Its people are creative and progressive, fresh in spirit, free in ideas, bold, willful and changeable in temper, like the sons of a rich man who have had no experience in life's trials. Should the Japanese, sentimental and stubborn, fly in the face of a nation so impulsive and excitable as the Americans are, a collision will be inevitable. In dealing with the Americans, therefore, Japan would do better to follow the example of the cool and deliberate British.

No other two neighboring nations contrast with each other in so many respects as America and Japan. America is an extensive country sparsely peopled and so an importer of immigrants, while Japan is a small country densely crowded and an exporter of emigrants. In the United States equality rules in society and liberalism and progressivism in politics, whereas in Japan society is cut up into classes and politics are dominated by militarism and conservatism. The Americans are outspoken and frank, while we are silent and gloomy. They are apt to laugh and play pranks; we are disposed to take offense and get angry. They attach greater importance to substance than to form, while the reverse is the case with us. The only points of resemblance are perhaps that neither country has had any experience with real international difficulties and that both are willful and self-conceited. But these differences are no reason why the two nations should disagree and quarrel. There is really no cause for them to go to war with each other.

Korea was the object of the SinoJapanese War, and Manchuria was the

cause of the Russo-Japanese War. In like manner, Cuba was the reason for the war between the United States and Spain. But there is no such motive for war between Japan and America. As for China, she is not a problem between Japan and America alone, but a problem for the whole world. If collision ever occurs between America and Japan, therefore, it must be either a conflict of feelings or a conflict of misunderstandings or a conflict of

honor.

There is one serious question which Japan must settle in order to adjust her relations with America - nay, with the entire outer world. That is the question of population. What is to be done to accommodate our ever-increasing numbers to our scanty resources? This is Japan's greatest problem, and is troubling the whole world. This is one reason why America regards Japan with doubt and suspicion. It is entirely on account of this that Australia is afraid of Japan, and Holland is so alarmed for her South Sea islands, France for Annam, and Britain for India. The objection of Westerners that it is irrational for Japan to procreate beyond her means of subsistence and then insist on shipping some of her children to foreign countries, callous though it seems, is reasonable. So long as Japan does not settle this problem independently of external assistance, the other nations will not cease to be on their guard against her. What is the proprietor of a confectionary to think when a man of suspicious appearance stands about his shop with an army of greedy urchins?

[WE continue M. Naudeau's account of his observations in Germany with the principal paragraphs of his discussion of the chief - and most controversial topic of his inquiry. The forty-threepage article on German disarmament, by Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan, from which the author quotes, was printed in last October's issue of the British Quarterly Review.]

THE first article of every German's political creed to-day is that his country was not responsible for the war. He will tell you, 'Europe was swept into a whirlpool, Germany with the rest.' Innumerable volumes have been published to persuade him that some particular Entente statesman maliciously precipitated hostilities. He starts out with an assumption, which he will not permit to be questioned and which there is a moral conspiracy to maintain, that no German ever wanted war. His people are a unit in disavowing an adventure that, having proved so disastrous, could not in their opinion have been planned by themselves.

In the second place, Germany no longer remembers that she devastated France. When you bring that to a German's attention he will turn the conversation or will murmur, 'It was very regrettable, but it was war.' On the other hand, even liberal and reasonable Germans insist that the Treaty of Versailles was imposed on Germany.

'But,' I would object, 'every treaty that ever ended a war was "imposed." 1 From L'Illustration (Paris illustrated literary weekly), February 28

Did we not have a knife against our throat when we signed the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871?'

Germans also say that in 1918 they honestly trusted to Wilson's Fourteen Points. Theodore Wolff, the editor of Berliner Tageblatt, and the leading liberal journalist in Germany, protested to me: 'No plebiscite was taken in the territories that were torn away from us. If our enemies were so sure that they were right, why would not they consult the wishes of the people whose fate was in their hands? Furthermore, this is the first instance, I believe, where a treaty has contained a clause demanding the complete disarmament of a great nation. Everything goes to show that the Treaty of Versailles was imposed upon us; for in addition to all the rest we were not allowed to discuss it before affixing our signature.'

