achieved, were taken into consideration, the country had a right to expect, not merely the delivery of Portugal, but that the army of Junot should have been rendered in capable, either by a subsequent defeat, or by the terms of capitula tion, of injuring the cause of our allies. Or that, if our troops were actually unable even after the victory of Vimiera, and the reinforce ments they received, to force Junot to yield to better terms than those of the convention of Cintra, our commanders should have consider ed, whether the cause of our allies would not have been much less injured by leaving Junot in quiet possession of Portugal, from which, after the defeat of Dupont, he had no temptation or means to escape, than by liberating him from it, and restoring him to France; while at the same time we were obliged to lock up our own army in the former country, useless and idle. This, it was contended, that even granting the nation had no reason to expect more than the liberation of Portugal, still we had purchased that liberation at the expense of a much greater good. The argu. ments of those who were dissatisfied with the convention in every re. spect, derived additional force from *the long continuance of our troops In Portugal, while the army which they had conquered was again in a condition to act offensively. In the mean time, the ministry were slow and apparently reluctant in proceeding to institute the premised inquiry: they did not at least keep pace with the eagerness and anxiety of the public. Perhaps they might have expected that the disapprobation would cool; that the convention of Cintra would be forgotten, and gradually removed from recollection by the interven tion of other events. But it sò happened, that most of the events which succeeded it were of a nature to recall it to the memory of those who had almost forgotten it, and to fix it there more deeply, by pointing out more clearly the mis chiefs to which it had given birth. The intelligence which was received of the disasters in Spain, and of the inactivity of our army in Portugal'; and the belief that those disasters might have been prevented by a more speedy junction of the British and Spanish troops; and that they would, too probably, be increased by the arrival of Junot's conquered army at the scene of action before his conquerors had crossed the frontiers of Portugal, rendered the convention of Cintra still more the ob ject of the public indignation. At length, on the arrival of sir Arthur Wellesley, sir Hew Dalrymple, and some of the other officers as witnesses, the long promised and anxiously expected investigation was set on foot; not by a court martial, as was usual in such cases, but by a board of inquiry. The very name of the tribunal which was to be employed on this occasion seemed to indicate the doubt of ministry, whether any blame ought to be attached to the convention. Against it many objections were urged: it was not known or acknowledged by the laws of the country: it had no power to examine upon oath, nor were the members who composed it sworn to the strict and im. partial performance of their duty. Without any precedent to direct their proceedings, it was justly to be apprehended that there would be much delay, intricacy and disorder: that no point would be brought out fully and clearly; and that both from the prejudice of the nation against the court, as inade. quate quate and unprecedented, and from their want of power to examine upon oath, their opinion, whatever it might be, would by no means satisfy the country. It would appear to be necessary, in the constitution of a military court, to guard it, as much as possible, against the intrusion of partiality or prejudice. In our civil courts, there is much less danger that these feelings will operate. The judges are trained by education and habit to that state of mind which enables them to divest themselves of all partiality and personal feelings, and to give admission to no thought or consideration but what relates to their duty and to the interest of the public. They are also guarded against partiality by the strong motives of personal interest. To determine on cases of law is the sole occupation of their lives; by acting justly and without partiality, there. fore, they can alone hope to succeed. To these circumstances of education, habit and interest operating unitedly to guard them against partiality or prejudice, it may be added, that they can seldom be put in the way of temptation. Few cases will come before them, in the performance of their duty, where they must sit in judgment on those towards whom they entertain any particular feelings; and even in cases of crimes against the state, where a desire to gratify the wishes of government, by the condemnation of the accused person, may be supposed to operate, their habits, feelings, honour and regard to their character and interest al most invariably preserve them in the path of their duty. It should also be remarked that much depends upon the jury: so that even if a judge were disposed to indulge in partiality or prejudice, he might show this disposition, and incur ali the dishonour and injury, without being able to gratify his injustice. But in a military court it is very different. The members who com pose it cannot have the habits and feelings of judges. It will