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for the interests of civilization and commerce, it must also, we venture to think, in spite of Lord Malmesbury, be one for the advantage of ourselves.

The deep sea—we submit with all deference to received opinions-is, indeed, what foreign writers seek to make it, the neutral highway of all nations. It cannot be occupied or conquered, because human science, as yet, is unable to appropriate and farm it, though the day, perhaps, may come when man's labour will make vast portions of the now barren sea productive as a garden. But by a justifiable fiction of international jurisprudence, the waters within a certain distance of the coast are regarded as subject to the dominion of man. A naval force which invests a port or territory conquers and takes possession of the jurisdictional waters of the coast in the name of the belligerent sovereign, so far as the investment reaches. The new sovereign acquires thereby a right of sovereignty within the limits of the conquered waves. In virtue of this right he may prohibit neutral transit, or impose on it such regulations as he chooses ; but, the blockading force once gone, the waters revert to their original owners, and the natural privilege of neutral intercourse revives. For a blockade can only be, at best, a temporary interruption of the ordinary and natural right of neutrals to trade with all the world. With the traffic that comes and goes on the broad and free ocean the blockaders have no authority to interfere. Their right is confined to the occupation of such waters as it is possible for man to occupy and make his own. A blockade is a naval investiture and siege carried on within these latter. During siege, the necessities of war com pel the suspension of all communication with the beleaguered spot; and those who choose to attempt to raise the siege by traversing the conquered strip of waters must take the consequences. “They are of the party of the “enemy," says Grotius, “who supply “ him with what is necessary in war;" and it is impossible to say that communication with the outer world may not

be a necessity to a besieged town. The neutral who gratuitously violates the cordon of blockade may be considered as having gratuitously interfered in the hostilities to befriend the besieged.

We have said that a blockading force takes possession of the blockaded waters so far as the possession reaches. How far over the jurisdictional waters of the invested territory does the blockading fleet extend the dominion of its flag? The whole question of the effectiveness of blockades seems to depend upon the answer. No satisfactory reply, however, is returned by most writers on the subject of blockade. Some French authorities contend that a fleet can only take possession of the stretch of water within gunshot of its artillery. We cannot accept so strict a limitation. The narrow theory in question rests, no doubt, upon the analogy of the international rule, that the dominion of the sovereign of the shore extends no further than gunshot from the shore itself. Finitur dominium terræ ubi finitur armorum vis. But the analogy must not be taken to be more exact than it really is. A stationary fort, or a battery mounted on the land, may justly be said to dominate those waters only which are within range of its cannon. But a ship is a floating, not a stationary battery, and its motive power must be taken into consideration when we wish to measure its possible dominion. Doubtless we may accept the maxim, Finitur dominium ubi finitur 'armorum 'vis. The error lies in supposing that the offensive power of a man-of-war is as limited as the offensive power of a fort upon the shore. The introduction of the use of steam into the royal navies of the world renders the distinction between floating and stationary dominion still more important. A vessel which attempts to break blockade cannot be said to be safe from the cannon of an armed cruiser, because at the moment of the attempt the cruiser is not within gunshot. Allowance must be made for the celerity with which the guardian of the blockade can sail down and cover the entrance of the blockaded port.

Bolivia Teras, Venezuela, and the Re Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State:-"My Dublic of the Equator, ranging over a “object has been to prove that there can Period from 1878 to 1843, contain in “ be no effectual blockade, without & structions couched in the same spirit. “ competent force stationed or present There can be no reasonable doubt that “at or near the entrance of the blockan respect of blockade ** by cruisers,” of “aded port.” On May 23d, 1799, Mr. diplomatic “notice," of "special notice, King warns Lord Grenville that. " the and of other details branching out of “presence of a blockading force is esthis part of the question, England may “sential to constitute a blockade.” On be broadly sail to be at variance with February 4th, 1844, Mr. Smith, Secrethe rest of the paral world.

tary of State, informed Commodore Having hitherto been the advocates Preble, then blockading Tripoli, that of belligerent as well as neutral rights; "the trade of neutrals in articles not