This is the absolute conviction of every representative German with whom I have had an opportunity to talk. One can easily see what danger lurks in this state of mind. If Germany honestly believes that she is no more responsible for the outbreak of the war than any other of the belligerents, and if she also honestly believes that her enemies abused her confidence to impose upon her harsh peace-terms violating every canon of justice and reason, then instead of being a guilty party she is herself a victim of oppression; and a victim has an inalienable right to appeal to the future for redress.

This seems to be the dominant state of mind in Germany in 1925. The people refuse to remember their own past

errors, and regard themselves as martyrs whom we are oppressing. They imagine that a sort of conspiracy born of hatred and envy has inflicted on their country untold misery, mutilation, and shameful indignities like the occupation of the Ruhr. They speak of these things as veritable 'slavery.' Their only consolation is their faith that the future will redress their wrongs.

I do not overlook the existence of a powerful Socialist Party that is more inclined than any other body of citizens to recognize Germany's responsibility, to keep the Treaty, and to maintain peace. But we must not let ourselves be unduly deluded in regard to them. Even assuming their absolute sincerity, we must bear in mind that, despite the nominal strength of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag, the Nationalists and other reactionary parties are equally strong numerically and have the powerful advantage of wealth and social prestige. They control the press, they are men of initiative and enterprise, they are accustomed to rule. The Social Democratic Party is a great organization, but when we speak of Germany as a whole we do not think of her as a socialist country, especially in her international dealings.

When a Frenchman discusses disarmament with representative Germans he notices at once that even though they belong to opposite Parties they express practically the same opinions in almost identical words. They all insist that Germany is absolutely disarmed. They shrug their shoulders and lift their eyes to heaven at any allusion to the secret preparations for war that the Allied officers of control believe they have detected. They know nothing about them, they deny them, they laugh at our fears, they declare we are the dupes of our excited imagination. They adjure us to

How are we to interpret this unanimous denial? Are we to assume that German civilians, irrespective of their rank, their responsibility, and their official positions, are kept rigorously ignorant of the subtle combinations that General von Seeckt is sedulously spinning? Or do they think they understand the situation when they are but imperfectly informed? Or may we assume that these civilians consider such things entirely out of their sphere of action, and refuse to know what is happening on the theory that it does not lie within their province? I shall take the liberty not to adopt any one of these hypotheses, and to leave it to my readers to form their own opinion.

For five years the military experts of the Allies have been studying the situation, and they are agreed concerning one thing. Since the Treaty of Versailles was signed an evolution has been under way in Germany in the direction of giving that country a certain sort of military organization. But since this evolution has been secret and has occurred simultaneously with the pretty effective destruction of the old military machine, it is exceedingly difficult to say precisely what it has accomplished.

Probably the truth lies somewhere between two extremes. Those who maintain that Germany is armed to the teeth are deceiving both us and themselves. Those who, making realities of their wishes, assert that Germany has divested herself completely of all her armor, are probably hugging a dangerous illusion. Is Germany disarmed? Yes, if this means that her fortresses have been dismantled, her armaments destroyed, her former military forces disbanded. No, if this means that during the confusion that has attended the destruction of the old system and under the dust of its ruins nothing has been done to rebuild under cover what has been swept away. Will Germany be in

a position to fight to-morrow? Unquestionably no. But on the other hand, are we entitled to expect that any sort of control of a permanent character can be exercised over Germany that will prevent her recovering her military strength if she so desires? . . . From the time the Interallied Commission of Control first set foot on German soil the German military authorities have beset its path with obstacles that have in many cases practically nullified its surveillance. . . While

appearing to accept our inspection with good grace, the Germans have managed to elude it by a shrewd system of mystifications, suppression of documents, false reports, and other evasions.

In February 1920 the Germans seized upon the pretext of the disorders in Berlin, Munich, and the Ruhr to ask the Allies for permission to maintain a force double that prescribed in the Treaty — that is, an army of two hundred thousand men, equipped with heavy artillery and airplanes. At that time the Germans dreamed of creating a real army, and with that in prospect general staffs for twenty divisions were secretly organized.

