submit to be oppressed: but I am sure there is a fund of good sense in this country, which cannot be deceived.

JUNIUS.

SIR,

LETTER XVII.

TO THE PRINTER OF THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER.

Aug. 1. 1769.

IT will not be necessary for Junius to take the trouble of answering your correspondent G. A. or the quotation from a speech without doors, published in your paper of the 28th of last month. The speech appeared before Junius's letter; and as the author seems to consider the great proposition, on which all his argument depends, viz. That Mr. Wilkes was under that known legal incapacity of which Junius speaks, as a point granted, his speech is in no shape an answer to Junius, for this is the very question in debate.

As to G. A. I observe, first, that if he did not admit Junius's state of the question, he should have shown the fallacy of it, or given us a more exact one ;-secondly, that considering the many hours and days which the ministry and their advocates have wasted in public debate, in compiling large quartos, and collecting innumerable precedents, expressly to prove that the late proceedings of the House of Commons are warranted by the law, custom, and practice of parliament, it is rather an extraordinary supposition, to be made by one of their own party, even for the sake of argument, "That no such statute, no such custom of parliament,

no such case in point, can be produced." G. A. may however make the supposition with safety. It contains nothing but literally the fact, except that there is a case exactly in point, with a decision of the House diametrically opposite to that which the present House of Commons came to in favour of Mr. Luttrell.

The ministry now begin to be ashamed of the weakness of their cause; and, as it usually happens with falsehood, are driven to the necessity of shifting their ground, and changing their whole defence. At first we were toid, that nothing could be clearer than that the proceed

ings of the House of Commons were justified by the known law and uniform custom of parliament. But it now seems, if there be no law, the House of Commons have a right to make one; and if there be no precedent, they have a right to create the first :--for this I presume is the amount of the questions proposed to Junius. If your correspondent had been at all versed in the law of parliament, or generally in the laws of this country, he would have seen that his defence is as weak and false as the former.

The privileges of either House of Parliament, it is true, are indefinite, that is, they have not been described or laid down in any one code or declaration whatsoever; but whenever a question of privilege has arisen, it has invariably been disputed or maintained upon the footing of precedents alone. In the course of the proceedings upon the Aylsbury election, the House of Lords resolved, "That neither House of Parliament had any power, by 66 any vote or declaration, to create to themselves any new "privilege that was not warranted by the known laws "and customs of parliament." And to this rule the Hcuse of Commons, though otherwise they had acted in a very arbitrary manner, gave their assent; for they affirmed that they had guided themselves by it, in asserting their privileges.-Now, Sir, if this be true with respect to matters of privilege, in which the House of Commons, individually and as a body, are principally concerned, how much more strongly will it hold against any pretended power in that House to create or declare a new law, by which not only the rights of the House over their own member, and those of the member himself, are included, but all those of a third and separate party, I mean the freeholders of the kingdom? To do justice to the ministry, they have not yet pretended that any one, or any two of the three estates have power to make a new law, without the concurrence of the third. They know that a man who maintains such a doctrine, is liable, by statute, to the heaviest penalties. They do not acknow ledge that the House of Commons have assumed a new privilege, or declared a new law. On the contrary, they affirm that their proceedings have been strictly conform. able to, and founded upon the ancient law and custom of parliament. Thus, therefore, the question returns to the

E

point at which Junius had fixed it, viz.

"Whether or no

"this be the law of parliament? If it be not, the House of Commons had no legal authority to establish the pre. cedent; and the precedent itself is a mere fact, without any proof of right whatsoever.

Your correspondent concludes with a question of the simplest nature, Must a thing be wrong, because it has never been done before? No. But admitting it were proper to be done, that alone does not convey any authority to do it. As to the present case, I hope I shall never see the time when not only a single person, but a whole country, and in effect the entire collective body of the people, may again be robbed of their birth right, by a vote of the House of Commons. But if, for reasons which I am unable to comprehend, it be necessary to trust that House with a power so exorbitant and so unconstitutional, at least let it be given to them by an act of the legis lature.