-having-as we do not doubt, in the “contraband cannot be rightfully obabsence of evidence to the contrarr— “structed to any port, not actually eren so late as the Congress of 1856 “blockaded by a force so disposed berefused to allow the difficulty to be “ fore it as to create an evident danger settled in the interest of neutral power, “ of entering it." This doctrine, proEngland cannot now, with seemliness, claimed by the United States so early insist on foreing down the throat of in their national career, they have never America an interpretation of the law of abandoned until now. They are unwise blockade against which we have always to abandon it even under the pressure of openly or tacitly protested. We may a gigantic civil war. But if America take it for granted that the American cannot properly defend her “blockade blockade is nothing much better and by cruisers," neither can we demur to nothing much worse than a blockade by it, unless its defectiveness be more "cruisers" For a blockade by cruisers glaring than it has been shown to be. is is tolerably effective. In estimating Doubtless there are Admiralty decisions its ethiciency allowance must indeed be to the effect that an occasional cruiser made for the many ships which would appearing off a port does not constitute break the blockade, were they not un. a blockade, any more than one swallow Willing to run a risk, which for anything makes a summer. Still, we have conthey know may be a slight one. Yet, with tended too stoutly against the views of out doubt, the large ports along the coast, the “armed neutrals" to permit of our and most of the creeks that communicate forming ourselves, in company with with them, are closed virtually to general France, into that thing so hateful to us commerce ; and if they are not hermeti- of old—“an armed neutrality.” Lord cally sealed, it does not lie in our mouths Malmesbury and the Tory organs find to be too inquisitire or strict. America themselves in a dilemma. They are certainlr ought to do more than cruise anxious to precipitate the separation of O the Southern ocast if she wishes to be North and South, but they are equally consistent with herself. Her own official anxious that we should relax nothing I mments are a testimony against her of our old belligerent theories. We do

1 Juir 5th, 1T99, Mr. King, United not agree with them. For the present, ates' Emroy at London, writes thus to we ought not to bear ourselves impa

tiently towards an exaggerated doctrine 2 The Danish Government's definition, ac i ns on its order of Ist May, 1845, steers

which in other days we refused dismay between the definitions of the Anglo

tinctly to sacrifice, when it was to our an Cavention of 1301 and of the armed

benefit to retain it. But, for the future, Ust5 of 1:30: and is-"est regardé warned by this experience, let us accept

warned by this experience, let us na part banque celui devant lequel un sa per pi

a wider view of blockades and the rights s vsuisseaux de guerre sont stationdes de manière que nal batiment ne puisse

of neutrals in general. The true theory er mi syrir sans un danger évident of blockade has not yet been advocated

for the interests of civilization and commerce, it must also, we venture to think, in spite of Lord Malmesbury, be one for the advantage of ourselves.

The deep sea-we submit with all deference to received opinions-is, indeed, what foreign writers seek to make it, the neutral highway of all nations. It cannot be occupied or conquered, because human science, as yet, is unable to appropriate and farm it, though the day, perhaps, may come when man's labour will make vast portions of the now barren sea productive as a garden. But by a justifiable fiction of international jurisprudence, the waters within a certain distance of the coast are regarded as subject to the dominion of man. A naval force which invests a port or territory conquers and takes possession of the jurisdictional waters of the coast in the name of the belligerent sovereign, so far as the investment reaches. The new sovereign acquires thereby a right of sovereignty within the limits of the conquered waves. In virtue of this right he may prohibit neutral transit, or impose on it such regulations as he chooses; but, the blockading force once gone, the waters revert to their original owners, and the natural privilege of neutral intercourse revives. For a blockade can only be, at best, a temporary interruption of the ordinary and natural right of neutrals to trade with all the world. With the traffic that comes and goes on the broad and free ocean the blockaders have no authority to interfere. Their right is confined to the occupation of such waters as it is possible for man to occupy and make his own. A blockade is a naval investiture and siege carried on within these latter. During siege, the necessities of war compel the suspension of all communication with the beleaguered spot; and those who choose to attempt to raise the siege by traversing the conquered strip of waters must take the consequences. “They are of the party of the “enemy," says Grotius, “who supply “ him with what is necessary in war;" and it is impossible to say that communication with the outer world may not

be a necessity to a besieged town. The neutral who gratuitously violates the cordon of blockade may be considered as having gratuitously interfered in the hostilities to befriend the besieged.

