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midable to the prince; the common people and townsfolk became threatening to both, and each in turn were jealous and fearful of the others. The result of all this was the refined and perfect development of the feudal system, from the gradual though natural expiration of which sprung the systems of constitutional monarchy, so totally different from the Oriental despotism of the old empire.

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During the early periods of this system, the degraded vassal would scarcely dare suggest to his imagination that he was indeed a man, like his lord. But events brought the prince to his resThe haughty barons, by their "privilege of union," had reached a pitch which is well explained by the oath of allegiance, or obedience rather, taken by the great nobles at the coronation of the kings of Arragon: "We, who are each of us as good as you, and who are altogether more powerful than you, promise obedience if you maintain our rights-but if not, not;" and by the famous answer of Bigod, of Norfolk, to King Edward, when ordered abroad in command of his foreign armaments" By the eternal God, Sir Earl, you either go or hang."-"By the eternal God, Sir King, I neither go nor hang." Kings, thus infuriated, enlisted the good will of the common people, to humble the barons; and, without intending it, put into the hands of every man a writ of inquiry into the title by which either kings or lords were rulers. The natural propensity of inferiors to animadvert upon their superiors was in this way actively aroused. The invention of gunpowder armed the weak, and the printing-press enlightened the ignorant. Knowledge became diffused throughout the community. Political topics were discussed. Commerce extended itself into new channels. And finally old superstitions vanished like the morning vapor before the rising sun of the reformation, and the bright rays of Christianity streamed over the remains of the feudal system. The evil practices of the dark age were rapidly dispersed, and all the wholesome checks upon arbitrary power were nurtured by the warmth of this new and auspicious state of things.

Doctrines now began to be preached, and the thing called politics was brought into existence. There was a resurrection of

Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Xenophon. Sir Robert Filmer wrote, and was grappled with and defeated by Algernon Sidney. Locke, Harrington, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Abbe Sieyes, leaped up and instructed mankind, ere yet the astonishment at their varied achievements had subsided. The doctrine of the "jure divino" right of kings was met by that of original compact, and finally Europe settled down into two grand schools of Liberal and Conservative politicians. There were the Whigs and Tories in England; Revolutionists and Royalists in France; Liberal and Servile in Spain; Arbitrary and Constitutional in Germany; and similar divisions elsewhere. And here, in the New World, was born Constitutional Republicanism.

We must observe, however, at this place, and the reflection is highly illustrative of the progressive nature of human affairs, that the doctrine of the Divine Right was scarcely less fallacious than that which so great a mind as Locke's opposed to it. But the notion that government originated in a compact between the governed and the governors, which he advanced, though fallacious, was certainly productive of good. And this is one of the rare cases in which false doctrine has brought about true results, owing to the fact that some truth was admixed with the falsity. The great benefit produced was its warning to rulers that they owed duties to the governed, and that they must be careful to regard their wishes and interests. The moment the mass of mankind learn that they are contractors in the matter of their government, notwithstanding they may be put in a false position, they look about them to discover whether they have received the thing contracted for. In this search, it is needless to say, every variety of conclusion will be arrived at. But in the main, good will result, as we will now endeavor to show.

The only serious evil which could result from this doctrine, would be the danger of overturning government, however inexpedient such a measure may be. To tell men that they have government under contract, when they have been accustomed to regard their rulers as having them under levy, would seem to be the same as urging them to the extreme of fault-finding and discontent, regardless of the real excellence of the system under which

they live, or of the incidental blessings they reap from it. There is a bad tendency in our nature to destroy whatever we suddenly learn we have the power of destroying, and this particularly applies to those artificial barriers, which men are apt to conceive they can displace for the fantastic creatures of their own imagination. Fortunately, however, there are two prevailing principles which neither time nor prejudice can ever destroy. One is, in the physical world, that every thing seeks a state of rest and resists motion: The other, in the world of morals, that Peace is preferable to war. Thus, rest and peace are the great designs of nature. Unreasonable resistance to government would certainly be the consequence of Locke's doctrine were it not for these, but, thanks to the great author of all things, these conflicting provisions in his economy are so truly balanced that the result of their mutual operation is the general advancement of society, instead of that perfect chaos or stagnation which would ensue were either allowed to go uncontrolled by the other.

