This repeal applies to all such Acts in force on August 10, 1842. Consequently the general issue of not guilty in a civil case can now be pleaded, if at all, only under a statute of a local and personal nature passed since 1842 (Boden v. Smith, 1849, 18 L. J. C. P. 121); and while it cannot be said without examination of the mass of such Acts that no case now exists for such a plea, it is highly improbable that a Select Committee on a bill of this character has since 1842 allowed such a clause to be inserted. These repeals do not affect informations at the suit of the Crown or indictments for statutory offences. The plea of not guilty was also used in answer to informations on penal statutes, and to all indictments. It was the only plea on which sentence of death could be passed (4 Black. Com., 338). On indictments for treason and piracy, when tried according to the course of the common law, and for felony, the accused, on arraignment, had not only to plead in person, but to elect his mode of trial. He was called to the bar and directed to hold up his hand; and the indictment was read to him, and he was asked, "How say you, Guilty or not guilty?" If he answered "Not guilty," he was next asked, "How will you be tried?" "By God and my country" (en pais); to which the response was, "God send you a good deliverance" (see 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 415). The Criminal Law Act, 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, s. 1, got rid of all these ancient formalities in treason, felony, or piracy, except in the case of persons having privilege of peerage; and in 1841 (4 & 5 Vict. c. 22) the ancient mode of pleading by such persons was abolished as to felony (see R. v. Cardigan, 1841, 4 St. Tri. N. S. 601). But the right to trial by peers remains as to treason, felony, and piracy, jure gentium, etc. This change in the law does not alter the effect of the plea, but makes the mode of trial by jury of persons not having privilege of peerage a matter of course instead of a matter of particular election. Where the defendant to an indictment for felony refused to plead guilty or not guilty, he was subjected to the peine forte et dure. This was abolished in 1772 (12 Geo. III. c. 20), and the effect of refusal to plead in felony was made equivalent to a plea of guilty. Since 1827, when the defendant, not being mute by the visitation of God, refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty is entered, and the trial proceeds (7 & 8 Geo. IV. s. 28, s. 2). Any question whether the defendant is mute of malice or by visitation of God is determined by a jury sworn to try the preliminary issue. If their verdict is "Mute by the visitation of God," a second issue must be determined, whether the defendant is able to plead and understand the proceedings at the trial. If he is not, he is treated as insane, unless the incapacity is temporary (R. v. Berry, 1876, 1 Q. B. D. 447). The effect of the plea of "not guilty" is to put the prosecution to the proof of all facts and circumstances constituting the offence, the burden of proving which lies on them, and to entitle the defence to raise any matter which contradicts the indictment, or excuses or qualifies the acts alleged as an offence without specially pleading the special matters to be put in evidence. This extends to absolute objections to the jurisdiction of English Courts over the offence, but not to objections to the jurisdiction of the particular Court (see R. v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q. B. 425; ABATEMENT). On charges of misdemeanor, special pleas in lieu of the plea of not guilty are admissible and in some cases necessary, e.g. on indictments for non-repair of a highway (Archb. Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 1226, 1228; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 472). VOL. X. 3 [Authorities.-Archb. Cr. Pl., 23rd ed.; Bullen and Leake, Pr. Pl., 3rd ed.] -- Notice. In this article it is proposed merely to summarise the chief legal meanings of the word "notice." The making something known that a man was or might be ignorant of before. It is necessary to give notice to justify certain proceedings, e.g. before entry on another's land to abate a nuisance there (see Lemmon v. Webb, [1895] App. Cas. 1), and to make time of the essence of a contract where it was not originally so, and one party has been guilty of delay, in which case the notice must be reasonable (Compton v. Bagley, [1892] 1 Ch. 313). Again, a person who is in possession of a thing in respect of which another is bound by statute or contract to fulfil a duty at uncertain intervals, must give notice of the necessity for such fulfilment to the person liable (London & S.