bona even when there is property, if the writ has been delivered to him to defeat the debtor's creditors (Shattock v. Carden, supra). On the other hand, if a seizure and sale have actually taken place, a return of nulla bona would be bad, even though the sheriff had in his possession an earlier writ for an amount large enough to exhaust the proceeds (Rybot v. Peckham, 1778, 1 T. R. 731n.); and all a plaintiff has, in such a case, to prove in an action against the sheriff, is that goods were seized, and yet a return of nulla bona was made (Stubbs v. Lainson, 1836, 1 Mee. & W. 728). So, where there are prior writs, the sheriff ought, before returning nulla bona, to ascertain whether they are bond fide or not; for if they prove fraudulent, he may be liable as for a false return (Dennis v. Whetham, supra).