I SHALL make you no apology for considering a certain pamphlet, in which your late conduct is defended, as written by yourself. The personal interests, the personal resentments, and, above all, that wounded spirit, unaccustomed to reproach, and I hope not frequently conscious of deserving it, are signals which betray the author to us as plainly as if your name were in the titleYou appeal to the public in defence of your repupage. tation. We hold it, Sir, that an injury offered to an individual, is interesting to society. On this principle, the people of England made common cause with Mr. Wilkes. On this principle, if you are injured, they will join in your resentment. I shall not follow you through the insipid form of a third person, but address myself to you directly.

You seem to think the channel of a pamphlet more respectable, and better suited to the dignity of your cause than that of a newspaper. Be it so. Yet if newspapers are scurrilous, you must confess they are impartial. They give us, without any apparent preference, the wit and argument of the ministry, as well as the abusive dulness of the opposition. The scales are equally poised. It is not the printer's fault, if the greater weight inclines the balance..

Your pamphlet then is divided into an attack upon Mr. Grenville's character, and a defence of your own. It would have been more consistent perhaps with your professed intention, to have confined yourself to the last. But anger has some claim to indulgence, and railing is usually a relief to the mind. I hope you have found benefit from the experiment. It is not my design to enter into a formal vindication of Mr. Grenville, upon his own principles. I have neither the honour of being personally known to him, nor do I pretend to be completely master of all the facts. I need not run the risk of doing an injustice to his opinions, or to his conduct, when your pamphlet alone carries upon the face of it a full vindication of both.

Your first reflection is, that Mr. Grenville was, of all men, the person who should not have complained of inconsistence with regard to Mr. Wilkes. This, Sir, is. either an unmeaning sneer, a peevish expression of resentment, or, if it means any thing, you plainly beg the question; for whether his parliamentary conduct with regard to Mr. Wilkes has or has not been inconsistent, remains yet to be proved. But it seems he received upon the spot a sufficient chastisement for exercising so unfairly his talents of misrepresentation. You are a lawyer, Sir, and know better than I do upon what particular occasions. a talent for misrepresentation may be fairly exerted; but to punish a man a second time, when he has been once sufficiently chastised, is rather too severe. It is not in the laws of England; it is not in your own Commentaries; nor is it yet, I believe, in the new law you have revealed to the House of Commons. I hope this doctrine has no existence but in your own heart. After all, Sir, if you had consulted that sober discretion, which you seem to oppose with triumph to the honest jollity of

tavern, it might have occured to you, that, although you could have succeeded in fixing a charge of inconsistence upon Mr. Grenville, it would not have tended in any shape to exculpate yourself.

Your next insinuation, that Sir William Meredith had hastily adopted the false glosses of his new ally, is of the same sort with the first. It conveys a sneer as little worthy of the gravity of your character, as it is useless to your defence. It is of little moment to the public to inquire, by whom the charge was conceived, or by whom it was adopted. The only question we ask is, whether or no it be true? The remainder of your reflections upon Mr. Grenville's conduct destroy themselves. He could not possibly come prepared to traduce your integrity to the House. He could not foresee that you would even speak upon the question; much less would he foresee that you could maintain a direct contradiction of that doctrine, which you had solemnly, disinterestedly, and, upon soberest reflection, delivered to the public. He came armed indeed with what he thought a respectable authority, to support what he was convinced was the cause of truth; and I doubt not he intended to give you, in the course of the debate, an honourable and public testimony of his esteem. Thinking highly of his abili ties, I cannot however allow him the gift of divination. As to what you are pleased to call a plan coolly formed to impose upon the House of Commons, and his producing it without provocation at midnight, I consider it as the language of pique and invective, therefore unworthy of regard. But, Sir, I am sensible I have followed your example too long, and wandered from the point.

The quotation from your Commentaries is matter of record. It can neither be altered by your friends, nor misrepresented by your enemies; and I am willing to take your own word for what you have said in the House of Commons. If there be a real difference between what you have written and what you have spoken, you confess that your book ought to be the standard. Now, Sir, if words mean any thing, I apprehend, that when a long enumeration of disqualifications (whether by statute or the custom of parliament) concludes with these general comprehensive words," But, subject to these restrictions