"Gentlemen, you are the most enlightened body of men that I ever had the good fortune to meet; and your hospitality is the greatest compliment that I have ever had, or ever shall have, or could conceive. Each of you is a prince of the earth. And I am a worm . . ." And then there are the minor speeches, finishing off in detail the vast embroidery of laudation which was begun by the Chairman. Everybody is more or less enfolded in that immense mantle. And everybody is satisfied and sated, save those who have sat through the night awaiting the sweet mention of their own names, and who have been disappointed. At every banquet there are such. And it is they who, by their impatience, definitely cause the reaction at last. The speakers who terminate The Nation.

the affair fight against the reaction in vain. The applause at the close is perfunctory-how different from the fever of the commencement and the hysteria of the middle! The illusion is over. The emotional debauch is finished. The adult and bearded boys have played the delicious make-believe of being truly great, and the game is at an end; and each boy, looking within, perceives without too much surprise that he is after all only himself. cohort "of the best," foregathered in the cloak-room, say to each other, "Delightful evening! Splendid! Ripping!" And then one says, ironically leering, in a low voice, and a tone heavy with realistic disesteem: "Well, what do you think of?" Naming the lion of the night.

Arnold Bennett.

A

but

We do not believe that anything so terrible as a disturbance of the peace of Europe will follow the action which Germany has taken at the Moroccan port of Agadir. That certain consequences will flow from that act, and ultimately consequences of a very momentous kind, is probable, for the moment at any rate they will not be sensational. German action, however, with its very disquieting, nay, alarming effect upon Europe, provides a striking illustration of what we have so often said about the international situation and the peace of the world. Many excellent people are in the habit of asking us why we consider the condition of Europe to be precarious, and why we are so wicked as to suggest that other Powers, meaning thereby Germany, are not as sincerely anxious for peace as we are. "Why do you not give them credit for as good intentions as those of the Brit

ish people and Government and the other Governments of the world?" That is a question very natural and very easy to ask, and one which is, we are fully aware, asked by a great many people in perfect sincerity-people who regard us as bloodthirsty Jingoes incapable of understanding that the angel of peace is abroad in the world. Our answer-an answer which, again, has always seemed to our critics unsatisfactory, cynical, and unjust-is that the peace of the world can only be permanently maintained if all the chief Powers are satisfied with the status quo. The peace of the world means the maintenance of the status quo.

If there is any one strong Power which is not satisfied with the status quo, but regards it as inimical to her just aspirations and ambitions, and therefore an injury to her, it is ridiculous to pretend that peace would be assured to the world but for the crim

inal incitements of militant journalists. But while we have said that the difficulty of assuring peace by agreement is caused by the fact that Germany looks upon the status quo as injurious to her, especially in the matter of sea power, we have never failed to point out that we regard the German people with the greatest sympathy and respect, and believe that as a whole they do not in the least share the ambitions and aspirations of their rulers, but would infinitely prefer to leave things alone and remain at peace with all mankind. We have been obliged to add, however, that the views of the mass of the German people are utterly unimportant in this connection, first, because the Germans are essentially an obedient people and do what their Government tells them to do; and, secondly, because in any case they are prevented from exercising any real influence on military, naval, and foreign affairs. The Reichstag no doubt often hampers the German Executive, and in minor matters is a considerable source of trouble to it, but when once any great and momentous decision involving peace or war is taken the very limited reign of the toga and the civilian in Germany passes away. What we have got to consider is the ruling caste and not the people. As we have said, the ruling caste are not satisfied with the status quo, but are anxious for many developments which mean its destruction. And here again let us be careful to be just to Germany. We cannot with anything approaching fairness to the ruling caste say that they are actuated by wicked motives. They do not, however, believe that war or the threat of war is a bad thing. On the contrary, they sincerely and honestly believe that war is a great instrument of policy, not to be used lightly, no doubt, but never to be abandoned or forgotten. They have great and, as they think, noble, God-given aims, and

LIVING AGE. VOL. LII. 2728

they wish to use their army and navy to further those aims, not necessarily by war, but certainly when necessary by the display of their powers on sea and land. They do not want to draw the sword, but nothing will induce them to abandon the right of emphasizing argument by tapping the swordhilt or half drawing the sword from its sheath. Now the dispatch of the German warships to the port of Agadir, in South Morocco, at the head of the Sus River and Valley, is an example of Germany's unwillingness to recognize the status quo as binding upon her, and of her desire to alter it without thought of any considerations but her own special interests. This is not wicked on the part of Germany.

