Again: we do not believe that, even if the United States Government were inclined to apologize and restore, they would dare to do it. The temper of the people and the press, as is clear by our last accounts, would make such a course instantaneously fatal to the official career of the ministers who should propose it. Even if the case of wrong were so perfectly clear that even Americans could not gainsay it, we doubt whether any American Government would venture, or would be able, to make an acknowledgment of error and to deliver up the captives. But, unfortunately, the case is not so clear as this: scarcely yield to us if they had no case, is it likely they will concede an inch when they have persuaded themselves they have a very good case? If the conduct of the Federal Government boarding and searching for rebels, envoys, since the commencement of their unhappy and despatches, every mail packet that plies civil disputes had been in the main friendly between Dover and Calais, and between towards this country; if they had manifested Holyhead and Dublin. any wish to be fair or courteous; if their departures from courtesy and friendly behavior had been such as could reasonably have been attributed to excessive irritation arising out of their home perplexities and griefs, and such as might have been excused in consideration of these circumstances; if they had ever manifested the faintest desire to mitigate to us as far as they could the inevitable inconveniences and sufferings which their belligerence and our neutrality combined to inflict upon us; if, in a word, their habitual language and proceedings had been at all indicative of, or compatible with, a desire to remain in amity with us,-then it would we are right, no doubt; but the Amerihave been easy for them to have made such cans, as we see by their papers and speeches, an acknowledgment in reference to the seiz- have no doubt also that they are right. They ure of the commissioners as we could have are already crowing over the assumption accepted, and we should on our part have been that we must pocket the affront because we too happy to make such acknowledgment as have no legal ground of complaint. The little onerous to their pride and as little dam-matter-obvious as we hold the justice of aging to their popularity with their vain and the transaction to be- at least admits of irritable countrymen as possible. But the discussion;-and if our antagonists would very contrary of all these "ifs" is unfortunately true. From the beginning of their difficulties they have been as cantankerous and uncivil as they could; they have stretched every inconvenient and vexatious right of Beyond all question it is something very belligerents to the utmost; what they have like insanity for the Federalists to bring done they have done in an unusually offen- upon themselves a war with England, when sive manner; rightly or wrongly, from tem- they have enough and more than enough on per or from design, they have given the im- their hands already. But they do not think pression that they were not only willing but so. They-that is the voting, electioneerrather anxious to insult us ;-and to crown ing, spouting, rowdying public. - do not the whole it is believed by many well-in- think either that their hands are full, or that formed persons that the act of Captain a war with England is a thing to be dreaded Wilkes was the result of a deliberate and or deprecated. The depth of their ignowell-considered design; and that it was only rance is unfathomable. The height of their a matter of accident that the outrage was frenzy is inconceivable. Their talk is not not perpetrated a fortnight earlier and in our mere conscious bombast and rhodomontade. own waters. Believing and considering all They actually believe that they can easily this, we cannot for a moment expect either conquer the South, and lick Great Britain that the authorities at Washington intend into the bargain. They are already growto apologize for the act of their officer, or ing wild with the prospect of crowning their to make restitution of their captives. Nor do victories by adding Canada to Texas. Of we entertain much doubt that, even were we course Mr. Seward knows better than this, -if such a thing were possible-to pass over and so do Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Chase. So this outrage or to be content with an inade- does Mr. Adams over here. So do the hunquate and informal reparation, we should dreds of well-informed and travelled gentlesoon have to submit to some further insult men in Boston. So do the trembling and even more flagrant and intolerable. We victimized merchants of New York. But greatly fear, from all that we can learn of what of that? These are not the menthe temper of the Cabinet at Washington,- these are not the classes-who habitually or at least of those members of it who have decide the policy of the United States, who hitherto determined its policy, as well as elect the Congress, and enthrone the Presifrom that of the trading and agitating pol-dent. Only in the rarest crises are their iticians who guide or drive it, that the voices heard; and even then they are too Government of the United States are quite commonly drowned in the fierce and tumulcapable, if we yield or temporize now, of tuous roar of a passionate, misled, and un governable populace,-accustomed to make their own law, to avenge their own wrongs, to trample on all obstacles, moral, legal, and material, sincerely fancying-for they have been always taught so that nobody ought to oppose them, and that nobody can resist them. There appears to be three chances-feeble ones unquestionably-that the dire extremity of war may yet be escaped. First. The merchants and bankers of the North, who have entered into such heavy engagements to supply the Government with money, may get thoroughly frightened at the utter ruin which a rupture with England would entail upon them; may make the best use of the secret power they are said to have over the Cabinet; and, calling to their aid the moderation, good sense, and sound knowledge which undoubtedly pervade the educated classes of the Union, but are usually so silent and inoperative,-may rise in their inherent strength, brave and curb the violent mob and the corrupt jobbers and contractors, eject