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The expense of this was estimated at 9297. It appeared that the testator had, in his life, said to one of his tenants that he would erect the feeding stalls.

Mr. Walpole and Mr. Follett, in support of the petition, argued, that the proposed outlay was within the terms of the testator's will, being an "improvement" and a "necessary outgoing."

Mr. Turner and Mr. Roupell, for the parties entitled to the two-eighths of the rents, opposed the petition, and argued, that this outlay might be for the benefit of the inheritance, in which they were not interested, but was not for the advantage of the tenants for life:-they observed that it was not within the terms of the will, and was not even said to be such as would increase the annual income, or to be required by the present tenants. They insisted, therefore, that the expense ought not therefore to be incurred.

Mr. Walpole, in reply.

The MASTER of the ROLLS.

I regret to hear such a petition. This gentleman is sole trustee under the will, and is entitled to threefourths of the whole income, and the daughters of the testator, the founder of this gift, are each entitled to one-eighth.

What is desired here is, that, under the name of "improvements," a large sum should be laid out upon the estate for its permanent improvement and paid for out of the income. I cannot, without regret, see such a claim made; but if it be a just one, it must be attended to.

The

1850.

WALPOLE

V.

BOUGHTON.

1850.

WALPOLE

v.

BOUGHTON.

The testator has used the word "improvements;" but it is used in connection with taxes and other outgoings, apparently referring to annual expenditure; and the question raised on this occasion is, whether the word "improvements" is to be considered in a sense wholly independent of the interests of the tenants for life. The only thing sought to be attained is, the improvement of the inheritance, and not the benefit of the tenants for life. I should understand it, if it were calculated to improve the rents, for the benefit of the tenants for life, or if it were necessary to induce the tenants to continue at their present rents; but how could the testator have intended improvements to be made, to the prejudice of the interests of the tenants for life? There is nothing in this petition tending to shew that the tenants for life are to be in the least benefited by the proposed buildings and improvements; and I do not think that they come within the words.

I am not in a situation to say that some improvements might not be justifiable; but here I am asked to act, as if the interests of the tenants for life were to be left out of consideration, and, without any suggestion that the rents would be improved, or that the buildings are required for securing the continuance of the old tenants, I am asked to sanction an expense, which must diminish the income of the tenants for life.

I must either dismiss the petition, with liberty to present another, or allow it to stand over.

AN

INDEX

ΤΟ

THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

ABANDONMENT OF ORDER.
Upon a motion to discharge an
order of course to tax or to give
security for costs, the Court or-
dered the latter only. Held, that
the client could not afterwards,
by mere notice, abandon the or-
ders and file a bill for the same
matter. Such proceedings having
however been taken by the client,
they were stayed until he had
paid the costs consequent on the
order of course, and of the ap-
plication. Foley v. Smith. In re
Smith.
Page 154

ABSOLUTE INTEREST.

See LIFE INTEREST.

ABSTRACT.
See TAXATION, 6, 7, 8.

ACCOUNT.

See DECREE.

INTERROGATOries, 1.

VOL. XII.

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ANSWER.

un-

1. If a Defendant puts in an answer
to an interrogatory, which is ac-
quiesced in by the Plaintiff, and
the bill is afterwards amended,
leaving the interrogatory and the
corresponding statement
changed, but varying an antece-
dent which alters the meaning of
such statement, the Plaintiff is not
entitled to a new answer to such
interrogatory, unless he specially
requires it; but a Defendant who
acquiesces in the new meaning of
the statement by professing to an-
swer it, must do so fully. The
Attorney-General v. Rees. Page 50
2. An answer may be verbally full,
but technically insufficient, as
where a Defendant sets up his ig-
norance of facts as to which he
has plainly the means of obtaining
the information required. Ibid.
The answer of persons engaged
in working a coal mine, which
stated that they could not, as to
their belief or otherwise, set forth
the mode of working, held insuf-
ficient; the Court assuming that
they must have workmen under
their control from whom such in-
formation might be derived, and
which the Defendants were bound
to afford.
Ibid.

3.

APPEARANCE.

1. A solicitor was concerned in a
cause for two parties, and a peti-
tion was served on him which
affected

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312

1. The "instrument" referred to
in the Apportionment Act is not
the instrument creating the pe-
riodical payments, but that creat-
ing a life interest therein. Knight
v. Boughton.
2. A testator died in 1838, having,
by his will, given real estates to
trustees, in trust, after keeping up
his mansion &c. to pay five eighths
of the net rents to his widow for
life. The widow died in 1847,
and rents were receivable on the
next rent day, under leases cre-
ated by the testator anterior to
the Apportionment Act. Held,
that the rents were apportionable.

Ibid.

ARBITRATION.
A railway contractor, on the com-
pletion of the works, brought an
action against the company to re-
. cover the balance.
By an order
of Court, all matters in difference

were referred to arbitration, with
full powers; and the Court was
empowered to refer back the
award from time to time. The
award was made in July 1848, and
in January 1850 the Company
filed this bill, alleging fraud in the
performance of the works prac-
tised in collusion with their en-
gineer, and discovered since the
award, and seeking to set aside
the award, and have the accounts
taken. A general demurrer was
allowed, on the ground that the
matter was already before another
jurisdiction competent to recon-
sider the matter and decide all
questions. Londonderry and En-
niskillen Railway Company v.
Leishman.
Page 423

ASSETS.

A testator had mortgaged his estate
S. By his will, he directed his
debts, other than the mortgage, to
be paid out of a specified part of
his personal estate; he recited his
intention of forthwith paying off a
great part of the mortgage debt,
and he directed that "the ba-
lance" of such mortgage should
be paid by sale of timber on the S.
estate. He made no bequest of
his general personal estate. Held,
that the mortgage was payable
first out of the general personal
estate; secondly, out of the de-
scended real estate; and, thirdly,
out of the timber
money.
v. Lomax.

Lomax

285

Tt 2 ASSIGN-

See ANNUITY.

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