estants by Edward the Sixth's accession, in the autumn of 1548, and towards the end of the same year he published a translation of one of Melancthon's works. Mr. Chester justly defends him from Foxe's charge of implication in the doom of Joan of Kent. He makes clear the succession of his ecclesiastical preferments during Edward's reign. In May, 1550, Rogers became Rector of St. Margaret Moyses and Vicar of St. Sepulchre, both in London, and on the 24th of August, 1551, he was appointed Prebend of St. PanSomewhat later he became Divinity Lecturer in St. Paul's. But, even in those sunny days for Protestantism, he had too much of the nonconforming spirit to be heartily liked by those highest in power; and then upon Edward followed Mary.

cras.

their heads to the block than in any point to rebel or once mutter against the Lord's Anointed. In writing and praying, and in such converse with his fellow-prisoners and his wife and other visitors as the rigid prison-rules would allow, a year was passed. On the 22d of January, 1555, he was again taken before the Council, and then there could be no question of his doom. Brow-beating and wanton cruelty, such as always accompany religious persecution, Rogers had to face, and there was in him the same rare patient endurance of insult as in thousands of brave martyrs. Sir Richard Southwell scornfully told Rogers that, when he came to the burning, he would not be so confident and fearless. "Sir, I cannot tell," he answered, raising his eyes to heaven, "but I trust to my Lord God, yes." On returning to his cell, Rogers wrote a very eloquent account of his examination, and compiled appropriate messages to the wife and children, from whom he knew he must very soon be separated. These latter were penned on "the 27th of January, at night." On the morning of the 28th he was, with unseemly haste, brought up for the final trial, which occupied two days, although its issue had been long decided. On Monday morning, the 4th of February, he was burnt. At almost the last moment Sheriff Woodroffe urged him to recant. "That which I have preached I will seal with my blood," was Rogers' only answer. "Then thou art an heretic," said the "That," meekly replied Rogers,

Rogers had conscientiously objected to the Lady Jane's elevation to the sovereignty, as the right was clearly with Mary; but on the 6th of August, 1553, three days after the queen's arrival in London, he delivered, at Paul's Cross, what Foxe describes as "a most godly and vehement sermon, avowing and confirming such true doctrine as he and others had there taught in King Edward's days, exhorting the people constantly to remain in the same, and to beware of all pestilent popery, idolatry, and superstition." It was his glory to be the first public assertor of those principles for which many-he the earliest-suffered martyrdom under Mary, and by which religious liberty was won for Englishmen in all succeeding time. For his bold speech he was forthwith called be-" shall be known at the day of judgment." fore the Council. Gardiner charged him Woodroffe was not pleased. "Well," he with preaching against the queen. “That said, “I will never pray for thee." But I did I not," he declared; "let that be proved, will pray for you!" answered Rogers, and and let me die for it!" He was arrested, in that brave Christian temper he died. and deprived of all his clerical emoluments, Of the martyr's children Daniel rose to be but less vindictive measures were resorted a skilful, honest diplomatist, a man after to than his enemies desired. For nearly half a year he remained prisoner in his own house. On the 27th of January, 1554, he was transferred to Newgate.

"Bonner," avers Foxe, "had long striven, with his utmost power, to accomplish this result, as he could not abide such an honest neighbor." From Newgate he issued noble protests for the true faith, but at the same time enjoined men to singular moderation, beseeching them to act as obedient subjects of the Queen's Highness, and rather to give

sheriff.

Walsingham's own heart, under Queen Elizabeth. A dear friend of Sir Philip Sidney, he was, we are told by Camden, "excellently well learned." Mr. Chester's brief account of him is especially valuable, because in it he is able to rectify some inaccuracies into which Mr. Motley has fallen, and to present the man in a much truer and worthier light than is thrown on him through the pages of the "History of the United Netherlands."

Mr. Chester's book, we should add, is adorned with a portrait and five illustrations.

From The Spectator.

INTELLECTUAL INSTINCTS.*

THE valuable portion of this little book is the first,-on what we may call the Intellectual Instincts. The second, on Reason, could not be discussed to much purpose, even succinctly, within the brief limits of Sir George Ramsay's book, but he has done good service in bringing pointedly before the philosophical world the large instinctive element which still remains unexplained at the basis of all our intellectual operations.