We have said that a blockading force takes possession of the blockaded waters So far as the possession reaches. How far over the jurisdictional waters of the invested territory does the blockading fleet extend the dominion of its flag? The whole question of the effectiveness of blockades seems to depend upon the answer. No satisfactory reply, however, is returned by most writers on the subject of blockade. Some French authorities contend that a fleet can only take possession of the stretch of water within gunshot of its artillery. We cannot accept so strict a limitation. The narrow theory in question rests, no doubt, upon the analogy of the international rule, that the dominion of the sovereign of the shore extends no further than gunshot from the shore itself. Finitur dominium terræ ubi finitur armorum vis. But the analogy must not be taken to be more exact than it really is. A stationary fort, or a battery mounted on the land, may justly be said to dominate those waters only which are within range of its cannon. But a ship is a floating, not a stationary battery, and its motive power must be taken into consideration when we wish to measure its possible dominion. Doubtless we may accept the maxim, Finitur dominium ubi finitur 'armorum 'vis. The error lies in supposing that the offensive power of a man-of-war is as limited as the offensive power of a fort upon the shore. The introduction of the use of steam into the royal navies of the world renders the distinction between floating and stationary dominion still more important. A vessel which attempts to break blockade cannot be said to be safe from the cannon of an armed cruiser, because at the moment of the attempt the cruiser is not within gunshot. Allowance must be made for the celerity with which the guardian of the blockade can sail down and cover the entrance of the blockaded port. fore the world, it is well to see what is and what ought to be the recognised theory of nations in this respect.

In 1780 the armed neutralities," with France and Russia at their head, for their mutual benefit and the benefit of all neutrals, agreed by a number of conventions,—the language of all of which was virtually the same,—that the practice of this country with respect to blockades ought to be modified and limited. Grotius had rested the right of blockade upon the mere principle that a neutral power has no right to interfere with the investment of a beleaguered port ; hinting in language unmistakeable, though obscure, that a blockade was by sea what a siege was on the land. He had not laid down the unseemly doctrine that commerce between a neatral and the enemy is to be intercepted whenever it can be intercepted thoroughly : nor would it have been possible for the great advocate of the mare liberum and the opponent of Selden to take a line so narrow and untenable. Bynkershoek himself, whose doctrine is often harsher than the doctrine of the mild Grotius, understood and appreciated the principle as expounded by his master : and though belligerents, sometimes from insolence and sometimes from imperious necessity, have pretended to excommunicate their enemies from the pale of commercial intercourse, there have always been found plenty to defend and to establish the truth that blockade is only to be justified when it is used as part of a military plan. The definition given by the conventions of 1780 of a blockaded port was an attempt to put down for ever paper blockades,a species of warfare designed rather to harass an enemy's trade than to occupy his ports. It runs in most instances and in effect as follows :- A blockaded port is “celui où par la disposition “ de la nation attaquanto il se trouve “ des vaisseaux arrêtés et suffisamment proches pour qu'il y ait un danger “ évident à tenter d'y entrer.”

According to the laws of nations, as

tion, the blockading vessels must be present and close to the blockaded port. No official notice would be sufficient to close a harbour until it was ipso facto closed by an investing fleet, nor would the sending of a few cruisers to a hostile coast give a colour of legality to a fictitious and illegal measure. On this interpretation, even after the most authoritative warning from the belligerent Government, ships might still set sail for the besieged territory to satisfy themselves that the blockade was indeed a reality and not an empty threat. If stress of weather compelled the blockaders to intermit their watch, according to some continental interpreters the nentral trading vessels might take advantage of the opportunity to slip in : according to others the daring attempt would be justified by success and by success alone. But at all events, the definition required the absolute presence of the belligerent vessels in close proximity to the blockaded spot. Though the rules were laxer, yet the spirit was still the same as the spirit of the old treaties, which stipulated that ten, twenty, or half a dozen vessels, as the case might be, should be necessary to blockade the mouth of a harbour or a port.

