purpose; and the corrective of pacifism is not a lapse into barbarism, but the acquiring of sufficient might and resolution to do the work which a humane purpose requires.

VII

NON-RESISTANCE AND THE PRESENT

WAR

R. BERTRAND RUSSELL, of Trinity

MR.

College, Cambridge, is probably the most eminent of the small group of Englishmen who have openly advocated non-resistance as a present policy. His recent articles, published in this country, are admirable for their detachment and humanity; they might well serve as a model for the philosophical discussion of the great issues that are now hanging in the balance. And since non-resistance is not likely to find a more able protagonist than Mr. Russell, I have selected one of his articles, entitled "The Ethics of War,"1 as an instance by which to judge the merits of that principle.

Although I disagree with almost every specific opinion which this article contains, let me first express my agreement with the general and underlying opinion that "the way of mercy is the way of happiness for all." This opinion is abundantly verified by human experience, past and 1 International Journal of Ethics, January, 1915.

1

present, and is rapidly coming to be a common premise from which all philosophically minded persons argue. War in itself is an unmitigated calamity. It is not to be praised, but denounced; it is not even to be tolerated and idealized as a natural necessity, but is rather to be hunted to its sources and eradicated like a curable disorder. Granting this, what is the reasonable attitude toward the present war and toward its principal actors? It is here that Mr. Russell seems to me to be mistaken in his facts and in his inferences.

There is in this country and at least to some extent among the Allied Powers, a disposition to take international treaties and conventions seriously, and to condemn as "lawless" a nation that violates them. Mr. Russell regards this disposition as groundless because treaties are in practise "only observed when it is convenient to do so." They lack the sanction which enforces law, and serve only "to afford the sort of pretext which is considered respectable for engaging in war with another Power." Now I am willing to assume for the sake of the argument the doubtful thesis that nations do in practise universally disregard treaties at the dictation of selfish expediency. There remains the impor

tant fact, conceded by Mr. Russell, that such action is judged to be disreputable and "unscrupulous." How is that judgment, which already impels governments to seek a "pretext," to be so strengthened as to act as a deterrent?

The analogy of law, to which the pacifist appeals, would suggest a resort to force. But the enforcement of international law predicates an international organization resolved to substitute arbitration for war. How is such an international organization to be brought about? Only, it would appear, by the cultivation of opinion and habit. In short, before the present sentiment for the observance of international law shall be convertible into a sanction, it must be strengthened and attain to something like unanimity. To this end it is important that no breach of such conventions as are already in existence should be condoned. It is not by a passive admission of past and present lawlessness, but by a counsel of perfection and a stern condemnation of the common fault, that usage is to be improved. A cynical violation of treaties should to-day be denounced with a severity exceeding any judgment in the past, so that to-morrow this thing may become so damnable that no government shall dare to be found guilty.

The disputes of private citizens are not commonly settled, as Mr. Russell asserts, "by the force of the police," but by legal process resting on habit and intelligence. The police do not so much enforce law as prevent its occasional infraction. The great majority of persons, and all persons for the greater part of their lives, are "law-abiding." If international law is to be similarly sanctioned, its observance must likewise rest on habit and intelligence. Nations must become generally law-abiding, before any international police can undertake to constrain law-breaking nations. "If the facts were understood," says Mr. Russell, "wars amongst civilized nations would cease, owing to their inherent absurdity." How is such a general understanding to be brought about, and how is the reasonable practise to become the normal practise? Only, it seems to me, by an unflagging effort to promote every instrument, such as international law, treaties, courts of arbitration,

1 Mr. Russell, on the other hand, evidently agrees with the view of Mr. Strachey as quoted by Mr. Graham Wallas: "Why do men have recourse to a Court of Law in private quarrels ? Because they are forced to do so and are allowed to use no other arbitrament." To this Mr. Wallas replies: "But, as a matter of historical fact, the irresistible force by which men are now compelled to resort to the law-courts in their private quarrels is the result of custom arising from thousands of free decisions to do so." -The Great Society, p. 169.