possession to the party who seemed to hold it, and referred the opposite party to the more prolonged but deeper deliberation of the Civil Court.

In process of time this very case, having been brought into the Civil Court, came before me as Registrar for decision. On perusing the pleadings and documents I was as much puzzled as I had formerly been to find out by what singular process this apparently inextricable confusion had come to pass. The outline of the affair was briefly this. We will say that A had four sons, B. C. D. and E. After a lapse of some years after his decease, another party, F., purchased the rights of E and his descendants. When F. attempted to get possession, he was met by the descendants of B. C. and D. with an allegation that E.'s right in the estate had been one-sixteenth, and not as he claimed, one-fourth. F. produced an old decree of Court positively assigning to E. one-fourth of his father A's property. B. C. and D. filed copies of civil decrees reciting as the grounds for their respective decisions that one-sixteenth only had been decreed to E. I obtained the key to the mystery by observing that all these decisions, varying as they did, assigned the same date to the authority by which they were guided; that is by a decree bearing date the same day, decisions so grossly conflicting as to the amount of the thing decreed had been issued. This was in the highest degree improbable, nay impossible. I determined, therefore, no longer to trust to the authenticated copies of the decree before me, but to refer to the original documents of the case itself, provided they were forthcoming. This, indeed, was a matter of chance, as the case was very old, and perhaps I might find the papers rotten or mildewed. At last, however, they were produced; and on perusing them no manner of doubt remained. E. had sued his brothers for his paternal property, and had got his decree for a fourth of the whole, which was by law his dne. How then had the mistake occurred? This was manifest from the record book in which the decree had been entered. The suit had been laid for a fourth of four shares. In the Persian the word " chahar" means four, and "chaharoom" which is made by the addition only of the letter meem, signifies fourth. Some scoundrel had got access to this book, and in the decree had added this letter throughout; so then the decree though giving a fourth of four, read as if it gave only a fourth of a fourth. By similar scoundrelism, copies, in which, of course, the falsification was not manifest, of the altered decree had been given to some parties, and on seeing these, the Courts in various trials had based their decisions. The discovery was a notable one; but for many years that these cases were pending, no one ever dreamt of the solution of the mystery. As to discovering the persons who had done this, the thing was impossible. The persons holding the false decrees pointed to the Judge's seal and signature as authenticating them, and these could not be gainsaid. As for the keepers of the records, without whose participation the alteration could not have been made, that office had passed through many hands since the decree had been given, and on whom could it be fixed ?

I recollect another case where a witness's evidence had been falsified, by occasionally prefixing the letter n, the Persian negative, to many affirmatives. A mere touch of the pen does it.

Another case occurred to me when I was very young in office. It was one of some daring, and will shew to what extent the people will sometimes go, and the nature of their legal chicanery. The case was one of dispossession, but brought forward before me as Magistrate at Patna under the head of trespass: and thus many matters were tried which did not require the application of the existing Regulation 15, of 1824. It must be observed that in those days the Courts of Circuit existed, and to them alone were appeals under that Regulation remittable; whereas in all other cases an appeal was referrible to the Sudder or Chief Court then in Calcutta. The Prosecutor in the case was Shums-ool-Toheed, one of the Court officers, and the defendant Syud Rahut Ally, a man well known at Patna, as one of the cleverest scoundrels that ever lived. The points at issue were decided against the defendant, who went to Calcutta, and laid grievous petitions, as was his wont, against me to the Sudder Court. They were in general too absurd to be listened to; but in one respect I was found in error and requested to be more careful. It seems that the Persian proceedings recorded my decision to be given under Regulation 15, of 1824; whereas certain forms and notices, which were prescribed by that Regulation, had been omitted, and the proceedings had been vitiated in consequence. I marvelled much at the oversight which I had committed, inasmuch as I was never wont to do things after such a fashion. Nevertheless I was obliged to bow the head of submission, and eat my leek in patience.

