General, and said to be the order of the Secretary of War, he had practically been relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac. This order had been ratified by the General in Chief as late as the 31st of August, who explained it by telegraphing General McClellan:

You will retain command of everything in the vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field.a

To reinstate the deposed commander, was to confess that the whole campaign was a failure; yet something had to be done. A double peril confronted the Government. Bragg, in the West, had begun his march toward the Ohio River, while Lee, with renewed confidence, was crossing into Maryland. For two or three days the President consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory result. At last, assuming all the responsibility, he took the General in Chief with him, turned his back on the War Department, and, without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the house of General McClellan, where, for the moment, he brought the long controversy to a close by saying:

General, you will take command of the forces in the field.a

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 451-453.

CHAPTER XXV.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE FINAL REMOVAL OF GENERAL MCCLELLAN FROM COMMAND.

The Departments of the Rappahannock and Shenandoah having been swept away by the course of events, the laconic order to General McClellan ought to have restored unity of command East of the Alleghenies, but the morbid fears still entertained as to the safety of the capital, again prevented a result which might otherwise have been decisive. On receiving this order, the commander of the Army of the Potomac did not seek to harrass or perplex the mind of the President. He might have represented that there could be no success in military operations while any civil officer other than the constitutional Commander in Chief was permitted to exercise military command. He proposed, however, no conditions, but like a faithful and subordinate soldier, at once crossed the Potomac to make dispositions against attack. The moment he appeared, the acclamations of the troops could be heard for miles, throughout the whole extent of the long columns.

No sound should have been more welcome at the capital. Confidence was restored. Retreating from a twice-fatal field, the defeated and dejected armies became, in an instant, ready for battle. In this crisis history repeated a valuable lesson. The fugitives from the First Bull Run spread such terror and dismay throughout the country, that for six months it was found impossible to again meet the enemy.

It was now reserved for the Army of the Potomac to prove that discipline could cover a multitude of blunders. Not a moment was lost in reorganizing. General McClellan was restored to command on the 2d of September. The same day General Halleck ordered the two armies to fall back to the defenses. On the 3d, the heads of columns were directed across the Potomac, and on the 12th, the right wing reached Frederick. Thus far everything had gone well. But now the chronic fear in regard to the safety of the capital again began to trammel the action of the commander. On the 9th, he received a telegram from General Halleck:

Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Dranesville, 1 think we must be very cautious about stripping, too much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this, a

On the 11th, General Halleck again telegraphed:

Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here.

a McClellan's Report, p. 186.
Ibid., p. 187.

The offer was quickly accepted and the request made for all the troops that could be spared, but none were sent forward. The next day the President again telegraphed:

* * *

Governor Curtin telegraphs me "I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborated the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt, a

By unexampled good fortune, General McClellan, on the 13th, received the full text of General Lee's order for the investment and capture of Harper's Ferry. The order directed Jackson, with three divisions, to move via Williamsport and Martinsburg, on Harper's Ferry; McLaws, with two divisions, to Maryland Heights; Walker, with one division, was to recross the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and occupy Loudoun Heights; Longstreet, with two divisions, all the reserve, supply, and baggage trains, was ordered to Boonsboro; Hill's division was to form the rear guard; the cavalry, after detaching a sufficient force to accompany each of the moving columns, was to bring up the stragglers in the rear.

Five divisions of the Confederate Army were thus separated from the remaining four by a broad river, while nothing but a thin curtain separated the artillery and trains from the whole Army of the Potomac. Never was a more brilliant opportunity presented to a commander. Another opportunity had presented itself for ending the Rebellion. Unfortunately the telegraph brought news of divided councils at the capital. The President a few days before had relinquished control, but he had not yet learned the importance of signifying his wishes through a General in Chief. While the President was telegraphing, "Please do not let him (the enemy) get off without being hurt," General Halleck was urging more caution. On the 13th, the day the order was found in the enemy's camp, he telegraphed McClellan:

Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over. a

Thus hampered by contradictory orders, McClellan moved forward, and on the 14th, to the great alarm of the enemy, captured the line of South Mountain, but not without a loss of more than 2,000 men.

To the despatch announcing this victory the President replied:

Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.

On the same day, the following telegram from General Halleck checked the energy and boldness which ought to have characterized his movements:

Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear.a

It may be said that, with the knowledge that had come into his possession, General McClellan should have imitated the example of Montecuculi, who refused to read the despatches from his government till

a McClellan's Report, p. 187.

after the close of the campaign. The knowledge, however, has first to be tested, besides, since the time of a Montecuculi or a Eugene, who dared to attack his enemy in defiance of orders, the modes of communication had changed. The telegraph bound the commander of the Army of the Potomac to Washington. Had he postponed the opening of a telegram for a single day, his conduct would have been insubordinate, and would have justified his instant removal.