Mr. Seward from the Ministry, and compel the Government to yield. Such an issue is unquestionably possible, and much to be desired. There can be no doubt of the existence of the party we speak of, nor of its wealth and numbers; we only mistrust its courage and its power. Secondly. Those enthusiastic patriots who are bent, heart and soul, upon the subjugation and re-annexation of the South, and those untaught fanatics who sincerely believe in their power of achieving these results, may perhaps be awakened-it is at least in the power of their leaders to awaken themto the conviction that a war with England would be at once and irretrievably fatal to their hopes. The first step of England as soon as hostilities broke out, would naturally be to recognize the Southern Confederacy, and the second, to terminate the blockade. These things once effected, the independence of the Seceding States becomes a fait accompli, which nothing could undo. Now we know that the restoration of the Union is with the majority of the Northerners the dearest object of their heart-dearer even than insult and injury to England. They still prefer the recovery of their own grandeur to the humiliation of their rival; and they may be willing to apol ogize to us now, reserving vengeance and compensation for a future day, rather than give up at once the sacred purpose of the civil war. There is no doubt of the existence of this party, nor of their numbers, nor of their earnestness:-the only question is as to their rationality and their political influence. Thus much seems certain: if the Government refuse our demand, it will be a sure sign that they at least have abandoned all hope of a successful issue of the civil war. If they offer us reparation, it is because they still cling to and hope for the restoration of the Union. Thirdly. They may, however, pursue a middle course, and this, we apprehend, is the one they will adopt. How we shall receive it, it will be for us to determine. They may see that they cannot fight Great Britain and the Southern Confederacy at once, and so may endeavor to put us off by diplomatic stratagem. In this case, they will express their unfeigned surprise that Great Britain should take so strange a view of international law,-their conviction that they have only acted within the strict limits of belligerent rights, and according to precedents set by England herself. They will disclaim any intention of insult, and ask how we can attribute such folly and such discourtesy to a people who are notoriously models of forbearance and good sense. But since the two Governments take such diametrically opposite views of the matter, and as they are sincerely desirous that no hostile discussion should arise between nations so closely connected by interest and kindred, and to show their willingness to soothe our wounded sensibilities, they have no objection to express regret for any transgression as to form of which Commodore Wilkes may have been guilty, and to refer the question of substantial right and law to the proper legal authorities, to American prize courts, of which all the world has long admired the impartiality, -or if England insists, even to a Court of Joint Commission. Such a course on their part might embarrass us not a little. It might, at all events, postpone a war;-and our Government would then have to consider whether a partial apology and a reference of the essentials of the complaint to a court whose decision we feel confident must be in our favor, would secure us from similar outrages in future, and save us from the painful necessity of avenging our own wrongs with our own hands,whether, in fact, a partial and imperfect reparation be preferable to a sanguinary and desolating war. From The Press, 7 Dec. THECASUS BELLI." with America may afford immediate relief and plenty to the famished cotton market: expectation of war only brings increased pressure and menaces decreased supply. If IT is sometimes advantageous to narrow a we are to have a war with the Federal Gov-question, in order not to leave a wider field ernment, we shall, of course, recognize the for controversy than is necessary. Possibly Southern Confederacy, break the blockade of the Southern ports, and scatter to the winds the squadron that for so many months has been sealing up our cotton. Ships will at once sail to New Orleans, Mobile, Charleston, and Savannah, laden with all that the Confederates need, and will return to us in three or four months with cargoes of that raw material which is wanted to save the operatives of Lancashire from idleness and privation. If we are not to have war, then the high prices which will be maintained will secure as large a supply from India, as can be furnished to us for the money. But if we are to have for a considerable period an imminent probability of war, followed by a resumption of pacific relations which will leave the blockade and the civil conflict in America untouched, then there is every danger, not to say certainty, that we shall obtain cotton from neither quarter. Peace will prevent its coming from America-the dread of war will have deterred its coming from India. Already much has been jeopardized, and all parties connected with the cotton manufacture are under great uneasiness. The effect of the news of the San Jacinto outrage and of our consequent proceedings has already been to cause a fall of price in Liverpool of nearly 2d per lb.,-quite 2d from the highest point previously reached. This fall, and still more the further one which would ensue from complete rupture, will be sufficient to render unprofitable a considerable part of the importations ordered and expected from India. Many of the orders recently sent out are, therefore, being countermanded; and of many more the limits of price at which they were to be executed are being much reduced. Those merchants who have had the courage to direct Indian cotton to be bought at Calcutta, Bombay or Mirzapore, on the basis of a price in Liverpool of 8d per lb., will lose enormously if the United States apologize and if peace is maintained. The knowledge of this, and the feeling that, under any circumstances, what has happened shows how very precarious must be the continuance of the American blockade, will, we fear, greatly discourage the shippers of cotton