certain, that the pleasure which is felt ought to be the standard by which our taste should be ultimately determined. If, indeed, music had any thing in it, that rendered the sense less clear, or less easily understood, if sentiments conveyed in blank verse, were more evident or more certain, it would be but reasonable to deny ourselves the gratification which it imparted, and conform our taste to that structure of versification which was best suited to the purposes of a rational being.

The moment, therefore, we make a comparison between any two objects, whether sensible or intellectual, in order to ascertain which is the most beautiful, the only difficulty we have to surmount, is to ascertain, which is found to be most generally pleasing. The person, however, who makes the comparison, is not to regard, for a moment, which is most pleasing or agreeable to himself, if he know, at the same time, that it is not the most pleasing or agreeable to mankind. If his own feelings could enable him to determine the matter, there are few objects in nature that would not be both beautiful and ugly, at the same moment, as there will always be found some person to differ with the general feeling, in his judgment of them. If, then, we have any means of ascertaining the general feeling, we should consider the question decided; for if any

individual should happen to differ with this general feeling, all he could prove is, that the object does not please himself, and that, therefore, he cannot pronounce it beautiful. So far as it regards him, his argument is admitted, for beauty can have no abstract existence of its own, independent of a perceiving mind, and to the mind which cannot perceive, it can have no beauty whatever, because it cannot excite that emotion, to the cause of which, the term beautiful is applied; but when we talk of general beauty, we do not mean, as I have already observed, what pleases any individual, or number of individuals, but what pleases the generality of mankind. And indeed it would be easy to shew, that a man must be perversely organized, who cannot be pleased with what is generally pleasing, if he has imbued his mind with the spirit of those principles that enable us to judge; for no natural endowments will enable us to determine, in all cases, that beauty which is the proper object of taste, without an acquaintance with those principles.

But as in most questions concerning the beauty of objects, we cannot make ourselves acquainted with the common feeling of mankind regarding it, we must necessarily have recourse to discussion, and discover, if we can, such of its qualities as are similar to other qualities in other objects; and having ascertained what emotions these other

qualities generally excite, draw our conclusions regarding the beauty of the object in question, from this analogy. This mode of investigation, however, is subject to many exceptions; for it will be found, when we come to treat of beauty, that the quality which pleases in one subject, will not please in another, and that the character of the impression which it makes will always be determined by the manner in which it affects and is affected by the aggregate of qualities with which it is combined. In these cases, discussion must be founded on our own feelings, and their testimony will generally be found faithful, and agreeing with that common feeling which is the true standard of taste, if they be improved by experience, and disciplined by long habits of investigation and comparison. If we have once brought our feelings to agree with the general feeling, in all matters where this general feeling can be ascertained, it is reasonable to suppose, that they will agree with it also in matters where it is not yet discovered.

From what has been advanced in this chapter, we are naturally led to the following conclusions: 1. That the common feeling of mankind is the true standard of taste; 2. That whatever is acknowledged as beautiful by the writers of all ages and nations, is to be regarded as the voice of this common feeling; 3. That in determining any point

concerning which the writers of different ages and nations have expressed no opinion, we must have recourse to discussion and investigation, it being, if not a certain, at least the most certain mode of becoming acquainted with the common feeling; 4. That this discussion must deduce all its conclusions from the laws of feeling alone, and not from any abstract positions which, though true in themselves, and as they regard their proper objects, have no relation to the sympathies, sensibilities, or affections of man; and lastly, that whenever we can ascertain the common feeling without discussion, we may, without further investigation, rest upon it, with as much certainty as upon the axiom, that the whole is greater than any of its parts. All further discussion is impertinent, if its aim be to prove the common feeling wrong; but if it only seek to analyze and resolve into its component parts the individual elements of beauty, by which this common feeling was excited, the object of its investigation is highly laudable, and the surest means of advancing the Fine Arts to their last perfection.

CHAP. IV.

On the Taste of particular Ages and Nations; and the necessity of studying the Ancient Models.

THOUGH the common feeling of mankind is the true standard of taste, it is still certain, that the revolutions of taste are as constant and uniform as the revolutions of literature. New schools and new styles of poetry, painting, music, &c. are common to every age, and every revolution seems to receive the approbation of mankind. This general assent, however, to the innovations which eternally take place in taste, is rather apparent than real. We generally adopt the reigning taste, not because we prefer it to that of all former ages, but because, though we have sense to discern which is best when pointed out to us, we are generally too indolent to investigate or enter into comparisons ourselves; and we have seldom ability or inclination to contend with those who stand at the head of society, and influence it by their example. We, therefore, suffer ourselves to be led away, without examining, or without daring