A week later, March 6, he dictated a call for 100,000 men to take the field under his unquestioned and supreme command." In contrast with these formidable preparations, such was our organization and so scattered was our Army that on the 15th of December, 1860, we had but five inexpansive companies available to garrison the nine fortifications along the southern coast. These garrisons six weeks later were increased by about 600 recruits. The remainder of the Regular Army, scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was too remote to participate in the first shock of arms or even to provide a sufficient defense for the capital. Alarmed at the impending danger, the President, as had been done so often before, turned to the militia. On the 9th of April a call was made upon the District of Columbia for ten companies, but when paraded for muster many through disloyalty refused to be sworn, while others imposed the condition that they should not be required to serve beyond the limits of the District. Subsequently, during the month of April, companies were mustered into service for three months, all but three with the stipulation "to serve within the District and not go beyond it."b Although it should be stated that many of these companies did finally serve outside the District without protest, it should also be observed that their conduct afforded another proof that in time of great civil commotion, it is only raw troops who presume to dictate to their lawful commanders. In the meantime so prompt was the response to the Confederate call for 100,000 volunteers, that by the middle of April 35,000 men were equipped for the field. Conscious of their strength, they at once seized our arsenals and began the seige of our forts. April 12th, the first shot fired at Fort Sumter, followed two days. later by the evacuation of the post, awakened the people to the dread reality of a long civil war. To the commanding officer at Fort Moultrie, Secretary Floyd sent the following remarkable letter: Major ANDERSON, WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, December 21, 1860. First Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C. SIR: In the verbal instructions communicated to you by Major Buell, you are directed to hold possession of the forts in the harbor of Charleston and, if attacked, to defend yourself to the last extremity. Under these instructions you might infer that you are required to make a vain and useless sacrifice of your own life and the lives of the men under your command upon a mere point of honor. This is far from the President's intentions. You are to exercise a sound military discretion on this subject. It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity and make the best terms in your power. This will be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be fully justified in such action. These orders are strictly confidential and not to be communicated even to the officers under your command without close necessity. Very respectfully, JOHN B. FLOYD. a Pollard's Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History of the Confederacy, p. 91. 6 Report of the Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 1, p. 7. CALL FOR MILITIA. In every stage of their prosecution the wars of the Revolution and of 1812 gave evidence that a system of national defense, based on the consent and cooperation of the States, possessed none of the elements of certainty or of strength. Nevertheless, for the want of an expansive regular army or a system of national volunteers, the President was again compelled to look to the States, and therefore on the 15th of April, issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 militia for the period of three months. The terms of the proclamation show that the President and Cabinet began the war with the same confidence in raw troops as was manifested by their predecessors in 1812. The militia was not summoned for the defense of the capital, but to suppress "combinations and to cause the laws to be duly executed." a In explanation of the call, the President further stated: I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth, will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union. Language so unmistakable, and which had the sanction of our most distinguished statesmen, leads only to the conclusion that with raw troops, it was believed that a formidable rebellion, already covering a territory of 560,000 square miles, could be subdued within the brief space of three months. REFUSAL OF THE GOVERNORS TO FURNISH MILITIA. The conduct of the governors in this emergency, as in the war of 1812, was largely controlled by their party affiliations. In the North, patriotic men rushed to arms in numbers far exceeding the requirements of the Government. From the South nothing was received but defiant refusals. The replies from the border States were as follows: Governor Letcher, of Virginia, under date of April 16, 1861, wrote: The militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object--an object in my judgment not within the purview of the Constitution or the act of 1795-will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we will meet in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South. Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, under date of April 15, replied: Your dispatch is received, and, if genuine-which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt-I have to say in reply that I regard the levy of troops made by the Administration, for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South as in violation of the Constitution and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina. I will reply more in detail when your call is received by mail. Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, on April 15, made this answer: Your dispatch is received. In answer I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States. a President's proclamation April 15, 1861, (Report of Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 2, p. 205). Governor Harris, of Tennessee, on April 17, made this reply: Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000, if necessary, for the defense of our rights or those of our southern brethren. Governor Jackson, of Missouri, on April 22, followed with this statement: Your requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and can not be complied with. Governor Rector, of Arkansas, on the same date wrote: None will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury.a The State of Delaware failed to respond to the call for one regiment of militia, for a reason scarcely less illustrative of the inherent weakness of our military system. In a proclamation dated April 26, 1861, the governor stated: Whereas the laws of this State do not confer upon the Executive any authority enabling him to comply with such requisition, there being no organized militia nor any law requiring such organization, and whereas it is the duty of all good and lawabiding citizens to preserve the peace and sustain the laws and Government under which we live, and by which our citizens are protected: Therefore, I, William Burton, Governor of the said State of Delaware, recommend the formation of volunteer companies for the protection of the lives and property of the people of this State against violence of any sort to which they may be exposed. For these purposes such companies, when formed, will be under the control of the State authorities, though not subject to be ordered by the Executive into the United States service, the law not vesting in him such authority. They will, however, have the option of offering their services to the General Government for the defense of its capital and the support of the Constitution and laws of the country. In their haste to defy the Government no reference of the President's call was made to the