To that may be answered

That no Fact which she shall do here in England will hold, for she will alleage the same to be done in a Foreign Country, being restrained of Liberty. That there is great likelyhood of escape, wheresoever she be kept in Scotland; for her late escape there, sheweth, how she will leave no way unsought to atchieve it; and the Country being, as it is, greatly divided, and of nature marvellously Factious, she is the more like to bring it to pass. Or if the Regent, by any practice, should yield to a composition, or finding his Party weak, should give over his Regiment, Then what assurance have we, either of Amity or Religion. That the Regent may be induced to do this, appeareth by his late secret Treaty with the Duke of Norfolk, for her Marriage, without the Queen's Majesty's knowledg. And though the Regent should persevere constant, yet if he should be taken away directly, or indirectly, (the like whereof is said, hath been attempted against him) then is all at large, and the Queen of Scots most like to be restored to her Estate, the Factions being so great in Scotland, as they are; so as the Case is very tickle and dangerous to hang upon so small a Thread, as the Life of one Man, by whom it appeareth the whole at this present is contained.

And touching the Hostages, though that Assurance might be good to preserve her from Violence in Scotland, yet it may be doubted how the same will be sufficient to keep her from escaping or governing again, seeing, for her part, she will make little Conscience of the Hostages if she may prevail; and the punishing of the Hostages will be a small satisfaction to the Queen's Majesty for the Troubles that may ensue. And for the doubt of her escape, or of Rebellion within this Realm, it may be said, That if she should not be well guarded, but should be left open to practice, then her Escape, and the other perils, might be doubted of; but

if the Queen's Majesty hold a stricter hand over her, and put her under the Care of a fast and circumspect Man, all practice shall be cut from her, and the Queen's Majesty free from that Peril. And more safe it is for the Queen to keep the Bridle in her own Hand, to restrain the Scottish Queen, than, in returning her home, to commit that trust to others, which by Death, composition, or abusing of one Person, may be disappointed.

And if she should, by any means, recover her Estate, the doubt of Rebellion there is not taken away, but rather to be feared, if she have ability to her Will. And if she find strength, by her own or Foreign Friends, she is not far off to give Aid, upon a main Land, to such as will stir for her; which, so long as she is here, they will forbear, lest it might bring most Peril to her self, being in the Queen's Hands. The like respect, no Doubt, will move Foreign Princes to become Requesters, and not Threatners, for her delivery.

And where it is said, That the Queen's Majesty cannot be quiet so long as she is here, but it may breed danger to her Majesty's Health; That is a Matter greatly to be weighed, for it were better to adventure all, than her Majesty should inwardly conceive any thing to the danger of her Health. But as that is only known to such as have more inward Acquaintance with her Majesty's disposition, than is fit for some other to have. So again, it is to be thought, that her Majesty being wise, if the Perils like to follow, in returning her Home, were laid before her; and if she find them greater than the other, she will be induced easily to change her Opinion, and thereby may follow to her Majesty's great satisfaction and quietness.

Sir Walter Mildmay's Opinion concerning the keeping of the Queen of Scots (G. Burnet, History of the Reformation, London, 1683, Part II, Book III, No. 12).

57. Burghley to Elizabeth on Matters of By WILLIAM State (circ. 1583)

The second point of the general part of my discourse is, the consideration of your foreign enemies, which may prove either able or willing to hurt you; and those are Scotland, for his pretence and neighbourhood; and Spain, for his religion and power: As for France, I see not why he should not rather be made a friend than an enemy; for, though he agree not with your Majesty in matters of conscience and religion, yet, in hoc tertio, he doth agree, that he feareth the greatness of Spain; and therefore that may solder the link which religion hath broken, and make him hope, by your Majesty's friendship, to secure himself against so potent an adversary.

