paring that article in the convention which respects the contributions levied by the French, with the powers vested in the commissioners, we shall perceive how far and in what respects the Portuguese were actually benefited by their labours. By the 15th article it is evident that all the contributions which the French had levied, prior to the 30th of August, and which were actually paid to them, were declared to be valid and irreclaimable. Thus did a convention, signed and ratified by the allies of the Portuguese nation, deprive the injured nhabitants of all right to recover the heavy and exorbitant contributions levied upon them during ten months of French usurpation. On this point the commission which was instituted gave no redress; they were to confine their inquiries to two objects: 1st, Whether the property extorted by the French, by way of contribution for the maintenance of their army, was actually extorted before the 30th of August? If it were, it belonged to the French; if not, the commissioners were empowered to restore it. And 2dly, Was the Porguese property in possession of the French army, the fruit of private robbery? In this case also it might be reclaimed by the right Where surreptitious sales of public property had taken place, the commissioners were also empowered to declare the sales void, and to restore the goods so sold. From this view of the subject, it will too plainly appear how little the objectionable articles of the convention could be modified, so as at once to relieve the oppressed and injured Portuguese, and to preserve it from an absolute and palpable infraction. If we consider with what an unchecked and un

principled love of plunder all ranks in a French army are infected, and how completely they had the city of Lisbon under their power for ten months, we may form some conception of what the inhabitants suffered, and what they were deprived of, of what the French carried away, and of the gross and criminal inattention and misconduct of those who sanction ed their proceedings, by allowing them to enjoy the entire and unmolested possession of their plun der.

One of the most pleasing circumstances which resulted from the victory of Vimiera, and the consequent liberation of Lisbon from the yoke of the French, was the freeing from bondage, and restoring to their country, the Spanish troops, which Junot had ordered to be disarmed and to be confined in the vessels in the Tagus. The day on which their arms were de livered to them presented an interesting and grand sight. In order that this act might be performed with the magnificence which was justly due to it, all the British and Portuguese troops were assembled on the occasion. The sword of the Spanish general was delivered to him by general Beresford, with an appropriate address, in which he congratulated himself on the ho nour which had been allotted him of delivering to a Spaniard, and therefore a man of honour, that sword, of which he had been de prived by the artifice and violence of the foes of his country, and which, now that he had regained possession of it, would undoubted. ly be employed by him, for the purpose of cooperating with his patriotic and loyal fellow citizens in the liberation and defence of their country. As soon as the offi 2A 3

cers

cers and soldiers were put in possession of their arms, they pronounced a solemn and unanimous oath, never to repose till they had seen their beloved Ferdinand re-established on the throne; and for him, their religion, and their country, to conquer or die.

After the English had liberated Portugal from the French, it was necessary to consider of the most proper mode of establishing a provisional government. Great and unforeseen difficulties arose; the regency which had been appointed and left in power on the enigration of the prince, was necessarily dissolved when the French obtained possession of Lisbon: many of the persons who had formed it had united themselves to the enemy, and therefore could not with any propriety or prudence be re-appointed on the expulsion of the French. Sir Hew Dalrymple took upon himself to name the new regency. The assumption of this power by a military man, in the service of a foreign state, sent out expressly for the purpose of afford ing assistance to the Portuguese, certainly bore an extraordinary and rather a suspicious appearance, which, after the many reasons for coldness and dissatisfaction that existed, ought carefully to have been avoided. Either from the regency having been named by the general of a foreign army, or from a dislike to some of the persons who composed it, a considerable degree of opposition was made to its appointment, and its authority was refused to be acknowledged in different parts of the kingdom. The bishop of Oporto, who had signalized himself by the spirit, vigour, and success of the measures he adopted for liberating the north of Portugal, appeared to

many to have a fair claim to a considerable share in the provisional government. Thus two parties were formed; and it soon became apparent that a third party, much more hostile to the interests and liberty of the kingdom, existed in no inconsiderable degree of strength and influence. The south of Portugal had never cordially or gene rally united with the other parts of the nation in their detestation of the French, or in their measures for resisting and expelling them. And even in Lisbon, plundered and insulted as it had been by the French army, the partisans of the enemy were more numerous than under these circumstances might have been expected.

