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sorts of 'squeeze.' The Japanese have not tolerated these practices, and consequently have made enemies of the Chinese padrones, who stir up labor trouble in revenge.

THE KURD REVOLT

A CONSTANTINOPLE correspondent writes in Eleftheron Vima, an Athens daily, that the 'obscure bandit chief Said' who, according to Turkish reports, is leading the Kurd revolt, is actually a famous Sheik and a lineal descendant of the Saladin of the Crusades. His wife, instead of being an ordinary Kurd mountaineer woman, is a sister of Sheik Abdullah, and a member of one of the noblest families of Asia Minor. Said is related by blood or marriage to prominent officers of the old Turkish army, who are supporting his movement.

All this suggests that the revolt springs from profound personal, political, and religious differences among people of New Turkey, and explains the reported mobilization of a large army to suppress it. Rumor has it that

the insurgents are using airplanes to sprinkle the provinces with Kurdish proclamations; and according to some reports, they have from thirty to thirty-five thousand troops under arms.

Mustapha Kemal is determined to wipe out Kurdish feudalism as an antiquated institution opposed to his modernizing programme and tending to perpetuate banditry and disorders in the interior mountain provinces. His Government, partly with this in view, and also in accord with its general plan of administrative reform, recently put into force a law abolishing the old provinces with their semi-independent governor-generals, and replacing them by smaller departments under prefects wholly subordinate to the central authorities. This substitution of a modern military-bureaucratic régime for the old aristocratic system is especially unpopular in the Kurdish end of the country. It is doubtful, however, if a movement originating with the Kurds can spread widely among the Turks proper, because the two races are hereditary enemies.

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AMERICA'S PACIFIC MANOEUVRES1

BY CAPTAIN MIZUNO HIRONORI

[THE author is a well-known naval of ficer who has been placed on the retired list on account of his liberal views.]

AMERICA'S grand naval manœuvres were at length started in the early part of January. In point of area and duration they are entirely unprecedented, for they are to be conducted over the whole region of the Southern Pacific, extending to Australia and New Zealand, with Hawaii for centre, and are to last for a period of six months. Almost all the vessels of the American navy, big and small, exceeding one million tons in all, will participate in the exercises. It is evident that the cost must reach several scores of millions of yen. Considering that the Pacific has been specially chosen for the seat of the manœuvres and that Japan is the only nation on the Pacific seaboard that is capable of engaging the American fleet in naval war, it is hardly necessary to say that the manœuvres are being conducted with Japan as the imaginary enemy, for it would be idle to suppose that the American fleet is at so much pains and expense with reference to such practically navyless nations as China, Australia, and New Zealand. But it would be improper to jump to the conclusion that America therefore regards Japan as an enemy. The fact is that as an imaginary enemy is essential to the determination of the scope or standard of a country's armament, so

1 From Chuo Koron-Central Review' (To

kyo public-affairs monthly), February. Translated in Japan Weekly Chronicle (Kobe AngloJapanese newspaper), February 19.

the clear conception of a hypothetical enemy is essential to render manoeuvres really effective and useful. Before the Russian War the manoeuvres of the Japanese navy were located chiefly in waters west of Japan and the Sea of Japan, whereas since then they have mostly been in the Pacific. Japanese naval manœuvres with the Bonins for centre would differ in nothing but size from the great American naval exercises that are being conducted with Hawaii for their centre.

But as the great naval manœuvres of Britain and Germany, who were imaginary enemies before the war, used to irritate the nations involved, so to-day many Japanese are offended at the present American manœuvres, which they regard as a demonstration against Japan. Indeed, some of our militarists who are not favorably disposed to America are using the incident for antiAmerican propaganda and to show the necessity for increasing armaments against America. If Americans really love peace as much as they profess, they should, out of moral scruple, curtail to some extent exercises that are so liable to engender misunderstanding or unpleasantness, though, logically speaking, Japan has no right to demand of America that the manœuvres be stopped, nor is America under any obligation to stop them.

