can reach, which it is most essential to determine. For instance, the seemingly elementary questions In what light are we to consider a ship at sea? What is the protection which may be afforded by a national flag?-however much discussed, have never been decided. Even the very practical question of the right of search, as the case of the Trent itself shows, embraces several unsettled points. Let us take the first question :From Jefferson to Webster, America has endeavoured to maintain the principle, that a vessel is to be considered a part of the national territory. But it is obvious that such a principle, construed strictly, is radically contrary to the very existence of the right of search, which her own greatest international jurist, Dr.Wheaton ("Elements of International Law," vol. ii. p. 248,) speaks of as "a "belligerent right, essential to the exer"cise of the right of capturing enemy's 66 property, contraband of war, and ves"sels committing a breach of blockade." Jefferson, indeed, did not shrink from such a conclusion. In a letter to R. R. Livingston, (September 9, 1801), written some months after his entering upon the duties of the Presidency, he says: "The persons on board a vessel traversing "the ocean, carrying with them the laws "of their nation, have among them"selves a jurisdiction, a police, not es"tablished by their individual will, but "by the authority of their nation, of "whose territory their vessel still seems 66 to compose a part, so long as it does "not enter the exclusive territory of "another. No nation ever pretended a right to govern by their laws the "ship of another nation navigating the 66 ocean. By what law, then, can it "enter their ship, while in peaceable "and ordinary use of the common ele"ment?" "War between two nations," he says, further on, cannot diminish "the rights of the rest of the world "remaining at peace." And he proceeds accordingly to argue away the whole doctrine of "contraband of war." ("Correspondence," vol. iii. pp. 487-8.) 66 ship, neutral territory," thus carried out to its logical consequences, and the old English doctrine of untransferable allegiance, in virtue of which the Crown claimed a prerogative right of enforcing the services of English subjects wherever they might be, and searching neutral vessels at sea to discover, impress, and if found to be deserters, hang them, there is an abyss. I believe the latter doctrine, although so late as 1842 Lord Ashburton declined to abandon it, will be found untenable for the future. I believe the former doctrine, though it has been once asserted by an English cabinet minister (Sir William Molesworth, in 1856), cannot be literally applied. Some right of search at sea in time of war must, I conceive, subsist, to prevent neutrality from sinking into the most treacherous and cowardly of all modes of warfare. Yet we feel instinctively, that much of the reasoning as to the territorial character of the ship comes entirely home to us. Let us see if there be not some principle by which these contraries can be reconciled. It is strictly true, no doubt, that every ship is primarily governed by the municipal law of the country to which it belongs, and is therefore independent of any other. It is, so far, similar to the landed territory of the country itself. But there is this great difference between the two. The domain of the municipal law in question on land is fixed, and immediately conterminous with other domains of a different municipal law. You cannot step out of France to the north without stepping into Belgium; to the northeast and east, without stepping into Germany, Switzerland, or Italy; to the south, where the frontier is a land one, without stepping into Spain. The sphere of international law, so far as it affects that territory on the land side, is purely a moral one. But, when we come to those domains of municipal law which are called ships, we find them in the first place movable ones-now conterminous with the land-domain of the same law, now with that of another material realm of international law called the sea. From this movable character of ship-territory, if we may so call it from the circumfusion of the great international water-realm-flow important No one, and peculiar consequences. that I am aware, has ever claimed that the three miles of water, which are held annexed to every coast-line, should follow a ship at sea. Again, on land, the sovereignty of each system of municipal law is, within its domain, absolute against every other, except so far as it may be modified by treaty. Without a treaty for the pursuit or extradition of criminals, you have no right to meddle with a malefactor except upon your own territory. At sea, the pirate, though he may claim the benefit of every municipal law in succession, may be sunk or blown out of the water by the first comer; and this right has, under various safeguards, been extended in various cases to the prevention of the slave-trade. In time of war more important results yet follow. On land a belligerent, through his ambassadors and ministers, through his resident or travelling subjects, or simply through their relations with other countries, is almost always able to know all that is going on in a neighbouring neutral country. His frontier forts and forces protect him against direct hostilities. If aid be furnished to his adversary through another frontier of the neutral state, he can remonstrate, and, if need be, enforce neglected remonstrances by marching troops over his own frontier-in other words, by making war on the false neutral who is really helping his foe. But at sea he has no such safeguards. Suppose (which God forbid) a war between England and Prussia, France remaining neutral. Our coastdefences and Channel fleet may be a sufficient protection against French ships; our ambassador, consuls, English merchants established in France, Alpine club-men in search of summits, and every Brown, Jones, and Robinson on their travels, must look to the what is to be done with all those little tised by a private ship, would entail lated