and the income paid to the life tenant and the principal secured for the remaindermen," citing Burnett v. Lester, 53 Ill. 325; Welsch v. Belleville Savings Bank, 94 Ill. 191; Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N. E. 65.

Just what the character of the testator's personal property here involved was at the time of the testator's death is left in some doubt by the averments of the bill. The bill avers that at the time of his death William T. Cowger was seised and possessed of certain real estate therein described, "and about $3,000 in money as the net proceeds of his personal estate after the payment of all debts and legal charges against said estate." Whether this $3,000 was all money on hand at the time of the testator's death, or whether part of it was "net proceeds of his personal estate" converted into cash by his executor, is not clear. However that may have been, it does appear from the averments of the bill that at the time he turned it over to the widow, less than two months after the testator's death, it was all cash. A case as nearly in point as any we have examined is Green v. Hewitt, 97 Ill. 113, 37 Am. Rep. 102. In that case the testator gave his widow all his personal property so long as she remained his widow, and directed that "at the expiration of that time the whole, or whatever remains, to descend to my daughter, Mary Thompson." It was there insisted that the words "or whatever remains" showed the intention of the testator to have been to give his widow the absolute property in his estate, but the court held that she took only a life estate, and said: "The misapprehension as to the legal effect of the devise doubtless grows out of the use of the expression 'whatever remains,' by the testator, in limiting the remainder to his daughter. The use of that expression is of no vital significance, and cannot be permitted to override the clearly expressed intention that the widow should take a life estate only." Similar expressions received consideration in an elaborate opinion in Welsch v. Belleville Savings Bank, 94 III. 191.

Το say that the widow of William T. Cowger had the right to convert the personal property into real estate, take the title in her own name and control and dispose of it as she thought proper, would also require holding that she would have the same power with reference to the real estate, for she received her title to both the real and personal property in the same clause, from the use of the same words-and this is the position sought to be maintained by her in this case. We find no warrant from any language used in the will by the testator for any such construction to be placed upon that instrument. If he had so intended, why qualify the bequest by the use of the words "during her natural life?" It is a cardinal rule in the construction of wills that the testator's intention, as indicated by the words used, shall be ascertained from a consideration of the entire instrument, and each clause, sentence, and word thereof be given meaning and effect if it can be done. Dee v. Dee, supra; Young v. Harkleroad, 166 Ill. 318, 46 N. E. 1113; Einbecker v. Einbecker, 162 Ill. 267, 44 N. E. 426. Ap

plying these rules to the construction of this will, what meaning is to be given the words in the first clause limiting the estate given his widow, "during her natural life?" If defendants' construction is correct then this clause must be held to be meaningless. It is clear the testator intended these words to mean something, and it is the duty of courts, in construing wills, to give the words used their ordinary and generally accepted meaning, unless a clear intention appears from the will that they were intended to be used in another sense. Roberts v. Roberts, 140 Ill. 345, 29 N. E. 886; Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287, 24 N. E. 611. There is no repugnancy between the first and subsequent clauses of this will. The subsequent clauses clearly show the testator's intention to have been that at the termination of the life estate in the property in controversy, and after the bequests made his son Alva had been satisfied, the remainder of the estate should go to the persons named in the will.

Whether, if the personal estate had been preserved in the condition it was left by the testator, the widow would have had the right to its possession during her life, and whether she would have had the right to use any of the corpus of the fund for her support and maintenance, is unnecessary now to be determined. By the averments of the bill Alva has arrived at the age of 21 years, has received the provisions made for him by his father's will, and the widow has invested the entire remainder of the personal estate in lands, the title to which she took in her own name and which she now claims to own and control, and threatens and is about to dispose of contrary to the provisions of the will, and wholly deprive complainants of any interest therein. To permit this to be done would be a palpable violation of the plain intention of William T. Cowger as expressed in his last will and testament. If the averments of the bill are true that the land purchased by Mrs. Carr was purchased wholly with the personal property left by her husband, the title should be placed in her for life with remainder in fee in those entitled to it under the provisions of the will. We see no good reason for the appointment of a trustee to manage and control the estate or requiring Mrs. Carr to give security for the protection of the remaindermen if the facts are as averred in the bill. She would be entitled to the use, rents, and profits of the land, and should be given its possession and management during her life. The cancellation of all deeds made by her purporting to convey title to other persons and vesting in her a life estate, with remainder to those entitled to it under the will, would prevent any disposition of the fee by her, even if she were inclined to dispose of it.

