Governance of International Strategic Alliances: Technology and Transaction Costs
Psychology Press, 1999 - 127 oldal
In Governance of International Strategic Alliances: Technology and Transaction Costs, Joanne Oxley analyzes international joint ventures and strategic alliances, building on recent theoretical developments in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to systematically examine factors influencing the formation and governance of these alliances. Oxley effectively draws the TCE framework into an application of increasing strategic interest. Bringing rigorous empirical analysis to an arena that has largely been pursued through speculative and theoretical approaches, this book will be a serious contribution to international business, strategy and economics.
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THREE Appropriability Hazards and Governance
FOUR An Empirical Study of Appropriability
FIVE An Empirical Study of Appropriability
SIX Conclusions and Suggestions
Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
agreements alliance experience alliance form alliance partners alliance structure alternative ance appropriability hazards arrangement asset specificity Benchmark Survey bilateral contracts CATI database coefficient Compustat contract law contract-based alliances contracting hazards control variables cooperative countries cultural distance differences Dummy effect empirical analysis empirical study enforcement equity joint ventures example foreign geographic scope Gomes-Casseres governance choice Governance costs governance mode governance structures hierarchical governance hostage exchanges hybrid organizations impact incentive alignment Incentive intensity included increases independent variables industries institutional environment intellectual property protection intellectual property rights inter-firm alliances international business international strategic alliances investment IPINDEX know-how Kogut licensing market-hierarchy continuum measure ment monitoring nology ordered probit organizational form parties partner firms patent protection predicted previous alliances probit model R&D intensity relevant resource-based view sample shift parameter framework significant suggests tacit technology transfer alliances Teece tion transaction cost economics tures unilateral US-based firms Williamson