-W. Rly. Co. v. Flower, 1875, 1 C. P. D. 77; 45 L. J. C. P. 54; Makin v. Watkinson, 1870, L. R. 6 Ex. 25; Hugall v. Maclean, 1885, 53 L. T. 94; 33 W. R. 588, where it was held that a lessor covenanting to repair cannot be sued for non-repair unless notice of want of repair is given to him; Torrens v. Walker, [1906] 2 Ch. 166). Generally, on the subject of notice in cases of contract, see Baron Parke's judgment in Vyse v. Wakefield, 1840, 6 Mee. & W. 442, 453; and Chitty on Contracts, 1904 ed., pp. 606-607. A tenant on whom a writ in an action of ejectment has been served, is bound under penalty of three years' rent, forthwith to give notice of the writ to his landlord (Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 209, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76). As to notice of assignment of a chose in action, see Vol. I. p. 555. Notice of dishonour of bills of exchange, see Vol. II. p. 209. Notice to pay off mortgage money, see MORTGAGE. Payment of a cheque is countermanded by notice to the banker of the customer's death (Bill of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 75). A continuing guarantee, e.g. of a person's account at a bank, provided there is nothing to the contrary stipulated for, is revoked as to subsequent advances by notice of the surety's death (Coulthart v. Clementson, 1879, 5 Q. B. D. 42; see also In re Silvester, Midland Rly. Co. v. Silvester, [1895] 1 Ch., at p. 577). Special business can be transacted at a meeting of the directors of a company without previous notice thereof (La Compagnie de Mayville v. Whitley, [1896] 1 Ch. 788; Buckley on Companies, 1902 ed., p. 578). As to notice of action, see that heading. As to notice to justices required before application for certiorari, see Crown Office Rules, 1906. Form and Contents of Notices. To avoid doubt or ambiguity in the terms of a notice, it is advisable to give it in writing, and to preserve evidence of its delivery by making an indorsement of service on a copy (Stapylton v. Clough, 1853, 2 El. & Bl. 933; 23 L. J. Q. B. 5). All notices required by the Rules of the Supreme Court are to be in writing, unless expressly authorised by the Court or a judge to be given orally (Order 66, r. 1, R. S. C., 1883); and this rule applies as far as is practicable to all civil proceedings on the Crown side (Crown Office Rules, 1906). Notice of intention to take depositions under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 6, must be in writing (R. v. Shurmer, 1886, 17 Q. B. D. 323). The requisites for the validity of notices under the Conveyancing, Notices of distress, see DISTRESS, Vol. IV. p. 626. Notices of suspension of payment by a debtor, see BANKRUPTCY, A notice under sec. 94 of the Public Health Act, 1875, to abate a smoke nuisance, need not require the execution of any works or the doing of anything as a means to the abatement (Millard v. Wastall, [1898] 1 Q. B. 342). For a case where a notice under the same section was held bad for not specifying works, see R. v. Wheatley, 1885, 16 Q. B. D. 34. "Waiver" of notice was discussed in the case of In re Thompson & [This article relates only to the effect of notice in dealings with respect to land. The effect of notice of assignments of and incumbrances on personal estate is treated of in former volumes (see Perham v. Kempster, [1907] 1 Ch. p. 378). See ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSES IN ACTION, Vol. I. p. 555; EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT, Vol. V. p. 309; MORTGAGE, Notice, Vol. Any person taking an estate or interest with notice of a prior equity affecting it, is bound to give effect to that equity. The rule was estab- This case established that the rule applied not only where the OF DEEDS RELATING TO LAND IN MIDDLESEX. Le Neve v. Le Neve, supra, also established that the rule applied in a register county (see REGISTRATION OF DEEDS), notwithstanding the express words in the Middlesex Registry Act that every deed or conveyance that should not be registered as directed "shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent mortgagee or purchaser for valuable consideration." Lord Hardwicke adopted the words of King, L.C., in Blades v. Blades, 1727, 1 Abr. Ca. Eq. 358, pl. 12; 21 E. R. 1100: "They would never suffer any Act of Parliament made to prevent fraud to be a protection to fraud;" and held that “taking the legal estate after notice of a prior right makes a man a malá fide purchaser, and is a species of fraud." [The protection meant to be afforded was a protection against secret incumbrances, and it never could have been the intention of the legislature to put a man who had knowledge of a conveyance in the position of a man who was liable to be defrauded or injured, James, L.J.], in Greaves v. Tofield, 1880, 14 Ch. D. 563, a decision on an annuity deed not registered under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 12, which contains similar words; see also Sydney, etc., Association v. Lyons, [1894] A. C. 260. Le Neve v. Le Neve also settled that the Registry Act operated to give the grantee under the registered conveyance the legal estate at law (see Doe v. Allsop, 1821, 5 Barn. & Ald. 142). Notwithstanding the doctrine