It was not until a year afterwards that I became acquainted with the truth of the transaction, nor until I had left the district in which all the actors resided. It seems that the prosecutor, being an officer, had many friends in the Court; while the defendant, from his well-known character was feared and hated. On the decision being given against him a committee of the prosecutor's friends, among whom was Meer Furzand Ally, the Serishtadar or Head-man, was held to consult how they might best defeat the appeal from my decision, which they well knew would be made by Rahut Ally. It would be highly illustrative of Native intrigue to describe this consultation, but I shall spare my reader. In the Court of Appeal there were then four Judges, of whom two were supposed, from having had cognizance of cases in which he was concerned, to know his character and to be unfavourable to him. One of the party, who had connexions in the Court of Appeal, readily promised to make such arrangements as would secure the appeal being heard by one of these Judges, who, he did not doubt, would confirm the decision. So far so good; but there was another difficulty to be provided for. They knew that Rahut Ally would spare neither time nor money in following up his appeal, and that he would resort to Calcutta; and it was on the cards that he might succeed then, especially as his unenviable reputation had not there preceded him. It was then and there, though not until after much demur, resolved to adopt the bold step of altering my proceedings, which were held under the common law of trespass, into a proceeding under Regulation 15, of 1824; by which means an appeal to Calcutta would be avoided. It was done accordingly. My final decision was drawn up and recorded as having been held under a law, which I had not at the time contemplated. The consequences were that I, for the first and only time of my life, was reprimanded, and the conspirators lost their object, as the decision was quashed as illegal. In the mean time I was helpless, I could not prove these facts, though they were well known, and formed the topic of conversation among the Native coteries.

These instances may serve to show how much the Amlahs have in their power, even when vigilantly superintended. Where there is any relaxation in this vigilance, the extent of their power may be imagined.

But this were, indeed, a very one-sided picture, were I to give rise to the belief that in our Courts and offices were found no scenes but these, and no men but such as I have described. Many and many of these hardworking, under-paid men have I known of the highest moral worth, and

unblemished integrity. Among them I may name my old friend and quondam officer Syud Imdad Ally of Patna, and Moolvee Ushruf Hossain of Soorajgurra; both of whom, originally Serishtadars, have risen to the highest judicial offices in the State, and to which, I may add, they have done honor. To the elevation of the latter from an inferior situation to one of high responsibility, I lay claim; for I consider that thereby I have deserved the gratitude of the country, as do others who completed what I had begun. And well may I add to the list the name of a long-cherished little friend Meer Nusser-ood-deen, son of Imdad Ally. He was, I may say, brought up in my house, and lived with me as a companion; and from him never did I hear a dishonorable opinion, nor of him a dishonorable act. I made him the Serishtadar of the Magistracy at Delhi when he was bat twenty years old; and his integrity in that city of much intrigue was proof against much temptation-and even against the offer of a scion of the imperial house in marriage. Meer Nusser-ood-deen has hitherto been confined to ministerial offices, and has not, therefore, risen to high judicial offices, for which he is so admirably adapted. I hope that by the recent change in the law, by which these offices are thrown open to ministerial officers, he will obtain that to which he is in a manner entitled ; in which case I will venture to say, that he will rise to the same eminence as his father.

The course of events led me in after days to visit the ancient abode of these Rajahs, and I there had my attention called to a fact, the like of which I never heard in any country. The killah or fort was built of stone, but one part seemed more dilapidated than the rest, which, however battered, stood up pretty well against the assaults of time. On seeking the reason of this manifest difference, I was told that it was there that the Rajah in for. mer days recovered his castle. This appeared very strange, as that part being the weakest seemed more likely to be the cause of the fort being lost instead of recovered. This difficulty was cleared up by the following explanation. The Rajah, who some century ago, constructed the buildin building, had cast in his mind during those troublous times the possibility of his being attacked and, perhaps, ousted. To obviate a difficulty with which, perhaps, for the time being, he could not contend, he caused part of the fort to be constructed of mud, cased only with stone, cautiously of course guarding the secret of its weakness. The object of this act was, that should his castle be taken, and should he be enabled to again make head against the usurper, he should be aware which part of the wall he might attack with assured success. Such eventually turned out to be the issue. One of the Rajah's descendants being vanquished, again besieged the fort, and attacking it on the weak point, became its master. Thus it was related to me, and the appearance of the ruins (for it has been long abandoned) seem to corroborate the story.