Notwithstanding the renewed interference from Washington, he still had a brilliant prospect of success when, on the 16th of September," he heard of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. This untoward event, brought about in part by the misconduct of the raw troops who abandoned Maryland Heights, but chiefly due to the imbecility of the commanders, cost the Government 12,000 men. On the morning it occurred, nearly the whole army was over the South Mountain and Franklin's corps was at Crampton's Gap, but 7 miles from Maryland. Heights. Had the garrison held in check for a few hours longer McLaws' two divisions, they would have been overwhelmed by Franklin. The capture of Harper's Ferry opened up to McLaws the only means of escape. Rapidly crossing into Virginia, five of the six divisions which had participated in the investment began their circuitous march to rejoin the forces north of the Potomac.

REVIEW OF CRITICISMS OF GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

An ex parte investigation, made by a military commission of which General Hunter was president, threw the blame of the surrender of Harper's Ferry upon the commander of the Army of the Potomac. In the report of this commission it was stated:

The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such censure deserved. The General in Chief has testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only 6 miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading army. The General in Chief also testified that, in his opinion, he could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concurred.

The conclusions of the commission were reached by a very simple process. By eliminating the restraining influence of General Halleck's telegrams, and making no allowance for the enemy's movements from the 2d to the 13th of September, the problem, as presented to the commission, was one in arithmetic.

General McClellan assumed command at Washington on the 2d of September, and on the 4th, two of his corps were on the north bank of the Potomac at Tenallytown. The distance from Tenallytown to Harper's Ferry, as the crow flies, was but 40 miles. Casting aside the whole of Lee's army, as Banks's force of 35,000 men had been set aside by Generals Hitchcock and Thomas when they reported that the President's orders for the defense of Washington had not been complied with, it clearly appeared that had the army moved at the rate even of 6 miles a day, it would have arrived at Harper's Ferry on the 11th, whereas the surrender did not take place till four days later, on the 15th.

a It is possible that McClellan heard this news on the night of the 15th. At 7 o'clock a. m., on the 16th, he telegraphed General Halleck: "I learn that Miles surrendered at 8 a. m. yesterday."-EDITORS.

This reasoning, which temporarily served a partisan purpose, will not affect the verdict of history.

General McClellan's plan to punish Lee was formed the instant he received the order disclosing the Confederate movements. At 6.20 p. m. on the 13th, after explaining in full the enemy's intentions. he instructed General Franklin:

*

*

You will move at daybreak in the morning by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the road to Rohrersville. I have reliable information that the mountain pass by this road is practicable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as practicable and debouch upon Rohrersville in order to cut off the retreat of, or destroy, McLaws' command. * Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve Colonel Miles. My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. I believe I have sufficiently explained my intentions. I ask of you, at this important moment, all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise.a

The next day at 2 p. m., well knowing the value of time, he again sent orders to Franklin:

Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at any cost. a

By a gallant assault on the afternoon of the 14th, Franklin carried Crampton's Pass, and, debouching from it and turning to the left, arrived within 3 miles of Maryland Heights only to learn the next morning that Harper's Ferry had surrendered. Cheated of its legitimate prey, the Army of the Potomac completed the passage of the South Mountain on the 15th, pushed forward to the Antietam on the 16th, and on the 17th, won the victory which ended the first Confederate invasion. Civil and military critics with full knowledge of the strength of both armies, have followed the luckless commander to the close of his last battle. With the benefit of their after knowledge, he doubtless might have now punished Lee's temerity and crushed the Rebellion at a single blow, but seeking information at the point of the bayonet is one thing, and looking for it on the shelves of a library is another. The principal criticisms were that he fought the battle in detail, and that the corps of Fitz John Porter, numbering 12,000 men, was not engaged. The first charge is true, but the fighting of battles in detail took place both in the East and in the West during the great campaigns of 1864, and has happened in nearly every war in history, being of all others the most frequent cause of defeat.

The successive attacks of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner were not, however, in accordance with plans or repeated instructions of the commander. Hooker engaged at daylight, Mansfield about 8 o'clock, and Sumner an hour later. The onset of these three corps nearly crushed the Confederate left, but at 10 a. m., the arrival of two divisions from their right saved it from total defeat. To prevent the possibility of such a transfer of troops from one point to another, General McClellan early in the morning, directed Burnside's corps on the extreme left to be held in readiness to assault the bridge in its front. At 8 a. m. he was ordered to carry the bridge and the heights beyond, and then attack the Confederate right in rear of Sharpsburg. In proportion as the fighting developed on the right, these orders to the Ninth Corps became more frequent and urgent. Nevertheless it was not till 1 p. m. that the bridge was carried, nor till 3 p. m. that the successful advance was made upon Sharpsburg.

a McClellan's Report, p. 192.