and to worship the Supreme Being. The emotion is well expressed by the words veneration and deference, and when in great vigour is called devotion. Firmness I consider to be a tendency to persist in conduct, opinion, and purpose. Resolution is the name which its emo tion receives. Conscientiousness seems to be a propensity to give every man his due. The emotion is the sentiment of justice; and the actions prompted by it are honest, candid, just. I doubt the propriety of calling this faculty the sentiment of right and wrong; for Benevolence and Veneration likewise have the power of discriminating right from wrong in their own spheres, and hence these three faculties are termed moral sentiments. It appears to me that they alone are entitled to this denomination, and that it is incorrect to include along with them, as has hitherto been frequently done, the faculties of Hope, Ideality, Wonder, Firmness, Wit, and Imitation. Hope seems to be a mere emotion, unaccompanied by any propensity. It can hardly be said to give rise, except indirectly, to a tendency to act in a speculative manner. Acquisitiveness, modified by the emotion of Hope, appears to do this. Of Ideality it may be safely affirmed that no propensity is connected with it. There is only the lively emotion of the beautiful and sublime. Wonder is clearly an emotion, but whether no inclination is associated with it may perhaps be doubted. Is it not, for example, a propensity to exaggerate? The emotion of the ludicrous, which I am at present inclined to regard as a fundamental faculty, wheresoever its organ may ultimately prove to be, appears to be accompanied by a propensity to act comically.-Imitation is a mere propensity, without any special emotion whatever. This concludes the list of the affective faculties. If we take the guidance of the principle by which Dr Spurzheim was led, they ought, I think, to be divided into three genera instead of two-the first including those faculties which give rise to tendencies as well as emotions; the second, those which are tendencies without emotions; and the third, those which are emotions without tendencies. In the first genus, therefore, we ought to rank Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, Adhesiveness, Opposiveness, Destructiveness, Secretiveness, Acquisitiveness, Self-Esteem, Cautiousness, Benevolence, Veneration, Firmness, Conscientiousness, Wonder, and Mirthfulness or the sentiment of the ludicrous. In the second genus-that of tendencies without emotions-I would place Constructiveness and Imitation; and in the third, comprehending mere emotions, the faculties of Hope and Ideality, and perhaps also Love of Approbation. Such appears to be the classification of the affective faculties, on Dr Spurzheim's principle, warranted by the present state of phrenological science. With respect to the nomenclature of this class of faculties, it may be observed, that, in order to designate a faculty with correctness, the term employed ought to include the whole sphere of its activity, inclination as well as sentiment, and all the modifications which the sentimental part of the function assumes. The word Benevolence, for instance, designates only one affection of a fundamental faculty, and leaves pity and the inclination to increase happiness and alleviate misery entirely out of sight. Whether a nomenclature of perfectly comprehensive terms will ever be attained, is a question which I fear must be answered in the negative; for no single word can well express both a sentiment and an inclination, or perhaps even the different sentimental affections of a single power. It may, however, be suggested, that, with the view of preserving uniformity, those faculties which comprehend both an inclination and a special emotion or sentiment, ought, in every case, to receive a name applicable either to the one or to the other; that is to say, it is impro per to designate some of them by a word expressive of the inclination, and others by a word which applies to the sentiment. Here the nomenclature of Dr Spurzheim is at fault; and much perplexity has consequently arisen in the minds of persons who have attended closely to the analysis of the mental powers. The words Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness, though used to designate faculties which Dr Spurzheim calls mere inclinations to act, are in reality expressive of sentiments—namely, three kinds of love; while Combativeness, Destructiveness, Acquisitiveness, and Constructiveness, on the other hand, are synonymous with propensity to fight, to destroy, to acquire, to construct. The terms Self-Esteem, Love of Approbation, Cautiousness, Benevolence, Veneration, Conscientiousness, Hope, and Wonder, designate sentiments, but leave inclinations (which some of them are) out of view. Firmness is perhaps less expressive of a sentiment than Resolution, and rather designates the character produced when the faculty is strong; and to Mirthfulness or Gaiety a similar remark is applicable. Imitation expresses mere propensity. I do not venture to propose any series of terms capable of realizing the foregoing suggestion. It would be necessary to coin new vocables; and, until analytical phrenology shall have arrived at greater perfection than at present, it appears inexpedient materially to change the nomenclature in general use. All that seems desirable is, that the student should bear in mind the different forms of inclination and sentiment in which facul ties designated by limited names display their activity; and that he should not be led to regard as a mere inclination that which includes also a sentiment, or as solely a sentiment that which is also an inclination—or to consider that a word, significant of a single affection of a faculty, denotes the entire sphere of its activity. No subdivision of the intellectual powers, or those which procure knowledge, was made by Dr Gall; but Dr Spurzheim has minutely classified them. "They may be subdivided,” says he, "into four genera. The first includes the functions of the external senses and of voluntary motion; the second, those faculties which make man and animals acquainted with external objects and their physical qualities; and the third, the functions connected with the knowledge of relation between objects or their qualities;-these three genera I name perceptive faculties: the fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other sensations and notions, and these I style reflective faculties.”* Respecting the first and last of these genera I offer no remarks. The second includes Individuality, Form, Size, Weight, and Colouring, all of which, except Individuality, seem rightly clas sified. The exception of Individuality is here made on the ground that nothing but the qualities of external objects is perceptible, and that by these alone the existence of an object is revealed to us; so that Individuality, which takes cognizance of no quality, cannot be said to "perceive" at all. Its essential nature appears to be, as Dr Spurzheim expresses it, "to produce the conception of being or existence, and to know objects in their individual capacities."