Judgment, and thus comes to view the two objects thus given in relation to each other, as the same or not the same. Its act then becomes complete; and a perfected product of thought, a Judgment, is the result. Thus the second object may be given in the Perception itself, as black, or four-footed, and the Judgment recognizes this color or this form as belonging to Bucephalus-that is, as identical with one of the parts or characters that make up the whole perception. Or the second object may be given by the Regulative Faculty, or Faculty of Intuition, as of Being, of Space, of Time, or other idea of the proper Reason; and then the Judgment identifies Bucephalus with Existence, with some part of Space, of Time; or in other words, affirms Bucephalus to be, to be in such a place, at such a time, and the like. The second object of thought may, in like manner, be given to the Judging Faculty by the Memory. We may identify Bucephalus as now perceived with the Bucephalus perceived yesterday; with the black color, the four-footed figure, before perceived in some other object.

"The essential nature of a Judgment, thus, is seen to be an identification of one object with another, either totally or partially-in some one or in all respects. It is accordingly a relative cognition; and in the relation which it involves are necessarily contained three elements: 1. The object of thought identified with some other. 2. The object with which it is identified, either in whole or in part. And, 3. The

mental act which identifies. The first two constitute the matter of thought, the datum; the last is the Thought itself, the identifying cognition-the Judgment.

"To the several parts, or to different aspects of the complex procedure in all Thought as thus exemplified in one of its gradations-the Judgment Psychology has assigned distinctive. names, which it may not be inexpedient here to recall. Inasmuch as the original datum or object of thought is given in an indefinite vagueness as one and undivided, and as, in order to be cognized in thought, it must be viewed in relation to some part, it becomes necessary to loosen up, to analyze or separate it as a whole into its parts. This part of the process is called Analysis.

"The next step is to select the part out of the whole for separate apprehension, and to draw it away, as it were, to abstract it from the other parts. This part of the movement in Thought is called Abstraction. The term, however, it is proper to add, is applied in various ways by different writers or on different occasions, but with the same result. Thus it may be applied to the mind itself; so that in Abstraction the mind, when confining its view to certain parts of an object, is regarded as being abstracted or drawn away from the parts that are to be excluded from view; and this, it may be observed, is in strictness the most correct view. But in a looser sense the term may be applied to the part itself that is selected, and then such part is re

garded as being abstracted from the other parts. Or, in the third place, it may be applied to those other excluded parts themselves, and then they are regarded as being abstracted or drawn away either from the other parts or from the mind's consideration. The result is the same in any view, that one part is separated from the other parts for exclusive consideration, and it is therefore a matter or indifference, so far as the result is concerned, which of these different views is entertained.

"When thus one part is separated from the rest for exclusive consideration by the mind, the act of mind in which it concentrates its notice upon it is called Attention,

"In the next place, the two objects are brought up and viewed face to face with each other in order that their identity or non-identity may be apprehended. This part of the process is called Comparison.

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Finally, the last part of the complex process, in which the thought is perfected by bringing together the two objects attended to into one relative cognition, is called an act of Synthesis.

"All Thought thus begins with an Analysis, it proceeds by Abstraction, Attention, and Comparison, it ends with a Synthesis. And this is to be understood in a sense more or less full and complete, in modes varying with the nature of the particular gradation of all the acts of thought, whether in judging, conceiving, or reasoning. The two essential elements of thought are analysis and synthesis. With one it neces

sarily begins, with the other it necessarily ends. For its very function is to lead to truth, to a unity in the intelligence, which supposes an undistinguished manifold as its condition, and a gathering into a unity as its result. The other parts of the complex process, abstraction, attention, and comparison, are the means by which the mind passes from the multiform given in the analysis to the unity in the synthesis.

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"Of the two objects of thought identified in a Judgment, one is necessarily viewed as the primitive which is to be identified with the other, or is determined by it. This so viewed primitive or determined object is called the Subject; which may be defined to be that of which we judge. The other, viewed as the determining element, is called the Predicate, which may be defined to be that which is judged of the subject. The Subject and the Predicate make up the matter of thought or the datum to thought. They are called the Terms of a Proposition (termini). The act of thought itself which recognizes the identity between the two terms is called the Copula, which may be defined to be the identification of two objects of thought. It was called by Aristotle, in reference to the two terms, an Interval." (Day, Ele. of Logic, pp. 31-5, ed. 1868.)

184. "The Second gradation of Thought is the Concept. It is derived from the primitive product, the Judgment, by an act of synthesis or composition. It accordingly presupposes two or more Judgments, and, if a valid product of

Thought, can always be resolved back into them. It can, in fact, be verified only by being thus referred back to the Judgments from which it is derived. It is formed either by the synthesis of the Subjects of two or more Judgments, or by a synthesis of their Predicates—an alternative which gives rise to the two fundamental classes of Concepts. It may conduce to clearness to exemplify the process of forming the Concept in these two ways separately.

"First, then, if we synthesize the subjects, the procedure will be as follows: The Judgments, out of which the Concept is to be formed, we will assume to be-Socrates is rational; Cicero is rational; James is rational. By uniting the subjects, we have Socrates and Cicero and James, and marking the union by a single term which shall embrace them all in one, we will say, man, we have the union signalized in language. This union of the differing subjects of several propositions having a common predicate is called a Concept; in this case a Concept in Extensive Quantity. The formula for the formation of all Concepts of this class is, accordingly The Judgments, B is A, C is A, give the Concept (B+C), or when signalized in language by one term, the Concept D; or in brief: The Judgments B is A, C is A, give B + C = the Concept D.

"The procedure in forming Concepts of the other class is analogous. Here the Subject remains the same, and the Concept arises from the synthesis of the Predicates which differ. Thus,