needs and desires of a nation cannot, how- | assuming the authority of "Outidanos,"

ever, by itself, afford sufficient data for predicting the course of its foreign policy. The means which a State can employ to secure its ends, its military and financial resources, and the temper of its people, these are also factors which forcibly and inevitably control all political movements; and these must be fully considered and accurately weighed before competent opinion can be expressed on the political position. Sir Charles Dilke has recognized this truth more fully than is usual, and his writings on politics teem with facts and opinions concerning military questions.

and basing his calculations concerning the intricate and complicated question of the available armed strength of nations on a few figures drawn from "popular " sources. Such "popular" sources considered sufficient by "Outidanos are, we fear, as used by him, popular sources of error. To take from some rough compilation the nominal number of soldiers with the colors in the different armies on their peace footing, and then to assume that these figures alone, even if they were accurate, give a reliable measure of the comparative available fighting strength of the respective armies, is far too serious an error to "Outidanos," in his recent article, also permit of our regarding it in its comic acknowledges the fact that a comparison aspect. Surely the most unmilitary and of the material resources and military inexperienced civilian must see that the strength of the different nations is the quality of the men, their armament, the first necessary basis for the discussion of numbers of the readily available reserves, their proper and probable policy. He the training of the officers, the organizamaintains that it is a gross mistake for tion of the army, its capacity for rapid Italy to join hands with Germany and mobilization, the supplies of transport and Austria, first, because he assumes that material, the strategical position occupied, Italy's accession to the alliance fails to and a hundred other details, are of infigive to the combination the strength nec- nitely greater importance than the nominal essary to make it a real "league of peace; "number of men under arms on a peace and secondly, because he further assumes footing. And yet "Outidanos" is content that the probable causes of dispute be- to build the whole fabric of his foreign tween the other powers do not concern policy on the scanty haphazard informaItaly. The argument of "Outidanos" tion which entirely omits all such imporwould appear to be, that the material tant considerations. resources and military strength of France and Russia combined are approximately equal to the material resources and military strength of Germany, Austria, and Italy combined; therefore the alliance of the central powers has not the requisite preponderance of force to impose its will on the other two without a struggle, and therefore the so-called "league of peace is only an alliance for war. We demur to the assumption of the approximate equality of the resources and fighting strength of the two opposing parties. And we maintain that under certain circumstances, and especially if supported by England, the forces of Italy will fully suffice to turn the scale decisively in favor of the central powers.

As regards" Outi danos's" estimate of comparative strength, it is almost sufficient to say, that though, by the order in which this point is taken in his argument, its importance is fully admitted, neverthe less it is dismissed in some three lines of figures, drawn, as the writer himself says, from "popular" sources. To use his own words on another question, "it would be comic if it were not ruinous" to see any would-be instructor of his countrymen

We will now endeavor briefly but seriously to consider what are the chief material interests which the several more important nations have nearest at heart, and which are likely to affect their foreign policy. Germany is above all things anxious to maintain her present position and territories, and to do so, if possible, without war. She urgently requires peace, and time for general development, and for the consolidation of German unity. There are places not under her rule which she would gladly acquire by peaceful means, if the opportunity should offer, but there are none for which the life of a German soldier would willingly be risked. Not long ago Germany appeared to be entering on an ambitious and aggressive policy of colonial extension; but we believe that no strong national feeling was ever awakened in favor of such a policy, and that the few enthusiasts and busybodies who were prominent in the colonial movement were temporarily encouraged by Prince Bismarck merely to annoy England, and to endeavor to convince English statesmen that German hostility is as dangerous as German friendship is valuable. Germany has no colonial army, and she could not

