who have not the necessary knowledge, | tract is left free by the law, it will depend though they have served the regular on many circumstances, whether the period of apprenticeship. If the exami- master will be content with such a period; nation of the attorney and apothecary he may require either more money with is sufficiently strict, that is a better gua- the apprentice and less of his service, or rantee for their professional competence less of his money and more of his serthan the mere fact of having served an vice. This is a matter that no legislator apprenticeship. Yet the apprenticeship can usefully interfere with. But when is some guarantee for the character of boys leave home at an early age, and are the apothecary and solicitor, which the sent to learn an art, it is necessary that examination alone cannot be, for a youth they should be subjected to control, who has much misconducted himself and for a considerable period. They during his apprenticeship cannot receive must learn to be attentive to their busithe testimonial of his master for goodness, methodical, and well-behaved; and conduct, and he is liable to have his indentures cancelled. The attorney and apothecary belong to two classes whose services are constantly required by the public, who have little or no means of judging of their professional ability. A man can tell if his shoemaker or tailor uses him well, but his health may be ruined by his apothecary, or his affairs damaged by his attorney, without his knowing where the fault lies. There is no objection, therefore, to requiring apprenticeship or any other condition from an attorney or apothecary which shall be a guarantee for his professional competence, but nothing more should be required than is necessary, and it is generally agreed that an apprenticeship of five years is not necessary. If, however, the law were altered in this respect, it is very possible that the practice of five years' apprenticeship might still continue; and there would be no good reason for the law interfering if the parties were willing to make such a contract. In all those arts, crafts, trades, and mysteries which a boy is sent to learn at an early age, a relation analogous to that of master and servant, and parent and child, is necessary both for the security of the master and the benefit of the boy. Adam Smith speaks of apprenticeship as if the only question was the length of time necessary to learn the art or mystery in. If parents can keep their children at home or at school till they approach man's estate, the control created by the contract of apprenticeship is less necessary, and the term for serving a master not be longer than is requisite for earning of the art. Still, if the con if their master sets them a good example, the moral discipline of a boy's apprenticeship is useful. If the master does not set a good example, the effect will be that he will not be so likely to have apprentices; for an apprenticeship partakes of the nature of a school education, an education in an art or mystery, and a preparation for the world; and a master who can best prepare youths in this threefold way is most likely to have the offer of apprentices. APPRISING. [ADJUDICATION.] APPROPRIATION. [ADVOWSON.] APPROVER. By the old English law, when a person who had been arrested, imprisoned, and indicted for treason or felony, confessed the crime charged in the indictment, and was admitted by the court to reveal on oath the accomplices of his guilt, he was called an approver. The judge or court might in their discretion_give judgment and award execution upon the party confessing, or admit him to be an approver. In the latter case a coroner was directed to receive and record the particulars of the approver's disclosure, which was called ar appeal, and process was thereupon issued to apprehend and try the appellees, that is, the persons whom the approver had named as the partners of his crime. As the approver, in revealing his se complices, rendered himself liable to the punishment due to the crime which he had confessed, and was only respited at the discretion of the court, it was considered that an accusation, made under such circumstances, was entitled to pecu liar credit, and the accomplices were therefore put upon their trial without the intervention of a grand jury. Here, however, as in other appeals [APPEAL], the parties accused by the approver were allowed to choose the mode of trial, and the approver might be compelled to fight each of his accomplices in succession. But, unlike an appeal by an innocent person, the prosecution at the suit of an approver might be defeated and discharged by a pardon granted by the king either to the approver or to the appellee. If the approver failed to make good his appeal, judgment of death was given against him. If he succeeded in convicting the appellee, he was entitled to a small daily allowance from the time of being admitted approver, and to a pardon from the king. The appeal by approvers had become obsolete before the abolition of it by parliament; and the present practice is to prefer a bill of indictment against all parties implicated in the charge, except the approver, and to permit the criminal who confesses his guilt to give evidence against his companions before the grand jury. If upon the trial the demeanour and testimony of the accomplice