It is too common to confine the notion of instinct to active processes, and the result has been a fatal narrowing of the whole field of discussion on this subject. In fact intellectual instinct is quite as important as active instinct, and is usually involved in it. Instinctive acts and emotions are those, as Sir G. Ramsay reminds us, which are, in the individual at least, original, not slowly built up out of association and habit-which are involuntary-which force themselves on us without any thought of our own, and which spring up beneath the field of consciousness and cannot be adequately justified in that field but must be assumed as justifying themselves. For example, take the case of parental love; so far as it is an instinct at all, it is due to no education, or meditation, or will, or habit, but asserts its own force over the mind; it springs into existence beneath the field of consciousness, and if asked to justify itself to another who has not experienced it, it can do so only by asserting imperatively its own overpowering vitality. Here, then, we have the type of a true instinct: but the thinking world has not generally perceived that the whole basis of our intellectual life, as well as our moral, emotional, and active, rests upon such instincts, and that this fact has a great bearing upon the theory of instinct which Mr. Darwin recently brought so ably before the world in his theory of species. Let us take Sir G. Ramsay's four

notes of intellectual instinct :

"The characteristics of instinctive knowledge may more methodically be summed up

thus:

First. It must be original, not derived from previous knowledge. From this it follows, as a corollary, that it is got without effort, whether we will or not; without seeking, without meditation; that it neither demands nor admits of logical proof.

"Secondly,-It must be universal, held by all men without exception; even by those who profess to doubt it.

Instinct and Reason on the First Principles of Human Knowledge. By Sir George Ramsay, Bart. Walton and Maberly.

"Thirdly.-It must be irresistible, proof against all sceptical arguments, though unanswerable.

"Fourthly. It must not be self-evident, like the axioms of mathematics; in other words it must not be discerned to be true. The corollary from this is, that the denial of instinctive truth, however perverse, is still admissible; for such denial is, strictly speaking, not absurd, that is, not directly opposed

to reason.

corollaries, sufficiently determine what is "These four characteristics, with their instinctive knowledge."

Now we have a remark to make on this fourth criterion of instinctive knowledge. It is true to say that instinctive knowledge dent; must not, while it remains indistincmust not, properly speaking, be self-evimistake to say that any knowledge, which is tive, be discerned to be true, but it is a great knowledge at all, can in no case be discerned knowledge of his personal identity differs to be true. Sir G. Ramsay says that a man's from his knowledge that "lines equal to the same line are equal to one another," in that the one is not discerned to be true, and the other is. We say, on the contrary, that there are stages in every man's life when neither the one nor the other are discerned to be be true, though they regulate all the actions true, though they are implicitly assumed to and the life, as instinctive knowledge. Again there comes a time when both the one and the other truth are discerned-the one sonal truth as certainly as the mathematical as truly discerned as the other, the pertruth. The lower animals assume, and act

upon

tity as habitually as man; otherwise a dog the assumption of, their personal idenbeaten once would not be disposed to refrain from the act which brought him the beating; the assumption of personal identity is as clearly there wherever there is memory, as in the man, but the dog does not think about it and discern it, he does not bring it within the discriminating power of his reason. The child is, in its infancy, in just the same position,-it assumes for all practical purposes, but never discerns, its personal identity. But that it is a truth as capable of intellectual discernment as mathematical axioms themselves seems to us perfectly clear.

But Sir G. Ramsay would have been right in saying that the majority of instinctive truths are not like the particular class of mathematical truths, capable of being made evident to others, and is quite right in saying that their denial is not intrinsically selfcontradictory. But this is a cross division which distinguishes the instinctive truths founded, in each case, on individual experience from those founded on external facts

a

accessible to all alike. I can never make | same class tend to form in the mind a cerevident to another my grounds for believing tain instinctive or working notion of a class, in my own personal identity, and if another is a fact at the basis of our whole intellectual man had lost all sense of his own personal nature, without which we could scarcely be identity, if he forgot one moment the self of said to have an intellectual nature, and it is the previous moment and looked upon him- fact common to us with the lower animals. self as a different man, I could assert that Again, Sir G. Ramsay has omitted the inhe was not sane but not that he was self- terpretative instincts of man-by which we contradictory. The fact on which intellec-attribute (long before definite associations of tual instincts usually rest is a fact of indi- ideas can have been formed) a certain meanvidual experience alone, where no one else's ing to the expression of the human face and experience can invalidate yours. A mother manner-to smiles and frowns, and the other without maternal instincts could as easily be symbols of thought and emotion. Probably made to appear logically incoherent-which the "instinct of belief in human testimony" of course would be impossible as a man is really to be classed as simply one of the without the instinct (and perception founded tendencies to ascribe a definite meaning to on the instinct) of his personal identity. He would be a man with a craze, no doubt, because this sense of personal identity runs through everything; but if he cannot identify himself, no one can do it for him. The fact, therefore, on which the knowledge derived from intellectual instincts usually rests is a personal fact, accessible to no mind but one. The facts on which mathematical knowledge rests are external and objective facts open to all the world. In the former case, therefore, both the basis of fact and the perceiving power lie in the individual mind; in the latter only the perceiving power, the basis of fact being patent to all the world.