form one without déranging the all-impor- | equanimity; but the occupation by the tant and delicate organization of her mili- Giaour of Egypt, of Tunis, and even of tary forces, as prepared for European Cyprus, is viewed in a very different light. wars. Germany has no millions to spare The Osmanli is singularly sensitive refor colonial enterprises, and England's garding the subjugation of true believexample has shown the cost of such ers to Christian rule, and the hope of reundertakings. The results of German establishing the authority of the caliph action in Samoa and on the east coast of over his whilom subjects in Africa will Africa have not been encouraging, and long affect the foreign policy of the Prince Bismarck is now evidently doing Porte. his best to assuage the slight attack of colonial fever which he had allowed momentarily to affect a small percentage of his countrymen. On the other hand, Germany is resolved to retain Alsace and | Lorraine; her armies are ever ready for action in Europe; and the first trespasser on what is to-day German soil, will be quickly and sternly met at the point of the sword.

remains unchanged, and a source of dan- | Greek faith, will immediately rouse all ger to the peace of the world.

odds, to fulfil what he considers to be his
sacred duties. This is the real and great
danger which threatens the world through
Alexander III.'s belief in the sanctity of
his own person; and this belief has been
extraordinarily strengthened, and the con-
sequent danger greatly aggravated, by the
marvellous escape of the imperial family.
in the Borki accident-
an escape which
is confidently attributed to the special in-
terposition of the Divinity on behalf of his
chosen and favored servant.

Austria is in a very different position
from Russia, and she can have only one
desire, the maintenance of that peace
which her strained finances and troub-
lous internal politics imperatively demand.
The Hapsburg family are the only Aus-
trians in Austria, though, with the ex-
ception of the Ruthenians, the different
nationalities composing the Austrian Em-
pire feel that their liberties and institu-
tions depend upon its maintenance. Hence
the loyalty of all his subjects to the person
of the Austrian emperor, and hence also a
general disinclination to an adventurous
foreign policy. Austria would, no doubt,
like to increase her influence in the Balkan
Peninsula; but this, the solitary ambition
of the dual empire, is only a result of the
desire to forestall the action of other and
probably hostile competitors.

that is stubborn in the character of AlexThough we think that his power is gen- ander III., and will be promptly avenged. erally somewhat overestimated, the per- A true lover of peace, he will nevertheless, sonal character of the czar is certainly a without a moment's hesitation, plunge his matter of importance in considering Rus-country into disastrous war, against any sian affairs. The present autocrat of All the Russias came to the throne under circumstances specially calculated to impress him with the fact that the most powerful monarch is helpless against the consequences of serious discontent among even a fraction of his people. The lesson was not lost, and internal difficulties of various kinds have often given warning reminders of its significance. Alexander III. undoubtedly endeavors, more frequently than his predecessors, to take into account the sentiments and aspirations of his people. Though the word “foreigner" is in the mind of the czar equivalent to a term of reproach, he is himself, little as he supposes it, very like a foreigner in his own country. Thanks to the complete suppression of everything approaching an expression of public opinion, he has little means of ascertaining the drift of national feeling, and from personal experience he knows nothing of any class but the higher officials of the State. It must not be supposed that his consideration for the wants of his people is due only to selfish motives. Far from it. The present emperor of Russia is a man of truly noble character, thoroughly honest in purpose, sincerely religious, kind in heart, and most disinterestedly solicitous for the welfare of his country. There is, however, one strange apparent contradiction in his Italy, too, considers the preservation of character, which may yet have sinister re- peace as her most material interest. "Outisults. The czar is not gifted with the danos" styles Italy's attitude in joining extraordinary intelligence which would be the armed alliance of central Europe desirable in his position; no man is more grotesque." The appearance of a peacemodest as to his personal merits and abil-ful citizen parading his house at midnight ity, but there is no man in this world so armed to the teeth would certainly be impressed with his own importance, in the grotesque to those who were ignorant that peculiar light in which he views himself, he had good reason for anticipating an as the divinely appointed head of the only attack from armed burglars; but those true faith, and of a specially chosen peo- who knew his grounds for alarm would ple. The most devoted of husbands, he find nothing strange or unreasonable in is yet ever conscious that his wife, born a his conduct. Italy has genuine grounds foreigner of alien faith, remains outside for alarm. Her geographical position in the pale, and consequently the empress the Mediterranean renders her freedom as has as little influence in his counsels as a maritime power in that sea essential to if she were a stranger to him. The office her future prosperity and independence. of czar is, he considers, a holy office; no The southern coast of the Mediterranean other mortal than the holder of that office necessarily occupies Italian attention, and is on anything approaching the same ex- French aggression in that direction alalted level. Any real or supposed slight ready rouses strong feelings; still, unless or injury to the chosen people, the Rus- Italy can find an ally sufficiently powerful sians to their semi-divine head, the czar to ensure success, she will not willingly or to the only true faith, the orthodox risk the peace she so urgently needs, even