are satisfactory to the court, he is recommended to the mercy of the crown. (See 2 Hawk., Crown Law, ch. 24.) ARBITRATION is the adjudication upon a matter in controversy between private individuals appointed by the parties. This mode of settling differences is very frequently resorted to as a means of avoiding the delay and expense of an action at law or a suit in equity. It has the advantage of providing an efficient tribunal for the decision of many causes -such, for instance, as involve the examination of long and complicated accounts, which the ordinary courts are, from their mode of proceeding and the want of proper machinery, incompetent to investigate. The person appointed to adjudicate is called an arbitrator, or referee. The matter on which he is appointed to adjudicate is said to be referred or submitted to arbitration. His judgment or decision is called an arbitrament, or, more usually, an award. Most matters actually in controversy between private persons may be referred to arbitration; but an agreement to refer any differences which may hereafter arise is not binding, for the parties cannot be compelled to name an arbitrator. But an agreement may be made to refer any dispute that may arise to arbitration, with a condition of certain penalties, to be paid by the party who shall refuse to agree in the appointment of an arbitrator. No injury can be the subject of an arbitration, unless it is such as may be a matter of civil controversy between the parties: a felony, for instance, which is a wrong, not to the party injured merely, but to society in general, cannot be referred. There are no particular qualifications required for an arbitrator. În matters of complicated accounts, mercantile men are usually preferred. In other cases, it is usual to appoint barristers, who, being accustomed to judicial investigations, are able to estimate the evidence properly, to confine the examination strictly to the points in question, and, in making the award, to avoid those informalities for which it might afterwards be set aside. Both time and expense are thus saved by fixing on a professional arbitrator. Any number of persons may be named as arbitrators: if the number is even, it is usually provided that, if they are divided in opinion, a third person shall be appointed, called an umpire, to whose sole decision the matter is then referred. A dispute may be referred to arbitration, either-1. When there is an action or suit already pending between the parties relating thereto, or-2. When there is no such action or suit. 1. In the former case, the parties to the action or suit, if sui juris, are in general competent to submit to arbitration. The reference may be made at any stage of the proceedings: if before trial, it is effected. by a rule of the court of law or an order of the court of equity in which the action or suit is brought; if at the trial, by an order of the judge or an order of Nisi Prius, either of which may afterwards be made a rule of court. The usual mode of proceeding in a case referred to arbitration where an action is pending, is for the parties to consent that a verdict shall be given for the plaintiff for the damages laid in the declaration, subject to the award of the arbitrator. The person named as arbitrator is not bound to accept the office, nor, having accepted, can he be compelled to proceed with it. In either case, if the arbitrator refuses or ceases to act, the reference is at an end, unless the contingency has been provided for in the submission, or unless both parties consent to appoint some other person as arbitrator in his stead. The order of reference usually provides that the award shall be made within a certain period; and if the arbitrator lets the day slip without making his award, his authority ceases, but a clause has usually been inserted to enable the arbitrator to enlarge the time; and now, independently of any such clause, the court, or any judge thereof, is, by the late statute for the amendment of the law (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42), empowered to do so. The authority of an arbitrator ceases as soon as he has made or declared his award. After this (even though it be before the expiration of the time appointed) he has no longer the power even of correcting a mistake. When the arbitrator has accepted his office, he fixes the times and place for the parties to appear before him. Each of them furnishes him with a statement of his case, which is usually done by giving him a copy of the briefs on each side; and on the day appointed he proceeds to hear them (either in person, or by their counsel or attorneys), and to receive the evidence on each side, nearly in the same manner as a judge at an ordinary trial: but he is frequently invested by the order of reference, with a power of examining the parties themselves. No means existed of compelling the attendance of witnesses, or the production of documents, before an arbitrator, until the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, authorized the court or a judge to make an order to that effect; disobedience to which order, if served with proper notice of the time and place of attendance, becomes a contempt of court. The witnesses, thus compelled to attend, are entitled to their expenses in the same manner as at a trial. And where the order requires the witnesses