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If the report of the board was adverse, its approval by the President vacated the officer's commission. Under the operations of this provision 310 officers were dismissed or their resignations accepted within eight months.

Without dwelling further upon the organic acts of July 22 and 25, the magnitude of whose defects can only be appreciated by results yet to be stated, let us pass on to the act of July 29, increasing the Regular Army. Adopting the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, each regiment of infantry and cavalry was organized into not more than three battalions, but with no provision for regimental depots or territorial recruitment. Economy was also sought to be practiced by prescribing that all the adjutants and quartermasters should be detailed from the subalterns of their respective regiments or battalions. In this manner, by legislative enactment, eight companies in each regiment, before going into battle, were shorn of one-third of their commissioned officers. Fortunately, this evil of detached service was not inflicted upon the regiments of volunteers whose adjutants and quartermasters were extra lieutenants.

It having proved impracticable to recruit the regular regiments, particularly the infantry, in competition with the volunteers, the section of the above law, worthy of the closest attention, was the last or the eighth. In recognition of the value of professional training, it prescribed that the recruitment of the new regular regiments should be conducted by the officers appointed from civil life, and that pending the recruitment the officers appointed from the Regular Army should be detailed by the commanding general to such service in the volunteer regiments then in the field as, in his judgment, might give to them the greatest military instruction and efficiency, or be employed with any part of the regular forces also in the field.

The last and most important clause of the section gave the commanding general authority to detail any officers of the Regular Army for service with the volunteers with such work as might be offered in volunteer regiments, again repeating the phrase "for the purpose of imparting to them military instruction and efficiency."

At the time Congress indicated the desire that trained officers should be employed in positions of the greatest usefulness, it had at its disposal more than 600 captains and lieutenants who would have made able and efficient colonels. Yet by giving to governors the authority to appoint officers, without reserving to the President the right to designate at least one field officer in each regiment, Congress not only thwarted its own intentions, but needlessly jeopardized the national success. It can not be claimed that the surrender of this enormous power into the hands of the governors was essential to the preservation of the Union.

Individuals everywhere in the loyal States tendered directly to the President companies, battalions, regiments, and even brigades in such numbers that the War Department, up to the present time, has not been able to compute them. The mistake, however, was irretrievable. It mattered not that within two years all schemes for recruiting, based on the distribution of new commissions, might prove so many failures. The right to appoint officers, which in the Navy has always been vested in the President, had been given to the States and was continued to them to the end of the war.

SUCCESS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF SUPPLY.

While our military legislation relating to the line deprived the Government of all right to appoint trained leaders to the regiments of the Volunteer Army, the great departments of supply, on the contrary, were placed wholly under the supervision and control of regular officers. This was accomplished by the simple process of increasing the quartermaster and commissary departments by the addition of volunteer officers commissioned by the President. There was no sudden expansion; with each new brigade each supply department was increased by a captain who could look for instruction to chief quartermasters, chief commissaries, or depot commissaries, who, at the beginning of the war, were exclusively selected from the Army.

Requiring no other qualifications than integrity and business capacity, three or four months sufficed to qualify the brigade and division quartermasters and commissaries for the discharge of their duties. The system as applied to the Medical Department could scarcely be improved. The field duties of the Ordnance Department were performed mostly by officers detailed from the volunteers, while the law of August 6, placed every armory under the superintendence of a regular officer of the department.

It is scarcely worthy of remark that the duty of purchasing clothing and forage, issuing rations, drawing and distributing arms and ammunition, required no technical military knowledge. If a contrary opinion be expressed, we need but refer to the organization of the Quartermaster's Department in 1864.

The regular department then consisted of 1 general, 3 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 11 majors, 46 captains, 12 storekeepers; total, 77." These officers, several of whom were given higher rank as colonels and aids-de-camp, were mostly employed as chief quartermasters of armies and departments or in charge of the purchasing depots located in the great cities of the Union.

The volunteer department consisted of 465 captains."