It is interesting in this connection to compare the relative strength of the American and Japanese fleets and their respective locations in the possible

event of a declaration of war between the two countries. By the Washington

Agreement, the naval ratios between America and Japan up to 1932 have been fixed at five to three so far as capital ships and aircraft supply-ships are concerned. No arrangements have yet been made fixing the ratios of subsidiary ships. But America must insist on maintaining in this respect the same ratios as in the other, so that the relative strength of the American and Japanese fleets must on the whole stand at five to three. As to the location of the belligerent fleets on the outbreak of the war, it is safe to suppose that the first moves of the war would find Hawaii in occupation of the American fleet. For should America be a member of the League of Nations, war could not be begun until a period of from three to nine months had elapsed after the reference of the dispute to arbitration; and even if she were still outside the League she would have to agree to the League's advice for reference, in which case the same interval as above would have to elapse after the reference and before the starting of hostilities, unless she were prepared to fight all the members of the League as provided in Articles Twelve and Seventeen of the League Covenant.

This interval of from three to nine months before the commencement of hostilities would suffice for America to put her whole fleet in fighting-trim and to send part of it around to Hawaii, without another Power being able to lodge any protest against the course, since Hawaii is American territory.

With the American fleet in occupation of Hawaii, four thousand miles away from Japan, it would be reckless or immensely hazardous for the inferior Japanese fleet to attack it, and nothing short of divine intervention would enable Japan to capture Hawaii with her naval force. The opposing fleets would thus have to remain the one at Hawaii and the other at Yokosuka, glaring at

each other, as the party that made the first move would be a loser by it. In the meantime aerial attacks on towns would be attempted on both sides. Coasts would be bombarded by cruisers. The Philippines might be occupied by Japanese troops. But these subsidiary actions would not affect the general situation unless an event such as the razing of Tokyo to the ground occurred. As for the occupation of the Philippines, it would be a mere waste of labor and lives, because if Japan were defeated they would be recovered, while if Japan won the war they would pass under her rule even if not occupied. Even supposing that some chance enabled Japan to capture Hawaii, the distance between Japan and Hawaii being about twice as great as that between Hawaii and America, it would be extremely hard for her inferior naval force to protect regular supply-convoys across so great a distance. As for operations on a large scale beyond Hawaii and against the American continent, it may be confidently stated that they are well-nigh impossible. But the occupation of Hawaii by Japan, while from a Japanese point of view it would mean only the change from glaring at each other between Yokosuka and Hawaii to the same operation between Honolulu and San Francisco, would seem to America like a sword pointed at her very heart.

Therefore, with Hawaii safely in her occupation, America has nothing to fear from the Japanese navy, and the present manœuvres are quite justifiable so long as they aim at studying how to defend Hawaii in time of war. But according to report, the plan of the American navy contemplates sending a greater part of its fleet to Australia and New Zealand after the defensive manœuvres near Hawaii have been completed, in order to carry on combined manœuvres with the Australian

fleet. The intended voyage of the American fleet has no doubt a diplomatic meaning: it is designed to promote amity between America and Australia. But it may well irritate the feelings of the Japanese people, because that naval visit will be made as a continuation of the great manœuvres. It is on too large a scale to be taken for an ordinary diplomatic call, especially if, as is rumored, the Australian fleet is expected to join in the subsequent manœuvres. The distance between Hawaii and New Zealand or the eastern shore of Australia is about the same as that between Hawaii and Tokyo Bay, or four thousand sea miles, and the voyage will prove the practicability of the voyage of a similar armada from Hawaii to Japan. So the voyage of the American fleet to Australia may, in a sense, be looked upon as a rehearsal of aggressive operations against Japan.

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The relations between America and Japan, which were relieved by the Washington Agreements and improved by the great sympathy shown this nation by America on the occasion of the earthquake, have suddenly taken a turn for the worse in consequence of the anti-Japanese legislation in the spring of last year. As a result, the prevailing sentiment in Japan toward America is very dangerous. It is reported that many officers are inculcating extreme anti-American sentiments into their soldiers. Several books have been published urging the nation to deal with America as an enemy, to chastise America, and the like. This has been magnified by anti-Japanese agitators in America until Americans who do not know the real strength of Japan are clamoring for war, while those who know better have thought it politic to get up huge manoeuvres in order to intimidate Japan by a superior show of force.