laid down in Le Neve v. Le Neve, that taking the estate with notice of a prior right was fraud, eminent judges. have doubted the policy of Lord Hardwicke's decision in that case, in allowing notice of an equity to prevail against the express words of the statute. See per Sir W. Grant in Wyatt v. Barwell, 1815, 19 Ves. 439; 34 E. R. 578; 13 R. R. 236; per Lord Romilly in Ford v. White, 1852, 16 Beav. 120; 51 E. R. 723; and Rolland v. Hart, 1871, L. R. 6 Ch. 678; and the cases indicate that in the absence of proof of actual knowledge of a prior equity, stronger evidence will be required to affect with constructive notice, e.g. from negligence, a person taking under a registered deed than one taking under an unregistered deed (see per Lord Hardwicke in Hine v. Dodd, 1741, 2 Atk. 275; 26 E. R. 569, before his decision in Le Neve v. Le Neve; and see Jolland v. Stainbridge, 1797, 3 Ves. 478; 30 E. R. 1114; 4 R. R. 64; Lee v. Clutton, 1875, 45 L. J. Ch. 43; on app. 46 L. J. Ch. 48; Chadwick v. Turner, 1866, L. R. 1 Ch. 310). It is difficult, however, to extract from the cases any clear rule for distinguishing the difference between notice in case of a registered and unregistered deed. The judgment of Lord Selborne in 1874 in Agra Bank v. Barry, L. R. 7 H. L. 135, on a case under the Irish Act, still seems the best statement of the rule in question. Lord Selborne says: It would be inconsistent with that policy (i.e. of the Registry Acts). to hold that a purchaser or mortgagee is under an obligation to make any inquiries with a view to the discovery of unregistered interests. But it is quite consistent with that, that if he or his agent actually knows. of the existence of such unregistered instruments when he takes his own deed, he may be estopped in equity from saying that, as to him, they are fraudulent. This was the effect of the old Registry Acts, and still is relevant in the case of land in Middlesex. OF DEEDS RELATING TO LAND IN YORKSHIRE. The old Yorkshire Acts were repealed by the Yorkshire Registry Act, 1884, 47 & 48 Vict. c. 54, amended by 48 & 49 Vict. c. 26. [The doctrine of notice has, except in cases of "actual fraud," now become apparently of much less importance. Effect is given to priority according to date of registration (Battison v. Hobson, [1896] 2 Ch. 403); see for full details REGISTRATION OF DEEDS, Yorkshire Registry.] OF UNREGISTERED MORTGAGES UNDER THE MERCHANT Mortgages and the Merchant Shipping Act of 1856, s. 40, are dealt with under SHIP, but it is material to observe that sec. 69 gave priority to the deed first registered, notwithstanding any implied or constructive notice. Although equitable interests in ships are now recognised, a legal mortgage of a ship in statutory form and registered has priority over an equitable mortgage previously given but registered after the legal mortgage, even where the legal mortgagee takes with notice of the charge (Liverpool Bank v. Turner, 1860, 1 John. & H. 159; 70 E. R. 703; 2 De G., F. & J. 502; 45 E. R. 715; Black v. Williams, [1895] 1 Ch. 408; Barclay v. Poole, [1907] 2 Ch. 284). REGISTRATION NOT ITSELF NOTICE. Registration in Middlesex or Yorkshire does not of itself give notice if the register is not searched by the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee (Morcock v. Dickens, 1768, Amb. 678; 27 E. R. 440; Cator v. Colly, 1785, 1 Cox, 182; 29 E. R. 1119; Williams v. Sorrel, 1799, 4 Ves. Jun. 389; 31 E. R. 198; In re Russell, etc., 1871, L. R. 12 Eq. 78). But see as to the omission to inquire as to document disclosed by the register being an omission of ordinary precaution, Kettlewell v. Watson, 1884, 26 Ch. D. 501. The Yorkshire Registry Act of 1884, 47 & 48 Vict. c. 54, by sec. 15 enacted that registration of any instrument under the Act should be deemed to constitute actual notice of such instrument, but this was repealed the next year by the amending Act 48 & 49 Vict. c. 26, s. 5. But if a purchaser or mortgagee searches the register he will be deemed to have notice of all instruments registered within the period. for which he searched (Bushel v. Bushel, 1803, 1 Sch. & Lef. p. 103; Hodgson v. Dean, 1825, 2 Sim. & St. 221; 57 E. R. 330; 25 R. R. 188; Ford v. White, 1852, 16 Beav. 120; 51 E. R. 723; see also as to searches in other cases, e.g. judgment under the old law, Ardland v. Piller, 1876, L. R. 10 Ch. 10; and see also Proctor v. Cooper, 1853, 2 Drew. 1; 61 E. R. 618; 1 Jur. N. S. 149; Lane v. Jackson, 1852, 20 Beav. 535; 52 E. R. 710; Rolland v. Hart, 1871, L. R. 6 Ch. 678. See as to Court Rolls in case of copyholds, Sugden, Vendors and Purchasers, 14th ed., p. 780; Bugden v. Bignold, 1843, 2 Y. & C. C. 377; 63 R. R. 167; 60 R. R. 202). And the fact that the register is not of itself notice is unimportant in case of documents capable of registration and registered under the Irish Act or the Yorkshire Registry Act of 1884, as under those Acts documents take effect according to priority of registration (see as to Irish |