made; and may, when the instructions are received, twenty days after the event, be totally inapplicable.

In ordinary transactions this is an inconvenience, but in the state of the Punjaub it is positively dangerous.

I have a firm conviction that the chances of preserving peace will be diminished by the powerless state in which the Government would be placed, by not being able to act with decision and promptitude, and that opportunities would be lost of effecting some good, and of preventing much mischief, if in the state of the Punjaub the responsible authority of the Government remains more than 1,000 miles off, at the other extremity of Bengal; it appears to me, therefore, to be expedient, as a means of averting risk, and of carrying our policy more securely into effect, that the Governor-General should, in the month of October next, proceed to the Upper Provinces, and that the authority should be entrusted to him with which the law enables the Council to invest him, when separated from his colleagues.

Having given my decided opinion that, under existing circumstances, it will be the duty of the Governor-General to proceed to the Upper Provinces in the autumn, I have to request the attention of my colleagues to this subject, at their earliest convenience.

I concur, T. H. MADDOCK.

I concur, F. MILLETT.

I concur, GEO. POLLOCK.

H. HARDINge.

As the separation of the Governor-General from the Council requires the sanction of a law, I presume it is proper that I should record my opinion upon the proposition.

I concur, C. H. CAMERON.

The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.

On the River Ganges, off Monghyr, 30 September, 1845. The forbearance of the Government of India has been carried to an extent beyond that which has been customary. Every military precaution has, however, been taken; advice and warnings have been repeatedly conveyed to the Lahore Government in the plainest language; even the risk of giving offence by such language has been incurred, rather than fail in the essential point of clearly defining the nature of our policy, and of having that policy well understood. I am convinced that our desire to see the Maha Rajah's government re-established on a basis of independence and strength, is well known to the most influential and leading chiefs. Their personal interests, endangered by the democratic revolution, so successfully accomplished by the Sikh army, may induce those chiefs to exert all their efforts to compel the British Government to interfere; but these attempts, and any danger resulting from them, will be attributable, not to our forbearance, but to their personal fears for life and property.

You may be assured that, whilst I shall omit no precautions, and be prepared for any event, I shall persevere in the direct course I have hitherto pursued, of endeavouring, by moderation, good faith, and friendly advice, to avert the necessity of British interference by force of arms in the affairs of the Punjaub.

The Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief.

Agra, October 24, 1845.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, on or before the 12th of November arrangements will have been made, by which the commissariat department will be prepared to equip nearly two-thirds of the force at, and in advance of, Meerut, with the necessary means of marching at the shortest notice.

The extent to which it may be expedient to be prepared with

this description of equipment must always be dependent on contingent events, which fluctuate, in an unsettled Government like that of Lahore, in a manner which defies all ordinary calculations of probable results.

In the present state of our relations with the Lahore Government, your Excellency is aware that I do not anticipate the probability of any emergencies arising which can require the army, under your Excellency's orders, to take the field this autumn.

Nevertheless, having to deal with a mutinous Sikh army, which has usurped the functions of the Government, and whose caprice may, at any time, force on a rupture with our forces on the frontier, I have deemed it advisable to be prepared with the means of movement to the extent noted in the margin*; and as it is desirable that the arrangement should be made on the most economical scale, the whole will be hired at the halting rates.

7 Troops of Horse Artillery. 6 Companies Foot Artillery. 4 Light Field Batteries. 2 Regiments of Dragoons. 3 Regiments of Light Cavalry. 5 Regiments European Infantry. 13 Regiments Native Infantry. 6 Companies Sappers & Miners. 2 Regiments Irregular Cavalry.

If, as I expect, the tone of the Lahore Durbar should continue to be more friendly, as has been the case since Sirdar Jowahir Singh's death, I shall be anxious, according to events, gradually to diminish the scale of the present preparation, which, as before, is strictly of a defensive character.

No provision has been made for the baggage animals of the European officers, according to the decision of the Government of India last year. The number required would probably exceed 1,200 camels.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, the Deputy Commissary-General, will be instructed to communicate with your Excellency on this subject, and will postpone his usual tour of inspection for one month.

The Despatch of the Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee of the East India Company.

Camp, Umballu, December 2, 1845. I left Delhi on the 19th ultimo, [November,] making the usual marches towards Kurnaul and Umballa, with the intention of meeting the Commander-in-Chief at the latter place, who was on his way to inspect the troops at Meerut, Delhi, and other districts.

On the 22nd November I received from Major Broadfoot the official despatch dated the 20th November*, detailing the sudden intention of the Sikh army to advance in force to the frontier, for the avowed purpose of invading the British territories.

The letter of the 20th was succeeded by a private communication of the following day*, stating the same facts, and inclosing news, letters, and papers of intelligence received from Lahore, which professed to give an account of the circumstances which have led to the present movement, and which would appear (if these papers are to be depended upon) to have originated with the Ranee and certain of the Sirdars, who felt the pressure of the demands of the army to be so urgent, and its present attitude and temper so perilous to their existence, that they desired to turn the thoughts of the troops to the objects which might divert their attention from making extortionate demands for higher pay, by employing their energies in hostile operations against the British Government.

The precautions already adopted to provide against the possibility of our forces being unprepared to meet any movement of the Sikh army this season, and the arrangements made by the Commander-in-Chief, on the receipt of Major Broadfoot's intelligence*, rendered it, in my opinion, unnecessary to allow these reports of invasion to make any change in my movements. I arrived on the 26th at Kurnaul, where the Commander-in-Chief met me, having proceeded from Umballa by dâk, returning to his camp the same evening; on the same day I was also joined by Major Broadfoot.

* The despatches here alluded to follow this of the Governor-General, see pp. 17 and 22.

I had the satisfaction of concurring in all the orders which his Excellency had given, to hold the troops in readiness to move at the shortest notice, and in the instructions which he had sent to the officers in command of the stations at Ferozepore and Loodiana. The force at the former post consists of one European regiment, seven regiments of native infantry, two regiments of native cavalry, and twenty-four field guns, exclusive of heavy ordnance. The force at Loodiana consists of one regiment of Europeans, five regiments of native infantry, one regiment of native cavalry, and two troops of horse artillery.

After a full and satisfactory consultation with his Excellency, and taking into consideration the improbability of the Sikh army crossing the Sutlej, I determined that no movement should be made towards the river by the forces from Umballa and Meerut, and I postponed, for further consideration with his Excellency, any change in the present distribution of the troops; eventually some alterations will be made, which, when they have been finally determined upon between me and the Commander-in-Chief, will be reported to you. At the present moment his Excellency coincides with me that no forward movement is required.

In the midst of much hesitation and irresolution, the enterprise ordered by the Sikh Government does not appear to have been formally abandoned; the intelligence received by Major Broadfoot*, on the day of his joining my camp showed that the three brigades of the Sikh force had actually left Lahore a few miles in advance, to be followed the next morning by three other brigades, including one of artillery. This was on the 24th ultimo. The intelligence received from that date has been communicated to me by Major Broadfoot each day, as it arrives.

It is said they intend, in reply to Major Broadfoot's remonstrance, to allege that the fact of our having collected so large a force, with all the munitions of war, on the frontier, is the cause of the concentration of their forces on the Sutlej; that they

* The despatches here alluded to follow this of the Governor-General, see p. 17.