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in the most violent and outrageous manner. Having ordered them to be formed into close columns, and the officers being assembled, he told them, that after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, and passed through Germany, by forced marches, he should, without allowing them a moment's rest, order them to march through France. He had occasion for their immediate service. The hideous presence of the leopard of England contaminated the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. It was incumbent on them to drive him with dismay and destruction from the continent. The pillars of Hercules must witness their conquering and avenging prowess. From it would result a prosperous and durable peace, and the consequent prosperity of France. These were the objects the nearest his heart; the wish to obtain them alone induced him to call for their exertions. What they had already performed placed them on a level with the Roman legions: what remained, what he had no doubt they would perform, with as much cheerfulRess, promptitude and success, would, if possible, augment their glory, secure the happiness of their country, and imprint its remembrance deeply and permanently on

his heart.

Soon after he had thus arranged his military operations, he set out from Paris, in order to meet the emperor of Russia at Erfurth, This conference had been announced some time before; but it was hoped that a remembrance of what was due to his own honour, if not to his own dignity and safety, joined to the unpopularity of the measure among his subjects, would have

prevented the emperor Alexander from actually proceeding to it. When it did take place, sore slight expectation was entertained that the remonstrances of Alexander would induce Bonaparte to forgo his attempts upon Spain. But unfortunately for the repose of Europe, this monarch had given himself up completely and without reserve to the views and interests of Napoleon. What were the most material objects, which induced Bonaparte to hold this conference, it is impossible absolutely to ascertain. He announced in a letter which he wrote to the prince primate, during his journey to Erfurth, that he was going to give peace to Europe! What meaning can be attached to this phrase, when proceeding f. om a man whose element is war, and from whose unprincipled and aggressive conduct alone all the calamities which he pretended to lament, had proceeded? As Spain was undoubtedly at that time the principal object of his meditations and plans, it may naturally be concluded, that the conference with Alexander was intended to further that object. We have already seen that he was jealous of the increased preparations and formidable attitude of Austria: to restrain and check these, he had caused his senate to declare his de

termination to increase his forces in the same proportion. But, this power was to be held in more complete uncertainty and fear while he led his troops against France; it was evident that she would not dare to move, while she was in doubt respecting the views and intentions of Russia. It was therefore the interest of Bonaparte to hold this conference; in order that Austria might be firmly impressed

with the complete union of plan and interest, which subsisted be tween him and Alexander. In this he succeeded; for the Austrian cabinet, naturally alarmed at the meeting of the two emperors, dispatched baron Vincent, who had followed the steps of Bonaparte during the campaign in Poland, on the important and delicate mission to Erfurth. On his arrival he was admitted to separate interviews with the two sovereigns: what passed is not known, but he probably satisfied Bonaparte, that his master would remain inactive and neutral, and that his military preparations either were not of the formidable and extensive nature represented, or that they were not carried on with any hostile views. Bonaparte having thus succeeded in one of the most important objects of the conference, found little difficulty or reluctance on the part of Alexander to enter completely into all his projects.

One determination and consequence of the conference at Erfurth was soon apparent. On the 21st of October a Russian officer and a French messenger arrived in England with proposals from the two emperors to enter into a negotiation. The intelligence of their arrival created no hope in the public mind, and indeed excited little surprise. It had been so usual a step in the policy of Bonaparte to proffer a negotiation for peace before he preceeded to direct the horrors of war, that many people confidently predicted that this would be one of the results of the conference at Erfurth, But there was a great variety of opinions respecting the motives which had prompted him to this step at such a time. The more sanguine friends of the Spanish pa