II.

DOES DEISM TEND TO BELIEF OR UNBELIEF?

There is, perhaps, no axiom more generally received in India than this-that Deism is a step in advance from idolatry towards Christianity. When it is objected that the schemes for the education of the Natives, now so rife and extensive, tend to produce but a race of Deists, at the best, it is very commonly replied, that these Deists will or may, or at any rate that their children will or may, embrace Christianity:that Deists are more hopeful characters for the preacher of the Gospel than idolaters. The fact that the progress of missions, such as it is, has been in the conversion of the idolaters in rude rural districts, and that scarcely a convert has been gained from the ranks of the infidel progeny of the education schemes, is wholly ignored, and the axiom doggedly repeated, that Deism tends to Christianity. It is purposed in the following pages, then, to deal with this abstract question "Does Deism tend to Belief or to Unbelief?" We will begin by defining our terms. By belief, then, we mean the reception of the Christian Faith. By unbelief we mean the rejection of it. And by the Christian Faith we mean, concisely, the Apostle's Creed. And, as this may be considered as consisting of two great divisions, viz. 1st, the doctrine of the Ever Blessed Trinity in Unity, and 2dly the doctrine of the Church as resulting from that, we may yet further simplify our term, and say, without any disparagement to, or diminution of, its idea, that Christian Faith is, κατ ̓ ἐξοχὴν, Faith in the Ever Blessed Trinity; whereupon the question before us resolves itself into the following equivalent, but more simple expression, viz.-Does Deism tend to the reception or to the rejection of the doctrine of the Ever Blessed Trinity?-But what is to be understood by Deism? What is Deism? Is Unitarianism Deism? Socinianism Deism? Is Mahomedanism Deism? One can hardly say that they are, severally, simple Deism, and yet it surely cannot be denied that they are, severally, forms of Deism; being, in all three cases, Deism with the doctrine of a Revelation superadded-a revelation of a certain economy. Whereas the Deism with which we have now to deal seems to be a so called acknowledgment of a God without the recognition of a Revelation from him. All the three above named forms of misbelief, admit, in the main, the genuineness of the Bible, and, in the right and by the fancied light of their private judgment, make of it-what they please. Ignoring the second division of the Creed, viz., the doctrine of the Church, they make what they please of the first part, the doctrine of God. Since, however, they do so far receive the Bible, and do acknowledge a Revelation, one cannot set down either Unitarianism or Socinianism or Mahomedanism as the same with the simple Deism with which we have to deal. This, as it is now met with, means, we apprehend, the belief in a God without belief in a Revelation from God, of himself, His Laws or his Providence. Such seems to be the distinctive feature of the Deism now resulting from the un-religious education of the heathen around us in India. That another, (and, that it is submitted, a more hopeful) form of Deism is conceivable, and has existed, we shall have occasion to show before we conclude; but, for the present, the above is the Deism we deal with. Does this, then, tend to a reception of the doctrine of the Ever Blessed Trinity in Unity? or does it not? First-Does it logically tend to it?

Secondly-Does it morally tend to it?

We conceive that it cannot logically tend to it, for this one obvious reason, viz., that the truths constituting the doctrine of the Trinity are pre-eminently of the character of first truths, above, because prior to, all logic; -matters to be received and believed, but not to be reasoned out, and, so, essentially, matters of Revelation. But this Deism rejects all Revelation. Wherefore the first of these two questions may be set aside at once and for all as far as our present subject is concerned. If it be said hereupon, but the doctrine of only one God opens the way to the well-known argument, that if so, then it is most probable that He should have given a Revelation of Himself-the reply is obvious, that, be it so, still we are not thereby a whit in advance of the heathenism which assumes Revelations, however false and absurd.

But-Does Deism morally tend to the reception of the doctrine of the Trinity?

This is a question which, we submit, can be answered only from experience. Is any one, then-is any one prepared to show that the history of the Deism in question, or even of Deism in the general, proves such to be its moral tendency? Is the Deist's heart found practically to be a better soil than the idolater's for the implanting of Gospel truth?

Hereupon, however, an objection may be urged as obvious. It may be said-two cases are not to be confounded. And