It

is simply a fact which we are bound to take note of, and which if not taken note of will put us in far greater danger than ever of a European conflagration.

That

Everybody is asking, What is Germany's object, and why has this bolt from the blue fallen so suddenly? That the alleged object, the protection of German interests in the neighborhood of the Sus River, is the real object cannot be regarded as serious. may be the excuse, but it is certainly not the reason. In all probability the German action is due to a great many motives, all converging on one point -the advisability of Germany asserting herself at a convenient moment. Though it may not be written over the doors of the German Foreign Office, there is certainly written in the hearts of the German official class: "Never miss a good opportunity of making the rest of the Powers feel that nothing can be settled without Germany being first considered and consulted, and the world being reminded that she is a Power that cannot be overlooked." German publicists and politicians sometimes call this Germany's protest against "being hemmed in." Other

If this succeeded, and the entente were broken up, Germany would clearly have scored a great success diplomatically, but what real hope is there of success? "In vain is the net set in the sight of any bird." We confess that such procedure strikes us as rather too naïve.

So much for the governing principle. Below that there is an instinctive desire on the part of the statesmen who control Foreign Affairs in Germany to test the international conditions by what we might call, in continuation of our medical simile, small exploratory operations. They are always desiring to test the efficacy of the triple entente. The idea seems to be that if they do this often enough some day either Russia or Britain, possibly through a defect of diplomacy or temper, will be led into some action which may be represented as not quite loyal to France. But if this should take place there would be a tremendous asset available for German diplomacy which could be used to isolate one or other of those Powers. The Germans would be able to go to Paris and say: "See how worthless the entente really is, and therefore in what a dangerous position you are. Germany would really like to be friendly to you, but so long as you maintain the entente with these two Powers you are provoking Germany. Yet, as recent events show, the entente is almost good for nothing. Some day you will find that you have provoked Germany too far, and then your so-called allies will desert you, and you will have to pay the whole of the terrible cost payable by

Probably another consideration which has influenced Germany to use the troubles in Morocco is the talk which there has been of late in England about the necessity of treating Germany more fairly and giving her a "place in the sun." Certain well-meaning people here take the German complaints in this respect quite seriously and, astonishing as it may seem, really think that Germany is a kind of poor relation who, through being gauche, has not been fairly treated. Therefore they want, as they call it with patronizing imbecility, "to give Germany a chance." The German Foreign Office is not averse from finding out by action such as that at Agadir what is the value of all this talk. It argues: "If the talk should turn to be genuine our action will alarm and disturb the French, and so help to weaken the entente. If, on the other hand, the talk of the Liberals is proved to be not genuine our action will be almost as useful. In that event we shall have a splendid argument to use against those Germans who are beginning to say that it is no good to go on spending so much money on the Navy, as it only provokes England and accomplishes nothing. If British opinion becomes excited over Agadir, and we have to withdraw, the Navy League and those officials who secretly support its extreme demands will be in clover. They will be able to say to the people: 'We could do nothing, and had to accept a great humiliation because we were not strong enough at sea. Give us a stronger Navy by

means of a new and expanded naval programme and we shall not be in danger of such humiliation again."" Thus it is hoped that Germany will be able to have it both ways. If she succeeds there will be a splendid Imperial triumph for use at the General Election. If she fails there will be a most powerful argument for further naval developments. For those who believe in the wisdom of fishing in troubled waters the situation can thus be represented as ideal. France has intervened in Morocco with an armed force. Spain has followed suit. Now Germany desires and claims the right to take similar action. If she is not to be allowed to do so she will ask the reason why, and the answer is sure to give her opportunities which will be useful externally and internally.