triots even hoped that, aware of the difficulty if not impossibility of succeeding against them, he had reluctantly determined to restore Ferdinand, on condition that Eng land should make peace. To others it appeared that his sole object was to deceive us, by the proffer of ne gotiation, into the neglect or delay of our sending assistance to Spain, and to create distrust of us in the minds of the patriots. All agreed that we could not, consistently with our honour, listen to any terms which did not expressly include the liberation of Spain from French troops, and the restoration of her sovereign. And as these terms could not be expected from a man who set at nought every obstacle and all principle, when they stood in the way of his ambition, the people of England, so far from rejoicing at the arrival of the messengers, and at the appearance of a negotiation, were disposed rather to censure ministers for giving any countenance to the prospect of peace, by the intercourse they kept up with France. When however his majesty's declaration was pub. lished, it appeared evident that, the British government, while on the one hand they had not rashly rejected the proffered negotiation, but had conducted it in such a manner, and so far as to put beyond a doubt the insincerity of the views of Bonaparte; on the other hand, they had not prolonged it from the slightest thought of con-promising the honour of their country, or sacrificing the interests and the hopes of Spain. As this declaration is distinguished, above most other state papers, by a brevity which will hardly admit of abridgement or condensation; and by a plainness, precision and perspicuity,

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which would be injured by any at tempt to alter its form, or to clothe it in different language, we shall lay it before our readers, entire and unchanged.

"The overtures made to his majesty by the governments of Russia and of France have not led to negotiation; and the intercourse to which those overtures gave rise being terminated, his majesty thinks it right thus promptly and publicly to make known its termination. The continued appearance of a negotiation, when peace has been found to be utterly unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy. It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who are combined to resist her oppression; and if among the nations which groan under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintain against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any which even now are balancing between the certain ruin, of a prolonged inactivity, and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that rain; to nations so situated, the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed by the vain hope of returning tranquillity, or their purpose shaken by the apprehension of being left alone. That such was, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted to his majesty from Erfurth, his majesty entertained a strong persuasion. But at a moment when results so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or war, the king felt it due to himself to ascertain, teyond the

possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies. It was difficult for his majesty to be lieve that the emperor of Russia 'had devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with which his imperial majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy; and to acknowledge and maintain the right assumed by France, to depose and imprison friendly sovereigns, and forcibly to transfer to herself the allegiance of. independent nations..

"When, therefore, it was propose ed to his majesty to enter into nego. tiation for a general peace, in concert with his majesty's allies, and to treat either on the basis of the uti p ssidetis (heretofore the subject of so much controversy), or on any other basis consistent with justice, honour, and equality, his majesty determined to meet this seeming fairness and moderation with fair nessand moderation, on his majesty's part real and sincere.. The king professed his readiness to euter into such negotiation, in concurrence with his allies, and undertook forthe, with to communicate to them the proposals which his majesty had received. But as his majesty was not connected with Spain by a forme al treaty of alliance, his majesty thought it necessary to declare,. that the engagements which he had contracted in the face of the world, with that nation, were considered by his majesty as no less sacred, and no less binding upon his ma jesty, than the most solemn treaties; and to express his majesty's just confidence that the government of Spain, acting in the name of his catholic majesty Ferdinand the seventh, was understood to be a party to the negotiation. The reply

returned

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returned by France to this proposiFrance tion of his majesty, casts off at once the thin disguise which had been assumed for a momentary purpose, and displays with less than ordinary reserve the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation is described by the degrading appellation of the Spanish insurgents; and the demand for the admission of the government of Spain as a party to any negotiation, is rejected as inadmissible and insulting. With astonishment, as well as with grief, his majesty has received from the Emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, though less indecorous in tone and manner. The emperor of Russia also stigmatizes as insurrection' the glorious efforts of the Spanish people in behalf of their legitimate sovereign, and in defence of the independence of their country; thus giving the sanction of his imperial majesty's authority to an usurpation which has no parallel in the history of the world.

"The king would readily have embraced an opportunity of nego tiation which might have afforded any hopes or prospect of a peace compatible with justice and with honour. His majesty deeply laments an issue, by which the sufferings of Europe are aggravated and prolonged. But neither the honour of his majesty, nor the generosity of the British nation, would admit of his majesty's consenting to commence a negotiation by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who are contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man; and whose exertions in a cause so unquestionably just, his majesty has solemnly pledged himself to sustain."