to be examined upon oath, the arbitrator is by the same statute authorized to administer an oath or affirmation, as the case may require; and any person who gives false evidence may be indicted for perjury. The extent of an arbitrator's authority depends on the terms of the reference: it may either be confined to the action pending between the parties, or it may incince any other specified grounds of dispute, or all disputes and controversies whatever existing between them at the time of the reference. Where the matters referred to him are specified, it is his duty to decide upon them all; where they are not specified, it is his duty to decide upon as many as are laid before him. In no case is an arbitrator authorized to adjcdicate upon anything not comprehended in the reference; such, for instance, 25 any claims or disputes which may have arisen after the reference was made, or, where the reference is specific, anything not expressly included in it. An arbitrator being a judge appointed by the parties themselves for the settlement of their differences, his decision on the merits of the case submitted to him is conclusive. But if his award be partially or illegally made, the superior courts have the power of setting it aside, upon application being made within reasonable time. This happens either, 1. where the award is not co-extensive with the, arbitrator's authority; or, 2. where it appears on the face of it to proceed on mistaken views of law, or to fail in some of the qualities required for its validity: or, 3. where any misconduct has been committed. This may happen in two cases: 1st, where the arbitrators have been guilty of corruption or other misbe haviour, as, if they have proceeded to arbitrate without giving notice of the meeting, have improperly refused to recei evidence, or committed any other gross irregularity in practice: 2ndly, where it is proved that the arbitrator has been misled by fraud used by either of the parties. Where an award is absolutely void, as where it is made after the asthority of the arbitrator has ceased, it is not in general necessary to set it aside, for it is incapable of being enforced. When the award has been made and delivered, if one of the parties refuses to comply with it, the other may bring an action against him on the award. But the most prompt and efficient remedy is to apply to the court for an attachment, grounded on the contempt of court which he has been guilty of by disobeying the order of reference. In opposing this application, the other party may insist on any objection apparent on the award itself; but if there were any other objections affecting its validity, and he has neglected to apply to the court to set it aside within the time fixed by them for that purpose, it is too late for him to avail himself of them. When, in the original action, a verdict has been given for the plaintiff subject to a reference, if the defendant does not abide by and perform the award, the plaintiff may, by leave of the court, enter a judgment and sue out execution for the whole damages mentioned in the verdict. 2. Where no action has been commenced, the parties may refer their differences to arbitration by mutual agreement. Every person capable of making a disposition of his property may be party to such an agreement: no peculiar form is necessary for its validity. Whether the submission be verbal or in writing, it is in the power of either of the parties to revoke it, and thus put an end to the authority of the arbitrator at any time before the award is made. In order to prevent this, it is usual for the parties to make it a part of their agreement, that they will abide by and perform the award; and if after this either of them should, without sufficient reason, revoke bis submission, or otherwise prevent the arbitrator from proceeding with the arbitration, he will be liable to an action for the breach of his agreement. The time for making the award may be enlarged, if there be a clause to that effect in the agreement of submission, or if all the parties consent to it, but not otherwise. There are no means of compelling the attendance of witnesses, nor has the arbitrator the power of adminis tering an oath; but the witnesses and -if they have agreed to be examined— the parties are sworn either before a judge, or, in the country, before a commissioner. They may, however, be examined without having being sworn, if no objection is made to it at the time. The courts cannot enforce performance of the award by attachment; the only remedy is an action on the award itself, or rather, on the agreement of submission. The defendant may insist on any objection apparent on the award itself, but where there is any other ground for setting it aside, his only remedy is by a bill in equity. Thus where the reference is by agreement, many inconveniences occur, particularly from the deficiency of the remedies: but the statute 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 15, enables parties to put such references on the same footing as those which are made where a cause is depending. The statute enacts that all merchants and others, who desire to end any controversy, suit, or quarrel (for which there is no other remedy but by personal action or suit in equity), may agree that their submission of the suit to arbitration or umpirage shall be made a