legislatures or highest judicial tribunals of the seceding States. The governors, as the commanders in chief of the militia, acted solely on their own responsibility. Possessing the power, they did not hesitate, but made a merit of paralyzing the military resources of six States which afterwards, on an appeal to the people, furnished for the Union no less than 251,787 men. These facts possess a still deeper significance; on the one hand, they reveal the utter weakness of a military system, based on the theory of confederation; on the other, they represent the mighty power of a government which, instituted by the people and for the people," makes its appeal directly to the people. SPREAD OF THE REBELLION. The fall of Fort Sumter was followed by the secession of Virginia, April 17; Arkansas and Tennessee, May 6; and North Carolina, May 20. The prospective accession of so much territory to the cause of secession demanded renewed efforts for its defense. April 29, Mr. Davis therefore, wrote to the Confederate Congress: There are now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, 19,000 men, and 16,000 are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, an army of 100,000 men.d a Report of Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 2, p. 130. Extract from New York Herald, April 28, 1861, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol 1, p. 155. Report of Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 2, p. 180. d Pollard's Lost Cause, p. 117. With such a force to sustain him, the seat of the Confederate Government was, on the 20th of May, removed to Richmond, Va., while Confederate troops advanced to Fairfax and Alexandria, within distinct view of the national capital. The advantage so far as related to the forces in the field was, at the time decidedly on the side of the Confederates. The Government had called for 75,000 militia for the period of three months; the Confederates had called for 100,000 volunteers for the period of one year. Both had repeated the blunder of short enlistment. The President, by a law more than sixty years old, was obliged to limit the service to three months; the Confederate Congress, with no appreciation of past history, adopted the identical policy which had led to the protraction of all our previous wars. Nevertheless, in default of further measures, on the part of the President, the Government at the end of three months would see the forces dissolved, while the Confederate army, constantly improving in discipline, would still be available for nine months of field service. PRESIDENT LINCOLN EXERCISES DICTATORIAL POWERS. The flames of rebellion kindled at Fort Sumter, did not stop at the Potomac. April 19, they burst out in Baltimore, where for several days they checked the advance of the Union troops, cutting off all communication with the Government. The troops, whose appearance was the signal for an outbreak, consisted of the Sixth Massachusetts and the Seventh Pennsylvania. The former regiment, fighting its way through a mob of from 8,000 to 10,000 people, with a loss of 2 killed and 8 wounded, succeeded in traversing the city and passing on to Washington. The regiment from Pennsylvania, being unarmed, was compelled to turn back. The loss inflicted on the rioters was 7 killed, ! the number of wounded was unknown. When the riot subsided, the mayor of the city and the governor of the State informed the President that no more troops could traverse the city without fighting their way through. Everywhere in the South treason had triumphed, and from all quarters troops bearing the ensign of rebellion began to pour into Virginia and to move toward the Potomac. It was no longer a question of repossessing our forts. Railroads and telegraphs had been cut; the President could only communicate with the loyal masses by private messengers; the capital was in a state of siege, and for the third time in our history appeared doomed to fall into the hands of its enemies. To avert such a calamity and to prevent the overthrow of the Government the President, trusting to popular approval, assumed and exercised the war powers of Congress. By proclamation of the 3d of May he decreed that the Regular Army should be increased by 22,714 officers and men, the Navy by 18,000 seamen, while in addition he called for a force of 42,834 volunteers, an aggregate increase of the land and naval forces amounting to 82,748 officers and men. No usurpation could have been more complete, but what else could be done? An emergency had arisen, the militia was disorganized, Congress had neglected the national defense, the military preparation of the insurgents threatened the speedy overthrow of the Government, and the situation brooked no delay. In every similar crisis however produced, history teaches that the fate of a nation may depend on the patriotic or selfish action of a single individual. Twice when the capital was in danger, Congress had conferred dictatorial powers upon Washington. In a situation scarcely less appalling, the President, who had sworn to protect and defend the Constitution, saw but one method to save the Union, and fearlessly adopting it, his act was everywhere received with the approval and gratitude of a patriotic people. LEGALIZING THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION. When Congress assembled in extra session on the 4th of July, 1861, it found that its power to "raise and support armies" had been exercised by the President to the extent of 230,000 men." It was also confronted by estimates for additional appropriations amounting to $185,000,000 for the Army and $30,000,000 for the Navy. The report of the Secretary of War (Mr. Cameron) showed that under the call for 42,000 volunteers no less than 208 regiments had been accepted, of which 153 were already in active service. His exhibit of the forces at the disposition of the Government was as follows: Regulars and volunteers for three months and for the war.. Add new regiments of Regular Army Add to this 55 regiments of volunteers for the war, accepted and not yet in service 225,000 50,000 25,000 Total force now at command of Government 300,000 80,000 b220,000 Deduct three-months volunteers Force for service after withdrawal of the three-months men. This rush to arms of more than a quarter of a million of citizens, seemed to the Secretary of War to justify the neglect of all previous preparations. Unmindful of the fact that they had been called to the field in forced. violation of the Constitution, Mr. Cameron said: * * * I cannot forbear to speak favorably of the volunteer system as a substitute for a cumbrous and dangerous standing Army. A government whose every citizen stands ready to march to its defense can never be overthrown, for none is so strong as that whose foundations rest immovably in the hearts of the people. с With proper organization and leadership, it may be admitted that a government whose every citizen stands ready to march to its defense can never be overthrown, but history affords no such example. In the case then engaging the wisdom of our statesmen a population of 8,000,000 of white citizens was in arms, not to defend, but to destroy the Government. To accomplish their purpose they abandoned the militia system in favor of volunteers, and to thwart their treasonable designs the Government was forced to follow their example. Notwithstanding the action of both the Government and the Confederates, the Secretary still adhered to the militia. In speaking of the necessity for Congress "to adopt measures for the reorganization upon a uniform basis of the military of the country," he further stated: I know of no better source of information on the subject than the able report of a Report of Secretary of War, July 1, 1861. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 231. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 231. |