One of the children of the testator mentioned in the will as beneficiary, subject to the widow's life estate and the charge in favor of the son Alva, is Sarah Almina Vanatta. There is no direct averment in the bill that she has since died, and that complainants are her only children and heirs at law. It is averred that complainants and defendants are the only heirs at law of William T. Cowger. This averment,

857 though it leaves the fact obscure, we have treated as equivalent to an averment that Sarah Almina Vanatta had died intestate before the commencement of the suit, leaving the complainants as her only children and heirs at law. If this be correct it could be made clear by a simple amendment, and we have thought the rights of the parties are of such importance in this case that they should be determined on their merits.

We are of opinion the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and the decree dismissing the bill will be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.2

2 Semble, contra, Clark v. Middlesworth, 82 Ind. 240; Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 21 Me. 288.

PART IV

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

CHAPTER XXXII

THE RULE AND ITS COROLLARIES

CHILD v. BAYLIE.

(King's Bench and Exchequer Chamber, 1618. Cro. Jac. 459.) See ante, p. 321, for a report of the case.

DUKE OF NORFOLK'S CASE.

(Court of Chancery, 1682. 3 Ch. Cas. 1.)

See ante, p. 324, for a report of the case.

LLOYD v. CAREW.

(House of Lords, 1697. Show. Parl. Cas. 137.)

Appeal from a decree of dismission in chancery. The case was thus: Rice Tannott died seised in fee of several lands in the several counties of Salop, Denbigh and Montgomery, leaving three daughters and coheirs, Mary, Penelope, and Susan. Susan married Sidney Godolphin, one of the present appellants. In July, 1674, Mary and Penelope, in consideration of £4000 paid to the said Mary by Richard Carew, Esq.; and in consideration of a marriage to be had, and which was afterwards had, between Penelope and the said Richard Carew, by lease and release, convey all those their two parts of the said lands in Denbigh, Salop, and Montgomery, to trustees and their heirs, to the use of Richard Carew for life, then to Penelope for life for her jointure, then to the said trustees and their heirs, during the lives of Richard and Penelope, to preserve contingent remainders; then to the first and other sons of Richard and Penelope in tail male successively and in default of issue male, to the daughters of Richard and Penelope in tail: and in default of such issue, as to one moiety of the said two parts, to the first (858)

KALES FUT.INT.

and other sons of the said Penelope by any other husband in tail, the remainder of all and singular the premises to the said Richard Carew and his heirs forever, subject to this proviso, "that if it should happen that no issue of the said Richard, upon the body of the said Penelope, should be living at the decease of the survivor of them, and the heirs of the said Penelope should within twelve months after the decease of the survivor of the said Richard and Penelope dying without issue as aforesaid, pay to the heirs or assigns of the said Richard Carew the sum of £4000, that then the remainder in fee-simple so limited, to the said Richard Carew and his heirs should cease; and that then, and from thenceforth, the premises should remain to the use of the right heirs of the said Penelope forever."

After this Mary intermarried with the appellant Sir Evan Lloyd, and a partition was made of the premises, and the same had been enjoyed accordingly ever since, and Mr. Carew and his lady levied a fine to Mr. Godolphin and his lady of his part; who did thereupon by their deed dated 23 Sept. 1676, covenant to levy a fine of Mr. Carew's two parts, to such uses as he and his lady should limit and appoint, but have not yet levied the said fine.

Richard Carew and Penelope his wife, to avoid all controversies that might happen, whereby the estate of the said Richard Carew, or his heirs, might be questioned or encumbered by the heirs of Penelope; and to the end to extinguish and destroy and bar all such estate, right, title, equitable or other interest, as the said Penelope then had, or her issue and heirs might have or claim to the same, by any power, settlement, or condition, on payment of £4000 or otherwise, to the heirs of Richard Carew, by the heirs of the said Penelope; and for the settling of the same on the said Richard Carew and his heirs, did in Michaelmas Term, 1681, levy a fine of the share and part allotted to them, and by deed of 10 Dec. 1681, declare that the said fine should be to the use of the said Richard for life, remainder to Penelope for life, the remainder to the said Richard Carew, his heirs and assigns forever: and do further declare, that the fine agreed to be levied by the appellants Sidney Godolphin and Susan his wife, by their deed dated the 23 Sept. 1676, should be to the same uses, and then direct the trustees by the first settlement to convey to those uses.

Penelope died without issue in 1690. Richard Carew made his will in August, 1691, and devised the said lands to Sir John Carew, Baronet, his brother, subject to pay all his debts and legacies, and made Sir John Carew his executor.

In December, 1691, Richard Carew died without issue, and Sir John Carew entered, and was seised and possessed of the premises, and paid £4855 for the debts of Richard Carew.

Sir John Carew died, and the respondent, Sir Richard Carew, an infant, is his son, heir, and executor.

The appellants, Mary and Susan claiming the lands as heirs to Pen