CECIL, LORD BURGHLEY (1520-1598), Chief Secretary of State and Lord under Elizabeth. In crisis the Queen turned to Cecil, and although she

Treasurer

every great

did not

always follow his advice, yet she was much influviews. enced by his By him more

than by any other single

man during

the last thirty years of his

life was the history of

shaped."

cautious and

compromisfavoured a ing, but he

more vigorous policy of

And, though he were evilly affected towards your Majesty, yet, the present condition of his estate considered, I do not think it greatly to be feared, himself being a prince who hath given assurance to the world, that he loves his ease England much better than victories, and a prince that is neither Burghley's beloved nor feared of his people: And the people them- temper was selves being of a very light and unconstant disposition; and besides they are altogether unexperienced, and undisciplined how to do their duties, either in war or peace; they are ready to begin and undertake any enterprise before they enter into consideration thereof, and yet weary of it before it be well begun; they are generally poor and weak, and subject to sickness at sea; divided and subdivided into sundry heads, and several factions, not only between the Huguenots and Papists, but also between the Montmorencies the Guises and the and the people being oppressed by all do hate all; so that, for a well settled and established government and commonwealth as your Majesty's is, no grounds why to misdoubt or fear them, but only so far original.

I see

opposition to Spain, and of

support to

tants of the

the ProtesContinent than suited On Burghley, Hume, The Great Lord Burghley.

Elizabeth.

see Martin

Blank in the

Firebrands.

Leader of the Huguenot party, and later Henry

IV of France.

James VI of
Scotland,

later James I
of England.

forth as the Guisards happen to serve for boutefeus in Scotland; and while it shall please your Majesty, but with reasonable favour to support the king of Navarre, I do not think that the French King will ever suffer you to be from thence annoyed.

Therefore, for France, your Majesty may assure your self of one of these two, either to make with him a good alliance, in respect of the common enemy of both kingdoms, or at the least so muzzle him, as that he shall have little power to bite you.

As for Scotland, if your Majesty assist and help those noblemen there, which are by him suspected, your Majesty may be sure of this, that those will keep him employed at horne; and also, whilst he is a protestant, no foreign prince will take part with him against your Majesty: And of himself he is not able to do much harm, the better part of his nobles being for your Majesty; and, if in time he should grow to be a papist, your Majesty shall always have a strong party at his own doors, in his own kingdom, to restrain his malice; who, since they depend upon your Majesty, they are, in all policy, never to be abandoned; for, by this resolution, the Romans anciently, and the Spaniards presently, have most of all prevailed: and, on the contrary, the Macedonians in times past, and the Frenchmen in our age, have lost all their foreign friends, because of their aptness to neglect those who depended upon them: but, if your Majesty could by any means possible devise to bring in again the Hamiltons, he should then be beaten with his own weapons, and should have more cause to look to his own succession, than to be too busy abroad. But Spain, yea Spain, it is in which, as I conceive, all causes do concur, to give a just alarm to your Highness's excellent judgment.

First, because in religion he is so much the Pope's, and the Pope in policy so much his, as that whatever the mind of Pope Gregory, and the power of King Philip, will or can

XIII.

compass, or bring upon us, is in all probability to be ex- Gregory pected; himself being a prince whose closet hath brought forth greater victories than all his father's journies, absolutely ruling his subjects, a people all one-hearted in religion, constant, ambitious, politick, and valiant; the King rich and liberal, and, which of all I like worst, greatly beloved among all the discontented party of your Highness's subjects. . . . Now as of him is the chief cause of doubt, so of him the chief care must be had of providence.

But this offers a great question, whether it be better to procure his amity? Or stop the course of his enmity? As of a great lion, whether it be more wisdom, to trust to the taming of him, or tying of him?

I confess this requires a longer and a larger discourse, and a better discourser than myself; and therefore I will stay myself from roving over so large a field: but only, with the usual presumption of love, yield this to your gracious consideration.

First, if you have any intention of league, that you see upon what assurance, or at least what likelihood, you may have that he will observe the same.

Secondly, that in a parlying season it be not as a countenance unto him the sooner to overthrow the Low Countries, which hitherto have been as a counterscarp to your Majesty's kingdom.

But, if you do not league, then your Majesty is to think upon means for strengthening yourself, and weakening of him, and therein your own strength is to be tendered both at home and abroad.

For your home strength, in all reverence I leave it, as the thing which contains in effect the universal consideration of government.

For your strength abroad, it must be in joining in good confederacy, or at least intelligence, with those that would willingly embrace the same.

The

Catholics.