to restrain French ambition where its | Straits, and the determined attitude of ebullitions most sorely vex her. The Canada in the fishery difficulties with the Italian Tyrol, the Dalmatian coast, Savoy, United States in Nova Scotia and with and Nice, would no doubt be acceptable France in Newfoundland, - all these are additions to the juvenile kingdom; but instances of the almost recklessly comfor these Italy can at least afford to wait, bative spirit of colonial Britons. We like and their possession is not essential to to flatter ourselves that we are a most her welfare. peace-loving people; but whilst we are always able to explain, with moral satisfaction to ourselves, every step we take in the steady extension of our empire, we cannot expect foreign nations always to view our proceedings with equanimity, and we must at least admit that the nature of our empire is such as to bring us into continual collision with many nations, with whom we have no desire to quarrel, provided that they let us have our own way.

Spain is a growing power, with a great possible future; but though anxious to keep France out of Morocco, there is probably nothing, except her own independence, for which Spain would at present care to fight.

In England it is clearly understood that the most material interests of the empire lie in the preservation of that universal peace which gives the fullest opportunity for commercial enterprise and profit. At the same time, our conduct is influenced by the existence and growth of a superabundant population in the British Isles, by the recognition of the great advantage of close commercial relations with our prosperous colonies, and by the knowledge that the extension, outside Europe, of the dominion of other European powers, means the inevitable extension of a system of protective duties adverse to our commercial interests. We are becoming increasingly sensible of the necessity, not only of preserving existing colonial possessions, but also of forestalling foreign powers in their spasmodic endeavors to establish themselves in such portions of the globe as still await the advent of European civilization.

We now turn to the consideration of the value of the armaments and resources which the different nations can employ for the preservation and furtherance of their material interests, or for the gratification of their ambitious or sentimental desires.

As regards military armament, Ger. many is generally recognized as the most powerful nation in Europe. The total force of which Germany can dispose is about twenty-seven hundred thousand men.

We do not include in this estimate the force known as the Ersatz reserve, which in itself nominally exceeds six hundred thousand men; and we do not propose in any of our calculations to consider, as available for ordinary practical purposes, similar forces, the final resources of "a nation in arms," which in the case of the Russian Opoltchenie brings the Russian forces up to the extraordinary total of six million men calculated by Sir C. Dilke in his recent work on European politics. But we should observe in this connection, that in all military calculations the real available strength of Germany approximates much more closely to the tabulated estimates than is the case as regards the armies of her rivals.

The Anglo-Saxon is an enterprising and a combative race; and though the bulk of Englishmen in England have learned the advantages of peace, the rash combative instinct is still strong in our colonies, and the colonies are, year by year, necessarily and rightly, exercising a stronger influence over the foreign policy of the empire, of which they form so important a part. We need not fear being drawn into any war of overt aggression by colonial demands; but we must be prepared to see the colonies increasingly jealous of all attempts at the establishment of any foreign power in their neighborhood, and insisting on the might of the empire being employed in defence of what they consider as their direct material interests. Australian feeling regarding French and German acquisitions in the Pacific, the pressure put on the Foreign Office to re-tration; and also in the excellent strategic sist German and Portuguese pretensions in Africa, the outcry in British Columbia concerning the action of Russia and the United States in the region of Behring

Independently of large numbers, including over a million and quarter of combatants ready to take the field on either threatened frontier, the great strength of the German army lies in its perfect training, organization, and completeness in all details; in the marvellous development of a railway system specially planned to facilitate rapidity of concen

positions from which an army, either in east Prussia or on the Rhine, could, according to circumstances, resist an invader or undertake an invasion.