for this purpose to vessels in actual Government employ-whether a system of guarantees for the faithful neutrality of others could not be devised, so as to obviate the necessity of search, are ulterior branches of the question. It will be seen that, viewed as we have viewed it, the right of search becomes no more a peculiar prerogative, but a mere form of ocean-police, requiring to be regulated, within fixed limits, by wellconsidered rules. America in particular has, by special treaties with different nations, endeavoured to effect this; there is no reason why the practice should not be generalized. The position, therefore, that a ship at sea is to be considered as part of the country to which she belongs, must be taken with certain very important qualifications. Properly speaking, landterritory and ship-territory are analogous, not identical; the latter is to be held governed by the same rules as the former so far, and so far only, as the differences of subject-matter allow. But now-granted the belligerent right of search, or search and seizure, as respects ship-territory, the next question is, On what grounds should it be exercised? These, so far as the past is concerned, may be, perhaps, broadly summed up under five chief heads: 1. Contraband of war. 2. Despatches. 3. Persons in the enemy's service 4. Property belonging to the enemy. 5. Deserters, or other subjects of the searching Power. In considering them all, we should, moreover, always bear in mind the right of blockade, whereby a belligerent is held entitled, if strong enough, to cut off all communication with his enemy's coast. The two last heads may be soon disposed of. The principle long enforced by England in her own practice, that a friend's goods in an enemy's ship are free, whilst an enemy's goods in a friend's ship are good prize, must be considered to have been waived since the Conferences of Paris in 1856, in favour of the opposite one long contended for by neutrals, that "free ships that the former one cannot be reconciled with the mutual independence at sea of the various domains of municipal law. You could not enter on land a neutral territory to seize the goods of your enemy; there is no reason why you should do so at sea. Moreover, it is acknowledged that neutrals are entitled to keep up friendly relations with each belligerent, so long as they do not directly aid either to carry on the war. There can, therefore, be no right to hinder them from carrying, as an act of friendly intercourse, his goods not being contraband of war, nor, consequently, to search his ship for such goods. So, as before indicated, the same doctrine of the mutual independence of ship-territory would forbid in future the claim of any belligerent nation to take out its own subjects from any neutral ship, otherwise than by virtue of a treaty. Here again the right on land must govern that at sea. There is no reason why a nation should have any more right to search for and seize deserters, rebels, offenders of any description, subjects bound to service, on a neutral ship at sea, than in neutral territory on land. If anything, there is less, since the inconvenience to the neutral may be far greater; as when Washington complained that we had pressed men from American vessels by entire ships' crews. If the Southern commissioners were really seized as rebels, the act is in principle quite indefensible. Putting then aside as untenable these two grounds claimed for the right of search, we revert to "contraband of war." On this head, I take it, the right of search must clearly subsist. For a neutral ship to carry to either belligerent arms, ammunition, military stores -to transform herself in short into a floating arsenal for his behoof, - is clearly un-neutral conduct, a virtual act of warfare. No doubt there is great difficulty in defining precisely what is contraband of war. No doubt such definition has been extended, will fluctuate according to circumstances. Dr. Wheaton, in his " History of the Law of The International Law of the Sea. "munications of official persons on the 66 66 ere how an extension of the term to naval stores took place about the beginning of the eighteenth century. What is contraband of war at one time or place, need not be so at another. To take the notorious instance of coal; it evidently could not be contraband of war steam-ships existed; it need not be even now, in any country which does not yet possess them; it would be contraband of war of the most dangerous nature in a country which has warsteamers, and can get no coal but by sea. Thus, whilst it is easy to argue away all contraband of war by cavilling about the limits to be affixed to it, the very uncertainty of these limits in nature renders it all the more necessary to fix them by authority. Accordingly, the practice has often been followed in treaties, of defining or enumerating what articles should be contraband of war; as in the treaty of commerce and navigation of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States; or the maritime convention of 1801, between Great Britain and Russia, the long enumeration of contraband articles, in which begins with No cannons," and ends with "saddles and bridles." Of late our Queen's proclamations have in part fulfilled the office of a treaty for such purposes. I say in part, because the action of the proclamation is clearly only a limited one. ship probably could escape condemnation in a belligerent's prize court, which could be shown to have carried articles declared contraband by the proclamation of its own sovereign; but it does not follow that it would not be condemned for carrying articles not declared contraband by the proclamation, but which the prize court would hold to be such. What is needed on this head in international law, is clearly definite rules, universal agreement, subject of course to modification from time to time. Let us consider now the case of despatches. The right of search and seizure for the carriage of them is fully recognised by international law. Lord Stowell, in particular, is very