nor his ministers made any remarks on the treaty of Bassein, nor did they request a copy of it. 13. If it be true that his High ness the Peishwa has really invited Dowlut Rao Scindia to repair to Poona, of which fact the Maharaja assured nie he had undeniable proofs under the seal of Baajy Rao, Scindia may possibly march to that capital, and allege that this measure was sanctioned by

NOTE.

1. THE operations of our army, in the event of war with Scindia, must be directed to the following objects:

1. To seize all his possessions between the Ganges and Jumna.

2. To take the person of the
Mogul Shah Aulum under
our protection.

3. To form alliances with the
Rajpoots and other inferior
states beyond the Jumna, for
the purpose of excluding
Scindia from the northern
districts of Hindustan.
4. To occupy Bundelkund,
and thus to strengthen the
frontier of the province of
Benares against Scindia or
the Rajah of Berar.

2. The success of such a plan of operations would exclude the Mahrattas altogether from the northern parts of Hindustan, a powerful barrier between our frontier and that of Scindia, by the intervention of the Rajpoot

and other inferior states, strengthened under our protection.

3. In the execution of such a plan, the following circumstances would require immediate attention. 1st. The immediate reduction

of the forces collected under the command of M. Perron. 2d. The possession of the forts and passes to the southward of the Jumna, which would impede the march of an army from the Deccan.

4. M.Perron's forces are said to be at present collected at Cael, and to consist of about eight thousand infantry, and an equal number of cavalry. Scindia, it is generally believed, has no confidence in M. Perron's attachment to his govern ment. In the event of a war with the British government, it is probable that Scindia will endeavour to conciliate M. Perron; and the prospect of this crisis of affairs, which would render M. Perron's conduct an object of attention to both states, may have contributed to induce M. Perron to postpone

his avowed intention of relinquishing Scindia's service, in the hope of more advantageous offers from Scindia or from the British government.

5. A considerable number of Sepoys who were discharged from the British army at the late reduction, are said to have entered into M. Perron's service; and it is supposed, that if any new corps were raised in the vicinity of their station, many would return to the service; and that Scindia's European officers might be induced to resign the service of Scindia by offers of a present subsistence, and of a future establishment in the service of some of the allies or tributaries of the British govern.

ment.

6. It must be ascertained whether it would be safe or practicable to endeavour to detach M. Perron, or any of the European officers in Scindia's service, or any of Scindia's troops, from their employment with Scindia; and whether any, and what emissary, should be sent to M. Perron or to the officers.

7. If opposition is ultimately to be expected from M. Perron's force, a detachment of an adequate strength, formed at Saune or Bidgygush, might either attack M. Perron at Cael, or, by an easy change of position, might intercept his communication with Agra, where it is probable the principal supplies and military stores would be lodged, unless such a measure should have been prevented by the seasonable interposition of a British force between Agra and Cael, where M. Per ron's principal depots are understood to be established at pre

rent.

8. The fort of Agra is extensive,

1

but insufficiently supplied with artillery; a new bastion is said to have been constructed where it was formerly breached by M. Duboigne, but this work is said not to have added essentially to the defences of the place.

9. After the reduction of M. Perron's force, the principal object would appear to be, to prevent Scindia from entering industan with a large body of cavalry.

10. If operations against M. Perron's force should be necessary, a separate detachment of sufficient force might he formed at Etawah, to proceed directly upon Gualior, which covers the principal route from Ougein into Scindia's possessions in Hindustan.

11. The position at Gualior would probably render it impossible for Scindia to enter Hindustan with a considerable body of cavalry?

12. The Ranah of Gohud is said to be reduced to poverty, and to be destitute of resources or power. This chief, however, is

said to retain considerable influ ence with the Ghauts.

13. It is said that the Ranah of Gohud is anxious to obtain the support of the British government; with our support he would probably be enabled to raise a considerable force, which might assist in opposing Scindia's march into Hindustan. The possession of the fortress of Gualior by British troops would enable us to support the Ranah's authority in the country, and would encourage the Ghants to assist their native chief against the depredations of Scindia. The Ghauts Rajahs holding the strong forts of Bhistpoor-Chombeer and Deig, to the southward of Agra and Matra, are believed to be desirous of exchanging their dependence

dependence on Seindia for the protection of the British government; an assurance of the secure possession of their hereditary tenures, and of their internal power would probably attach those petty states to us.

14. The Rajpoot chiefs of Jynagur and Jeypour have been long dissatisfied under the yoke of Scindia. Those chiefs would probably enter into subsidiary engagements with the British government for an adequate support against the usurpation of the Mahrattas. The accession of the Rajpoot chiefs, with the Ranah of Gohud, to the interests of the British government, would present an almost insurmountable barrier to Scindia's presumption of influence in Hin dustan.

15. As these chiefs could furnish considerable bodies of cavalry a small force of British infantry and artillery would be sufficient to counteract any force of that description Scindia could detach from the Deccan

16. Bundelkund and Bhogachund are considered as fiefs hold

en from the Peishwa. Occupied by the British government either as a security for subsidy from the Peishwa, or in consequence of a subsidy granted for the support of the internal government of Bundelkund or Boghachund by British troops, these countries would oppose an effectual barrier to any attempts of the Rajah of Berar to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's provinces from those quarters.

17. It is believed that Scindia his stationed a body of predatory horse at Kalpee and Ongassy, on the southern bank of the Jumna. This point requires immediate attention.