If, now, Sir G. Ramsay wishes to deny the name of instinct to the latent and regulative general forms of the mind, and to keep it for the latent and regulative individual facts of the mind, we have no objection; only we say, do not deny that these truths are as capable as any others of clear discernment, and only incapable of being made evident by one to another, because the fact which makes it evident to my mind is not that which makes it evident to yours. It is a similar fact, but not the same.

is

This being premised, we must add that Sir G. Ramsay's list of intellectual instincts very defective. He enumerates "personal identity," "knowledge of matter" - he should rather say, "knowledge of something distinct from mind "-" knowledge of uniformity in nature," "knowledge of our own free will," "belief in human testimony." But one of the clearest cases of an intellectual instinct is left out, in the classifying instinct, which is as strong in the lower animals as in man. When the slave-making ant avoids the pupae of the little yellow ant, or uses them only for food, knowing that they will not make good slaves, while it seizes with the greatest eagerness the pupa of the red ant, to train itself up new slaves -is not the classifying instinct as distinctly devoloped as in man himself? That repeated perceptions of different individuals of the

the moral expressions of men, whether those expressions be conveyed through the eye and ear, or in any other way. This is one of the highest class of our intellectual instincts, and also one which scarcely ever passes at all, during our human life, into the region of really intellectual discernment.

On the whole, though, Sir G. Ramsay's little book has interest and acuteness; it would have been better if he had left Logic to others, and expanded the portion on intellectual instincts into a dissertation which is much needed.

The subject needs the more notice, because the discussion of the origin of instinct raised by Mr. Darwin was exceedingly embarrassed by the restriction to active instincts, which have a direct tendency to preserve and advantage the race of the beings which possess them. The theory of "natural selection" was-that creatures accidentally, and perhaps abnormally gifted with a special advantage in organization, often transmit that advantage, and that so soon as a species thus springs up of which it is a permanent and marked feature, the advantage they possess tends to prolong and multiply their class rather than that of the competing and inferior species, which become the prey of natural enemies, while the gifted species survives and increases. The knotty point of the problem was, how far the operation of this cause might be supposed to extend. Could it in any way account for the first birth of species-for the origin of instinct as well as its modification? We think the intellectual instincts would have something to say on this head. Could the classifying instinct, for instance, originate in the mind of an accidentally gifted ant, which for the first time should begin to recognize as a class the red ants, and as a distinct class the white ants? Is it not clear that in these intellectual instincts we have a starting-point which, though no doubt capable of indefinite improvement, cannot be supposed to originate in elements other than mental?

From The Spectator.
ELIMINATE.

The current number of the National Review presents another instance of the right SIR,-As a reader of your journal for the use of the word. It will be found in an Eslast twenty-five years, I beg to tender you say on the book of "Ecclesiastes,” p. 155: thanks for the nervous and correct language. The thinker may not be conscious of tendwhich has marked its columns, and for the ing towards Atheism, or of having eliminated frequent protests it has made against man- from his world the only power which gives nerisms of style and the lax employment of to man any personal consciousness of a words and phrases by public writers. May I be permitted to call your attention to the term “ eliminate" (with its nominal form), as one in which I observe a tendency towards a corrupt and confused meaning amongst some inferior writers, which it may be useful to check in time.

66

God."

It is clear, from these examples, that to use the word "elicit" in these passages, would be, indeed, to " eliminate " the meaning, not to express or "elicit" it. To find this substitution in curious specimens of second-rate temperance literature, as in the Its derivation explains its meaning to be Weekly Record, where the editor blames Dr. that of "thrusting out" or " expelling; Lees for not taking the wisest methods of its philosophical use is that of casting out a "eliminating the truth!"-is not surprising; confusing or non-essential element, so as to but when we pass to such respectable works, exhibit the relations of the essential factors as in general issue from the press of Messrs. of a problem. Figuratively speaking, elim-Blackwood and Sons, and find the same vulinate always refers to the "dross," never to garisms creeping into use, the fact seems to the "precious ore," to the accident, not the cause to the falsehood, not the truth.

We have words in plenty for expressing the idea of “bringing into view" the end or object desired, such, to wit, as elicit, evolve, unfold, deduce, discover, develop, etc., but we have, I think, hardly another word equivalent to "eliminate; " to "exclude" does not fully meet the sense required, and to "weed" is too specific and metaphorical.