+ "I speak," "I speak," says he, "under the name Individuality, of the faculty which recognises the existence of individual beings, which embodies several elements into one being or object, as tree, house, man, army, navy, &c.; whose activity and presence are denoted by substantives, or abstract terms in language, and which, in all probability, constitutes the personal identity. I acknowledge that objects are inseparable from their qualities, and that these constitute objects; but I think it possible to conceive an existence or entity without knowing its qualities, as God, the mind." "This faculty takes cognizance of all existences, objects, things, and beings." Dr Spurzheim here studiously avoids the use of the word perception; he speaks only of conception, knowledge, and cognition. + Under the third genus of intellectual faculties-those "which perceive the relations of external objects"-Dr Spurzheim ranges Locality, Order, Number, Eventuality, Time, Tune, and Language. In some respects he is here in error. Neither Eventua+ Manual of Phrenology, p. 59. * Phrenology, p. 131. lity, Time, nor Language, is cognizant of relations of external objects; Tune perceives only relations of sounds; and, according to the best of our present knowledge, Order is merely (what Dr Spurzheim calls it) a "disposition to arrange," and desire to see every thing in its proper place. In his "Philosophical Principles," and "Outlines of Phrenology," Dr Spurzheim inconsistently comprehends the second and third genera of the intellectual faculties in one, which is described as embracing the "internal senses or perceptive faculties which procure knowledge of external objects, their physical qualities, and various relations.” * "I had a dream, which was not all a dream."-BYRON. It was on Thursday the 12th of the present month, that having performed the scholastic duties of the day, having partaken of the evening meal, and digested, as I best might, a quantum sufficit of Greek, Latin, Trigonometry, Chemistry, Natural History, and French, preparatory to the recitations of the morrow, I took up a newspaper by way of dessert to this literary banquet. Casting my eye on that portion of the sheet wherein are * Phil. Prin. of Phren. p. 52; and Outlines, p. 59. + The author of this article is Mr John Newlands of A——, N. Y., who obtained a premium for it as the best composition presented at the semi-annual examination of the A- Academy in February 1835. We publish it as a clever jue d'esprit on one of those itinerant phrenological quacks who are practising with great success on the gullibility of our American brethren. At the close of a gratis lecture on Phrenology, the individual referred to announced that he had hired rooms where he would examine heads, and furnish notes of cerebral development, at the low charge of 3s. each. He was in consequence kept in full occupation for several weeks, and is said to have pocketed in A upwards of 1200 dollars. After exhausting the more wealthy class of citizens, he addressed himself to the lower orders, who congregate nightly at the Museum, a kind of twopenny show, much in vogue among stage-drivers, canal-boatman, &c. ; and there he gave lectures and manipulated heads. A number of amusing circumstances grew out of the visit of this charlatan. One of these, alluded to in the Dream in reference to the organ of Causality, is as follows:-A judge in the Court of Common Pleas was among the number of those to whom schedules of their cerebral development were furnished, and, on his way from the place of examination, shewed his schedule to some acquaintances whom he met on the street. Among other wise remarks, he made the following: "There," said he, "Ideality 16; why, that's three higher than he gave Mr Y- he gave him only 13, and every body knows that Mr Y has more ideas than any man in the city. And see, here is Casualty only 8; well, that's very right too, for I never was liable to accidents!" The illustration of the organ of Wonder alludes to the crowds of all grades who were attracted by the pretensions of the quack.-EDITOR. usually announced the amusements of the day, I perceived that in addition to the ordinary entertainments at the Museum, a. lecture was to be delivered on the advantages of Phrenology; and having understood that, since the visit of the lecturer to our ancient city, he had himself reaped much advantage from the science, I doubted not his capability of explaining these satisfactorily to the enlightened audience this announcement would collect at this place of fashionable resort. Forthwith I held a consultation with my purse-" to go or not to go, that was the question,"-" my poverty and not my will consented," and therefore I went-not to the Museum-but to bed, where I presently fell into a profound sleep; and, as it frequently happens that the last waking thought continues to occupy the mind when the body is in perfect repose, no sooner was I comfortably wrapt in the arms of Morpheus, than busy fancy transported me at once to the lecture-room, full of higher hopes and brighter expectations than the reality could have produced. For methought, ere the curtain arose, it was announced that the lecture was to consist of a full explanation of all the mental faculties, illustrated by appropriate emblems and devices, which had been prepared, adapted, and arranged at great pains and expense, and which it was hoped the public would appreciate, and for which they would, with their accustomed liberality, compensate the "spirited and indefatigable proprietor." After a brief delay, the curtain arose, and a scene presented itself more brilliant and novel than waking fancy could possibly have suggested. That portion of the room within the proscenium, appeared of great extent; it assumed the form of a human head of mammoth size and proportions, each faculty being represented by some suitable device, either adopted from the stock attractions of the Museum, or prepared with much ingenuity for this particular occasion. Like many other allegorical representations of ancient as well as of modern times, the uninitiated would perhaps have been left in doubt of their true meaning, had not the name of each development accompanied the emblem. Strong as was the impression on my dreaming imagination, a few particulars have escaped my memory. Such as I best remember I shall endeavour to describe, beginning with the propensities, and ascending to the sentiments and intellectual faculties. I ought, however, in the first place, to mention, that the generic term of Organ was suitably represented by the ancient instrument of that name belonging to the establishment, the dulcet tones of which are so well known to the inhabitants of this city, and so grateful to the ears of the residents in its present, as well as in its former vicinity: It was placed in front of the stage, and played "Scots wha hae wi' |