be dif ficult for them to divest themselves entirely of partiality and prejudice, and in many instances they must sit in judgment on those whom they are disposed to regard with these feelings. As men of honour, they will undoubtedly guard as much as possible against the improper execution of their duty; but such is the weakness of human nature, that honour cannot be too well fenced by every consideration or circumstance, that will increase the obligation and solemnity of the duty which is to be performed. In a court martial, the members can not, as a in board of inquiry, satisfy their conscience, if they neglect to examine the cause thoroughly and impartially, by the reflection that as the witnesses were not on oath, their evidence ought not implicitly to be believed; that the want of precedent necessarily produced confusion in their proceedings, so that they could not fully and accurately ascertain the nature and amount of the proof; and that by the very constitution of their court, they were not called upon to acquit or condemn, but merely to inquire. Where there might be reason to suspect that the conduct of ministers was implicated in the failure of an expedition, it would be more peculiarly incumbent to guard a gainst an unsatisfactory and partial investigation, by constituting the court in the most constitutional and unobjectionable manner, guarding by every means against the careless or partial execution of its duty, and investing it with the fullest powers powers to ascertain and expose the truth. On these and similar grounds, the nation in general expressed disapprobation and dissatisfaction at the institution of a board of inquiry, instead of a court martial: they were apprehensive that they should not get the truth from the witnesses, nor a fair and strict opinion from the members. As one object of the investigation was to satisfy the people, it does appear strange and unaccountable that a Court should be appointed, against which such a general prejudice existed; a prejudice, too, founded on such strong reasons, as its being unknown to the laws, implying a doubt of the dishonourable nature of the convention, and not possessing sufficient authority to come at the truth. Is it uncharitable to suppose that the members of a court from which, before it began to sit, the nation loudly declared they expected no good, would be as anxious to perform their duty, as they would have been had they possessed the good opinion and the hopes of the people? The board of inquiry met for the first time, at Chelsea, on the 14th of November. Sir David Dundas was the president: the other memhers were, the earl of Moira, gen. Craig, lord Heathfield, earl Pembroke, sir G. Nugent, and lieut.gen. Nicholls. On the first day of their sitting little took place but the reading of the warrant by which they were appointed. By it they were authorized and commanded to inquire into the conditions of the armistice and convention, the causes and circumstances which led to them, and into the conduct of Hew Dalrymple, or any other officer or person connected with the armistice and convention. For 1808. this purpose they were directed to summon and examine all who could give evidence or information on these points. Their opinior, whe ther any or what further proceed ings should be had respecting the armistice and convention, was to be laid before his majesty, along with a statement of their proceedings, and the evidence that should be given before them. As the opinion of the board of inquiry and the decision of his majesty were not made public till the beginning of the year 1809, an abstract of their proceedings belongs more properly to our next volume. We shall, nevertheless, in this, state very briefly some of the most important and interesting facts that were produced in evidence. In the first place, sir Arthur Wellesley expressed his general concurrence in the terms of the convention, founded on his opinion that the French should be permitted to evacuate Portugal. On some of the articles he disagreed with sir Hew Dalrymple; but he had not signed it, as had been asserted in this country, because he had been compelled, or even ordered. Secondly, From the evidence of several naval officers it appeared that the coast of Portugal is very dangerous and difficult of access during the months of autumn and winter; and consequently, as the British army could not have been supplied with provisions by the Portuguese, it was desirable to remove them from the country as speedily as possible. Thirdly, With respect to the prac-. ticability of having compelled Junot to an unconditional surrender after the battle of Vimiera, it seemed the general opinion of the witnesses who were examined on this point, 2 B that that after the French had recovered from the confusion, disorder and dismay into which their defeat had thrown them, they had it in their power to occupy such a strong position as would have defied the attacks of the British army for a considerable length of time. This opinion naturally led to the investigation of the causes which had prevented the victory our troops had gained at Vimiera from being followed up immediately, in such a manner as would not only have put it out of the power of the French to have retreated upon the forts near Lisbon, but would also have completed their