To generalize the word "elimination," therefore, so as to make it signify no more than "evolution" is not only to confound an obvious distinction between "casting out" and "bringing out," the one referring to that which is worthless, the other to that which is worthy, but it leaves our language without an exact philosophical term which is in constant demand.

call for special protest and rebuke, from all lovers, of "the pure well of English undefiled," and from all who appreciate the value of precision in philosopical language. I allude to a volume which has been noticed with some praise in your columns, The past and Present Life of the Globe, by David Page, F.G.S.

At p. 118, I find an example, which is repeated again and again, the word evidently being a favorite phrase, though always employed in the false sense : "The plants and animals of the newer epochs bear the impress of specialization, and find in new external conditions a fitting habitat for their growth and elimination"!!! (meaning development).

from mechanism to the subtler elimination of mind. . . from a long azoic period, during which the material elements were being eliminated into mechanical order."

Again, at p. 221, I find a double offence in a single sentence: "Not progress from Your own pages afford many illustrations imperfection to perfection of purpose, but of its precise and proper employment. Here is one taken from your article on "The Confessions of a Reforming German Duke," August 24, p. 915: "Liberalism is a political faith which can scarcely be said to exist Allow me, sir, the advantage of your colin very small societies, so much does it de- umns to protest against the notion that pend on a circle of various interests wide" elimination" is " development" on the enough to eliminate selfish individual wants, one hand, or “ arrangement" on the other: and give a certain breadth to patriotic zeal." above all, to reclaim "against the absurdity In the same number, p. 929, column 1st, that progress can in any sense consist in the I find another example: "Of too early mar-casting-out' of mind." riages, the author says, with striking justice, that they eliminate the period of youth from a workman's life."

Yours Truly,

Leeds, January 11, 1862.

F. R. L.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, the petition of the Subscriber respectfully sheweth:

THAT inauspicious as the present state of our national affairs may seem in some respects, it is favorable to the correction of a practice, long established, and of great damage to the stability of mercantile transactions, and to the pecuniary interest of the government. That is, suffering private corporations to usurp the sovereign power of creating the Currency.

large, and permanent accumulation of gold in the Mint and other depositories; while Mint Drafts will be supplying its place in all parts of the Republic. By such a process the Bank of England has always in circulation notes never less in amount than one hundred millions of dollars.

When it shall have been found that a considerable amount of gold has remained unSo vital does the Constitution consider called for, let a Board of Currency be empowthis point, that it prohibits the States from ered to invest portions thereof, from time to coining even Gold and Silver. How much time, in United States Stock. Let the intermore important that they should not coin est of such Stocks be invested in the same paper! And yet they have done this-and manner. The result will be First,-that the done it by irresponsible deputies. whole debt will rapidly be absorbed, as In ordinary times it would be almost im-shown hereafter; and Second, that such an possible to correct this practice, by means unfluctuating Currency will be provided for of which some hundreds of corporations all parts of the country as will give security now divide among themselves two hundred and steadiness to business, and will thus millions of dollars, borrowed without inter-raise the standard of mercantile morality. est from the people, and lent back to the same people upon interest. The political power of these corporations and their debtors would ordinarily be too strong to be resisted, and it is only when danger is upon us that an aroused patriotism makes it possible to resume this neglected attribute of sovereign power, and make it available for the defence of the nation.

And this may now be done gradually, and without any violent changes of existing customs or interests, by a process which has long been in successful practice in England, and which is as simple as is the planting of corn, -a process by which there will grow up a harvest of such abundance that it will pay off our debt; and in its other results will repay all the money loss occasioned by the war.

Let Gold to pay the Interest of the Public Debt, be deposited in the Mint, and let such interest be paid by Mint Drafts in sums of 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 dollars. These drafts should be payable in New York and Boston as well as in Philadelphia. As they will be of the same value as gold, and more convenient except for exportation, the gold itself, after the necessary amount shall have entered into circulation, will only be called for, when needed for sending abroad. When Peace shall return there will be a rapid,

Men who have lived long amidst the floods and ebbs of Bank-note Currency, by which so many thousands have been shipwrecked, will not think it extravagant to estimate this last advantage as a sufficient recompense for the money losses of the Rebellion.

It will cost nothing to begin such a policy. If proved good upon trial it will grow with the steadiness of nature, and when mature will supplant (as it ought) all other than National Currency. How much such growth will be impeded, or quickened, by the present derangement of our finances, and the failure of the Banks, it is not easy to compute. A table is appended, which is estimated to be below the mark. In less than twenty years from this time it would probably become an established doctrine that the proper business of Banks is to lend money, not to borrow or coin it.

Whatever other plans of Currency or Banking you may sanction, pray try this also. If it be worthy, as your petitioner believes, it will when once set in operation, outlive and outgrow all others. It is immaterial to the argument whether the progress be more or less rapid than is indicated in the Table.

It is evident that the growth of this Sinking Fund and of our National Credit and