Three months after the Commission began its labors that is to say, on April 24, 1920 — the German Government resumed its efforts. Insisting on the danger of Communist disorders, it demanded the privilege of manufacturing artillery ammunition sufficient to supply an army vastly greater than it possessed. At the same time the German authorities informed the Commission that they intended to preserve intact for two years longer the personnel engaged in the work of demobilization. This was an extraordinary announcement, since this personnel consisted of 3579 officers, 16,392 under-officers, and only 8517 privates! Besides this, pension bureaus were discovered that, after a full examination, appeared to be

merely the old recruiting-offices under another name. Little by little it was brought to light that Germany was trying to maintain under different titles her whole organization for carrying out a general mobilization. The Commission immediately put a stop to this, but there are excellent reasons to believe that the famous pension bureaus still have in their possession lists of every man in Germany qualified for military service, at least down to the class of 1921.

Be this as it may, the Spa Conference put an end to this first period of tortuous evasion. The conscription maintained up to that time by various artifices was finally abolished. The army was reduced to the hundred thousand men provided by the Treaty. The whole system of clandestine general staffs vanished. Volunteer military organizations were disarmed. Germany apparently submitted.

Two years ago the German Minister of Defense politely requested the Interallied Commission to withdraw from the country. He assured its members that their task was finished, that there was nothing left to watch or to uncover in Germany. Now just at that time several puzzling incidents, not fully explained to this day, were troubling the members of that body. But when they asked for certain documents relative to recruiting that might clear up these questions, the German Minister of Defense turned a deaf ear to their solicitations, and nothing was done. The Commission remained and continued to discover interesting facts.

What, for example, is the Green Police, the Schutzpolizei — that perfectly proper organization whose members exceed by at least one fifth, and probably more, the authorized figure? Why does a large part of the Schupo live in barracks? Why does it spend its time chiefly in military drill? The

German authorities argue that they need this force, which is absolutely loyal to the Republic, in case extremists either on the Communist or the Monarchist side try to make trouble. Is n't it quite logical, however, to regard the Schupo as practically identical with the Reichswehr!

That brings us to the question, What is the Reichswehr? Is it limited strictly to the hundred thousand men provided in the Treaty? How does it happen that in this army the salary-lists show that there are 35,644 sergeants and 40,000 corporals commanding 20,000 privates? What is the meaning of the excessive number of commissioned officers? Why do certain regiments have three colonels? Does n't all this suggest that the Reichswehr and the Schupo are merely two great military academies designed to furnish the officers for an invisible army of vastly more than a hundred thousand men?

By various devices the Germans have been able to give military instruction to a large number of young men enrolled as volunteers, or Zeitfreiwillige. How many of these have received such training? It is impossible to say. Some of our military experts believe that General von Seeckt has at present ready for service at least half a million men, in addition to the old classes, which have been kept up, as we have just shown, through the pension bureaus. Undoubtedly also there is reason for the alarm that the Commission feels on account of the frequent discovery of secret depots of arms and munitions.

But a far more serious aspect is given the situation by the fact that the moment the Interallied Commission is withdrawn the Germans could, if they were disposed to do so, restore their munitions factories in an incredibly short time to their condition in 1918. Instead of scrapping their munitions works after the Armistice, they con

verted them to other uses. Now the analogy between ordinary industrial production and armaments production is so close in many instances that not more than five per cent of a manufacturing plant can be set down as unquestionably available solely for peace manufacturing. All the remainder can be transformed in a few days to military uses. At the Krupps Works, notwithstanding the reiterated cautions of the Allies, no machinery formerly employed for making heavy artillery has been scrapped. It is not only intact, but it is carefully kept in the best of condition. Furthermore, there is a disturbing resemblance between the methods of building heavy machinery and of forging heavy artillery that makes it exceedingly difficult to determine just where the line between the two lies.

Although carefully camouflaged, there exists at Berlin, as everybody knows, an economic general staff, such as Germany lamented not having set up before 1914. Every industry indispensable for war has been reorganized, subventioned, and coördinated by this controlling body. Germany has rendered herself virtually independent of outside supplies for cement, sulphuric acid, nitric acid, and aluminum. All the rolling stock with which she has so liberally equipped her railways since the war can easily be adapted to military uses. Germany would have at present two hundred thousand troop-cars at her disposition, or considerably more than in 1913.

It is of little practical value to compute just how many months it would take Germany, if she were free from military inspection, to reëquip herself completely for war. You will note I say 'months,' for our military experts assure me that it would not require much more than a year. Is not every one of the fifteen thousand chemical