How ought the British Government and the British people to meet this situation? The first answer to the question is: by perfect loyalty to our friends the French. There is not the slightest fear of France being unreasonable or suggesting action which will provoke war, but in any case we must show her that we are absolutely loyal to the entente. With this governing principle premised, the next thing to do is to keep cool and not to get into a flutter about German action or to do anything heady and sensational. No doubt if we make sufficient protests about Agadir we can get the Germans to withdraw, but they will only withdraw at a price, and the more anxious we are to get them out, the higher will be the price demanded by Germany for going out. It will be said perhaps: "But it is essential to British interests, quite apart from those of France, that Germany should go out." If she does not, we shall be told, it will be a case analogous to the taking of Port Arthur by Russia or of Kiaochau by Germany. The occupation will become permanent, and Germany will es

tablish a great naval base on the Atlantic coast of Africa which will enable her to do all sorts of terrible things and threaten British naval interests. We are bound to say we are wholly sceptical in regard to the danger of a German naval base at Agadir. Let us look at the matter calmly. If Germany takes Agadir and makes a powerful naval base there, she will have to spend many millions of money, for such things are not done upon the cheap. But even Germany has not unlimited money to spend on naval preparations, and every pound thus spent at Agadir will be in the end deducted from the money which she can spend upon her Fleet. Now in our opinion German money spent upon ships, that is, upon floating things, is a much greater menace to British naval supremacy than money spent upon a naval base some five days' steaming from Germany's naval centre in the North Sea.

Naval supremacy is won by ships, not by forts; by iron, not by bricks and mortar. Furthermore, the command of the sea is won by concentration, not by dispersal of naval force. The great danger to us and the great advantage of Germny is the fact that she keeps her great war fleet always together and in one place, in a way which is not possible for any other naval Power except Japan, though it may be possible for the United States after the cutting of the Panama Canal. Germany has got two sea fronts, one on the Baltic and one on the North Sea, but the Kiel Canal enables her to have one undivided fleet. But if Germany were to establish a naval base at Agadir, either she would not use it— in which case her possession of that naval base would be of little or no importance except as a drain of moneyor if she used it she would have dispersed instead of concentrated her naval force, and so would have played

our game, not hers. But perhaps it will be said: "Suppose Germany does beat us at sea, what an advantage it will be to her to have a naval base on the Atlantic ready to her hand." The answer is simple. If she beats us at sea all the naval bases in the world are hers, and she can pick them up at leisure when and where she likes. If she beats us at sea she will find Gibraltar far more convenient than Agadir. To put it in another way. If the Germans are wise and know their business their possession of Agadir will be a negligible fact till they have obtained supremacy at sea. Indeed we can understand German naval experts looking upon its possession with alarm, since it might prove a temptation to Germany to split up her Fleet. The Spectator.

Re

member it is too far off from the Straits of Gibraltar-600 miles-for there to be any danger of Germany keeping a flotilla of torpedo destroyers there in order to make some unexpected attack upon our Mediterranean or Atlantic Fleet. But it will be urged, How about using it as a base for cruisers to prey upon our commerce? The answer is that if we beat Germany in the North Sea Agadir will be very soon and very easily "mopped up" by a British squadron.

In short, we shall be in our opinion most unwise if we grow over-excited at the thought of a German naval base at Agadir, for, to state the great and governing consideration once more, naval supremacy is maintained by fleets and not by fortified harbors.

One of the most striking and interesting features of the Thackeray Centennial Exhibition at the Charterhouse, the successful organization of which does infinite credit to the enthusiasm and energy of Messrs. Louis Melville and Walter Jerrold, is the wealth of Thackeray manuscripts and original drawings contributed by collectors on both sides of the Atlantic. From the splendid library of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan came the original manuscript of Vanity Fair, while the manuscript of Esmond and that of the third volume of The Newcomes were loans from Trinity College, Cambridge, and Charterhouse School. Of the miscellaneous letters few were more interesting than the appeal of Dickens to Thackeray, as one of "twenty old visitors at Gore House," for a subscription of £10 towards a purse "to be presented to Marguerite Power, niece of Lady Blessington," dated December 4, 1857, and

Thackeray's cordial assent to the kindly suggestion of his brother writer, written three days later. They should obviously have been catalogued 113 and 114, as the reply now comes before the appeal. These characteristic letters were exhibited by Mr. W. T. Spencer of New Oxford Street. Mr. W. Lawrence Bradbury is the owner of Thackeray's invitation to Bradbury and Evans dated September 27, 1842, requesting the presence of "three good fellows from Punch at dinner," and the letter to F. M. Evans giving the reasons for Thackeray's retirement from the staff of that journal. The very early letter to Macrone (No. 102 in the dainty little catalogue, destined doubtless to fetch a high price from the Thackeray collector of 2011!) was discovered some three years ago at Bath, and contains the writer's proposal for a work in "two vollums" to be entitled Rambles and Sketches in the Old and New