view be great also-we must calculate on both sides, and are not at liberty, in common prudence, to expose the highest interest to even a moderate degree of hazard. No prudent man would think of killing all the dogs in a town in order to prevent even a considerable risk of the influenza breaking out. But when the consequence of a mad dog's bite is a disease of the most dreadful and fatal kind, quite beyond the reach of human art, all agree in the prudence of taking such precautions as shall preclude even the least risk of so great a calamity. So civil war is an evil of the very worst description; it is, indeed, the greatest of national calamities. Therefore, in considering whether or not it is prudent and justifiable to resist an established government, the great probability of vast mischief being, at all events in the first instance, occasioned, must always be taken into account. In truth, it is nearly the certain consequence of resistance. But the resistance may also fail to succeed, the government may remain as bad or even worse than before.

Then

we have to reckon what chance there is of this last of all calamities befalling us, namely, the evil of civil war with a defeat and more oppressive despotism than ever being established. If there be but a considerable danger of this, we have no right to resist; because there would be no prudence, no common sense in trying the experiment unless we were nearly certain to succeed. So, even if we were nearly certain of succeeding, as the civil commotion is of itself a grievous infliction upon all classes, there is no prudence and no sense in bringing such an evil upon the community, unless the present evils are of a very bad kind. Common reason teaches us that it is far better to bear with much, than to pay such a price for even a successful attempt to change our condition. Therefore, we never can act with a tolerably rational regard to our own interests, or with any regard to our duty to our fellow-countrymen, if we resist the established government, unless its mischief and our sufferings under it and from it are such as to justify us-first, in encountering the certain evils of the struggle, and next in running the risk of a failure. The mischiefs of the existing system must, therefore, have become almost unbearable, and the probability of the resistance succeeding must be very great compared with the risk of its failing, before man can be justified in beginning a resistance. This is the rule of reason and prudence, and this is the foundation of the duty of obedience, even in circumstances so unfavorable that a change of government, could it be brought about safely, would be the greatest benefit to the people.

"In all cases, therefore, both where the existing government is as advantageous as possible to the people-where it is much less beneficial than it might be, but may reasonably be expected to improve in a peaceable way, and where it is extremely bad without chance of peaceable amendment-the duty of obedience is founded upon the same principle, the general interest or advantage of the whole. In the first case the community is interested in things remaining as they are; a change would be hurtful, and it is, therefore, wrong because hurtful to the people to attempt it. In the second case a change would be very desirable, but as the means happily exist of accomplishing it safely and without encountering either evil or risk in the transaction, it would be hurtful to the community, and, therefore, wrong, and indeed irrational to attempt any sudden and violent alteration of the existing order of things. In

the third case there is no hope for the people but in an attempt to change by force; but before it is prudent to make the effort they must be sure that they suffer so much as to make it worth their while, that is worth the while of the community at large to undergo the great evils of civil war; and they must, above all, be sure that, even if it would be prudent to undergo those evils, the chances are much greater of success than of failure in the enterprise. Till then-till both these things concur to justify the effort-it is hurtful to the people, and, therefore, wrong to resist even this bad and unchanging despotism.

"The foundation of government-that is of the duty to obey in the subjects has by many been sought in what lawyers term prescription; that is to say, in long and indeed immemorial usage or possession. There can be no doubt that this gives great weight and authority to every government and consequently materially strengthens its power. Not only immemorial possession of the supreme power, or the existence of any government for a known long period of time, gives great strength and stability to that government, even the date and circumstances of whose beginning are ascertained. Men have a national tendency to acquiesce in whatever they find established, and the longer the period of the establishment the more ready and and cheerful will be their acquiescence. This disposition has its origin to a great degree in habit and the association of ideas, because we naturally like to lean towards what we have always been accustomed to, and what is mixed up with all our recollections, connected with all our feelings and pursuits, and related as it were to all that belongs to us. But the disposition to favor things long established has another and a more reasonable cause also. When any particular arrangement has been for a course of ages adopted everything also has become adapted to it, and as it were, fitted and dovetailed into it; so that many things have been voluntarily and purposely settled in such a way as to suit it, and many arrangements have been made which would, but for the existence of the old system, have been differently contrived. There is thus a manifest convenience, and indeed real advantage, in keeping up the fundamental system, in preserving the ground-work upon which so much has been built, and not rashly changing or destroying what, if destroyed, must pull down with it much that we have had the labor of making and naturally should desire to preserve. Again, there is always considerable risk in change; and we know the worst of whatever has been long tried, whereas, of what is to be new in in all respects we never can for a long time see and know all the imperfections."

There is also the moral influence of government over the minds of individual men, by which the former seldom makes an approach to despotism without, in a corresponding degree, debasing the latter. One after another the petty usurpations are submitted to, till the people become not only reconciled to, but actually advocates of them.