from Indian ports. Every day of uncertainty risks, and costs millions. As we said at the outset, actual war with the North will bring with it material compensations. The prospect of war carries with it no compensation what ever. Her Majesty's Ministers were influenced by this consideration when they chose to narrow a great question of international law down to a single legal point of form. But they could not have adopted a course more impolitic and unsatisfactory. It is at least doubtful whether, when the issue may be war, it is at any time expedient to rest a casus belli upon a mere point of form, for this necessarily makes it appear as if the nation were fighting for a trifle. In the present case Her Majesty's Ministers have not only done this, but they have done it in such a way as to cut the ground from under their feet. It was open for them to demand reparation for the outrage as a violation of the broadest principles of international law. It was also open to them to do so on the ground that the Cabinet of Washington has not recognized the Southern States as belligerents but simply as rebels; and, therefore, that the seizure of these "rebels" when under the protection of the British flag was a flagrant violation of the rights of asylum, condemned by the very principle on which the Federal Government proclaims itself to be carrying on the war. But Her Majesty's Ministers have followed neither of these courses. They have admitted, not directly indeed, but by implication, that if the captain of the San Jacinto had carried the Trent into port, and if an American Admiralty Court had declared the passengers contraband, the commissioners might have been lawfully seized though under our protection. Suppose, then, the Cabinet of Washington say, "We are not responsible for the seizure of these men, but here they are-and here they would have been all the same if our captain had acted in the way you declare to be right. We are quite willing now to complete the formality which you require, by sending these men to be dealt with by our Admiralty Courts, and we shall abide by the decision." In the present temper of the people, and knowing as we do how subservient the Bench in America is to popular feeling, can any one doubt that the Admiralty Court would declare the commissioners contraband of war? Besides, if we admit that the captain of the San Jacinto was entitled to carry one of Her Majesty's mail-packets into port to be tried by the American prize courts, à fortiori is he not still more justified in letting the vessel go free, and in carrying into port only four of her passengers to be so tried by the proper tribunals? A great outrage has un-officers of the crown, has addressed to the questionably been committed upon the Brit- Cabinet of Washington, demands that the ish flag; but Her Majesty's Ministers, by a captive commissioners and their secretaries strange misfortune, have chosen to rest their shall not only be set free, but shall be redemand for satisfaction upon a mere law-placed on board a British vessel under the yer's quibble, and not a very tenable one. From The Press, 7 Dec. protection of the British flag. What answer may we expect to this? As we thought last week, we have more reason still to think now. We fear that the judgment of the calmer minds of the American Cabinet will be overborne by the warlike views of Mr. Seward and the clamor of the American mob. What, then, is to follow ? Shall we withdraw our ambassador, and content ourselves with a protest ?-or must we declare war? A WAR WITH AMERICA. THE English people are at present in the position of a strong good-hearted man who gets a slap in the face from an ill-tempered younger half-brother, who never at any time was a match for him, and who at present After the first burst of indignation is over, has his right arm in a sling. What are we every man in this country, we feel assured, English to do? Are we tamely to turn our will be in favor of, and will demand of the cheek to the smiter, in the perfect conscious- Government that it shall pursue, a policy of ness that in such a case he will not scru- the utmost moderation and forbearance. We ple to repeat the blow? This is one of our believe that if the question were not comdifficulties. If we yield to the present out-plicated and aggravated by the captivity and rage on our flag, we are sure to have a peril of the men taken from under our prodozen similar outrages in quick succession. tection, the right course would be simply to We are dealing with a people who have ever withdraw our ambassador, and refrain from been disregardful of established rights, and doing more. But is this enough when the who single out us, their own brethren, as commissioners are in captivity and in danthe special objects of such violations of in-ger of being condemned to death? This it ternational courtesy and law. But this is is, in our opinion, which imparts such gravnot all. It is not simply a question of na-ity to the crisis. Were these four men, or tional dignity and self-respect-vital as such any of them, to be hung as rebels-and in a question is: we are concerned also for the the present reckless mood of the American fate of four men who were under the pro- Government and people, such a result is tection of our flag, and who are victims of more than possible-what would Europe, this outrage. Though apparently a subsidi- what would the world say if we stood by, ary point, this in fact is a consideration without exerting the power of England to which of all others cannot be passed over. avert or avenge such a catastrophe ? What It is one which goes to the heart of the is more to the purpose, as a question of pracnation. It is as if the Austrian captain tical statesmanship, what would our own who in 1849 seized the Hungarian refugee people say? Would they be content with Kossta on Turkish soil had refused to give a Government that left these men to their him up. Every one remembers the excite- fate? Would not rather the indignation ment occasioned in this country by the mere which at first burst forth so unanimously acprobability of such a refusal; and no one quire renewed and augmented force? We can doubt how violently our sympathies feel assured it would. We trust, therefore, would have been manifested against Austria