While the intercourse was carry ing on between our court and the two emperors, Bonaparte was by no means idle, or inattentive to the means of prosecuting the war in Spain with his utmost strength and energy. Before he left Paris for Erfurth, the march of his troops towards that country had begun; and it was continued without intermission during his absence. On his return he addressed the legisla tive body in a speech filled with his plans and expectations. He made known to them the perfect union of sentiment between him and the emperor of Russia, with respect both to peace and war, and that they had determined to make some sacrifice, in order to enable the hundred millions of men whom they represented, the sooner to enjoy the commerce of the seas. That the relinquishment of his designs upon Spain was not one of the sacrifices which he intended to make, in order to procure peace, was announced in his resolution to depart in a few days, in order to put himself at the head of his armies; and by their means to crown the king of Spain in Madrid, and plant his eagles on the forts of Lisbon. The greater part of the troops intended to act against the patriots having arrived on the frontiers of Spain, and the imperial guard having also begun its route in the same direction, Bonaparte left Paris, and on the 3d of November he arrived at Bayonne. Here his impatience to put himself at the head of his army allowed him to stay but a few hours; and by the 8th of the month he arrived at Vittoria, bringing along with him a reinforcement of 12,000

men.

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CHAPTER XI.

Affairs of Spain con-luded-Position of the Spanish and French Armies at the Beginning of November-Repeated Attacks on General Blake-Disper sion of his Army-Remarks on its Dispersion-Defeat of the Army of Estramadura-Battle of Tudela-Remarks on the military Plans of Bonaparte, and of the Spanish Generals-Position of the British Trops in Spain-Proceedings of the Suprem: Junta-Decree establish ng be Tribunal of Vigilance-Royal Decree addressed to the Councils-Proclamation to the Spanish People-Proclamation on the Appra:b of the French to Madrid-Preparations for the Defence of the Capital-Proceedings of Bonaparte The Pass of Somsiera forced-Attack and Summons of Madrid-Lis Capitula ion-Remarks on the Reverses of the Spanish Arms.

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T the beginning of the month of November the centre army of Spain, commanded by Castanos, quitted its position on the line of the Ebro, and concentrated itself on the left bank of the smaller river Alagon, occupying a line from Villafranca to Sanguessa. The advantages of this new position were great: he was thus enabled to interpose between the French army in Navarre, and the troops they had in the citadel of Barcelona; to cover the important province of Arragon, and to present a formidable barrier to any attempt which the enemy might make to penetrate to Madrid. His new position still enabled him to rest his right wing on the left wing of the army of Palafox; and their joint armies occupied a position on the left wing of the French. The army of Blake in Biscay was stationed on the right wing of the French. The army of Estramadura, with the expected assistance from generals sir John Moore and Baird, opposed itself to the front of the French. The army of Blake was estimated, before the junction of the marquis de Romana, at 1508.

23,000 men: the conjunct army of Castanos and Palafox at nearly 60,000 men; and the army of Estramadura at 20,000 men.

At the beginning of the same month, or, to speak more accurately, at the end of October, the head quarters of the French army were at Vittoria. The corps of the duke of Cornegliano was posted at Rafalla; the left wing of his army having its position along the banks of the Arragon and the Ebro. The division of the duke of Echlingen was at Guardia. The duke of Istria was at Muanda, while part of his corps formed the garrison of, fort Pancuba. The heights of Durango were occupied by the division of general Merlin, and guarded the heights of Mondragon from the threatened attack of the Spaniards. As the army which was commanded by general Blake was at some distance from the united armies of Palafox and Castanos, the first offensive operation of the French was to interpose their whole force between the Spanish armies, and, if possible, to break into pieces the army of Blake. This manoeuvre was performed but Y

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