Thus, with the four principles now enumerated, viz: 1. The

gradual nature of the changes in the character of government, which renders men comparatively unaware of them; 2. The moral influence of government in debasing the public mind, in proportion as it becomes corrupt; 3. The expediency and utility of submitting to evils which we know, rather than fly to those we know not of; 4. And the principle of prescription, it is demonstrated that men will seldom resist their rulers, even when such resistance would be morally justified. And it was owing to this that Locke's idea of contract between the rulers and the ruled, so far from producing evil consequences, was productive of great good, in spite of the fallacy it involved.

Hobbes detected the absurdity of Locke's theory, and advanced his own, which was, in one sense, altogether true, but which we hope yet to show has not, to this day, been carried out to its proper and legitimate extent. He declared that all government existed by virtue of an implied or real compact, not between the people and their rulers, but between the people themselves. This is now the accepted doctrine, and will be discussed when the constitution and government of South Carolina comes to be more minutely considered. But this theory of the Philosopher of Malmesbury cannot be said to have originated entirely with him. The idea, we think, seems to pervade many of the chapters of Aristotle, and is almost definitely conveyed when he says, "The law is an agreement, a pledge between the citizens, of their intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just and good."

We need scarcely say this has always been the doctrine of South Carolina. The concluding portion of the preamble to our constitution of March, 1776; the enacting clause of the constitution of 1778, and the first section of the declaration of rights in our present compact, fully testify to this.

Let us now recapitulate briefly. Government, we have said, is the result of man's nature, he being a social and a political being. It is brought about by society to perform those offices which require special agencies, and which could not be effectually executed by the mere general consent of mankind. Society is the condition in which man is designed to live, and all who enter it must resign * B. III. ch. IX. Politics and Economics.

to its control and that of its agents whatever "natural liberty" they may pretend to be invested with. Since there are various species and races of men, forming different communities and having different social customs and manners, wants and qualifications, there will always be various forms of government; and since the legitimate object of each is the same-the assistance of society in the pursuit of human happiness-no one form can be said to be invariably best, that being alone the best which best adapts itself to a given people. And it is the destiny of every government (as, in fact, may be said of all human institutions) gradually to change its character, if not its form; in view of all which a few collateral considerations present themselves.

In the first place, it seems unquestionable that there can never be a fixed criterion or standard, by which the excellence of government is to be absolutely determined. The nearest approach to this would be the apparent amount of individual happiness and prosperity which is found to exist. But the very nature of these things, precluding any but a comparative view, and that only approximate and imperfect, renders it impossible to establish a fixed standard. Neither the stability, permanence, freedom, aggrandisement, tyranny, nor the conquests, the magnificence, the power nor the wealth of which a system is capable, afford us aid in forming this judgment. And no better proof of this can be desired than the gross absurdities into which all have fallen who have attempted to create model constitutions and governments, and the flat contradictions into which all have been led who have attempted to define them. Aristotle, with all his knowledge of the many existing governments of his time, repeatedly contradicts himself when treading on this forbidden ground; and, in spite of his repeated attempts to conclude what State is best, he is forced to admit that it may happen that, though one form of government may be better than another, yet oftentimes nothing prevents another from being preferable to it in particular circumstances and for particular purposes." Witness also the glaring case of "The fundamental constitutions of Carolina"-the deliberate See also ch. VIII. same book and B. v. ch. VIII.

* B. IV. ch. XI.

work of such a genius as JOHN LOCKE!-in which palatines, admirals, chamberlains, chancellors, constables, chief justices, high stewards and treasurers, as well as landgraves and casiques, and lords of signories, Baronies, precincts and manors, and, at the foot of all, leetmen and commons, are solemnly drawn up, as it were, in line of battle, under no less than one hundred and twenty articles, "every part whereof," saith the last in number, "shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever." Carolina! a distressed colony, or rather company of adventurers, who, at the very time these grand arrangements were making for their unalterable government, would have thought themselves fortunate to command a single regiment of disciplined soldiery and a few small craft to cruise along the coast; the very charter under which they embarked from the mother country being of but six or seven years' standing. Thus was a system devised for the government of a few thousand poor and suffering colonists, scattered over a comparatively vast and absolutely unexplored territory, which was ten thousand times better calculated to suit some densely-populated and wealthy district of the old world; and this scheme was conceived by a mind of the highest order!

Logically viewed, then, no doubt can remain that it is beyond the province of man to set up an arbitrary standard, whereby the excellence of governmental forms and constitutions can be properly decided. But reason sometimes falls to the ground in the face of facts, Let him, then, who will, take the world's history, and determine, if he can, which form has invariably been best and which worst in its operations and its effects. For ourselves, we are content with a single comparison and a single prominent instance. * Guizot presents the former; the latter is found in the Italian republics, but more particularly in the Venetian. The French Secretary makes this forcible reflection:

* History of the Origin of Representative Government in Europe, part 1., Lecture VI.

† Dr. Lieber, in his Manual of Political Ethics, (Boston: Little & Brown, 1847; part 1, ch. 10,) conveys an idea differing from ours, yet in keeping with and illustrative of our views. "Since government," says he, "is that