But while many Japanese thoughtlessly and irresponsibly talk of war with America, there is hardly any person with any knowledge of the conditions in Japan and America who seriously entertains the idea of hostilities between the two nations. War should be started, if at all, only when there is a firm belief in victory. Nothing is more dangerous and pernicious than to fan warlike sentiments without an invincible resolution to fight to a bitter and victorious end. From a military point of view we have nothing to fear from the American manœuvres, because it is our firm belief that so long as the Japanese navy maintains its present strength and does not venture on reckless tactics the American navy will be unable to do anything against Japan except make aerial attacks. What is to be feared is that our militarists and morbid chauvinists may incite the docile and credulous nation to an unnecessary extension of armaments and an unprofitable war with America.

But while the thoughtful section of this nation never contemplates war with America, it is not without reason that the foreign nations suspect Japan of militaristic and aggressive views and stand on their guard. To begin with, as a result of many years' isolation, our nation is devoid of diplomatic training and has the fault of expressing its feelings to foreign nations bluntly and coarsely. In common with the other Orientals, Japanese are apt to attach importance to the surface rather than to substance, to appearances rather than to contents. The anti-Japanese immigration law, for instance, is really a trivial matter when it is calmly scrutinized, and yet there are people who talk as if we must fight to vindicate the honor of the country. America deserves sympathetic consideration for disliking Japanese immigrants, even as we object to the immigration of Chinese la

borers. Japan would be in the wrong if she regarded America as a legitimate outlet for her superfluous population or a preserve for her unemployed.

Furthermore, as not many years have elapsed since the overthrow of the feudal system under which the bushi were all-powerful, the military spirit is still deeply implanted in the soul of our nation, and many leaders in all lines of activity — political, economic, and otherwise are people who have received the baptism of bushi. Besides, our great victories in the wars with China and Russia, which are believed to have brought about the present progress of the country, naturally strengthened the influence of military men and gradually led to the formation of a military clique of great political weight. The governmental institutions of Japan, moreover, are modeled on the German system. Their military spirit is pronounced, for example, in the regulations concerning the appointment of the Ministers for the Army and Navy, and the power of certain military and naval magnates to approach the Emperor personally with their views. Since the military spirit is strong in our nation, the military clique is powerful in politics, and our institutions are decidedly militaristic, Japan must inevitably move along militaristic lines.

It is a mistake, however, to imagine that the Japanese are a bloodthirsty and belligerent nation. In fact, they do not know what a serious foreign war is like. Their success against China and Russia has given them false faith in themselves. They are disposed to welcome a war in the belief that they are sure to be victorious and to win new territories. Knowing only the advantages of war and not its evils, the nation has been taught to talk thoughtlessly of it. If the present generation is warlike, therefore, it is not because of its inborn national character, but a re

sult of its exaggerated faith in Yamatodamashii and an overhigh opinion of its military genius.

Of late we hear brave cries of ‘Asia for the Asiatics,' or 'The Great League of Asia.' So far as justice and humanity go, we entirely endorse the idea. As a matter of fact, however, the greater part of Asia is not peopled by Asiatics. In order to bring about 'Asia for the Asiatics,' we shall have to expel the whites from Asia and recover the independence and freedom of Asiatic nations. It is hardly necessary to point out that nothing is more likely to be resented than such a movement by the white nations, to whom 'Asia for the Asiatics' is an open challenge. So if Japan assumes leadership of an Asiatic League, it is obvious that the attacks of the white nations will be concentrated on Japan.

Furthermore, the principle of Asia for the Asiatics logically means Japan for the Japanese, Korea for the Koreans, and so on. It is thus inconsistent for Japan to preach this ideal while she herself holds Korea under her domination. The colored races are the proletariat of the world, so to speak, and Asia for the Asiatics means the emancipation of the racial proletariat from white oppression. This being so, is it fitting for Japan, herself an imperialistic Power though on a small scale, to presume to lead the proletarian nations to their emancipation? Human nature is indeed a complex and curious thing: Japanese Conservatives, who are most zealous in defending capitalism and most strongly opposed to the emancipation of the proletariat, are the very ones who are most annoyed by the American naval manoeuvres and who have war between Japan and America constantly in their mouths.

America is a new country. It has no old traditions and conventions. It is not trammeled by time-honored usages.

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