It will be seen by a comparison of the strength of the regular and volunteer departments, the latter being a mere expansion of the former, that nearly all of the field duty of the department was performed by officers appointed directly from civil life.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

But while success in the supply departments did not demand previous military education, the same reasoning should not be applied to the Adjutant-General's Department, whose officers in peace and war should possess a thorough knowledge of the military art. Unfortunately, our Government has never deemed such acquirements necessary, neither have the officers of the Department thus far sought to rise above the mere drudgery of official routine.

a Army Register, 1864, p. 5.

Army Register, 1864, pp. 74, 75.

The success of the supply departments as compared with their failure in the War of 1812, was not wholly due to their supervision by regular officers. In the latter war our armies were, to a great extent, fed and supplied by irresponsible and unscrupulous contractors. Long before the Rebellion this system was abandoned, the supplies may still have been purchased by contract, but they were inspected by regular officers, collected into depots, and thence distributed to the Army.

To issue orders, write letters, examine returns, grant furloughs, such is the conception in our service of the duty of an AdjutantGeneral.

We often ridicule the apparent stupidity of foreign governments in placing members of the nobility in command of corps and armies, forgetting that if the commanders so selected have not been carefully educated the government takes special pains to place at their side chiefs of staff able to perform all the duties of a General in Chief. These chiefs of staff, together with all the officers subordinate to them in their own departments, have had the benefit of careful instruction at war academies especially designed for their education. Learning there all the principles of strategy and grand tactics and the importance of a knowledge of military geography, studying the theory of moving and directing troops in battle, impressed with the idea that their value as staff officers depends upon the assistance they can give to their generals in planning campaigns and fighting battles, they look with contempt upon any official occupation which may tend to degrade them to the position of a clerk. They therefore turn over the multitude of details relating to the proper work of the Army to aids-de-camp, or officers detailed for this purpose.

If we now glance at the operation of our military laws, it will be seen that the President could have appointed all of our commanders from civil life and surrounded them by staff officers without any military acquirements whatever. Four of the five major-generals of volunteers appointed up to the 18th of September, 1861, were selected from civil life. Among the brigadier-generals appointed up to the same date the ratio was changed-47 were in the Regular Army, or had formerly held regular commissions, while 24 were from civil life. The Army Register of 1864 shows that of the 70 major-generals of volunteers, 46 had had previous military education or training, while 24 were appointed from civil life.

Among the brigadiers, 99 had had previous military training, while 171 were appointed from civil life.

The possibility that so many generals might rise through the slow and expensive school of war to high and responsible commands, should have suggested, more than in any foreign system, the necessity of providing competent staff officers to assist them.

The organization of the Adjutant-General's Department in 1864 shows how far the Government ignored such a policy.

The regular adjutants-general consisted of 1 brigadier-general, 2 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 13 majors; a total of 20; while the volunteer adjutants-general consisted of 60 majors, 249 captains; a total of 309. a

In the campaign of 1864 but 12 of the regular adjutants-general performed their appropriate duties in the field. Of the 30 majors and captains of volunteers, but one in each grade had, before the war, received the benefit of a military education.

By way of contrast, the success of the Medical Department may easily be explained. Early in the war, many of the medical directors and surgeons in charge of permanent hospitals were officers of the regular department.

In the field the surgery for which our Army was famous, was performed by regular surgeons and by staff and regimental surgeons and

a Army Register, 1864.

assistant surgeons of volunteers. The staff surgeons and assistant surgeons were appointed only after a thorough medical examination. The inefficient and incompetent medical officers belonging to regiments, were weeded out by examining boards appointed for that purpose. In the hasty legislation relating to the line and staff of the Regular and Volunteer Army, it will be observed that the Pay Department was omitted and the question may naturally be asked why? The answer is, that this was the only department which, through the wisdom of a previous Congress, did not require a law for its expansion. The twentyfifth section of the act of July 5, 1838, authorized the President whenever volunteers or regulars should be called into the service of the United States to appoint additional paymasters at the rate of one to every two regiments, the paymasters to remain in service only so long as needed to pay the new troops. The number of additional paymasters in the service in 1864 was 319."

The successful application of this law during the Mexican War and the Rebellion, should suggest to our statesmen the feasibility of adopting a military organization adapted alike to the requirements of peace and war.

INFLUENCE OF STATES RIGHTS ON OUR MILITARY LEGISLATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE REBELLION.