The history of the opposition offered by England to the above theory is well known. In the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1801, which was designed to abrogate the conventions of the “armed neutralities," both English statesmen and foreign jurisconsults have seen a triumph of reactionary principles of blockade. The new definition imposed by Great Britain on her reluctant antagonist was as follows :-" Celui où il y a par la disposi“tion de la puissance qui l'attaque avec "des vaisseux arrêtés ou suffisamment “proches un danger évident d'y entrer.” There is but the change of a little conjunction, but the change is an important one. Lord Grenville, in his great speech of 1801, acknowledges that, by this “minute change" of a word, the framers of the convention intended to establish, in their full extent, the principles which

the question of maritime blockade principles which the article as it stood in the neutral conventions was intended completely to subvert. In the debate, of which Lord Grenville's speech forms part, the English Lord Chancellor pronounces a grave opinion that the “minute change” was sufficient to effect its object; nor can foreign jurisconsults be justly blamed for laying stress on an alteration which was confessedly designed to be unsatisfactory to the Continent. By it the stricter law is rejected, which would have made for ever impossible a “blockade by cruisers;" still more, a “paper blockade" itself; and have prevented the unseemly contest of five years later, between England and France, as to which could injure most illegally the commerce of its rival and enemy. Napoleon's Berlin decree of 1806 was, beyond all question, a flagrant violation of theories, for which France herself had contended, and which are now recognised by all civilized nations. It was itself a “blocus de cabinetof a most futile and illusory nature. But the Berlin decree was not entirely unprovoked. In the preceding May the English Cabinet had proclaimed the blockade of 300 marine leagues of coast, stretching from the mouths of the Elbe to Brest; and though nominal orders were given simultaneously to make the blockade effective, Napoleon with reason complained, that 300 marine leagues of coast could not have been blockaded by our then available forces, even had orders been given several months before. As the Berlin decree professed in its preamble to be a retaliation for the Elbe and Brest blockade, the subsequent famous "Orders in Council” professed to be justified by the intolerable Berlin decree. Both nations have to blush for the miserable war of “paper blockades". of that date. Instead of heaping reproaches on one another, it would be better if writers in England and in France agreed to forget and to forgive a series of illegalities so disastrous and so unprecedented.

It would be unjust and inaccurate to

delusive fiction styled a “blocus de cabinet," or " paper blockade.” All that our doctrine of blockade can be charged with is that, started from obscure principles, it notoriously justifies “ blockade by cruisers," (thus incidentally opening the door to many abuses), and lays down certain arbitrary rules which, though less important, are still vexatious enough to neutral commerce. English lawyers, for example, have been in the habit of considering that a diplomatic notice of blockade is a genuine part of the ceremony, and, at least, establishes a prima facie presumption in favour of its validity. Vessels starting after such public notice for the beleaguered port, unless they are vessels coming from a very distant country, by the very fact of starting are held to violate the blockade. A storm may drive off the blockaders, or they may retire to provision or refit their ships, without the right of neutrals to enter being thereby revived. Such regulations are not in accordance with either the theory or the practice of most other nations. Diplomatie notice of blockade the French regard in its true light, as an international courtesy which neither dispenses with the fullest proof of the effectiveness of the operation, nor with special notice to the neutral ships that approach the blockading fleet. In their war with the Argentine Republic, the French Cabinet acted on this principle, and released a vessel captured by a French man-of-war, without a special warning. Count Molé, in his despatch of 20th October, 1838, writes as follows :—“M. N. confond ici deux choses “très distinctes : la notification diplo“matique qui doit être faite du blocus "aux puissances neutres, et l'avis que les “commandants des vaisseaux employés "à le maintenir sont toujours tenus de “donner aux navires qui se présentent “sur les lieux. Il paraît croire que “l'accomplissement de la première for“malité dispense nécessairement de la “ seconde, qui deviendrait ensuite super“flue. ... Une telle manière de penser " est contraire aux principes ordinaires “du droit maritime." The French trea

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