As regards finances and other material | enormous progress since 1870, and it is resources, it is well known that the French most unlikely that they will ever again be ransom provided immense sums for the suddenly rolled up, as they were in that German military chest, which, though eventful year; but great as have been carefully husbanded, have supplied the their efforts at improvement, there is no army with the most perfect equipment, certainty as to the exact actual result, and have built and armed fortresses, have they have naturally lost much by the doubled railway lines and bridges, and continual change of their war ministers, laid down a new network of railways, and due to the instability of their governhave also filled all the military storehouses ment. They have had both good and bad with reserve supplies of every kind. And men in supreme command; and in spite all this, be it remembered, has been of much that has been justly said against effected without increasing the annual him as politician, it appears certain that military budget, with which it is the foolish the French army owes as much or more habit to compare our English military to General Boulanger than to any other expenditure, and to expect that for a administrator. similar sum we shall, under more difficult circumstances, not only do all that Germany does, but also that which Germany has not attempted to do without special and separate provision. Germany is ready to commence war with excellent credit, and having prepared and paid beforehand for every conceivable article which the most careful forethought can suggest as being likely to be required. On the other hand, as compared with England and France, Germany is not a rich country, and the burden of conscription tells heavily against national prosperity. The paysheet may be small, but the country, in some form or another, is obliged to provide for the wants of the enrolled conscript.

The opinions of experts as to the value of the French army are by no means so unanimously favorable as they are concerning the forces of her great rival. In the first place, though in estimated numbers on paper the French forces exceed those of Germany, there is not the same certainty in the case of France of a fair relation between estimated and available numbers, as can be relied on in the German calculations. In the next place, the drain on the French army for men for service in Algiers, Tunis, Tonquin, and Madagascar, has no equivalent in the German system. Again, neither in perfection of organization for mobilization, nor in discipline, or cohesion of the different classes of troops, do the French appear equal to the Germans; and lastly, though the French arrangements for frontier defence by fortresses are as nearly perfect as can be, the Germans have a distinct advantage in the possibility of manoeuvring their forces on the Rhine, so as rapidly to take advantage of circumstances, and to act either on the offensive or the defensive, as the occasion may suggest.

The French have undoubtedly made

There can be no doubt that France is a richer country than Germany; but French finances have been terribly mismanaged, corruption has been rife, and enormous sums have been wasted on unfortunate colonial enterprises. As a result, it would not seem that in a short war France would have any advantage over Germany in the matter of resources, though in the event of a prolonged struggle, if such were possible, the natural riches of France would tell in her favor.

But as we

In the question of the temperament of
the rank and file, the Germans have the
moral advantage of greater self confidence,
based on previous successes.
have said, the German does not want to
fight, whereas the Frenchman is eager for
the fray. Whichever side might really
strike the first blow, the French would be
inspired with the feeling of la revanche,
as if they were the attackers, and this
feeling is a distinct moral force in their
favor. In this view it seems unfortunate
that the French frontier defences have
apparently been designed with the idea
that France will necessarily act on the
defensive. French élan appears likely to
be sacrificed behind mud parapets.

We must now consider the value of Austria in the military scale, and we must at once say that we cannot accept Sir Charles Dilke's opinion concerning the weakness of Austria as a military power. The Austrian army is certainly smaller than that of either France or Germany, but the material and organization are good. There is not, as Sir C. Dilke curiously supposes, any want of capable leaders; and against Russia, their only likely direct opponent in a European war, all the varied nationalities of the Austrian Empire would be united by a bond of hatred against a common foe, the enemy alike of Hungarians, Germans, Italians, and Roman Catholic Slavs.