Allusion has already been made to Mr. Chase's refusal to prosecute the war by means of an expanded Regular Army. This refusal may have been due to State pride, but on December 4, 1861, a bill was introduced in the Senate, the fate of which demonstrated that the opposition to a Regular Army, whether provisional or permanent, had its root in the confusion of ideas relating to States rights.

The object of the bill as stated in the title was "To abolish the distinction now existing between the regular and volunteer forces of the United States."

The first section prescribed that all the officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of volunteers, then in the service, or who might enter thereafter, should have all "the rights, privileges, and benefits" of officers, noncommissioned officers and privates of the Regular Army, and that thereafter they should be considered "a part of the Regular Army of the United States."

The second, third, and fourth sections prescribed that the regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, should be numbered such regiment, United States infantry, artillery, or cavalry, the oldest volunteer regiment taking the designation next above the highest regiment numerically, in the corresponding arm in the existing army.

The fifth section prescribed that all future promotions should be made without regard to whether the vacancy was in an old or new regiment.

The sixth section prescribed that for all purposes of rank commissions given by the governors of States should be considered the same as if given by the President.

The seventh section prescribed that all future vacancies should be filled by the President in accordance with existing laws.

Under the volunteer system as inaugurated, it will be remembered that the appointment of all general and staff officers of volunteers

a Army Register, 1864, p. 83-86.

(regimental staff officers not included), was vested in the President. The effect of the law now proposed would have been to extend the President's power to every commissioned officer in the service, his action in every case being subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The bill which was introduced by Mr. Wilkinson was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and the Militia, and by it was returned to the Senate on the 17th of December, accompanied by an adverse report.

The views of the Military Committee, in relation to the constitutionality of the bill, are presented in the following extracts from its report:

No fact is more clearly deducible from the Constitution than this, that there should always exist in the country two different and distinct classes of military organization; the one, a permanent organization, to be raised, supported, armed, and disciplined by, and to belong to and represent, the whole Union, as a Federal army; the other, a temporary organization, to be raised by the respective States whenever the exigencies of public danger in the obstruction of the laws, the raising of insurrections, the fact of invasion should necessitate the use of a larger force than that possessed by the Federal Government, to be called into being only upon extraordinary occasions, to preserve their distinct character as volunteers or militiamen during the term of their service, and to be disbanded again when the occasion which called them forth had passed away.

The absolute and continually existing necessity of an army to maintain the power and dignity of the nation; the constitutional prohibition that “no State shall, without the consent of Congress, keep troops," and the express authority granted by the Constitution to Congress "to raise and support armies" are all confirmatory beyond question of the right, power, and duty of the Government to maintain a regular standing army as a Federal establishment; while the clause of the Constitution which provides for "calling forth the militia" and for their arming, discipline, and governance by Congress, in "reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training" them while "employed in the service of the United States," mark the latter a fundamentally separate and distinct organization and one which cannot under the Constitution be amalgamated with and made a part of the Regular Army.

The committee therefore are of the opinion that, as the volunteers were recruited under State authority and constitute a part of the militia system of the country, the clause of the bill which provides that the "officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates of volunteers shall form and hereafter be considered a part of the Regular Army of the United States," is in violation of the Constitution and cannot become law.a

As the committee admitted that Congress has the supreme right to "raise and support armies;" furthermore, as all the volunteers, except those first called out by the President, were raised by the Government of the United States, exclusively under the authority granted in the two laws of July 22 and 25, it is difficult to see how, by any process of reasoning, the volunteers could be considered as "recruited under States authority," and therefore as constituting "a part of the militia system of the country."

If the views of the committee are correct, then the use of the volunteers in the Mexican War was unconstitutional; if volunteers were militia, then every man ordered into Mexico had a right to halt at the Rio Grande, or to refuse to disembark at Vera Cruz. But without any fixed policy the action of Congress from time to time has been directly contrary to the views of the committee. When war was imminent with France, after authorizing a provisional army of 10,000 men, the President, by the third section of the act of May 28, 1798, was to accept any number of companies of volunteers and to appoint their commissioned officers. The same authority was specially con

a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 11, p. 119, Doc. 18.

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