that whatever be the reply of the Cabinet had such a course been followed. As for of Washington, it will at least contain an the Americans, though they had no more assurance that the commissioners will be interest in the matter than we had, the cap-treated merely as prisoners of war, and not tain of one of their frigates actually cleared as rebels. Indeed this is indispensable, acfor action rather than permit the Austrians cording to the plea advanced in justification to carry off their prisoner: and this conduct of their seizure. To do otherwise-to prowas applauded both by the American Gov-ceed to try and condemn these men as rebels ernment and people. How, then, can the would be political madness, as well as an same Government expect us now to be indifferent to the fate of the four "rebels" which it has seized and carried into captivity from under the protection of our flag? atrocious crime. It would at once occasion similar procedure-we might almost call it just reprisals-on the part of the South; and it would so embitter and aggravate the We can announce that, besides claiming rupture with this country that nothing but an apology for the outrage, the despatch war, in its full and dread severity, would be which Her Majesty's Ministers for Foreign deemed by our people an adequate retaliaAffairs, based upon the opinion of the law-tion for the wrong. We trust-we are willing to believe-we corresponding amount of money, the sinews earnestly pray that the Cabinet of Washing- of war. ton will listen, at least on this point, to the dictates alike of justice, of policy, and of humanity. As long as a hope is left to usand at present, thank God, we have much more than a hope, we shall take this for granted. Assuming this, then, and assuming also, as we fear we have at least equal reason to do, that the American Government will refuse satisfaction to this country for the outrage upon our flag,-what will be the position, and what consequences will it entail? If the American Government, while refusing to restore to us the prisoners, announce that they have no intention of illtreating them, the rupture between the two countries would lose its worst feature of aggravation, although it would still remain sufficiently grave. Were war, in such a case, to follow, assuredly it ought to take the most restricted form in which a state of belligerence can show itself. Should war come-and we sincerely trust it may be avoided-it will be the incumbent duty of our Government to carry it on with the utmost forbearance. Break the blockade of the Southern ports, and blockade the harbors of the North to prevent privateering; that is all we ought to do. In every other respect, if the Northerners let us alone, we must let them alone. At this present moment, as we know from Americans themselves, our mail-coated ships the Warrior and Black Prince could, without difficulty or danger, steam up into New York harbor, burn the shipping and bombard the city. But it would be the imperative duty of the British Government to refrain from all such acts of hostility, however legitimate. We repeat it should war prove unavoidable, it must on our part be virtually a war of defence: a war in which the only moves to be made are, to protect Canada by sending thither reinforcements, and to protect our commercial marine by blockading the ports of the North. The latter of which moves, of course, involves the opening of all the ports of the South. The superiority of force is beyond measure on the side of England. Not only are the whole military forces of the North fully employed in keeping in check the armies of the South, but the main difficulty which we experienced in past wars with the United But not less imperative is it upon our States-namely, to protect our commercial Government to avoid war altogether, if such marine from the attacks of American pri- an avoidance be possible. And it may be vateers would now be wholly removed. possible, even though the demands of our When American privateers had a seaboard Government are not complied with to the of three thousand miles, from Portland to letter. That will depend upon the mode and New Orleans, to start from and return to, it conditions under which the refusal (for we was no easy matter for our navy, numerous fear it will be a refusal) of the American as it was, to arrest their depredations. But Government is made. But war with our own now, by the secession of the South, two- kinsmen is a catastrophe above all others to thirds of that extent of seaboard has been be deprecated-to be shrunk from. The rent from the Union. The harbors of Port- very thought of it, we confess, fills us with land and New York, and the waters of the grief and repugnance. We deplore even Chesapeake, are almost the only points from that such a thing is possible: how much which privateers could sail, or to which they more deplorable would it be were it to becould return with their prizes. And to block-come a reality! Until Parliament meetsade these points, thoroughly and effectually, would be the easiest task in the world for our fleet of war-steamers. The danger to our commercial marine, therefore, in the event of a war, would be almost nothing. And as to that other great drawback upon a war with America, which has acquired such immense importance in recent times-we mean the loss of the raw material for threefourths of our manufacturing industry,-it no longer has any weight at all. We have already lost our supply of cotton-we have nothing more to fear on that account: and war would only give us it back. A declaration of war against the North would open to us the ports of the South, and would at one and the same time give us an abundant supply of cotton, and give the secessionists a and we hear that is to be soon-the whole responsibility of this most serious crisis must rest with Her Majesty's Ministers. We earnestly trust that they will prove equal to the emergency, and maintain the rights and dignity of England, without compromising the interests, or misinterpreting the true and enduring feelings of the nation. Correspondence of The Press. GERMAN OPINION. Berlin, Dec. 4. As you will be prepared to hear, the attitude which your Government has taken in the affair of the Trent is absorbing public attention here, and it invests with a certain |