strong on the subject. He treats as despatches (case of the Caroline) "all official corn 66 public affairs of the Government." "The comparative importance of the particular papers is immaterial," he declares; "it is sufficient that they "relate to the public business of the "It is enemy, be it great or small." not to be argued," he says, in another case (the Atalanta), that "it is necessary to show a military tendency." The consequence of such a service rendered by a neutral "is indefinite, infinitely beyond the effect of any contraband that 66 can be conveyed. . . . In the transmis"sion of despatches may be conveyed "the entire plan of a campaign. . . . It is "impossible to limit a letter to so small "a size as not to be capable of producing "the most important consequences in "the operations of the enemy." And lastly, "when a party, from want of proper caution, suffers despatches to "be conveyed on board his vessel, the "plea of ignorance will not avail him" (the Rapid). It is impossible to exaggerate the force and decisiveness of these positions. Nevertheless, I cannot help thinking that they require to be very considerably modified, if not wholly given up. Let us consider the case of a war on land. France is at war with Holland, and has landed troops on the coast. Luxemburg, however, has not been reduced; Belgium stands neutral. Would it be a breach of her neutrality to allow the despatches of both belligerents to pass across her territory-between the invading army and France-between the Netherlands and outlying Luxemburg I rather think that either belligerent, whose despatches she might stop, would be very apt to make it a casus belli. I am not aware that during the Italian campaign Austria ever dreamed of making the passage of French couriers through Switzerland a ground of complaint against the latter. Is there any reason why the mere transmission of despatches by sea should be governed by other rules? Unless the neutral ship be actually hired for the transmission of the despatch, in which case she is clearly neutral no longer, but lated for this purpose to vessels in actual Government employ-whether a system of guarantees for the faithful neutrality of others could not be devised, so as to obviate the necessity of search, are ulterior branches of the question. It will be seen that, viewed as we have viewed it, the right of search becomes no more a peculiar prerogative, but a mere form of ocean-police, requiring to be regulated, within fixed limits, by wellconsidered rules. America in particular has, by special treaties with different nations, endeavoured to effect this; there is no reason why the practice should not be generalized. The position, therefore, that a ship at sea is to be considered as part of the country to which she belongs, must be taken with certain very important qualifications. Properly speaking, landterritory and ship-territory are analogous, not identical; the latter is to be held governed by the same rules as the former so far, and so far only, as the differences of subject-matter allow. But now-granted the belligerent right of search, or search and seizure, as respects ship-territory, the next question is, On what grounds should it be exercised? These, so far as the past is concerned, may be, perhaps, broadly summed up under five chief heads: 1. Contraband of war. 2. Despatches. 3. Persons in the enemy's service 4. Property belonging to the enemy. 5. Deserters, or other subjects of the searching Power. In considering them all, we should, moreover, always bear in mind the right of blockade, whereby a belligerent is held entitled, if strong enough, to cut off all communication with his enemy's coast. The two last heads may be soon disposed of. The principle long enforced by England in her own practice, that a friend's goods in an enemy's ship are free, whilst an enemy's goods in a friend's ship are good prize, must be considered to have been waived since the Conferences of Paris in 1856, in favour of the opposite one long contended for by neutrals, that "free ships that the former one cannot be reconciled with the mutual independence at sea of the various domains of municipal law. You could not enter on land a neutral territory to seize the goods of your enemy; there is no reason why you should do so at sea. Moreover, it is acknowledged that neutrals are entitled to keep up friendly relations with each belligerent, so long as they do not directly aid either to carry on the war. There can, therefore, be no right to hinder them from carrying, as an act of friendly intercourse, his goods not being contraband of war, nor, consequently, to search his ship for such goods. So, as before indicated, the same doctrine of the mutual independence of ship-territory would forbid in future the claim of any belligerent nation to take out its own subjects from any neutral ship, otherwise than by virtue of a treaty. Here again the right on land must govern that at sea. There is no reason why a nation should have any more right to search for and seize deserters, rebels, offenders of any description, subjects bound to service, on a neutral ship at sea, than in neutral territory on land. If anything, there is less, since the inconvenience to the neutral may be far greater; as when Washington complained that we had pressed men from American vessels by entire ships' crews. If the Southern commissioners were really seized as rebels, the act is in principle quite indefensible. Putting then aside as untenable these two grounds claimed for the right of search, we revert to "contraband of war." On this head, I take it, the right of search must clearly subsist. For a neutral ship to carry to either belligerent arms, ammunition, military stores -to transform herself in short into a floating arsenal for his behoof, — is clearly un-neutral conduct, a virtual act of warfare. No doubt there is great difficulty in defining precisely what is contraband of war. No doubt such definition has been extended, will fluctuate according to circumstances. Dr. Wheaton, in his "History of the Law of |