18. With a view to preparation for a war, directed to all the points stated in this note, it would ap pear to be proper,

MILLITARY PREPARATIONS. 1st. That the main body of our troops should be assembled at a point between M. Perron's station and Agra, and Shah Aulum invited to put himself under its protection as soon as the communication with Delhi may be opened. 2d. That Agra should be seized,

if possible, by a separate de-
tachment to be assembled at
Shekoabad.

3d. That another detachment
should proceed from Etawah
to occupy Gualior.
4th. That Bundelkund should
be occupied by a force to be
assembled at Allahabad, or
in its vicinity.

POLITICAL.

1st. A negotiation with M. Perron.

2nd. With his European offi

cers.

3d. With his troops. 4th. With the Ranah of Gohud

and Jaut chiefs of Bhistpoor and Combeer.

5th. With the Rajpoot chief

of Jynagur and Jeypour. 6th. With the chiefs of Bundelkund.

N. B.-The commander in chief will make any preparations which he may deem necessary in draught or carriage cattle immediately, and will order any corps from any of the lower stations.

19. Benares must be well pro. tected until Bundelkund shall be occupied. Query, Does the Commander in Chief think that the experimental horse artillery, with any

any addition from the body guard, would be useful? 20. The Commander in Chief will be so good as to transmit any observations which may

Notes, with a detailed plan of a campaign against Scindia.

(Signed)

Fort William,

WELLESLEY.

THE necessity of providing for the event of hostilities with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar has already induced me to transmit to your Excellency, in the form of private notes, such suggestions as have appeared to me to be requisite for the purpose of enabling your Excellency, to frame a plan of military operations, connected with the political considerations which have ultimately compelled me to engage in war against those chieftains, and with the objects which I deem most important to secure, by the success of our arms, in the final settlement of peace.

2.These private communications from me have been answered by your Excellency in the same form, and I have hitherto decmed it to be expedient to return my observations upon your Excellency's propositions through the channel of private correspondence; it is now expedient to adopt the regular course of official correspondence with your Excellency in the secret department, and I shall accordingly henceforth address you in the form observed in this letter, or through the Secretary in the seeret department, according to the

cussion.

3. In this dispatch I propose to state to your Excellency my views and intentions with regard to the following important points: 16t. The objects which appear to be most desirable to be attained in the prosecution of hostilities against Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, on the north-western frontier of Hindustan. 2d. The general plan of military operations by which those objects appear to be attainable with the greatest degree of expedition and security. 3d. The course of political arrange ments and negotiations which I propose to pursue, under your Excellency's superintendence, for the purpose of facilitating the operations of your army, and of insuring the stability of peace under the most favourable conditions to the British interests.

4. With a view to render the statement of my sentiments on these questions more clear and distinct, I have annexed to this dispatch copies of the documents enumerated in the margin.

5. To every person conversant with the true nature of the British interests and power in India, the north-western frontier of Hindustan must have long appeared to

present

present the most vulnerable point of our extensive empire.

6. The condition of the power of the Seiks, as well as that of the Mahrattas, of the Rajpoots, and other petty states, oners considerable advantage to an invading enemy from the more remote northwestern countries of Asia,or from the banks of the Indus; and it is unnecessary to remark to your Excellency's judgment,experience, and knowledge, that the violence and rapacity of the Afghan tribes, or of the Asiatic nations inhabiting the northern and western countries of Asia, might have pursued objects of invasion in that quarter which might have occa. sioned considerable embarrassment to the British power in India.

7. A sense of this danger concurred with other motives to induce me to conclude those arrangements with the Nabob Vizier, which terminated in the treaty of Lucknow, and which secured a considerable augmentation of the military, political, and financial resources and power of the British, nation on the north-western frontier of Oude.

8. The result of that happy settlement has certainly afforded a great accession of security against the dangers which menaced the stability of our empire on that side of India.

9. But the local position of Scindia's territories, the condition and nature of Scindia's military force in Hindustan, and the cor rupt and profligate councils of that weak, arrogant, and faithless chief, still constitute a serious danger to the British interests. The territories of Scindia between the Jumba and the Ganges interrupt the line of our defence in that quarter, and some of his

principal posts are introduced into the centre of our dominions, while the possession of Agra, Delhi, aud the western and southern banks of the Jumna enables him to command nearly the whole line of the western frontier.

10. In the event of any considerable accession to Scindia's power, or in the event of his forming any connection with France, or with any enemy to the British interests, the actual position of his territories and forces in Hindustan would furnish great advantages to him in any attack upon the Company's dominions.

11. Formidable as the power of Scindia might have become in the event of any accession to his strength, a danger more urgent and more direct in all its couse. quences, has grown out of the decline of Scindia's local authority in Hindustan, and has recently assumed a more alarming aspect in proportion to the accumulated embarrassments of Scindia's cir. cumstances in the Deccan. and to the general decay of his resources and power.

12. The regular infantry in the service of Scindia, under the com mand of European officers, is supported by funds derivable almost exclusively from the territorial possessions of that chief situated between the Jumna, the Ganges, and the mountains of Cumaion.

13. A considerable portion, if not the whole et this territory, has been assigned to M. Perron, a French officer, who has suc ceeded M. Deboigne in the chief command of Scindia's regular infantry.

14. M. Perron has formed this territory into an independent state, of which Scindia's regular inlantry