It is seldom the mere love of change carries men to the extent of overturning government, when there is no good reason for doing so. The operation of the other principle, however, has carried men to the other extreme in every age; as is strikingly exemplified in the case of the Romans. Here, inertness and effeminacy succeed the most courageous energy and manly heroism the world ever saw. To such a mortifying extent was this the case, that it seems almost a tax upon our credulity to believe, that the same people which conquered nearly all Europe, and whose simple name, "Roman," was a passport among nations, could reach such a pitch of imbecility and baseness, by tolerating gross encroachments on their rights, as not only to submit to the whims and slaughters of such blood-thirsty monsters as Nero, Domitian, Tiberius, but actually to deify them when dead. All this, however, is susceptible of ready explanation.

We may suppose of a government, ever so excellent at its beginning, and the community ever so free, yet it is impossible for its administration to continue a long time without gradual changes of first principles, and imperceptible innovations upon first customs. Since all the affairs of government must be administered

by men, and since all, even the best of men, are imperfect and full of error and impurity, these changes and innovations are self-evident and inevitable. But the very gradual manner in which they are effected, renders it next to impossible for even the most discontented of the community to perfectly identify the wrong which may be alleged to underlie them. It must be something of a glaring nature which will be even so much as detected by the generality of men.

This was certainly Aristotle's conviction* when he declared that "Governments sometimes alter without seditions: by petty contention, as at Heræa; for which purpose they changed the mode of election from votes to lots, and thus got the contentious parties chosen; and by negligence, as when the citizens admit to State offices men who are not friends to the constitution; an event which happened at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was suppressed at the election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a democratic free State. Moreover, they change by little and little; I mean by this that very often great alterations silently take place in the form of a government, when people overlook small matters; as at Ambracia," etc., etc. Plato entertained the same idea as the result of his observation and his reasoning-" as every thing," says he, † "which is generated is liable to corruption, neither will such a constitution (his ideal one) as this remain forever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is thus not only the vegetable species, but likewise the animal, has seasons of fertility and sterility of soul as well as of body, when their revolutions complete the periphery of their respective orbits, which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrarywise to such as are the contrary." And how applicable to government is the exclamation ascribed by Herodotus to Solon-"Thus, then, O,Crosus, is man completely the sport of vicissitude!" History, in fact, is so full of the evidence of these gradual imperceptible changes and unobserved vicissitudes, that it remains for us simply to advert to them as constituting one chief source of security to those governments, which are in the process of change from good to bad.

*Aristotle's Politics and Economics, B. v., Ch. III. Plato's Republic, B. 8.

There is another source of this security, and though what we are about to say was not addressed to this subject by the author, it is an excellent explanation of it:

*

"In whatever way the power came originally to be lodged in one man's hands, or one council's, or one senates', and be its origin ever so full of fraud or violence, it is actually established, and produces advantages to the community. It would at first have been for men's interest to agree together and establish some system of authority, and each individual would have found his interest in giving up his own will in order to obtain his share of the general protection afforded by an orderly arrangement, made for the general security against individual violence and foreign aggression. But, although no such agreement ever was made, because in all likelihood each community arose, in very rude times, through accidental circumstances, from very small beginnings, yet the same view of each person interested in good order, dictates the propriety of maintaining the plan or arrangement actually established in whatever way its establishment may originally have been formed. To change it would be full of the greatest danger, and bring on much certain and immediate suffering to the whole people. Therefore, it is better for the people at large to continue obeying the power as it is established than to destroy it and try to make another government; or rather to rebel and attempt to destroy it a measure which would be dangerous and hurtful. The government established would, of course, resist; some, perhaps many, would take its part civil war would ensue; and the consequences would, after all, possibly be only to give more absolute power to the rulers, or to place a worst government in the stead of the present. General expediency of utility, therefore, the undoubted interest not only of the greater number but of almost the whole of the community, is best consulted by continuing to obey the established government and not seeking its destruction, as long as its dominion is tolerably mild and beneficial, and as long as the people can hope by fair means to mend it. But even in the worst despotisms, and where all improvement is out of the question, there is a duty to obey; because, until such a number concur in resolving upon a change as shall have power to effect that purpose, one or a few ndividuals throwing off the yoke would only insure their own destruction; and even were they joined by many more, unless the probability of successful resistance were much greater than the probability of defeat, as the country at large would be the losers and not the gainers, by the unsuccessful struggle, it is disadvantageous to all that so considerable a risk should be run except in extreme cases. encounter small hazards is the interest, and may be the duty, of all men, in even the ordinary management of their affairs; so it may be their interest, and quite consistent with prudence, to encounter great risks where the mischief to be apprehended from the worst happening is not considerable, and the benefit to be expected from success is great. But where the mischief to be apprehended is great-even if the benefit in

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*Brougham's Political Philosophy, vol. 1. p. 44. On this point see also the closing sentence of chap. VI. book Iv. Aristotle's Politics.