Measures giving effect to an extensive principle are generally accompanied with subordinate provisions, intended to limit and control their operation. In these cases, the legislator himself provides certain securities against the excesses of his own principle; he applies correctives and counteractions to its influence, if carried beyond certain limits. (43) In order, therefore, to determine how far a law of this sort is operative or inoperative, we must consider how far the legislator intended his principle to go, and whether the operation which it has had comes up to the mark which he fixed beforehand, or falls short of it. If a law fulfils the intentions of the legislature by which it was enacted, it cannot justly be called inoperative, though its effects may have been less extensive than some persons may desire. This remark applies particularly to laws, in the execution of which a discretion, within certain limits, is left to the subordinate authorities.

§ 8 We proceed now to the second class of effects—those incidental, and secondary in importance, but nevertheless contemplated and desired by the legislature.

It often happens that a government, having taken the steps necessary for the accomplishment of a given object, may be able incidentally, and with little further exertion or sacrifice, to accomplish a by-object, admitted to be useful and desirable. For example: in a military or naval expedition made for the purpose of conquest, or in a pacific visit of an ambassador for the purpose of negotiation, men of science may be taken, in order to make observations in their own departments of knowledge. When Alexander had, by his conquests, opened Central Asia to the Greeks, he availed himself of this opportunity to furnish Aristotle with the means of prosecuting his researches into natural history.(") Geographical knowledge has been promoted by all territorial conquests of civilized nations-by the

(43) Compare the remarks in the author's Essay on Authority in Matters of Opinion, c. 7, ad fin.

(44) See Sprengel, Geschichte der Arzneikunde, vol. i. p. 494-7. Compare the remark of Cuvier: C'est que l'histoire naturelle en effet est du

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conquests of Alexander in Asia, of the Romans in Europe and Africa,(4) of the Spaniards in America, of the English in Hindostan. So ships employed on a foreign station for the purpose of protecting trade may occupy their spare time in making charts, in surveying the line of coast, and taking astronomical observations. Regiments appointed to defend a frontier may assist in constructing or repairing fortifications. Similarly, in private life, a person who makes a journey, or otherwise incurs an expense, for some paramount object, may be able to accomplish incidentally some minor object, for which alone he would not have made the journey or incurred the expense. Α man who goes to a distant country on account of health, or of some important pecuniary interest, would not fail to see the remarkable works of art and nature in that country.

It often happens that a law (especially if it be of a complex nature) is recommended as accomplishing certain objects, accessory to its main object, but not strictly connected with it. For example, taxes are often recommended as subserving some moral end. The primary end of a tax is to raise a revenue to the government; but, in addition to this, we are told, perhaps, that a duty on spirits or beer discourages drunkenness, or that a certain arrangement of duties encourages the consumption of a less, instead of a more pernicious article-of beer, for instance, instead of spirits. More often, duties are recommended as encouraging certain sorts of industry or trade, as native or colonial rather than foreign. So the main object of a poor-law is to relieve destitution; but it is often recommended as accomplishing various collateral purposes, such as stimulating employment, regulating the number of dwellings, and repressing population. The main object of turnpike-gates is to collect tolls; but it is stated, as an incidental advantage of the system, that they facilitate the detection of horse and cattle-stealers who pass along the road.

Another example of incidental effects of an institution con

nombre des sciences où le génie seroit impuissant, s'il n'étoit secondé par le pouvoir; mais les efforts du pouvoir y seroient vains à leur tour si le génie ne savoit en co-ordonner les résultats.'-Hist. des Sciences Naturelles, tom. ii. p. 349.

(45) See Polyb. iii. 59.

templated as advantageous, but not a part of its main object, is afforded by the system of local self-government established in this country. The parochial, borough, county, and other local institutions are intended, primarily and directly, to accomplish certain objects of public administration, such as police, relief of the poor, repair of roads, maintenance of churches, sewerage, lighting and paving; but it is always regarded as an important incidental consequence of these institutions, and in their modification or extension is recognised as one of their leading recommendations, that in their operation they encourage habits of independence and business, and give to the inhabitants of each locality an interest in attending to public affairs. This is an incidental benefit, extraneous to the appropriate end of the institution, but it is nevertheless within the distinct contemplation of the legislature, which perpetuates, amends, and enlarges the system. The same remark applies in some measure to trial by jury-though, in the case of this ancient institution, it cannot be said that the incidental advantage was contemplated by its original authors. Trial by jury is a mode of judicial trial, the main object of which is the decision of criminal prosecutions and of civil controversies; but, besides its efficacy in determining these questions, it is also often recommended as producing the incidental effect of training the people in the administration of the law, and giving them a species of political education.

