should

taken into include an

account

collocation

nomena.

In any co-arrangement the principle or operating which cause of the combination must be account.1 The unity evident in the universe of the cannot be explained out of its mere component of pheparts. So, in the sequence of events, a commencement must be sought exterior to the phenomena themselves, sufficient to account, not only for their origination, but for their order of existence. Of such a kind is our notion of Divine agency determining in whatever manner, mediately or imme- Its relation diately, the arrangement of physical events. But in and human the infinite play of consequences dependent on the variation of antecedents in time or space and admitting of endless modification, the consent of the human will may find a place. Homogeneous in its ultimate independence with the operation of Divine purpose, it is yet essentially distinct in being conditioned in its exercise, subordinate,

2

2 "Conceive," says M. Guizot, Civ. in Europe, I. 197, ed. Bohn, “a great machine of which the idea resides in a single mind, and of which the different pieces are confided to different workmen who are scattered and are strangers to one another; none of them knowing the work as a whole, or the definitive and general result to which it concurs, yet each executing with intelligence and liberty by rational and voluntary acts, that of which he has the charge. So is the plan of Providence upon the world executed by the hand of mankind," &c. "Dieu fait présent à l'homme d'une image de la Divinité en lui donnant l'intelligence. Il le laisse faire en quelque façon dans son petit département; c'est là où le franc arbitre joue son jeu ; l'homme y est comme un petit Dieu dans son propre monde."-Leibnitz, Works, p. 548. Hence the scholastic distinctions of the antecedent and consequent Will of God, of Secondary Councils, and of the First and Second Law Eternal. See Hooker, Eccl. Pol., I. iii.

to Divine

agency.

The action

of the

ditioned,

permissive.1 For, under whatever theory of the freedom of the will, the original grant of such freedom must be assumed in the same manner as the primary underived properties of matter.2

§ 15. But if such be the testimony of reason to will con- the existence of will in man, what is the stumblingblock on the side of experience to its reception ? Not the assumption that its choice is unconditioned, for no such assumption is made. The will may act under fixed laws of choice, or, as it has been happily expressed, "by confluence with the laws of nature" determining in ordinary cases an uniform result, and yet may be free to choose. The part ultimately adopted in action, without being an instance of causeless or indifferent spontaneity, may be contrary to all expectation, and yet there may have been ground for expectation. The possession

1 "Nec tamen ita liberum arbitrium animæ datum est, ut quodlibet eo moliens, ullam partem Divini ordinis legisque perturbet."-Augustine, De Quant. Anim., c. xxxvi.

2 "L'âme a en elle le principe de toutes ses actions et même de toutes ses passions: le même est vrai dans toutes les substances simples répandues par toute la nature."-Leibnitz, Works, p. 526.

3 This is the erreur-mère of the paradox of Hobbes, that deliberation does not exclude necessity, for the choice itself is a necessary one. "A finite will constitutes a true beginning; but with regard to the series of motives and changes by which the free act is manifested and made effectual, the finite will gives a beginning only by coincidence with that absolute will which is at the same time Infinite Power." -Coleridge, A. R., p. 204. See also Dean Mansel, Aids to Faith, pp. 19, 20. Sir W. Hamilton writes, "A motiveless volition is only casualism; and the free acts of an indifferent are morally and rationally as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined will."

hibiting an

indepen

of will does not necessitate irregularity of conduct, even if considered absolutely free. A die often comes up several times running, though this does not leave the chances of the next throw other than even. Still less, if it be considered to any extent yet exlimited by laws. Yet, in most men, we find ultimate "occasional revolutionary moments," "a turn of dence. the tide in mind and character," a power of breaking loose from the continuity of habit, which in theology has received the name of an Effectual The profligate man (ékov åékovтí ye Ovμ@) (ἑκὼν θυμῷ) may, all at once, cast his slough of immorality; the irresolute renounce his hesitancy, the virtuous all his old propriety of choice. Such conduct, and it is by no means unfrequent, may admit, when examined, of a so-called natural explanation. Men are always guided, it is said, by the strongest motive. Well, but what is strength when we apply Our ignothe laws, or even the analogies, of matter to that the nature which is, in its nature, spiritual? It may be thus

Call.