This statement respecting the state of Portugal and the disposi tion of its inhabitants will probably account for, and in some degree justify, a proclamation issued by general Hope at Lisbon on the 16th of September, which was se verely blamed by many persons in this country. In this proclamation he assures the Portuguese, that the general in chief of the British army, after having freed the country from its invaders and oppressors, is anxious to replace the civil government upon the same footing on which it was left by the prince 1egent. In order, however, to prevent the evil-disposed from taking advantage of the extraordinary crisis of public affairs, and copverting real liberty into unbridled licentiousness, the British commander in chief thought it necessary to establish and maintain, for a short time, strong guards, piquets, and patroles in different directions, for the purpose of taking into custody any who should attempt to disturb the public peace. That every opportunity, or temptation of

creating

creating or promoting disturbances or insurrections might be done away with, no person was to be allowed to enter the city with arms, or to wear them in the streets; and all the small inns and taverns were ordered to be shut at six in the evening, and not to be opened before sun-rise. There can be little doubt that the state of the city called for such regulations: it cannot therefore properly or fairly be objected to them, that they savour too much of military power and law. But it is certainly strange and unaccountable, that these regulations were issued and were to be enforced by the British, and not by the Portuguese, commander.

That the state and disposition of Portugal was not exactly what might have been expected, after the expulsion of the French, is likewise but too evident from the large proportion of our army which remained there, at a time when the services of all we could possibly spare were so imperiously and urgently called for the situation of Spain. As the defeat of Junot and the liberation of Portugal were only mediate and not final objects of our expedition, as soon as these were accomplished, it ought to have proceeded without delay, and in its full and original force, to the assistance of the patriots. By sea it could not be sent, as our transports were occupied in restoring the conquered army of Junot to their country. Instead, however, of making up in some measure for the greater

length of time which a march by land would occupy, by quitting Portugal so much the sooner, the troops, from some cause not understood, or at least not yet explained, did not begin their march towards Spain til nearly two months after the convention -of Cintra: and even then, for some reason, of which we are not aware, it is affirmed that 10,000 men were left behind.

The state of Portugal at the close of the year does not present a very interesting or flattering prospect. The inhabitants manifest no zeal or disposition to assist their neighbours the Spaniards; nor are they seemingly inclined to adopt such measures of defence as would enable them to repel the French, if Spain should unfortunately again fall under the dominion of Bonaparte. The arming of the people, though strongly recommended, has not even commenced, and the numbers of the regular troops are little if at all increased. While the inhabitants of Lisbon felt the pressure of French despotism and plunder, they were eager to escape from it; but, having escaped from it, they seem to have forgotten the calamities they suffered, and to be in doubt whether they should attach themselves to the French, whose entire conduct towards them has been that of a determined enemy, or to the English, against whom their only accusation is the convention of Cintra.

that on their arrival there they should be at complete liberty again to serve, presented itself perhaps with stronger claims than any of the rest to the indignation and regret of the British nation. We had thus taken upon ourselves to convey a French army, from a situation in which they could do comparatively little injury to the great cause of the patriots, in defence of which we professed to be engaged, to France; and to that part of France where they could quickly join the armies which Bonaparte was collecting against Spain, These armies they could not possibly have joined if we had not afforded them the means: to us, therefore, their enemies and their conquerors, they were indebted for their liberation from Portugal, and for being placed in a situation in which their services could be of effectual and speedy detriment to the cause of our allies, And by so doing, we at the same time deprived our troops of proceeding to meet the army which they had conquered at Vimiera, on the frontiers of Spain. Our transports were to be employed in the service of our defeated enemies, in order to enable them to join the grand army of their country; while the conquering troops of Britain were obliged to wait till the transports returned from this unsuitable employment, or to undertake a harassing and tedious march by land. Can it be supposed that Junot had any wish more near his heart, than that he might be able to transport his army safely and quickly from its inactivity and danger in Portugal, and unite it with the force which his master was collecting against Spain? Assuredly, this he must have descried; and this the convention of Cintra enabled, him to accomplish.

The maritime treaty was alsq viewed with equally strong feelings of indignation and sorrow. It certainly was the first time that the fleet of an enemy was to be held in deposit; and that it was seen (as the Russian fleet actually was) entering a British harbour with its colours flying triumphantly at the masts' head. And with what gross and criminal inattention had we treated our ally the king of Sweden! At a time when he found

the utmost difficulty in opposing the immense superiority brought against him by the emperor of Russia, and when he consequently amply deserved the assistance, or at least the compassion of his ally, we injure and insult him by agree ing to conduct from the blockaded port of Lisbon 6000 seamen to man the fleets of his enemy.

Many other objections were brought forward against this convention. Indeed no single article of it gave satisfaction; for, by not one had any party been benefited but the enemy. The Portuguese, as has already been remarked,complained londly and justly of the sanction it gave to the pillage and plunder of the French. It had set at liberty against the Spaniards a considerable army, and provided them with stores and ammunition. It had strengthened the means of the emperor of Russia against our ally the king of Sweden. It had deprived our gallant soldiers of the glory,-as far as it could,-and of the consequences of the victory which they had achieved at Vimiera. But although there was but one sentiment respecting the demerit and infamy of the convention, opinions were divided respecting the person to whom the guilt ought justly to attach. "Strictly and legally speaking, sir Hew

Dalrymple,