standing is, in the order of nature, cbviously the first, and the memory the second; for things must be perceived before they can be remembered, and they must be remembered and compared together before they can excite volitions, from being, some agreeable, others disagreeable. The memory must, therefore, be said to spring from the understanding; and the will to proceed from both; and as these three faculties constitute one soul, so may it be conceived, how may three divine persons, partaking of the self-same nature, constitute one God.

Lindsey. How come you to make but three faculties in the soul? You may make three hundred, if you will. Why do you not make every passion a faculty? And so of the attributes of God: you may make them all persons ; one of wisdom, another of justice, a third of mercy, a fourth of power, and so on.

Witness. The faculties are the powers of the soul itself, and are of perpetual necessity to its constitution; so that without them the soul would no longer be a soul. Not so of the passions: they go and come; for a man is not always in joy, grief, fear, or anger; but he always has an understanding, a memory and a will; and it is from the action of these that the passions arise. The faculties are the constitution, while the passions are the complexion, of the soul: the complexion often changes, and when the constitution is broken, it is death;

but the complexion arises from the constitution, not the constitution from the complexion. Now, though the passions are many and various, yet there are but three faculties, and they can neither be more nor less. The difference between these is like that of colour and dimensions in the same body. The colours may be many and various; but the dimensions are three, and three only; that is, length, breadth, and thickness: these are the properties constituting the nature of extension; and these three together make but one extension, and they are each to be distinguished, though they are inseparable, from each other. Length is not breadth, and neither of them are thickness; yet no one of these can be without the other two. They are distinctly three, yet entirely one; they all make up but one and the self-same extension. The colours, indeed, change with every variation of the light, but the dimensions are still the same, and still necessary to the body. This body does not alter its nature by the change of colour, but it would cease to be a body could it want any three of its dimensions; for then it would no longer have an extension, and would no more be a body.1

Lindsey. This is new, and very ingenious; and, like all novelties, catching.

1 First Dialogue.

Witness. Not so new nor so original as you may at first imagine: the idea is suggested to me by our blessed Saviour's parable of the Sower, where the three ways of sowing the seed which became unfruitful are arranged according to the three faculties of the soul. The first way refers to those who understood not; the second, to those who retain or remember not; and the third, to those whose wills or affections were corrupted by the cares and pleasures of life.

Lindsey. But this illustration does not come up to a complete parallel with the Trinity in Unity, in all points.

Witness. No; the allusion between body and soul, between colour and dimensions in the body, between the faculties and passions of the soul, will not answer in every particular, from the vast difference subsisting between the nature of the body and the nature of the soul, and the different manner of their operations. Still they serve sufficiently, as his Lordship remarks, for mere illustration. But if it be so difficult to conceive matters relating to our souls, if, indeed, we cannot enter into the mysterious nature of them with our limited powers of understanding; how can we pretend to define, explain, or argue upon the infinitely higher subject of the Divine nature? The very imperfect knowledge we have of the nature of God is derived from what we see in the works of his creation;

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yet in none of these do we find any resemblance to that eternity, that self-existence, that omnipresence which we know of him from the Scriptures. Shall we then deny these as contradictions when applied to us? No; we believe them to be in the nature of God, though contrary to our nature, because they are revealed. Adopt the same method with respect to other Scripture truths which are above our comprehension and reason, and we immediately arrive at the assent to the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity.

Lindsey. How can there be this diversity of three persons in the Godhead without destroying the unity? This makes God to be compounded of three persons, whereas his nature is simple and entire.

Witness. The Unity of God is not compounded; it is the most perfect of all unities. With respect to our bodies we know they are compounded and made up of other bodies. My finger is a part of my body, and there are several parts in my finger, and these parts may be parted again and divided ad infinitum; so that every body is a compound of many bodies. bodies. But this is not true of spirits; a spirit is not compounded or made up of parts, and therefore cannot be divided, and is incapable of addition or multiplication. You cannot say of the soul that it is either multiplied or divided among its three faculties, or that it is compounded

of them; these faculties cannot be taken from the soul as a part may be taken from the body: its unity, therefore, is more perfect than the soul; for the faculties are not the parts, but the powers, of the soul, by which it acts, and without which it would be no longer a soul. Now, these powers of the soul bear a near resemblance to the persons of the Godhead, which are not parts of God, for he is an uncompounded, and simple, and single Being. The whole Deity perpetually flowing, in its full infinity from one person to another, is in the eternal enjoyment of its own beatitude, blessed for ever in itself. This perfect Unity cannot but be very faintly represented even in the unity of the soul. 1

Lindsey. But do you mean to affirm that there is not a mutual communication of spirits? Does not one spirit join with another, and partake of it, as bodies do?

Witness. Undoubtedly, there is an infinitely more intimate communion of spirits than there can be in bodies. All enjoyment and satisfaction in the union of bodies is from the union of their souls. This is what we call love without this, our bodies are insensible to their unions, and are only as trees, plants, and flowers. St. Paul says, man and wife "become one flesh; but he that is joined

1 First Dialogue, p. 239.