rule of any of the king's courts of record, and may insert such agreement in their submission, or promise, or condition of the arbitration bond; which agreement being proved on oath by one of the witnesses thereto, the court shall make a rule that such submission and award shall be conclusive; and after such rule made, the parties disobeying the award shall be liable to be punished as for a contempt of the court; unless such award shall be set aside for corruption or other misbehaviour in the arbitrators or umpire, proved on oath to the court, within one term after the award is made. The provisions of the new statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, apply as well to arbitrations made in pursuance of such agreements of submission, as to those made by order of court; and the law is the same in both cases, except in some few points of practice. Previously to the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, the authority of the arbitrator was revocable by either party at any time before the award was made; but by that statute it is declared that the authority of an arbitrator cannot be revoked by any of the parties, without the leave of the court or a judge: but it is still determined by the death of any of the parties, unless a clause to obviate this is inserted in the submission; and if one of the parties is a single woman, her marriage will have the same effect. The settlement of disputes by arbitration was usual among the Athenians. Aristotle, in giving an instance of a metaphor that is appropriate without being obvious, quotes a passage from Archytas, in which he compares an arbitrator to an altar, as being a refuge for the injured. He also (Rhetor. i. 13) contrasts arbitration with legal proceedings, and adds that the arbitrator regards equity, but the discast (judge in the courts) regards the law (Aristotle, Rhetor. iii. 11.) There were at Athens two modes of proceeding which passed by the name of arbitration -the Greek word for which is diæta (Síaira). In one of these the arbitrators (SiaiTnTal) appear to have constituted what in modern jurisprudence would be called a Court of Reconcilement. A certain number of persons, of a specified age, were chosen by each tribe, and probably for one year only, as official referees, and from among these the arbitrators to decide upon each particular case were afterwards also chosen (Petit, Leges Atticæ, p. 345; Heraldus, Animadversiones, p. 370), and were then bound to act, under the pain of infamy. They sat in public, and their judgments were subscribed by the proper authorities, though it does not appear who those authorities were. (Petit, p. 346.) An appeal lay from their decision to the ordinary courts; and sometimes the arbitrator referred the cause to their judgment at once, without pronouncing any sentence of his own. (Heraldus, Animadversiones, p. 372). The jurisdiction of the arbitrators was confined to Athenian citizens, and they took no cognizance of suits in which the sum in dispute was less than ten drachmæ, such smaller actions being disposed of in a summary manner, by a special tribunal. The litigant parties paid the expenses of the arbitration. (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, i. 316, English Trans.) When their year of offic expired, the arbitrators were liable to b called to account for their conduct, and i found guilty of corruption or misconduct were punished with infamy (arμíα). In the other mode of proceeding, which was strictly in accordance with the defi nition which we have given of arbitration the parties were at liberty to refer thei differences to whomsoever they chose The submission was generally made by written agreement, which frequently con tained an engagement by third person to become sureties for its performance (Demosthenes, Speech against Apaturius chap. 4.) There lay no appeal from th award of the arbitrator to any other tri bunal, unless probably such a right o appeal was reserved in the agreement (See the law quoted by Demosthene against Meidas, chap. 26.) The Roman law upon this subject i much better understood, and is of infi nitely greater importance. Its influence has extended over the whole of Europe and even in our own country it is evident that references made by virtue of a mutual agreement-apparently the first species of arbitration known in our law -are mainly founded upon the doctrines contained in the Digest, iv. tit. 8. The only mode of referring a matter to arbitration in the Roman law was by an agreement called compromissum, which contained the names of the arbitrators (hence called arbitri compromissarii), the matters intended to be referred, and an undertaking by both parties to abide by the award, or in default thereof to pay to the other a certain sum of money as a penalty. The rule which forbids matters of public interest to be submitted to the judgment of a private referee, was not confined in its operation to criminal prosecutions and penal actions, but extended to preclude arbitrators as well from entertaining any question affecting the civil condition (status) of any individual,-his freedom, for instance,- -as from deciding on the validity of any contract which it was attempted to set aside on the ground of its having been obtained by fraud or force. The persons named as arbitrators were not bound to undertake the office, but |