defeat. As sir Harry Burrard was here the responsible person, the sitting of the board of inquiry was suspended till he arrived. On his examination, he acknowledged that sir Arthur Wellesley was extremely anxious that the French should have been immediately pursued, after their defeat; but that to him the measure did not appear warranted by the relative situation and circumstances in which the two armies were placed. On this point there was considerable difference of opinion among the officers who were examined:-to some it appeared that our superiority was so very great, and the French army so broken and dispirited, that, had they been instantly pursued, the consequences would certainly have been much more decisive and splendid than they actually were. Other officers, on the contrary, were inclined to think that, destitute as our army was, in a great measure, of cavalry, and provided with artillery horses by no means equal to the pursuit of the enemy, it would have been imprudent and unsafe to have pushed forward, especially as a large proportion of the French had soon recovered from their confusion and dismay, halted, and formed again. It appeared too evidently, from the proceedings of the board, that a considerable difference of opinion and coolness had existed between sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Arthur Wellesley; and that sir Harry Burrard and the latter were by no means of similar or compatible dis positions and characters. Sir Arthur was active, enterprising, and bold; rather inclined to what was ha zardous, than to what was barely prudent and safe: sir Harry Burrard appeared to have been directly the reverse; cautious, deliberate, and content with performing the part of a brave but not a dashing soldier. Under the present circumstances of Europe, which, if they cannot be deemed actually desperate, must be regarded as highly unfavourable and alarming, such characters as that of sir Arthur Wellesley are, perhaps, more needed, and more likely to retrieve or save the continent, than generals endowed with the contrary qualities. To the dissi milar character of the generals, and to the circumstance that our ar my in Portugal had three different commanders within as many days, who were by no means likely to in spire it with the same sentiments, or to conduct it in the same man ner, may in part be attributed the disgrace and ill consequences of the convention of Cintra. (See Pus LIC PAPERS.) CHAP CHAPTER XIV. Afairs of the North of Europe-Treaty between Sweden and EnglandInvasion of Finland by the Russians-Russian Declaration of WarSwedish Answer-Danish Declaration--Swedish Answer-Traitorous Correspondence of the Russian Ambassador-His Arrest-Russian Proclamation on the Subject-Buxbovden's Proclamation to the People of Finland-Military Operations there-Abo taken-Masterly Retreat of Klingspor-Unexpected Surrender of Seaborg-King of Sweden's Orders and Proclamation on the Occasion-Cruelties of the Russians-Partial Successes of the Swedes-Armistice-King of Sweden's Dissatisfaction with bis Guards-Campaign in Norway-Sir John Moore's Army sent to Sweden-Supposed Cause of its Inactivity, and Return-Naval Operations in the Baltic-Russian Ship of the Line destroyed-Russian Fleet blockaded in Rogerswick-King of Sweden's Letter to the Emperor of Russia-The Emperor's Subserviency to France-Renewal of Hostilities in Finland-The Swedes cede Finland-Affairs of Denmark-Charges introduced by Bonaparte in Italy--Annexation of Rome, Tuscany, &c. to France and the Kingdom of Italy-Settlement of the Throne of ItalyTaking of Capri-Internal Affairs of France-Institution of bereditary Nobility-Decrees respecting the Jews-Annual Exposition of the State of the Empire-Constitution of Bavaria-Revolution in Turkey-Proceedings in America respecting the Embargo-Message of the PresidentCorrespondence of Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Canning-Disposition of the Spanish Colonies towards the Mother Country-Proclamation of LiniersBrazil. Ν IN the north of Europe the con sequences of the treaty of Tilsit soon began to unfold themselves. Russia, become the abject and willing instrument of the designs of Bonaparte, not only deserted Sweden, but prepared to attack her, as soon as the season of the year would admit of hostile operations. Denmark, which had thrown herself completely into the arms of France, in consequence of our bombardment of her capital and seizure of her fleet, viewed Sweden, as the ally of England, with more than her usual feelings of hatred and emity. These feelings were likewise increased and exasperated from the suspicion she entertained, that Sweden approved of the attack on Copenhagen, and had been by no means indisposed, if she had thought that her interest had required it, to occupy the island of Zealand when it was left by the English. Of this Denmark openly accused Sweden; and the answer that was given to the charges is more remarkable for the adroitness with which she declines the absolute denial of it, than for any expression of innocence, or detesta. tion of the alleged crime. In this perilous situation of the king of Sweden,-threatened with an invasion of the southern part of his dominions by the joint forces of Denmark and France, for the troops of the latter had crossed over into the islands in the Baltic, 2B 2 and |