grant as in the said information mentioned, been recognised and confirmed, or how the Defendants make out the contrary, or by what charters or letters patent or other documents the Defendants, the mayor and commonalty and citizens of the said city of London, maintain that the said right is recognised and confirmed. 3. Or whether it is not true, that the charters or letters patent of his late Majesty King Henry VI., in the said information mentioned, is or are of no force and effect to pass or convey to the said mayor and commonalty and citizens, the said soil, bed, and shores of the said river, or how the Defendants make out the contrary; or whether it is not true, that such charters or letters patent have or has been subsequently revoked, rescinded, or annulled, or how the Defendants make out the contrary. 4. Or whether it is not true, that no sufficient acts of ownership, on the part of the said mayor and commonalty and citizens, or other deeds, matters, or things can be shewn, as evidence of such immemorial usage as that set up by the Defendants, the mayor and commonalty and citizens of the said city of London, or how the Defendants made out the contrary, and they claimed the same benefit, as to so much of the said information as they thereby submitted they were not bound to answer, as though they had pleaded or demurred thereto. 5. They admitted, that they had in their possession certain deeds, charters, letters patent, &c., &c., relating to and touching and concerning the said right and title of the Defendants to the freehold of the bed and soil of the said river Thames, and the enjoyments thereof, all which several deeds &c., &c., "evidenced or shewed, or tended 1849. The ATTORNEYGENERAL v. The Corporation of LONDON. 1849. The GENERAL v. tended to evidence and shew, such right or title of the Defendants as aforesaid," and all which "formed material ATTORNEY- parts of the evidence possessed by the Defendants of their aforesaid right and title, and all which were inThe tended to be made use of and given in evidence by the Corporation of LONDON. Defendants, in support of their said right and title, in this cause, and none of which several charters, &c., did, as the Defendants were advised and believed, evidenced, or tended to shew or prove the pretended or alleged right of the Crown set up in the information; nor would the Informant derive any proof in support of his case, from the production of such charters, deeds, instruments, entries, or other documents, or any or either of them." But the Defendants said, that they could not specify or describe such deeds, charters, &c., &c., or any or either of them, in any list or schedule, without, as they were advised and believed, disclosing the nature and character of the evidence on which they intended to rely, as proof of their aforesaid right and title. And, therefore, under the circumstances therein stated, the Defendants submitted and insisted, that they were not bound, and ought not to be compelled, to set forth a list or schedule of such deeds, instruments, charters, &c. They admitted the possession of other documents, &c., "relating to the matters in the information mentioned other than the title of the Defendants to the bed and soil of the river Thames," a list of which they set forth in the schedule, and, save as aforesaid, they denied, &c., &c. To this answer the Attorney-General took five exceptions to the five portions to which, for convenience, numbers have been prefixed. The The Master allowed all these exceptions, and they were now brought before the consideration of the Court, upon exceptions to the Master's report. Mr. Bethell and Mr. Randell, for the Defendants. The Corporation have two distinct rights, first that of conservators, to protect the navigation for the public, and prevent nuisance, as to which no point as to title can arise; secondly, they set up a prescriptive immemorial title (a) to the bed and soil, and they appeal to various acts of ownership, and to repeated acknowledgments and recognitions of that right by the Crown itself. When the proper time arrives they must make out that title; but, until the hearing, the Informant has no right, by alleging that the deeds will not make out the Defendants' right, to have a discovery of the title, or of the Defendants' evidence. The Attorney-General, like any other suitor, is entitled to all the discovery which is necessary to make out his own title; but he has no right to compel a Defendant to state his title, or, by anticipation, the evidence on which the Defendant intends to support it. A Plaintiff must succeed by the strength of his own title, and is not, by a mere allegation of right, to compel his adversary to expose his title, and thus enable persons to pick holes in it. The rule is thus stated by Lord Brougham in Bolton v. The Corporation of Liver pool (b): "I take the principle to be this:-A party has a right to the production of deeds sustaining his own title affirmatively, but not of those which are not immediately connected with the support of his own title, and which form part of his adversary's. He can (a) Co. Lit. 115 a. not (b) 1 Myl. & K. p. 91.; and see S. C. 3 Simons, p. 490. 1849. The ATTORNEYGENERAL v. The Corporation of LONDON. 1849. The GENERAL v. The not call for those, which, instead of supporting his title, defeat it, by entitling his adversary. Those under ATTORNEY- which both claim, he may have, or those under which he alone claims. Thus an heir at law cannot in that character call for the general inspection of deeds in the Corporation of LONDON, possession of a devisee." Again, in Glover v. Hall (a) production was refused where the Plaintiff shewed, upon the answer, no interest in the deeds, and the liability to a disclosure of the contents was denied and resisted. The answer states distinctly, that the several deeds, &c., evidence the right of the Defendants, and do not shew the right of the Crown. The common law right of the Crown requires no discovery or evidence to prove it; nor is it alleged to be necessary; yet the AttorneyGeneral says, "shew me what is the nature of your title, and the deeds by which it is supported." This is contrary to the law of the Court. The objection to make a discovery of the Defendant's title may be made by answer as well as by plea; Bellwood v. Wetherell (b), Buden v. Dore (c), where Lord Hardwicke “allowed the exception to the report: for that you cannot come by a fishing bill in this Court, and pray a discovery of the deeds and writings of Defendant's title. If indeed (he observed) there was any charge in the bill, general or special, that Defendant had in his power deeds and writings of Plaintiff's title, an answer must be given thereto." Secondly. The prerogative right formerly possessed by the Crown to compel a subject upon an information of intrusion to set out his title on record, no longer exists. 1849. The GENERAL V. The Corporation of LONDON. exists. The 21 Jac. 1. (a), after reciting that "Where the King, out of his prerogative royal, may enforce the subject, in informations of intrusion brought against him, ATTORNEYto a special pleading of his title," &c. it is enacted, "That whensoever the King," &c. "hath been or shall be out of possession by the space of twenty years, or hath not or shall not have taken the profits of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments within the space of twenty years before any information of intrusion brought, or to be brought, to recover the same, that in every such case, the Defendant or Defendants may plead the general issue, if he or they so think fit, and shall not be pressed to plead specially; and that in such cases the Defendant or Defendants shall retain the possession he or they had at the time of such information exhibited, until the title be tried, found, or adjudged for the King." So the act abolishing the Star Chamber (b) is as follows:-"Be it likewise declared and enacted, by authority of this present parliament, That neither his Majesty nor his Privy Council have or ought to have any jurisdiction, power or authority, by English bill, petition, articles, libel, or any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine or draw into question, determine or dispose of, the lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, or chattels of any the subjects of this kingdom, but that the same ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary courts of justice, and by the ordinary course of the law." It will be found, upon examination, that the case of the Attorney-General to the Prince of Wales v. St. Aubyn (c), which was principally relied on in the Master's |