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fhadow of imperfection. Our reafon indeed afsures us, that his attributes are infinite; but the poornefs of our conceptions is fuch, that it cannot forbear fetting bounds to every thing it contemplates, till our reafon comes again to our fuccour, and throws down all those little prejudices, which rife in us unawares, and are natural to the mind of man.

We fhall therefore utterly extinguish this melancholy thought, of our being overlooked by our Maker, in the multiplicity of his works, and the infinity of those objects among which he feems to be incessantly employed, if we confider, in the first place, that he is omniprefent; and in the fecond, that he is omniscient.

If we confider him in his omniprefence, his being pofses through, actuates, and fupports, the whole frame of nature. His creation, and every part of it, is full of him. There is nothing he has made, that is either fo diftant, fo little, or fo inconfiderable, which he does not essentially inhabit. His fubftance is within the fubftance of every being, whether material or immaterial, and as intimately prefent to it, as that being is to itself. It would be an imperfection in him, were he able to move out of one place into another; or to withdraw himself from any thing he has created, or from any part of that space which he diffufed and fpread abroad to infinity. In fhort, to fpeak of him in the language of the old philofophers, he is a being whofe centre is every where, and his circumference no where.

In the fecond place, he is omnifcient as well as omnipresent. His omniscience indeed necessarily and naturally flows from his omniprefence. He cannot but be confcious of every motion that arifes in the whole

material world, which he thus efsentially pervades; and of every thought that is ftirring in the intellectual world, to every part of which he is thus intimately united. Were the foul feparate from the body, and with one glance of thought fhould fart beyond the bounds of the creation; fhould it, for millions of years, continue its progrefs through infinite fpace, with the fame activity, it would ftill find itself within the embrace of its Creator, and encompassed by the immenfity of the Godhead.

In this confideration of the Almighty's omniprefence and omniscience, every uncomfortable thought vanishes. He cannot but regard every thing that has being, especially fuch of his creatures who fear they are not regarded by him. He is privy to all their thoughts, and to that anxiety of heart in particular, which is apt to trouble them on this occafion: for, as it is impossible he should overlook any of his creatures, fo we may be confident that he regards, with an eye of mercy, those who endeavour to recommend themfelves to his notice; and, in unfeigned humility of heart, think themselves unworthy that he should be mindful of them.

ADDISON.

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CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENTATIVE PIECES.

SECTION I.

Happiness is founded in rectitude of Conduct.

ALL men purfue good, and would be happy, if they

knew how: not happy for minutes, and miferable for hours; but happy, if possible, through every part of their exiftence. Either, therefore, there is a good of this fleady, durable kind, or there is not. If not, then all good must be tranfient and uncertain; and if so, an object of the loweft value, which can little deferve our attention or inquiry. But if there be a better good, fuch a good as we are feeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from fome caufe; and that caufe muft either be external, internal, or mixed; in as much as, except thefe three, there is no other pofsible. Now a fteady, durable good, cannot be derived from an external caufe; fince all derived from externals muft fluctuate as they fluctuate. By the fame rule, it cannot be derived from a mixture of the two; because the part which is external, will proportionably destroy its cfsence. What then remains but the caufe internal? the very caufe which we have fuppofed, when we place the fovereign good in mind,-in rectitude of conduct.

HARRIS.

SECTION II.

Virtue Man's higheft Intereft.

I FIND myself exifting upon a little fpot, furrounded every way by an immenfe unknown expanfion.Where am I? What fort of place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated in every inftance to my convenience? Is there no excefs of cold, none of heat, to offend me? Am I never annoyed by animals, either of my own, or a different kind? Is every thing fubfervient to me, as though I had ordered all myself? No-nothing like it-the fartheft from it pofsible. The world appears not, then, originally made for the private convenience of me alone?-It does not. is it not possible fo to accommodate it, by my own particular induftry? If to accommodate man and beast, heaven and earth, if this be beyond me, it is not pofsible. What confequence then follows; or can there be any other than this-If I feek an interest of of my own detached from that of others, I feek an intereft which is chimerical, and which can never. have exiftence.

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But

How then must I determine ? Have I no interest at. all? If I have not, I am ftationed here to no purpose. But why no intereft? Can I be contented with none but one feparate and detached? Is a focial intereft, joined with others, fuch an abfurdity as not to be admitted? The bee, the beaver, and the tribes of herding animals, are fufficient to convince me, that the thing is fomewhere at least possible. How, then, am I affured that it is not equally true of man?

Admit

it; and what follows? If fo, then honour and juftice

are my intereft; then the whole train of moral virtues are my intereft; without fome portion of which, not even thieves can maintain fociety.

But, farther ftill-I ftop not here-I purfue this focial intereft as far as I can trace my feveral relations. I pass from my own stock, my own neighbourhood, my own nation, to the whole race of mankind, as difperfed throughout the earth. Am I not related to them all, by the mutual aids of commerce, by the general intercourse of arts and letters, by that common nature of which we all participate?

Again--I must have food and cloathing. Without a proper genial warmth, I inftantly perith. Am I not related, in this view, to the very earth itself? to the diftant fun, from whofe beams I derive vigour? to that ftupendous courfe and order of the infinite hoft of heaven, by which the times and feasons ever uniformly pafs on? Were this order once confounded, I could not probably furvive a moment; fo abfolutely do I depend on this common general welfare. What, then, have I to do, but to enlarge virtue into piety! Not only honour and juftice, and what I owe to man, is my intereft; but gratitude alfo, acquiefcence, refignation, adoration, and all I owe to this great polity, and its great Governour our common Parent.

SECTION III.

The Injustice of an uncharitable Spirit.

A SUSPICIOUS, uncharitable fpirit is not only in.confiftent with all focial virtue and happiness, but it is

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