Where an accessory and subordinate object can be accomplished without any disturbance of the means applicable to the primary end, then, assuming such subordinate object to be good, there can be no reason why an effort should not be made for its attainment; but if the attainment of the subordinate object is likely to interfere with the primary object, then it ought not to be attempted. In general, it may be laid down as a wise rule, that the objects of a law ought to be as simple, and its operation as direct, as possible. The Horatian precept―' Sit quodvis simplex duntaxat et unum'-is as applicable to the works of the statesman and legislator as to those of the poet. If an

attempt is made, by a single enactment, to accomplish indirectly various objects, running in parallel lines to the main object, there is a danger, not only that the collateral objects may not be attained, but that the main object itself may be more or less defeated. Attention is distracted, and the simple action of the machinery is perplexed, by a multiplicity of applications. For the most part, a law which, like Goldsmith's chest of drawers, is 'contrived a double debt to pay,' is a bad law.

As we shall see presently, the authors of a law ought to take care that its incidental effects, so far as they can be foreseen, are not mischievous. Assuming that the primary and intended effect of a law is good, it ought further to satisfy this condition-that its incidental effects, so far as they can be calculated beforehand, are innocent; that they are not bad; and if they comply with this negative condition, the legislator need not in general trouble himself further. Legislation is so difficult a work, that the utmost simplification of each legislative problem is desirable. For example, if a judicial system produces the effect of good decisions, with little delay or cost, it need not aim at the political education of the people. The attempt to attain moral ends, by the bye, in legislative acts and mercantile transactions—to steal a little good out of a measure destined to another purpose, is for the most part unsuccessful, and, by the circuitous and tortuous nature of its means, often does more harm than is compensated by the goodness of its end. Hence, in estimating the effects of a law, our attention should be steadily fixed on its primary purpose; and its worth ought not to depend, to any great extent, on consequences which are not a part of its direct and legitimate policy.

§ 9 Having considered the incidental effects of a law contemplated-and, as being beneficial, also desired-by the legislature, we proceed next to the other incidental effects, likewise contemplated by the legislature, but, as being mischievous, not desired by it.

Sometimes effects of this sort are counteracted, wholly or partially, by subsidiary provisions annexed to the main law. When extensive rights, such as the right of property, or the right

of parental control, are conferred by the legislature, they are accompanied with conditions and limitations intended to prevent their abuse. Thus, the right of property is guarded from a large class of incidental evils by the maxim, Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non lædas.' At other times, the incidental bad consequences of a law are treated as inevitable, but, although anticipated, are held to be outweighed by its advantages. The incidental evils are taken as a necessary alloy, as a detraction from the beneficial influence of the law, due to the imperfection of everything human. As goods are never unmixed, a portion of evil must be expected to arise from every law, and must be endured as necessary. If, upon striking a balance of good and evil, the former largely preponderates, the law is on the whole beneficial for instance, if, its effects being taken at 100, there are eighty good, and twenty bad. It is impossible to make a law so perfect that its incidental effects are never detrimental— that its use is wholly free from abuse. The best poor-law produces idleness, improvidence, and imposture; the most just and successful war destroys life, and causes large expenditure. the system of insurance, though on the whole beneficial, is constantly attended by certain liabilities to abuse. The insurance of lives sometimes produces murder; the insurance of buildings and farm-stock sometimes produces incendiary fires; the insurance of ships sometimes produces intentional shipwreck.

So

On the other hand, the evil effects foreseen to be incidental to any measure under consideration may be such as to outweigh its designed advantage; for instance, military success may be purchaseable at too great a loss of life, or a useful public work may require too large an outlay of money.

§ 10 We have now seen that the anticipated consequences of a law may be distributed into three classes: those which were desired by the legislature, either primary or incidental, and those not desired, but regarded as inevitable. It remains for us, lastly, to consider those effects of a law which were wholly unforeseen; which the legislature did not contemplate or advert to before its enactment.

When a law has been for some time in operation, it will be