1 Coleridge, u. s., p. 40. It cannot be denied that we have the power of contributing indirectly at least to frame our will at any future time. "On se peut chercher de nouvelles raisons et se donner avec le temps de nouvelles dispositions; et par ce moyen on se peut encore procurer une volonté qu'on n'avoit pas, et qu'on ne pouvoit pas se donner sur-lechamp."-Leibnitz, p. 631. This fact is also relied on by Kant in his Metaphysics of Ethics.

2 What right have we to presume that motives act on the mind, as bodies upon bodies?" Every system," says Mr. Hutton, Essays, I. 87, "but distorts and caricatures the moral nature of man which takes the analogies of material science into the region of the spiritual life." See the whole question as discussed by Dean Mansel, Prolegg., p. 302; and Mr. Mill, Exam., p. 518, who explains it as the motive strongest in

rance of

of motives.

liable to explanation, or it may not. If it be, it will be found to involve the same assumption of moral consciousness which, whether original or derived, the result of organism, inheritance, custom, or association, makes part of the furniture of our being. Nor is it possible to believe the whole human race to be, and to have always been, in error upon such a matter. Our senses, it is true, sometimes deceive us,' and there may be such a thing as colour-blindness in moral perceptions. Yet we Fatalism habitually follow their impressions. Fatalism, the antithesis of voluntariness, has ever been the offspring of dogma, whether in philosophy or religion. It is the resort of dialectical difficulties, not of hearty natural suggestion. It has never yet proved itself the outcome of unmixed human consciousness.

opposite

to con

sciousness.

Objection

to man's

of action drawn

§ 16. There is, however, undoubtedly, a growfreedom ing tendency to confound law with causation; and, by consequence, physical laws with moral causation. A law, considered as an agent, is "like an idol, nothing in the world." Yet, while admitted to be

from the univer

sality of laws of Nature.

relation to pain or pleasure. But, though these be, as Locke calls them, "the hinges on which our actions turn," we know nothing as to their acting directly on the will.

A topic which has accordingly formed the constant stock-in-trade of scepticism. Cf. Montaigne, Essais, II. c. xii.; Pascal, Pensées, II. 47. But in the end it is sufficiently apparent that we have ourselves to blame, having through haste and inconsideration misread the testimony of the senses. Compare Bacon, Works, III. 388, ed. Spedding.

2 See some good remarks on this subject by Dr. Rigg in his Lecture on Pantheism, pp. 14, 31; and by the Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law,

respects

only a mental creation, a metaphysical entity abhorred of Positivism, a generalization of relations among phenomena, it is too often made into a theory to explain their mode of existence. An argument is raised from the universality of laws of causation in Nature to the case of human action. But the In what major premiss rests upon a simple enumeration, defective. which is incomplete till the will of man can be shown to be reducible to the general formula. Again, the generality of laws, it is acknowledged, does not imply their necessity. But the fact of such generality existing is held to be enough.' Hence, if statistics prove the uniformity of human action, the question of a will in man is thought practically to be given up. But the law here stands not only for what is; it becomes a synonyme for what must be. It is no longer a mode only of expressing facts; it assumes a necessity of operation.

p. 230. "Ainsi," writes De Maistre with much passion and fire, "nous laisserons dire les sophistes avec leurs Lois éternelles et immuables qui n'existent que dans leur imagination et qui ne tendent à rien moins qu'à l'extinction de toute moralité et à l'abrutissement absolu de l'espèce humain."-Soirées, p. 175. Leibnitz (Works, pp. 542, 614, &c.) constantly distinguishes between what follows naturally and what follows necessarily. Present physicists profess themselves satisfied with the former, and thus do away with the office of metaphysics. It may some day appear as unreasonable to deny human liberty on physical grounds, as it would now seem to found, like Epicurus, man's freedom in acting on the original declination of atoms. Cf. Lucret., II. 251.

1 See Mill, Examination, p. 150. "A volition is a moral effect which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether it must do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant; . . . all I know is that it always does."